[請不習慣閱讀英文的台灣與台美鄉親跳過英文，只讀漢文]
---「台灣關係法」說得很清楚，美國在台灣有安全與政治等利益。”It is the policy of the United States--------to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern.”
第一部分
軍事觀察家與評論家都知道，老共已經有一段很長的時間，每年的國防算都以兩位數字在成長，所以，即令老共的軍令與軍政系統很腐敗 ，共軍的戰力被懷疑，但世人還是見證了老共傳統的海空武力走出了第一島鏈，並對美國、日本、台灣與東亞諸國形成威脅。
現在請大家讀底下這篇文章;
“Exposed: How China's Navy Went Global”
By Christopher Sharman
The National Interest
4/2/2015
“Exposed: How China's Navy Went Global”
By Christopher Sharman
The National Interest
4/2/2015
Over the last decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased the frequency, duration, distance from the mainland, and complexity of its operations.
Not only does China now maintain a permanent counter-piracy escort flotilla in the Indian Ocean, it also routinely conducts naval exercises and operations beyond the First Island Chain, which stretches from the Kurile Islands near Russia through Japan, the Ryukyu Archipelago, Taiwan, and the Philippines to Borneo Island. These changes illustrate growing PLAN capabilities and raise the prospect of changes in Chinese maritime strategy and an expanded PLAN geographic role.
PLAN deployments to the Western Pacific have evolved. The PLAN has progressed from single fleet mostly surface ship scripted exercises to multi-fleet coordinated unscripted training involving submarines, surface ships, UAVs and fixed wing aircraft. The PLAN has also gradually increased deployments to the Western Pacific from just a few ships to simultaneously deploying more than twelve ships and submarines beyond the first island chain.
PLAN deployments to and exercises in the “near seas” (the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea) since 2004 are evolutionary steps toward implementing China’s current near sea active defense strategy. However, regular deployments deeper into the Western Pacific have also helped the PLAN build the ability to operate in the far seas and begin to operationalize an emerging new maritime strategy that will incorporate “far seas defense” and extend PLAN combat capabilities further from China. This concept is consistent with PLAN stated goals and training requirements, but is not yet codified in China’s current maritime strategy.
This article presents highlights from “China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy [4],” a new National Defense University monograph that uses Chinese and Japanese press reporting to trace the evolution of Chinese navy deployments to the Western Pacific since 2004. These sources are sufficiently detailed to analyze how the PLAN normalized its operations in unfamiliar waters and to understand how this template can be applied to understand future PLAN efforts to incorporate “Far Seas Defense” into China’s existing maritime strategy. Analysis of China’s Western Pacific deployments contributes to broader discussions on China’s maritime strategy and can illuminate the PLAN’s strategic and operational ambitions.
The study suggests that the PLAN uses a building block approach to naval operations in unfamiliar waters. The Navy first methodically masters fundamental skill sets and then integrates new concepts or capabilities to conduct more complex operations. This maturation of PLAN operational capabilities has enabled the PLAN to expand its geographic and operational horizons.
The study also provides a strategic framework to illustrate how PLAN interests are increasingly linked to the far seas. This framework provides insights into ways the navy will be used to protect current Chinese interests and to defend against perceived threats in both the near and far seas. It concludes that integration of the concept of Far Seas Defense into its China’s maritime strategy is a near-term objective.
To assess PLAN operations, the report examines the evolution of PLAN near seas operations and exercises in the Western Pacific since 2004. The analysis breaks PLAN operations into two to three year increments for analytic purposes, tracing steps towards normalization of Western Pacific deployments. This approach yields useful insights into how lessons learned from near seas operations will be combined with far seas deployment proficiencies to modify China’s current maritime strategy.
2004-2006: Enhancing Fundamentals
Although the PLAN did not deploy outside the first island chain between 2004 and 2006, the PLAN enhanced training in disciplines that enabled it to take steps toward conducting operations further from the Chinese coast. Three factors influenced the development of PLAN capabilities and tactics to execute near seas active defense during this period. First, geopolitical events surrounding issues with Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong intensified PLAN requirements to become more familiar with waters that could be used during potential future contingencies.
