台灣人的「喬治亞教訓」(中)

                                            台灣人的「喬治亞教訓」(中)

三

在外高加索地區有一個被蘇聯併吞、在蘇聯崩解後獨立建國的喬治亞共和國，這個國家在2003年發生和平與民主的「玫瑰革命」，由非常年輕、曾在烏克蘭與美國留學、親美的Mikheil Saakashvili執政。這個小國統治著有嚴重分離傾向的South Ossetia、Abkhazia兩個地區，在2008年奧運期間，喬治亞的武裝部隊開進South Ossetia, ，俄羅斯翌日也出兵，擊退喬治亞部隊，並迅速佔領這兩個地區，俄國並承認這兩個地區的獨立。

這個事件發生後，西方陣營的歐洲國家與因忙著打兩場戰爭而分身乏術甚至是焦頭爛額的的美國小布希政府束手無策，無力給予親西方、哀哀求助的喬治亞顯著的軍事支援。

在烏克蘭人民起來抗議與反對親俄的Viktor Yanukovych政權、莫斯科派兵進入克里米亞之後，喬治亞與原被蘇聯統治或原屬蘇聯的勢力範圍的國家普遍陷入不安，甚至陷入恐懼或更大的恐懼，喬治亞就是其中之一。

已經從總統一職卸任的Saakashvili前往烏克蘭首都基輔，去為反Yanukovych的陣營打氣，他接受西方媒體訪問，他在西方媒體發表文章，不斷呼籲美國與歐洲國家支持親西方的烏克蘭抗議陣營。


四

建州派現在把時間拉回前幾年。

在「太陽花學運」發生之後，美國若干國安事務的專家學者與美國若干國會議員把台灣與烏克蘭相提並論，他們發現，台灣與烏克蘭都在一個有威脅性的大國旁邊[中國對台灣主張主權，一心想併吞台灣，而俄羅斯則希望烏克蘭中立化或成為它的勢力範圍] ，中俄這兩個有威脅性的強權都試圖以經貿手段做為胡蘿蔔 ，企圖進一步控制台灣或烏克蘭，在經濟的手段失敗後，就明目張膽地祭出或威脅要採取軍事手段。

另外，在俄羅斯武裝攻擊與侵略喬治亞之後，美國若干國安事務的專家學者開始為文批判小布希政府，他們說小布希政府事實上無法出兵保護或協助喬治亞，卻不斷「縱容」Saakashvili政權或不斷給予錯誤的訊號或暗示，讓Saakashvili政權誤以為它可以「挑釁」俄羅斯，且誤導Saakashvili做出「即使他向俄羅斯『挑釁』，喬治亞也將得到美國的軍事支援或保護」的印象或結論。這些美國國安事務的專家學者認為，小布希政權害了喬治亞，更因而損及美國的顏面，他們因而慶幸小布希政權在稍早的一段幾年的期間，對推動「台灣正常化工程」(正名、制憲、入聯公投)的扁政權總是不假辭色，嚴厲地壓制阿扁的言行，甚至發出「台獨不是一張可以用美國子弟的鮮血來兌現的空白支票」、「不要期待美國會為台獨而戰」、「美國在台灣關係法下沒有軍事保衛台灣的義務」、「台獨是推車撞牆」等嚇唬扁政權及台灣獨派的警告，美國嚴厲的壓制行動，讓北京沒有任何武力犯台的藉口，美國也因而可以用最低的成本，維護它在台海所建立的秩序。

建州派現在請鄉親們讀兩篇文章，讀完後，大家可能就會對台灣獨派陣營今後可能會持續受到來自華府的制約一事有一些更清晰的概念，雖然那兩篇文章的作者當時都非美國白宮或國務院的官員。

“From Georgia to Taiwan”
By: Richard C. Bush III and Kenneth G. Lieberthal
The Wall Street Journal
September 16, 2008

On the face of it, Taiwan and the Republic of Georgia have little in common. Taiwan is an island off China's coast that used American protection and assistance during the Cold War to become an economic success story. Georgia was absorbed into the continental Russian empire in the 19th century, suffered under the Soviet system for decades, gained its independence in 1991, but has struggled ever since to build national strength.