Second, President Hu reemphasized President Jiang’s “informatization” concepts, which influenced the PLAN tactical approach. Third, President Hu’s 2004 announcement of new PLA historic missions required the PLAN to enhance its ability to operate at greater distances from the coast to protect Chinese national interests, including the safety of PRC citizens, maritime commerce, and overseas investments. These three factors required the PLAN to enhance its maritime skills as prerequisites for future operations in the Western Pacific and beyond.
2007-2009: The Initial Steps into the Western Pacific
From 2007-2009, the PLAN continued to train and exercise in areas supporting future contingency operations, particularly expanding operations into the Philippine Sea beyond the First Island Chain as part of the evolution of near sea active defense. These Western Pacific operations enhanced the PLAN’s ability to operate in unfamiliar waters and helped to develop the logistics and command and control systems necessary for operations further from the coast. The PLAN also diversified the types and classes of ships it deployed to the Western Pacific.
The PLAN commenced its first counter piracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden during this period. While counter piracy deployments contribute little to the navy’s ability to defend China against advanced naval forces, the lessons the PLAN learned from these deployments contributed to basic proficiencies the PLAN needed to master as a prerequisite to defending China’s interests in the far seas.
2010-2012: Normalization of Western Pacific Deployments
The PLAN increased the frequency, complexity, and its confidence in executing “Blue Water” operations in the Western Pacific during the three-year period from 2010 through the end of 2012. Not only did the PLAN further diversify the straits used to access the Western Pacific, it also mixed up the classes of ships that participated in blue water training.
Whereas Philippine Sea deployments during 2007 through 2009 appeared to be relatively one dimensional (i.e. surface ship against surface ship), exercises from 2010 through 2012 became multi-dimensional (i.e. a more complex exercise where a surface ship must address air, surface, and subsurface threats).
While official Chinese press provided few details about PLAN deployments to the Western Pacific prior to this period, the PLA began reporting more liberally at the end of 2012. Ultimately, PLAN officials claimed Western Pacific open-seas training had been “normalized” by the end of 2012.
2013-2014: Stepping Stones towards Far Seas Defense
During 2013-2014, the PLAN integrated land-based fixed wing aircraft into Philippine Sea exercises and executed the first Western Pacific exercise that involved all three fleets operating simultaneously. In addition to its Philippine Sea deployments, the PLAN also conducted its first surface ship deployment to the Indian Ocean outside of Gulf of Aden counter-piracy operations.
The Indian Ocean is not part of China’s “near seas” concept, which could suggest the deployment represents PLAN nascent efforts to apply lessons learned from its routinized operations in the near seas to develop a Far Seas defense capability. The PLAN also appears to have refined how it responds to geostrategic concerns about its maritime operations in the near and far seas during this period.
The Indian Ocean is not part of China’s “near seas” concept, which could suggest the deployment represents PLAN nascent efforts to apply lessons learned from its routinized operations in the near seas to develop a Far Seas defense capability. The PLAN also appears to have refined how it responds to geostrategic concerns about its maritime operations in the near and far seas during this period.
Conclusions and Implications for Today
Normalization of PLAN operations in the Western Pacific, along with years of counter-piracy deployments to the Gulf of Aden, have given the PLAN the requisite experience, confidence, and proficiency to defend China through the operationalization of far seas defense capabilities.
Just as the PLAN incrementally expanded the complexity and scope of its operations in the Western Pacific over the last decade, the PLAN is likely to gradually increase the frequency of far seas combat readiness patrol deployments.
Such an approach would suggest that over the next five to seven years, we are likely to see an increase in mixed platform PLAN surface action groups deploying to the far seas and rehearsing a myriad of combat warfare disciplines, such as anti-submarine, anti-air, and anti-surface warfare exercises. These combat readiness patrols may include deployments along various strategic Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the Pacific, chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, and perhaps even to the northern Pacific to support China’s Arctic commercial interests.
Patrolling along distant sea SLOCs or near strategic chokepoints achieves two objectives. It helps to protect Chinese economic interests that transit strategic straits and has a deterrent effect by periodically placing Chinese combatants along potential routes that could be used by the U.S. Navy to intervene in a conflict involving China.
The study’s strategic framework and examination of the PLAN’s evolutionary approach toward operating in unfamiliar waters are useful for understanding how China uses its Navy to protect its interests. The longer report also identifies several indicators that if observed, would suggest PLAN is incorporating far seas defense into its maritime strategy. Another contribution is the comprehensive cataloging and systematic analysis of all PLAN Western Pacific deployments since 2004 and a forecast of where the PLAN will operate in the future.
The study also confirms two methodological points. First, the analytical framework of time period analysis facilitates the systematic assessment of PLAN evolutionary developments, and is useful for contemporary analysis of PLAN capabilities. Second, Chinese and Japanese press reporting can be incredibly valuable for analyzing Chinese military transparency. These points should be useful for today’s China hands and maritime analysts tackling other security puzzles.
Commander Christopher Sharman is a Navy officer at the National War College. He has worked strategic, operational, and tactical East Asia issues for most of his career including multiple tours with the Forward Deployed Naval Forces in Japan and has served as Assistant Navy Attaché in Beijing. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute having received formal language training in Japanese and Chinese.
The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.
(Image: Wikimedia/U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ben A. Gonzales)
第二部分
部分由於共軍來勢洶洶，所以現任的美國海軍部長大聲疾呼美國要加強海軍武力的建設，他的呼籲反映了美國若干有識之士、海軍建設專家學者以及這一屆國會增強國防建設與預算的強烈走向。我們現在來讀海軍部長前不久在「華爾街日報」發表的文章: ---Read More---
“Firmly Committed to Growing the U.S. Fleet”
By RAY MABUS
WALL STREET JOURNAL
March 17, 2015
By RAY MABUS
WALL STREET JOURNAL
March 17, 2015
--- The secretary of the United States Navy on what it takes to protect and project U.S. power.
Size matters. It’s as true for America’s Navy as anywhere. It is the size of our fleet that uniquely enables the United States Navy and Marine Corps to maintain presence around the globe, around the clock. That presence has kept the peace and promoted prosperity via trade across open sea lanes for nearly seven decades.
The U.S. has the most powerful Navy in the world, but comparing the size of our fleet directly to other nations’ fleets—as pundits and politicians of late have done—is fundamentally flawed. As America’s “Away Team,” the U.S. Navy protects and projects our leadership role because it can get anywhere faster, stay longer and carry everything it needs to execute its missions—all without needing anyone else’s permission.
In the first 54 days of the air campaign against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, for example, the U.S. relied solely on Navy F/A-18 Hornets flying sorties from the sovereign territory provided by the USS George H.W. Bush in the Persian Gulf. Land-based bombers were delayed until host nations granted approval.
To combat Ebola in West Africa, V-22 Ospreys put Marines on the ground the same day as President Obama’s order, providing logistical support to doctors. During Operation Tomadachi, following the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in 2011, more than 16 ships, 130 aircraft and 12,000 U.S. sailors and Marines delivered 340 tons of supplies.
Since World War II, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have secured the high seas, enabling 90% of world-wide seaborne trade and 95% of voice and data transfer carried by undersea cables to move without interruption.
But maintaining the U.S. Navy’s global presence requires continued investment in ships. President Obama’s fiscal year 2016 budget calls for $161 billion to fund our assigned missions and continue to grow our fleet. The challenging fiscal climate demands aggressive efforts to cut costs intelligently. We have and we will continue to do so, but not at the expense of maintaining presence. Cutting ships would jeopardize U.S. security and the global economy.
Because of America’s leadership role, no secretary of the Navy can base his decisions solely on a snapshot of America’s current capabilities relative to others around the globe. My charge is to evaluate the fleet’s size and combat readiness, including needed repairs and maintenance, in the face of sequestration and an increasing global need for naval forces to maintain peace and prosperity.
Before my tenure, our ship count was declining and our procurement strategy was making it worse. On Sept. 11, 2001, when terrorists struck the homeland, the U.S. Navy had 316 ships. When I took office in 2009, the fleet had declined to 278 ships despite a defense buildup. In the five years before I became secretary, the Navy contracted to build only 27 ships, insufficient to even maintain the fleet because of the number of older ships being retired. In my first five years as secretary, we put 70 ships under contract, and we plan to expand the fleet to more than 300 ships before the end of the decade.