Yet in recent years, the basic dynamics of the two countries have been remarkably similar. Both have had politically skillful, democratically elected heads of state who were determined to consolidate the independent identity and sovereignty of the territory they ruled. Each confronted a major power -- Russia for Georgia and China for Taiwan -- that felt it had legitimate historical rights to curtail the full exercise of sovereignty by the feisty smaller government. And each appealed to the United States for support. The leaders of Taiwan and Georgia had reason to believe they had a strong ally in President George W. Bush, who had declared a robust agenda of promoting democracy and freedom. They were acting, they said, to realize the democratic aspirations of their people.

But this similar dynamic has produced different outcomes. Georgia has become the scene of the most serious post-Cold War great-power conflict, while recent political change in Taiwan has greatly enhanced cross-Strait stability and provides reason for optimism about the future. What lessons can be learned from such different outcomes?

Although each narrative has its own unique and important details, these different outcomes reflect different policies by the Bush administration and illustrate the danger of sending mixed messages that can be interpreted as blank checks.

With respect to Georgia, Mr. Bush publicly lavished praise on President Mikheil Saakashvili and provided substantial support, for example giving advanced military training to the two thousand troops President Saakashvili sent to Iraq to support the U.S. effort there. During the past year President Bush also promoted Georgia's accession to NATO, asking other NATO members at a gathering in Bucharest this April to welcome Georgia into a Membership Action Plan that would prepare it for full NATO membership. In taking these and other measures, President Bush brushed aside explicit Russian warnings that the U.S. was crossing several red lines that would invite a strong Russian response.

President Bush adopted a similar attitude in his early days in office toward Taiwan, telling a CNN reporter in April 2001 that he was prepared to "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan against China. But over time Mr. Bush moved to a more tempered approach that increasingly took into serious account Beijing's concerns as well as Taiwan's pleadings. He recognized that the most serious threat to Taiwan was conflict through miscalculation, as an independence-leaning political initiative by Taiwan's president Chen Shui-bian might provoke a Chinese military attack, whether justified or not. The Bush administration therefore developed a nuanced American policy that publicly put the United States squarely in opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo by either Beijing or Taipei.

In Georgia, the net result is that, in response to various incidents, President Saakashvili ordered his military into South Ossetia on August 7, and the Russians responded with overwhelming force the next day, humiliating the Georgian military, seizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and placing some Russian military forces inside Georgia proper. This has created a major crisis in U.S.-Russian relations whose ultimate extent remains unclear. U.S.-Russian relations may continue to deteriorate, with serious implications for preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and for cooperation in handling other major international issues.

In Taiwan, by contrast, 2008 has witnessed the election of a moderate leader, Ma Ying-jeou, whose electoral prospects were bolstered in part by America's clear indications of its displeasure with the willingness of former president Mr. Chen to provoke China. Under President Ma we are seeing hopeful initiatives to stabilize cross-Strait relations in ways that hold out the prospect for improving Taiwan's economy, reducing the military threat from China, preserving Taiwan's democratic system of governance, and increasing America's capacity to work with China on the North Korea nuclear issue and other serious international concerns.

American officials reportedly did warn their Georgian counterparts, from President Saakashvili on down, about the dangers of recklessness in the face of Russian power. But these messages were paired with strong commitments of support. And any such warnings were conveyed in private while the commitments came in public. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship also had a problem with mixed messages for a period, but the Bush administration eventually managed to get its officials to speak from a common set of talking points.

The danger, of course, is that the recipients of mixed messages about the limits of America support will listen only to the messages they wish to hear. Those who perceive blank checks from Uncle Sam will believe they are free to cash them. Or, if they are caught in the crossfire between their own domestic politics and pressures from the hostile neighbor, they are liable to take risks with the American pledges that they might not otherwise take.

The Georgian and Taiwanese situations are each distinctive, and the future is not yet fully certain. But the central lesson of these two cases is clear: American commitment should be carefully shaped around sober analysis of American capabilities and interest and the competing goals and interests of other major players, and articulated on that basis. Otherwise, we create trouble for our friends, our major power relationships, our credibility, and our capacity to manage other critical international issues in the future.

“Georgia's Lessons for Taiwan”
By: Jeffrey A. Bader and Douglas Paal
September 16, 2008
http://www. brookings.edu

The Russian attack on Georgia sent ripples of alarm through Europe and the United States. Irrespective of arguments over who started the conflict and who is responsible, the West got the message: Russia expects to dominate the states of the former Soviet Union, and we can expect years of jockeying for influence in those states, with attendant tensions.

Americans and Europeans are not the only ones who have been watching with interest. In Asia—particularly Taiwan—people are wondering what events in the Caucasus may portend about their own security. 

Like Georgia, Taiwan lies on the periphery of a major power, in this case China, growing in strength in recent years. Russia’s designs for Georgia are not absolutely clear, but with regard to Taiwan, China is unambiguous in its assertion of sovereignty and its intention to absorb it in the long-run.

In both cases, the policy of the United States is central to the calculations of all the players. The United States leads plans to bring Georgia into NATO. With respect to Taiwan, U.S. security interests are of much longer standing, and the assumption of a U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan in case of attack is one of the foundations of security and stability in Asia. It is no wonder that many Taiwanese watched the events in Georgia with deep concern about their own future, and what these events say about the reliability of U.S. defense assurances.

What are the lessons of the Russia–Georgia crisis for Taiwan, and for U.S. policy toward Taiwan? We would point to six:

1) Be careful about security commitments. They mean something. Don’t make them unless you mean it. NATO is not a feel-good organization designed to increase the self-esteem of its members. It is a solemn commitment by its members to treat an attack upon one as an attack upon all. There should be no consideration of bringing Georgia into NATO unless the United States and the rest of the European members intend to bring the full force of NATO power to its defense. We do not believe in fact that the United States or the Europeans have any such intention. To provide a security commitment to Georgia and then not back it up is to send a message to all potential adversaries, including China in the Taiwan Strait, that the United States is not serious. On the other hand, we need to continue to make clear to China, including through military planning and deployments, the U.S. security interest in a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and the unacceptability of a Chinese attack, so that Beijing will not be tempted to see in the Georgia crisis a model for resolution of its own irredentist aims.

2) Don’t provoke the bear, or the dragon, expecting the eagle to fly to the rescue. [喬治亞不要在激怒俄羅斯北極熊之後，台灣也不要在激怒中國惡龍之後，期待美國鷹會飛奔救援] President Saakashvili has shown a propensity for statements and actions that seems to say to the United States and Russia, “Let the two of you fight over me.” His goal has seemed to be to encourage the United States and Russia to see Georgia as the target of a zero-sum security game and to appeal to the U.S. conscience to back him up. Taiwan’s former president Chen Shui-bian took the same approach to the triangular relationship among Taiwan, the United States, and China. The result in Saakashvili’s case has been to leave his troops alone to face an angered Russian military. In Chen’s case, it led to heightened cross-Strait tensions, but in Taiwan’s case, the United States showed wisdom and took issue with Chen and his provocative behavior and withdrew its support.

3) A constructive relationship between the United States and major powers is an essential component of security for vulnerable states. The United States has enjoyed a positive and constructive relationship with China for most of the past 36 years. Taiwan’s security has greatly benefited from this, as the PRC has understood that an attack on Taiwan would profoundly damage its relationship with the United States and its place in the world. On the other hand, the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and a disdainful attitude toward Russian security interests for the last decade led us to a situation where Russia seems to see little risk to its interests, and much to gain, in redefining its relationship with the United States.

4) Geography matters. Small nations near large powers should not forget who their neighbors are. Cuba has not prospered through its 50 years of defiance of the United States. Taiwan’s newly elected President Ma Ying-jeou seems to understand well that an improved relationship between Taiwan and China is essential to Taiwan’s future security. In the absence of unambiguous security commitments from the United States, such as those enjoyed by countries like Japan, small states might best seek a balance―the strongest possible U.S. commitment to their defense and survival, hedged by a non-hostile relationship with their big power neighbor. Taiwan’s example shows that prosperity and full-blown democracy can find their way in a tyrannical shadow.

5) It’s wise to speak softly when you don’t plan to carry a big stick. U.S. statements and actions implying that we would defend Georgia when we had neither the will nor the intention to do so, not to mention an adequate understanding of the region’s internal conflicts, sent all the wrong signals. They encouraged Saakashivili to provoke the Russians and face their response alone. The Russians saw the U.S. warnings as a bluff. And they sent a message to our allies, including those in Asia, that our real commitments might prove as empty as our casual verbal ones.

6) Credibility is global. There are no purely local crises. U.S. commitments, even in the post-Cold War era, remain critical for the stability of the international system. Potential adversaries and potential friends alike draw conclusions from our behavior. We want them to understand we will act to defend friends where we have declared security interests. We need to be careful about when and where we declare those interests to be engaged, but once we do we need to act in ways that sends a message to potential aggressors that reinforces their restraint.
 

(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)