We’ve done this, despite continuing fiscal uncertainty, with business fundamentals: fixed-price contracts, tough negotiations and multiyear procurement and block-buy contracting that lowers costs. Good business practices have allowed us to save money while providing more than 400,000 well-paying jobs directly or indirectly related to ship building and maritime industry.
To augment our forward deployed force I and our senior officers have advanced international partnerships, not only with our long-standing allies, but also with dozens of like-minded nations around the world. Partnerships are a force multiplier, maintaining our global presence, while encouraging others to bear their fair share of international security. We seek to preserve the peace, but should an adversary challenge us, I never want U.S. sailors and Marines engaged in a fair fight.
Along with the chief of Naval Operations and the commandant of the Marine Corps, I will continue to work together with the president and Congress to responsibly man, train and equip a Navy and Marine Corps that remains the most powerful expeditionary fighting force in the world. America can afford no less.
(Mr. Mabus is secretary of the United States Navy.)
第三部分
由於共軍對美國與盟國及安全夥伴的挑戰與威脅的能力增強，所以太平洋美軍也不斷進行演訓，太平洋美軍司令部的兩隻眼睛也必須緊盯著台灣這一個十分脆弱的環節，常常苦思要如何面對這個「美利堅帝國的軟腹」所突發的狀況。
“China angered after U.S. fighter jets land in Taiwan”
By Michael Martina and J.R. Wu in Taipei
Reuters
4/2/2015
Reuters
4/2/2015
BEIJING (Reuters) - China's Foreign Ministry expressed anger on Thursday after two U.S. fighter jets landed in Taiwan, in a rare official contact between the militaries of the United States and the self-ruled democratic island.[「路透社」在台灣時間4/2/2015發出一則報導: 中國外交部於美國兩架戰鬥機降落台灣、美軍與自治的民主台灣的武裝部隊進行一項稀有的官式接觸之後，在北京時間4/2/2015，表達了它的憤怒。]
Taiwan's Central News Agency said the two F-18s landed at an air force base in southern Taiwan on Wednesday after experiencing mechanical problems. It said it was not clear where they were coming from or where they were going.
"While this landing was unplanned and occurred exclusively out of mechanical necessity, it reflects well on Taiwan that they permitted pilots in distress to land safely," said U.S. Pentagon spokeswoman Henrietta Levin.
China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, told a regular news briefing: "We have already made solemn representations to the U.S. side."
"China demands that the United States strictly abide by the 'one-China policy' ... and cautiously and appropriately handle this incident."[老共要求美國嚴格遵守其「一中政策」，同時要審慎地與正確地處理這個事件。註: 老共那些寶貝蛋成天對台灣意淫，把台灣視為禁臠或己有，不准美國人碰台灣，老共真是可笑極了。]
The United States is obligated to help Taiwan defend itself under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, when Washington severed formal ties with the island to recognize the People's Republic of China in Beijing.[ 「路透社」的Michael的報導說，根據「台灣關係法」，美國有防衛台灣的義務。]
U.S. weapons sales in recent years to Taiwan, or indeed any formal contact between the two armed forces, have provoked strong condemnation by China, but have not caused lasting damage to Beijing's relations with either Washington or Taipei.
China views Taiwan as a renegade province and has not ruled out the use of force to bring it under its control.[中國視台灣為「叛離的一省」，並且一直不放棄使用武力，要將台灣置於其控制之下。]
China views Taiwan as a renegade province and has not ruled out the use of force to bring it under its control.[中國視台灣為「叛離的一省」，並且一直不放棄使用武力，要將台灣置於其控制之下。]
While Taiwan and China have signed a series of landmark trade and economic agreements since 2008, political and military suspicions still run deep, especially in democratic Taiwan, where many fear China's true intentions.
China's military modernization has also been accompanied by a more assertive posture in its regional territorial disputes.
(Reporting by Michael Martina, and J.R. Wu in Taipei; Writing by Ben Blanchard and Clarence Fernandez)
(Reporting by Michael Martina, and J.R. Wu in Taipei; Writing by Ben Blanchard and Clarence Fernandez)
第四部分
美國軍事報導的權威Bill Gertz於美東時間4/1/2015在「華盛頓時報」的網路版上張貼了一則報導，我們現在來看這位與五角大廈有很好的聯繫的權威記者如何解讀美國軍機降落台灣的這個事件:
“Marine fighter jets landing on Taiwan sends China message”
By Bill Gertz
The Washington Times
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
By Bill Gertz
The Washington Times
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
The emergency landing of two U.S. Marine Corps F-18 fighter jets on the island of Taiwan appears to have been a political message from the Pentagon to Beijing following a recent Chinese bomber drill near the island nation that is a key rival to Beijing's rule. [兩架美國海軍陸戰隊的F-18噴射戰機緊急降落台灣的事件似乎是五角大廈在中國的轟炸機最近在臨近台灣這個島國的地區進行演訓之後，向北京所發出的一項政治訊息。]
The Pentagon said the Marine F-18s landed at a southwestern air base that Taiwan's Defense Ministry identified as the historic Tainan air force base. Maj. Paul L. Greenberg, a Marine Corps spokesman, said the aircraft were on a routine mission, flying in support of a training exercise.
"Two F-18C Hornets from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMFA-323), based at Kadena Airfield in Japan, made a precautionary landing this morning at an airfield in southwestern Taiwan," Maj. Greenberg said. "There were no injuries and no damage to either aircraft. The cause of the mechanical issue which led to the precautionary landing is currently being examined. As soon as the necessary maintenance is performed, both aircraft will soon depart Taiwan."
All U.S. military activities with Taiwan are considered sensitive as China considers the island its territory under Beijing's "one China policy." The policy prohibits the United States from formally recognizing the Taiwanese government. [美國與台灣所有的軍事活動都被視為敏感，因為北京在其「一個中國政策」之下，將台灣視為其領土。註: Bill應寫「一個中國原則」，而非「一個中國政策」。]
The Tainan air base has a long history. It was used by the Japanese navy's Tainan Air Group for its Mitsubishi Zero fighters that were part of the initial attack on the Philippines in World War II. Tainan also hosted U.S. nuclear weapons during the periods of the U.S.-Taiwanese military alliance. The base deployed nuclear-tipped Matador cruise missiles.
Additionally, the Marine jets landed on Taiwan two days after a major Chinese bomber exercise near the island.
China's official Xinhua News Agency said the bomber exercises, which ended Monday, were the first time China's People's Liberation Army Air Force had exercised in the "west Pacific."
China state television identified the aircraft as H-6K bombers — upgraded, Soviet-design nuclear-capable bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles.
The precise location of the bomber flights was along the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and Philippines archipelago.
This may be a simple "accident," but one hopes the symbolism is not lost on Beijing, analysts say. Military analyst Rick Fisher said the Marine jet landings appear to be Pentagon sending a political message to China, since the aircraft could have made an emergency landing at a less-controversial location such as the Japanese airfield at Shimoji island, 120 miles east of Taiwan. [這個事件也許只是一個單純的事故，但是美國的分析家們認為北京不會不了解其象徵性的意義，軍事分析家費雪表示，這個事件似乎是五角大廈送給中國的政治訊息，因為美國軍機本來可以選擇降落在較無爭議的地點，如台灣東北方120哩遠的日本下地島機場。]
"The 'emergency' landing for two F/A-18 fighters at an air base in Taiwan, while perhaps unintended, does give China a significant signal of U.S. resolve, two days after China used its new H-6K nuclear cruise missile bomber in exercises intended to signal a threat to U.S. forces on Guam," said Mr. Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
Flying the nuclear-capable bombers so close to Taiwan harkens back to China's military intimidation of the island in what came to be known as the Taiwan Strait Crisis, when China fired test missiles north and south of the island in an attempt to intimidate voters prior to the 1996 presidential election.
The Clinton administration responded by dispatching two aircraft carrier strike groups to the region. The incident triggered China's drive for anti-aircraft carrier weapons, including its DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, and its first aircraft carrier the Liaoning.
Maj. Greenberg said Tainan was selected for the landings based on its location at the time of the mechanical problem. "The pilots followed standard procedures and safely landed the aircraft in the closest location where the weather was conducive to landing," he said. "The welfare of the pilots, and their ability to land safely and quickly, was our primary concern."
The Pentagon also is scaling back some of its military exchanges with China, a key feature of the Obama administration's military policies.
第五部分
最後我們來請鄉親們讀美軍「星條旗報」的一則報導:
