「美國轉向亞太」(America’s pivot toward the Asia Pacific)與台灣(下)
----美國國務院亞太事務助卿Daniel R. Russel於4/3/2014在參院作證時說，「『美國與台灣強化關係並與在台灣的人民強化存在已久的友誼』仍然是『美國向亞太戰略再平衡』的一項關鍵性元素」。
四
11/10/2011，國務卿柯林頓夫人在檀香山「東西文化中心」有一場題為「太平洋世紀」的演說，她在裡頭說了這麼一段:
“And we remain committed to the One-China policy and the preservation of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We have a strong relationship with Taiwan, an important security and economic partner, and we applaud the progress that we have seen in cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan during the past three years and we look forward to continued improvement so there can be peaceful resolution of their differences. “ (我們仍然對「一中政策」及台海的和平與穩定的維持保持承諾，我們與台灣這個「重要的安全與經濟的夥伴」有很強的關係，我們對過去三年來我們見到的中台之間關係的進步給予鼓掌，我們也期待台海兩岸關係的繼續改善，因此它們 之間的歧異能夠和平解決)。
這一段話裡頭的「安全夥伴關係」也許就是指「台灣是美國亞太戰略再平衡的一環」，但我們只能說「也許」，因為這純屬猜測。
歐巴馬在澳洲發表的「重返亞洲」的演說其中的一部分值得鄉親們再讀一讀:
Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament
Parliament House
Canberra, Australia
November 17, 2011
So here, among close friends, I’d like to address the larger purpose of my visit to this region -- our efforts to advance security, prosperity and human dignity across the Asia Pacific.
For the United States, this reflects a broader shift. After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region. -----------
Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truth -- the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation. Asian immigrants helped build America, and millions of American families, including my own, cherish our ties to this region. From the bombing of Darwin to the liberation of Pacific islands, from the rice paddies of Southeast Asia to a cold Korean Peninsula, generations of Americans have served here, and died here -- so democracies could take root; so economic miracles could lift hundreds of millions to prosperity. Americans have bled with you for this progress, and we will not allow it -- we will never allow it to be reversed.
Here, we see the future. As the world’s fastest-growing region -- and home to more than half the global economy -- the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and that's creating jobs and opportunity for the American people. With most of the world’s nuclear power and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress.
As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision -- as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.
Let me tell you what this means. First, we seek security, which is the foundation of peace and prosperity. We stand for an international order in which the rights and responsibilities of all nations and all people are upheld. Where international law and norms are enforced. Where commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded. Where emerging powers contribute to regional security, and where disagreements are resolved peacefully. That's the future that we seek.
Now, I know that some in this region have wondered about America’s commitment to upholding these principles. So let me address this directly. As the United States puts our fiscal house in order, we are reducing our spending. And, yes, after a decade of extraordinary growth in our military budgets -- and as we definitively end the war in Iraq, and begin to wind down the war in Afghanistan -- we will make some reductions in defense spending.
As we consider the future of our armed forces, we've begun a review that will identify our most important strategic interests and guide our defense priorities and spending over the coming decade. So here is what this region must know. As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not -- I repeat, will not -- come at the expense of the Asia Pacific.
My guidance is clear. As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region. We will preserve our unique ability to project power and deter threats to peace. We will keep our commitments, including our treaty obligations to allies like Australia. And we will constantly strengthen our capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century. Our enduring interests in the region demand our enduring presence in the region. The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.
Indeed, we are already modernizing America’s defense posture across the Asia Pacific. It will be more broadly distributed -- maintaining our strong presence in Japan and the Korean Peninsula, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia. Our posture will be more flexible -- with new capabilities to ensure that our forces can operate freely. And our posture will be more sustainable, by helping allies and partners build their capacity, with more training and exercises.
A secure and peaceful Asia is the foundation for the second area in which America is leading again, and that's advancing our shared prosperity. History teaches us the greatest force the world has ever known for creating wealth and opportunity is free markets. So we seek economies that are open and transparent. We seek trade that is free and fair. And we seek an open international economic system, where rules are clear and every nation plays by them.
This is the future we seek in the Asia Pacific -- security, prosperity and dignity for all. That’s what we stand for. That’s who we are. That’s the future we will pursue, in partnership with allies and friends, and with every element of American power. So let there be no doubt: In the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.
Men and women like these know what the world must never forget. The currents of history may ebb and flow, but over time they move -- decidedly, decisively -- in a single direction. History is on the side of the free -- free societies, free governments, free economies, free people. And the future belongs to those who stand firm for those ideals, in this region and around the world.
This is the story of the alliance we celebrate today. This is the essence of America’s leadership; it is the essence of our partnership. This is the work we will carry on together, for the security and prosperity and dignity of all people.
五
老K當局的外交部對美國「重返亞洲」的政策有什麼看法呢?建州派現在藉邁阿密大學政治系的金德芳教授(Prof. June Teufel Dreyer) 所發表的文章(“What Does the U.S. Focus on Asia Mean for Taiwan?”)中的一段來說:
四
11/10/2011，國務卿柯林頓夫人在檀香山「東西文化中心」有一場題為「太平洋世紀」的演說，她在裡頭說了這麼一段:
“And we remain committed to the One-China policy and the preservation of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We have a strong relationship with Taiwan, an important security and economic partner, and we applaud the progress that we have seen in cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan during the past three years and we look forward to continued improvement so there can be peaceful resolution of their differences. “ (我們仍然對「一中政策」及台海的和平與穩定的維持保持承諾，我們與台灣這個「重要的安全與經濟的夥伴」有很強的關係，我們對過去三年來我們見到的中台之間關係的進步給予鼓掌，我們也期待台海兩岸關係的繼續改善，因此它們 之間的歧異能夠和平解決)。
這一段話裡頭的「安全夥伴關係」也許就是指「台灣是美國亞太戰略再平衡的一環」，但我們只能說「也許」，因為這純屬猜測。
歐巴馬在澳洲發表的「重返亞洲」的演說其中的一部分值得鄉親們再讀一讀:
Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament
Parliament House
Canberra, Australia
November 17, 2011
So here, among close friends, I’d like to address the larger purpose of my visit to this region -- our efforts to advance security, prosperity and human dignity across the Asia Pacific.
For the United States, this reflects a broader shift. After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region. -----------
Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truth -- the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation. Asian immigrants helped build America, and millions of American families, including my own, cherish our ties to this region. From the bombing of Darwin to the liberation of Pacific islands, from the rice paddies of Southeast Asia to a cold Korean Peninsula, generations of Americans have served here, and died here -- so democracies could take root; so economic miracles could lift hundreds of millions to prosperity. Americans have bled with you for this progress, and we will not allow it -- we will never allow it to be reversed.
Here, we see the future. As the world’s fastest-growing region -- and home to more than half the global economy -- the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and that's creating jobs and opportunity for the American people. With most of the world’s nuclear power and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress.
As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision -- as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.
Let me tell you what this means. First, we seek security, which is the foundation of peace and prosperity. We stand for an international order in which the rights and responsibilities of all nations and all people are upheld. Where international law and norms are enforced. Where commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded. Where emerging powers contribute to regional security, and where disagreements are resolved peacefully. That's the future that we seek.
Now, I know that some in this region have wondered about America’s commitment to upholding these principles. So let me address this directly. As the United States puts our fiscal house in order, we are reducing our spending. And, yes, after a decade of extraordinary growth in our military budgets -- and as we definitively end the war in Iraq, and begin to wind down the war in Afghanistan -- we will make some reductions in defense spending.
As we consider the future of our armed forces, we've begun a review that will identify our most important strategic interests and guide our defense priorities and spending over the coming decade. So here is what this region must know. As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not -- I repeat, will not -- come at the expense of the Asia Pacific.
My guidance is clear. As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region. We will preserve our unique ability to project power and deter threats to peace. We will keep our commitments, including our treaty obligations to allies like Australia. And we will constantly strengthen our capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century. Our enduring interests in the region demand our enduring presence in the region. The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.
Indeed, we are already modernizing America’s defense posture across the Asia Pacific. It will be more broadly distributed -- maintaining our strong presence in Japan and the Korean Peninsula, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia. Our posture will be more flexible -- with new capabilities to ensure that our forces can operate freely. And our posture will be more sustainable, by helping allies and partners build their capacity, with more training and exercises.
A secure and peaceful Asia is the foundation for the second area in which America is leading again, and that's advancing our shared prosperity. History teaches us the greatest force the world has ever known for creating wealth and opportunity is free markets. So we seek economies that are open and transparent. We seek trade that is free and fair. And we seek an open international economic system, where rules are clear and every nation plays by them.
This is the future we seek in the Asia Pacific -- security, prosperity and dignity for all. That’s what we stand for. That’s who we are. That’s the future we will pursue, in partnership with allies and friends, and with every element of American power. So let there be no doubt: In the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.
Men and women like these know what the world must never forget. The currents of history may ebb and flow, but over time they move -- decidedly, decisively -- in a single direction. History is on the side of the free -- free societies, free governments, free economies, free people. And the future belongs to those who stand firm for those ideals, in this region and around the world.
This is the story of the alliance we celebrate today. This is the essence of America’s leadership; it is the essence of our partnership. This is the work we will carry on together, for the security and prosperity and dignity of all people.
五
老K當局的外交部對美國「重返亞洲」的政策有什麼看法呢?建州派現在藉邁阿密大學政治系的金德芳教授(Prof. June Teufel Dreyer) 所發表的文章(“What Does the U.S. Focus on Asia Mean for Taiwan?”)中的一段來說:
//As matters stand, to the extent that Taiwan’s security is affected by the pivot, its position is more, not less, precarious. In these circumstances, Taipei’s best strategy would seem to be to try to placate both Washington and Beijing, while keeping as low a profile as possible. The response of Taiwan’s foreign ministry to a query on what part, if any, the nation could play in the pivot reinforces this hypothesis. Averring that it does not believe the pivot is aimed at containment of China 「向亞洲再平衡」政策並非「圍堵」中國大陸之政策, the ministry states that “in order to guarantee our national security while we are improving the cross-strait relationship, we also need to strengthen relations with the USA and other friendly countries, and to constantly enhance our national defense so that the sovereignty of the ROC and Taiwan’s security can be maintained. The security commitment from the United States is vital to peace and stability over the Taiwan Strait, and to bring us more confidence when making peace with mainland China. (馬英九當局的外交部確信或斷言，美國的「向亞洲再平衡」政策並非「圍堵」中國大陸之政策。它向金德芳教授表示，為了要在改善台海兩岸關係的同時，也要保證台灣的安全，它必須強化台灣與美國及其他友好國家的關係，同時持續地增強台灣的國防，好讓ROC的主權與台灣的安全能夠維持。美國給台灣的安全承諾是與台海的和平與穩定生死攸關的，這種承諾也能讓我們在與中國進行和解時帶來信心)The above meets the interest of all parties concerned in the region.”//
在老K當局的外交部於1/22/2013寫給金德芳教授的那一封信中，提到「中華民國(對台灣)的主權」，這當然是胡說八道，因為美國從來沒有把台灣的主權移轉給所謂的「中國」、「中華民國」或「中華人民共和國」。
台灣的綠營對「美國亞太戰略再平衡」有什麼看法呢?建州派藉Missouri State University政治學教授Dennis Van Vranken Hickey所發表的一篇文章 “The U.S. Pivot to the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Taiwan”其中的一小部分來說明。
//There are some who fear that, while Washington bolsters it linkages with other regional governments, Taipei is being ignored. During an interview with the author, Dr. Joseph Wu, the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) representative to the US, voiced such concerns.// [當華府在強化它與亞太地區其他國家的政府的聯結時，有些人擔心台北被漠視，Hickey教授所訪談的對象吳昭燮博士就是其中之一。註: 綠營因為失去政權 ，所以對歐巴馬行政團隊與馬英九當局在台美安全合作這個領域上失去掌握，但若我們閱讀國防部前副部長楊念祖、AIT理事主席Ambassador Raymond Burghardt以及其他若干人士雖然低調的談話，我們仍然可以獲知，台美之間的安全與軍事合作的層級是很高而且很密切的。]
//“The security relations between the US and Japan have been streamlined and Japan has been urged to invest more [in defense]. And if you look at the security cooperation between the US and Korea, they are joining in military exercises on a larger and larger scale. Look at US-Australia relations, US-Philippine relation, US-Singapore relations, US-India relations—they are all strengthening—even US-Vietnam relations. But look at Taiwan. The US administration’s reaction to Taiwan seems that “oh, you’re doing just fine with China, go ahead and do more.” And I don’t know if that is in line with the US pivot or US redeployment in the Asia-Pacific,” he said.// [吳昭燮這段談話顯示，他無法掌握馬英九執政後美台在安全與軍事合作的狀況，事實是，不是只有他不了解狀況，其他人也如此。]
//Domestic critics of the Barrack Obama administration are harsher. Some accuse the president of “appeasement” and make claims that, while “China is on the march in Asia,” Obama is “cozying up to Beijing with a wink and a nod.”//
//To be sure, Taiwan is not playing a high-profile role in the execution of the strategic shift in U.S. policy. But Taipei has not been forgotten.// [Hickey教授告訴我們，他確知，台灣在「美國亞太戰略再平衡」中雖然沒有扮演高調的角色，可是台灣一直都沒有被美國遺忘。]
關於「『美國轉向亞太』(America’s pivot toward the Asia Pacific)與台灣」這個話題，我們今天就暫時說到這裡，以後再進一步向台灣與台美鄉親們報告。
我們最近似乎也不能不談國務院亞太事務助卿Daniel R. Russel日前提到的「台灣自治」(Taiwan autonomy)，因為在台美人社區中已有屬於某黨派的少數幾名人士又在捕風捉影，胡言亂語，大放厥詞，企圖把Russell助卿的談話引導到對他們的黨派有利的方向去。那些台美人一向喜歡隨意解讀與歪曲美國政府官員的談話，欺騙與誤導台灣人及台美人，他們實在很讓我們傷腦筋。因為他們喜歡拿一些似是而非的論述及天馬行空的揣測來愚弄台灣人與台美人，所以他們的不負責任的言論與行徑間接造成建州運動在台灣人與台美人中間正常發展的阻礙，我們感到十分遺憾。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
=======================================================================
附錄一
“Taiwan’s Role in Supporting the U.S. Pivot in Asia”
by Parris H. Chang (張旭成)
www.wufi.org.tw---Read More---
The United States Strategic shift toward the Asia-Pacific region is more than rhetoric. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told a conference of Asian defense leaders at Singapore in early June that the U.S. will “of necessity” rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region and vowed 60 percent of the Navy’s fleet, including 6 carrier battle groups, will be deployed to the region by 2020. He said that the U.S. presence will be more agile, flexible and high-tech, and a surge of U.S. troops overall.
America’s long-term allies, Japan, Korea and Australia, welcome the shift. Indeed, the U.S., Japan and Korea have been engaging trilateral security cooperation. Australia has agreed to the deployment of up to 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, the northern Australian city.
On June 3rd, Secretary Panetta paid his first visit to Vietnam and made a stop at Cam Ranh Bayh, making him the most senior U.S. official to go to the harbor since the Vietnamese War ended in 1975. He stood on the deck of a U.S. ship to commemorate the 17th anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations, underscoring Washington’s plan to enhance military cooperation with Vietnam.
Moreover, the U.S. is promoting a new strategy to forge partnership in Southeast Asia to protect vital maritime rights for all nations in the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has claimed the entire South China Sea as its own, in conflicts with Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and other states that have also territorial claims there.
In the past 13 years, the defense budget of the PRC has increased by 500 percent. Beijing’s perceived dominance and growing belligerence appears to be strengthening U.S. hand in rallying support of allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region.
Beijing’s campaign on the U.S. to Abandon Taiwan
In recent years, President Obama’s administration has continued to provide defensive arms to Taiwan as mandated by Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), despite bitter opposition from the PRC. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said emphatically last November that Taiwan is an important security and economic partner. The PRC sees the U.S. protective relationship over Taiwan as the most serious impediment to its goal of national unification, hence it has intensified efforts to remove the obstacle and weaken U.S.–Taiwan ties.
One approach is to force President Obama to end armed sales to Taiwan . When China’s ranking officials including Vice Chairman Xi Jinping visited Washington, they invariably put forth such a demand.
A second approach is to mount an all-court press on the U.S. to abandon its security commitment to Taiwan and repeal the TRA. Several U.S. academics have aired such a viewpoint , but to no avail. However, in Washington policy circles, retired ranking officials, such as Admiral Bill Owens, Vice-Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff, and Admiral Joseph Prueher, former Commander of the Pacific Command and former U.S. ambassador to China also took up Beijing’s cause, calling for President Obama to recognize the reality of a rising China and reconsider U.S. security ties to Taiwan.
A third approach is the threat of force against both Taiwan and the U.S. The PRC has deployed more than 1,500 ballistic and cruise missiles against Taiwan, improvement of the cross-strait relations since 2008 notwithstanding. Beijing is waging an intense political and psychological warfare both to deter Taiwan from seeking an independent statehood and compel President Ma Ying-jeou and his Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to start political talks leading to Taiwan’s eventual unification with China.
Furthermore, the PRC military has built up considerable “anti-access” and area-denial” capabilities. The strategy serves two purposes: to deter and defeat U.S. intervention in China’s possible use of force against Taiwan, and to uphold China’s hegemony in East Asia in contention with the U.S. Washington has not lost sight of China’s threat.
Taiwan Must Choose
Hence, The Obama administration issued in January the latest U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance in response to the forthcoming challenge. The Guidance underlies a heightened commitment to security in Asia and maps out a comprehensive plan to strengthen political, economic and military cooperation with allies and friends, including Taiwan.
Terrorism, nuclear proliferation and other threats require a shared and coordinated response. The Pentagon faces US$500 billion in defense budget cuts over the next 10 years; would U.S. allies share the burden for their own sake? When the American and allied forces moved into Afghanistan in October 2001 to fight Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party government lost no time in delivering 100 big military trucks to help with the Allies’ logistics and humanitarian relief operations in the war zones and, for several years, contributed US$20 million annually to the war on terror.
Will Taiwan’s KMT regime interact with the new U.S. strategy? And how? Is the Ma government willing to provide regional host support or other forms of burden-sharing to sustain and bolster the U.S. security presence in East Asia? This is especially critical, as Ma has been criticized for being excessively tilting toward the PRC, at the expense of Taiwan’s relations with the U.S. Taiwan must recognize who is its foes and who is its friend, and make the correct choice.
Obviously, the PRC is not Taiwan’s friend, as it has tried to isolate Taiwan in the international society and sought to annex Taiwan by economic and political means. Taiwan belongs to the community of democracies and should play an expanded and constructive role in the U.S. strategic pivot to Asia and in the world community.
Taiwan’s Expanded and Constructive Role
In December 2011, Rajiv Shah, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development(USAID) was in Taiwan to solicit Taiwan’s help in the U.S. global development aid programs. It would be wise for Ma’s government to take up the USAID invitation and actively participate in the U.S. global partnership projects to eliminate hunger and disease as well as promote social and economic development in less-developed countries. If Taiwan hopes to be seen as a responsible international stakeholder, Ma’s government must reverse its policy of “diplomatic truce” designed to accommodate Beijing, and desist from further cutting its foreign aid budget. In 2010, Taiwan spent US$ 380 million in foreign aid, or only 0.1 percent of its GDP, well below the UN standard of 0.7 percent. Worse, in 2012, Ma’s government may cut foreign aid by 13 percent.
To be worthy of a U.S. ally, Taiwan should strengthen its anti-proliferation security measures to forestall exports of precision instruments and dual-use high-tech components to Iran for research and production of nuclear arms and missiles. Likewise, Taiwan should stop or substantially reduce imports of oil from Iran, as Japan and Korea are doing, so as to reinforce U.S. sanctions on Iran.
In 2010, the PRC was the destination of 41.7 percent of Taiwan’s exports, and 83.8 percent of Taiwan’s outward investments. In 2011, the export and investment figures were respectively 40.2 percent and 79.6 percent. Taiwan’s over-dependence on China is dangerous, even without political complications. To redress the imbalance, Taiwan must enhance trade and investment connections with the U.S , the world’s largest economy, and with Japan and India.
Furthermore, Taiwan must foster security cooperation with the U.S., Japan and other democracies, instead of joint efforts with the PRC to safeguard sovereignty over disputed areas in the South China Seas, as Beijing-affiliated scholars have urged. It is imperative that an island-nation like Taiwan works closely the U.S. Japan and other democratic friends in the region to safeguard security and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and all the waterways surrounding Taiwan. As a member of the community of democracies, Taiwan must make its position clear that territorial disputes in East Asia and the South China Sea should be settled through peaceful means in a multi-lateral international forum and on the basis of international law.
(Dr. Parris H. Chang, professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University, is Chair Professor of General Education at Toko University and CEO of Taiwan Institute of Political, Economic and Strategic Studies. Previously, he was Deputy Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council.)
附錄二
“Taiwan’s Crucial Role in the US Pivot to Asia”
By Michael Mazza
7/9/2013
www.aei.org
The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia aims to improve security, prosperity, and human rights in the region, with particular focus on security efforts. Taiwan and the United States have a long-standing but often-underemphasized security partnership that could play a significant role in this effort. Because of its proximity to and knowledge of China, Taiwan is uniquely equipped to help US efforts to (1) expand presence and access in the region by ensuring US forces can utilize facilities on the island in the event of a conflict; (2) build partnership capacity by improving its self-defense capabilities; and (3) improve military innovation by sharing experience, technology, and intelligence with the United States. Rather than fearing damaging bilateral ties with China, the United States should take advantage of the benefits this important partnership can offer.
Key points in this Outlook:
• Although Taiwan’s potential role in the US pivot to Asia has been largely ignored, the island nation is uniquely poised to be an important partner in the security component of that effort.
• The United States should help Taiwan shore up its air and sea defenses so that it can assist in deterring potential Chinese aggression, thus contributing to stability in the region.
• Taiwan is positioned to contribute important cyber knowledge, communications capabilities, and intelligence to US defense efforts in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Republic of China (ROC), on Taiwan, is one of America’s oldest security partners. The formal relationship dates back at least as far as the early days of America’s participation in World War II, when the famed US Flying Tigers began flying combat missions over China against the Japanese. US and Republican Chinese forces fought side by side in Burma during the war and stood together against communism during the Cold War.
Ironically, faced with a reemergent People’s Republic of China on the mainland, which is posing a significant and growing threat to regional security for the first time since the mid-20th century, the United States has not attempted to reinvigorate its relationship with Taiwan. This is all the more peculiar at a time when the United States is supposedly pivoting its foreign, defense, and trade policies to focus on Asia.
The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia—also called the “rebalance”—is more than 18 months old. In a November 2011 speech to the Australian parliament, President Obama announced that he had “made a deliberate and strategic decision—as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.”[1]
The president described three pillars of his new Asia policy: ensuring security, promoting prosperity, and supporting human rights. Listing security first was deliberate. Security and peace enable continued prosperity and advancements on questions of human rights.
In describing how the United States would seek security, the president discussed defense modernization, the five US alliances in Asia (with Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand), outreach to Southeast Asian states, and engagement with regional organizations. Nowhere in his speech did he mention Taiwan—which knows China better than anyone and occupies key geostrategic territory—or the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the United States to supply arms to Taiwan and to ensure its own capacity to come to Taiwan’s aid in the case of conflict.
This neglect on the part of the Obama administration comes from a desire to avoid the supposed risk of offending China and damaging bilateral ties. But such logic is shortsighted. No, China will not like a cozier US-Taiwan defense relationship. But such a relationship would serve to stabilize the region, better deter China from using coercion or force against the island, and ensure continued peace in the Taiwan Strait. If the military pillar of the Asia pivot is meant to deter Chinese adventurism, there is little question that Taiwan has an important role to play in ensuring that outcome.
The US military rebalance to the Asia-Pacific includes three primary lines of effort:
• Expanding presence and access.
• Building partnership capacity.
• Military innovation.
These three pillars are mutually reinforcing: any one would be ineffective without the others. To date, Washington has largely neglected Taiwan in carrying out this policy. Taiwan, however, may be able to contribute to all three efforts.
Expanding Presence and Access
Two of the US Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) attempts to expand presence in Asia have been quite visible. In November 2011, then Australian prime minister Julia Gillard and President Obama announced that starting in 2012, Australia would “welcome deployments of a company-size rotation of 200 to 250 Marines in the Northern Territory for around six months at a time.” Over several years, that presence would increase to approximately 2,500 Marine personnel, or a full Marine Expeditionary Unit.[2] This rotational presence enables US Marines to more regularly exercise with their Australian counterparts and with partners throughout Southeast Asia. They are also poised to quickly respond to a crisis—whether natural or manmade—in the region.
Gillard and Obama also announced that US military aircraft would have greater access to the Royal Australian Air Force’s bases in the country’s north. Although the relatively small number of Marines and their distance from the most likely regional hotspots for US involvement limits their substantive contribution to regional security, the deployment at least sends a positive message to the region.
Last year, Singapore similarly agreed to welcome a rotational deployment of US Navy littoral combat ships (LCSs). The first ship arrived in Singapore in April, and the strategically located Southeast Asian country will eventually host four LCSs at a time. This access arrangement will enhance the Navy’s ability to engage in more regular port calls and combined exercises in Southeast Asia.
These LCSs, depending on the modules with which they are equipped, will be ideally positioned to carry out antipiracy, antisubmarine warfare, and other missions in the South China Sea. As with the new Marine Corps rotations in Australia, the LCS presence in Singapore is more style than substance and unlikely to significantly deter Chinese or North Korean adventurism.
Perhaps less visible, but no less important, has been DoD’s pursuit of expanded access arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. Here, Washington has seen the greatest progress in its talks with the Philippines. The two countries have recently settled on an agreement that will increase the rotation of US forces through the Philippines and grant US forces more access to former US outposts Subic Bay and Clark Air Base.
"If the military pillar of the Asia pivot is meant to deter Chinese adventurism, there is little question that Taiwan has an important role to play in ensuring that outcome."
Of the military pivot’s three pillars, Taiwan is least able to contribute to US efforts to expand presence and access in Asia. It should be noted that no US-China treaty bans American forces from Taiwan. In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, a document with no legal standing, the United States affirmed “the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan.”
Although this objective was met for a time, starting in 2005 US defense attachés were once again posted to the American Institute in Taiwan, the unofficial US embassy there.
Still, although there may be good geostrategic reasons for greater numbers of US forces to be present on Taiwan—such as enhanced capacity for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; conventional deterrence; and sea line security—neither Washington nor Taipei has any political appetite for such a change. Both capitals are likely to consider the deployment of US troops to the island as too provocative for Beijing and potentially damaging for US-China and cross-strait relations.
Yet Taiwan can take steps to ensure that US forces would have access to the island’s facilities during a time of crisis, even in the absence of a formal access agreement. Taiwan, for example, could invest in infrastructure that would enable the island to serve as a logistics hub for US forces in the event of a conflict to the island’s north or in the South China Sea. Along similar lines, Taiwan might stockpile supplies that would be of use to American forces operating in the region. Doing so would complicate China’s war planning, improve deterrence, and enhance America’s ability to come to the aid of Taiwan and other allies during an emergency, all without provoking Beijing in the way that formal access arrangements or actual US presence would.
Building Partnership Capacity
The Obama administration has recognized that one of the most effective ways of avoiding conflict in Asia is to ensure that American allies and partners have the capacity to defend themselves. The president’s 2012 strategic guidance to the Department of Defense promised to “expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.”[3] Speaking at the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue several months later, then–secretary of defense Leon Panetta put a finer point on it: “We will play an essential role in promoting strong partnerships that strengthen the capabilities of the Pacific nations to defend and secure themselves.”[4]
In large part, this effort will rely on continuing large annual and biennial multinational military exercises throughout the region. DoD will also, ideally, expand the number of maneuvers it leads and the number of countries with which it exercises. For example, Burma was invited for the first time to observe this year’s Cobra Gold, an annual exercise that the United States and Thailand colead. Other regular participants have included Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. The US Navy has likewise conducted drills with its Vietnamese counterpart, with exercises focusing on noncombat scenarios like search-and-rescue missions and maritime navigation.
In additional to expanding exercises, the United States has also transferred military items to partner nations. The flagship of the Philippine navy, for example, is a retired US Coast Guard cutter; Manila has thus far purchased two of these vessels from the United States. Although not modern warships, they do enhance the Philippines’ ability to patrol and defend its own waters. Japan, Australia, and Singapore will purchase F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and South Korea will likely follow suit. Further afield, India has also bought a number of high-end defense articles from the United States in recent years, including C-130J, C-17, and P-8I aircraft, as well as Apache helicopters and munitions.
The Obama administration has permitted some arms sales to Taiwan, but it has not been proactive on this front. In 2010, the administration released several items for sale that had earlier been approved by the Bush administration, including PAC-3 missile defense interceptors, Black Hawk helicopters, and refurbished Osprey-class mine hunting ships. In 2011, the administration approved the sale of upgrades for Taiwan’s F-16A/B fighters. Troublingly, the White House has not approved those items that Taiwan needs most: new F-16C/D fighter jets and submarines.
Taiwan does not have the opportunity—as Japan does—to assist weaker partners in developing their defense capabilities. As a US partner, however, it can and should focus on advancing its own capacity for self-defense.
Given its location, the island of Taiwan is of great geostrategic importance. In a sense, it is the cork that keeps Chinese maritime and air forces bottled up within what China calls the “first island chain”—a string of islands running from Japan in the north, through Japan’s Ryukyu chain to the Philippine island of Luzon, and then skirting the southern and western perimeters of the South China Sea. Even though no US troops are stationed on Taiwan, the island’s continued de facto independence is crucial for America’s forward defense perimeter, which since World War II has sought to keep would-be aggressors from approaching the United States via the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan fell into unfriendly hands, moreover, America would find it increasingly difficult to defend its Asian treaty allies, notably Japan and the Philippines.
Taiwan, then, can best contribute to the Pentagon’s rebalance by ensuring that it can adequately defend itself against Chinese aggression. Recent trends in Taiwan’s defense spending, however, suggest that the island is not dedicating sufficient resources to that task.
According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, since 2001, Taiwan’s annual defense budget growth has averaged only 0.5 percent, and this is at a time when Taiwan’s military is shifting to what should be a much more expensive, all-volunteer force. By comparison, China’s defense budget has grown an average of 12.2 percent yearly over the same period and 213.9 percent overall from 2001 to 2011 as compared to Taiwan’s 3.5 percent.[5]
Over the past decade, Taiwan’s defense spending has accounted for between 1.9 and 2.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). By comparison, Georgia—which like Taiwan faces a considerable military threat from a giant neighbor but which has per capita GDP only one-sixth that of Taiwan—has dedicated over 5 percent of GDP to defense spending since 2006, hitting 9.2 percent in 2007 (before, not in reaction to, the Russian invasion in 2008).
Although Taiwan has experienced slower economic growth of late, it is, by any measure, a prosperous country. Taipei should at the very least meet its own goal of spending 3 percent of GDP on defense. Failure to do so will not only limit the effectiveness of Taiwan’s armed forces, but also risk empowering those in the United States who argue that since Taiwan does not defend itself, neither should America.
Of course, Taiwan’s defense capability is a question not of simply how many dollars are spent but of how they are spent. The military should be able to respond to the full range of potential Chinese actions, from a relatively low-intensity scenario (such as a partial naval blockade) to the highest-intensity option (a full-scale invasion). Such preparedness requires a wide range of defense capabilities.
A combination of advanced air defenses and modern tactical fighter aircraft are necessary, first so that Taiwan can control its own airspace and, second, so that the ROC Air Force can carry out limited retaliatory strikes on the mainland if need be. To that end, Taipei should continue lobbying both the Obama administration and Capitol Hill to approve the export to Taiwan of new F-16C/Ds. Although the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND’s) requirement for “next-generation fighters,” as articulated in its recent Quadrennial Defense Review, is sensible over the long term, the realities of America’s recent arms sales track record and of the F-35’s development challenges make this an unrealistic option during the next decade if not longer.[6] New F-16s remain MND’s only viable option if Taiwan is to maintain an effective air force in the coming years.
"Taiwan can best contribute to the Pentagon's rebalance by ensuring that it can adequately defend itself against Chinese aggression."
At sea, Taiwan needs a mix of traditional and asymmetric systems. To maintain a capability to keep open safe transit corridors during a blockade, submarines are crucial. Quiet, diesel-powered submarines would also enhance Taiwan’s ability to interdict surface vessels entering the northern or southern approaches of the Taiwan Strait. Fast-attack missile boats, meanwhile, would grant Taiwan a much-needed sea denial capability. MND’s decision to develop a new 500-ton stealth corvette is a positive development.[7]
The US Naval War College’s Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes have made the case that the ROC Navy should rely more heavily on such vessels than on traditional large surface combatants.[8]Writing for the Diplomat, Holmes argued that Taiwan could “disperse large numbers of small combatants to hardened sites . . . around the island’s rough coast. Such vessels could sortie to conduct independent operations against enemy shipping. Or, they could mass their firepower in concerted ‘wolf pack’ attacks on major PLAN formations.”[9]Taiwan does not have the resources to match China’s investments in destroyers and frigates, but if the ROC Navy fields innovative capabilities and develops innovative ways of operating, it could make life miserable for the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Taiwan Strait.
On land, ROC forces should be able to prevent, or at least delay, PLA forces from establishing a beachhead. A fight for control of the island would be the most stressful scenario for both Taiwan’s military and society. As several colleagues and I argued in 2009:
Ground forces should be ready both to fight the PLA and to provide for the population’s safety and well-being. . . . Military units should maintain a high level of mobility and be able to move quickly around the island. Troops will also need to maintain rear area security in times of crisis and have the capability to counter PLA special forces operations. . . . As part of a comprehensive strategy, the ROC should be prepared to mount a sustained ground resistance, even in the event that Taipei is occupied. Strategic endurance involving an effective, long-term, organized resistance could enhance deterrence by raising the costs of an amphibious invasion and forcible occupation of the island.[10]
If Taiwan fields a force such as that described in the preceding paragraphs, it will contribute to Washington’s stated effort to shore up its own defense posture in Asia. If Taiwan and other individual states in Asia can deter aggression, that will alleviate pressure on US forces to be everywhere at all times and will undermine the arguments of those who believe that the United States should not defend countries that do not defend themselves. Countering that charge is especially important in the case of Taiwan, which does not have a formal defense treaty with the United States and is still viewed by some as an obstacle to better Sino-American relations.[11]
By enhancing its own defense capabilities, Taiwan can complement US efforts to build partnership capacity across Asia. Improved defenses among all of America’s Asian partners will contribute to stability in the region, a central goal of the US rebalance to Asia.
Military Innovation
DoD’s pivot to Asia cannot be limited to simply deploying more assets to the region and aiding others in bulking up their militaries. Forces in the region must be capable of operating safely and defeating possible adversaries. Given the nature of China’s military modernization, those are becoming more difficult tasks.
Indeed, China is posing a new kind of challenge for US air and maritime forces in particular: namely, the fielding of effective, high-tech, anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2/AD). Last year’s Defense Strategic Guidelines described the challenge in general terms:
In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged. In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus. States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well.Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.[12]
In other words, Beijing is developing capabilities designed to hold US forces distant from Chinese shores so as to prevent or complicate American intervention in a conflict in China’s so-called “near seas.” To address this challenge, DoD has developed a new operational concept: Air-Sea Battle. General Norton A. Schwartz (US Air Force) and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert (US Navy) described the concept in an article for theAmerican Interest last year:
With Air-Sea Battle, we are reinvigorating the historic partnership between our two departments to protect the freedom of the commons and ensure operational access for the Joint Force. Air-Sea Battle provides the concepts, capabilities and investments needed to overcome the challenges posed by emerging threats to access like ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced submarines and fighters, electronic warfare and mines. . . . Air-Sea Battle relies on highly integrated and tightly coordinated operations across warfighting domains—for example, using cyber methodologies to defeat threats to aircraft, or using aircraft to defeat threats on and under the sea.[13]
According to Schwartz and Greenert, Air-Sea Battle will require “resilient communications networks,” “new models for command and control” to better integrate air and naval forces, and a capability to “attack adversary systems wherever needed to gain access to contested areas.”[14]
Taiwan is situated well within the reach of China’s A2/AD capabilities. Whenever ROC forces operate—whether they are exercising or carrying out routine patrols—they are operating in an A2/AD environment. They thus face similar challenges to their American counterparts and may develop some similar solutions. Taiwan can assist the US military’s Air-Sea Battle efforts in two primary ways: first, by sharing experience and technology and, second, by sharing intelligence.
Cyber. No country has more experience than Taiwan in dealing with cyberintrusions emanating from the People’s Republic of China. The United States may be the biggest, juiciest target for Chinese hackers, but Taiwan is their primary concern. Taiwan is, in effect, on the front line of the growing confrontation in cyberspace between China and the United States and its allies. According to Chuang Ming-hsiung, chief of the Taiwan Criminal Investigation Bureau’s High-Technology Crime Prevention Center, “Before China releases a virus to the United States, it will test it on Taiwan. That’s why Taiwan has a faster response rate than the United States. This is Taiwan’s soft power.”[15]
Media reports have focused on cybertheft of information from companies in Taiwan or on attempted intrusions of the National Security Bureau, but People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hackers are surely also targeting Taiwan’s armed forces, particularly their command-and-control networks. Chinese cyberunits may be more aggressive in going after these networks than those of American forces, as they may have determined that doing so is not as risky.
Taiwan should be developing means to defend its military networks against cyberattacks and to neutralize attackers. Primary efforts to do so will likely remain in the cyber realm, but Taiwan’s military intelligence services should also work to identify and locate cyberunits on the mainland. In the event of a conflict, Taiwan and partner militaries should have the option to respond to cyberoffensives with kinetic means (with precision-guided munitions launched from sea, air, or land).
"No country has more experience than Taiwan in dealing with cyberintrusions emanating from the People’s Republic of China."
As Taiwan’s cyberwarriors learn to anticipate or rapidly identify and counter Chinese attacks, they should offer to share knowledge and technology with their American counterparts. Indeed, Taipei should consider inviting American military cyberexperts to regularly observe Taiwan’s cyberoperations. Taiwan’s expertise in this area can help ensure that American forces do not remain vulnerable to Chinese cyberattacks, mitigating one aspect of China’s A2/AD threat.
Command and Control. A primary target of China’s A2/AD capabilities is American command and control, which is enabled by a constellation of military communications satellites. These satellites are vulnerable, and the PLA has accordingly been developing antisatellite weapons to neutralize them. Kinetic kill vehicles, directed-energy weapons, and advanced jammers will allow the PLA to temporarily disable, if not destroy, US military communications satellites as well as imaging and intelligence satellites. In short, China is developing a capacity to blind, deafen, and silence US forces, eliminating a key advantage American forces have over their adversaries.
The US Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program will employ high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to complement space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. UAVs are much less costly than satellites and much easier to replace. Could US forces adopt a similar approach for command, control, and communications, at least at the theater level?
Taiwan’s military should experiment with just such a system for its own communications needs. Airborne, joint communications relays would enable dispersal of land, maritime, and air forces across, above, and out to sea from the mountainous island. An inner-atmosphere UAV “constellation” would consist of numerous aircraft aloft at once to allow for nearly uninterrupted communications should any units be destroyed; decoys could likewise be employed to confuse enemy munitions. Caches of communications UAVs would need to be maintained for rapid replacement of downed aircraft. The system would complement, rather than replace, Taiwan’s current hard-line and wireless communications.
If Taiwan can make such a system work in a hostile environment, it could provide invaluable assistance to Pentagon planners looking for ways to overcome China’s threats to America’s space-based systems. With early American participation in designing the system, it could even be designed for interoperability with US forces; in the event of a conflict in which US command-and-control networks are damaged, American forces could piggyback on Taiwan’s UAV constellation, easing operations in a contested environment.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Taiwan can most directly support the US defense posture in Asia by sharing intelligence. Via UAVs as well as ground-based and undersea sensors, Taiwan can develop a level of sustained, comprehensive, localized maritime domain awareness that the United States cannot given its more varied responsibilities and geographically diverse concerns. If Taiwan’s armed forces can maintain a comprehensive picture of what is happening on, above, and under the waters in the Taiwan Strait and around the island, it will serve to deter China (by making strategic, operational, and tactical surprise much more difficult) and enhance the ability of the US Navy and Air Force to confidently operate off China’s southeastern seaboard.
If Taiwan can establish comprehensive maritime domain awareness, it will likewise contribute to Japan’s security and to security in the South China Sea. Knowledge of Chinese naval and air movements will allow the United States and its allies to forecast possible confrontations at sea and, again, deter China from engaging in provocative deployments. During a conflict, Taiwan’s ISR could complement and in an emergency supplement America’s own ISR networks. Most importantly, US awareness of China’s maritime assets near Taiwan will help the United States blunt or overcome the PLA’s A2/AD capabilities.
Conclusion
As keeping the peace in Asia has become a more challenging task, the Obama administration has wisely emphasized the defense aspects of its policy for the region. Yet even as it has done so and as it has considered how close allies likes Japan and South Korea can enhance regional stability, Taiwan’s potential to play a crucial role in the pivot has been overlooked. Taiwan’s track record as a US partner, its military and technological capabilities, and its geostrategic importance all merit the island greater consideration from American defense planners—not only as a potential hotspot for conflict but also as a democratic society that can contribute to broader Asian security.
附錄一
“Taiwan’s Role in Supporting the U.S. Pivot in Asia”
by Parris H. Chang (張旭成)
www.wufi.org.tw
The United States Strategic shift toward the Asia-Pacific region is more than rhetoric. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told a conference of Asian defense leaders at Singapore in early June that the U.S. will “of necessity” rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region and vowed 60 percent of the Navy’s fleet, including 6 carrier battle groups, will be deployed to the region by 2020. He said that the U.S. presence will be more agile, flexible and high-tech, and a surge of U.S. troops overall.
America’s long-term allies, Japan, Korea and Australia, welcome the shift. Indeed, the U.S., Japan and Korea have been engaging trilateral security cooperation. Australia has agreed to the deployment of up to 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, the northern Australian city.
On June 3rd, Secretary Panetta paid his first visit to Vietnam and made a stop at Cam Ranh Bayh, making him the most senior U.S. official to go to the harbor since the Vietnamese War ended in 1975. He stood on the deck of a U.S. ship to commemorate the 17th anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations, underscoring Washington’s plan to enhance military cooperation with Vietnam.
Moreover, the U.S. is promoting a new strategy to forge partnership in Southeast Asia to protect vital maritime rights for all nations in the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has claimed the entire South China Sea as its own, in conflicts with Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and other states that have also territorial claims there.
In the past 13 years, the defense budget of the PRC has increased by 500 percent. Beijing’s perceived dominance and growing belligerence appears to be strengthening U.S. hand in rallying support of allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region.
Beijing’s campaign on the U.S. to Abandon Taiwan
In recent years, President Obama’s administration has continued to provide defensive arms to Taiwan as mandated by Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), despite bitter opposition from the PRC. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said emphatically last November that Taiwan is an important security and economic partner. The PRC sees the U.S. protective relationship over Taiwan as the most serious impediment to its goal of national unification, hence it has intensified efforts to remove the obstacle and weaken U.S.–Taiwan ties.
One approach is to force President Obama to end armed sales to Taiwan . When China’s ranking officials including Vice Chairman Xi Jinping visited Washington, they invariably put forth such a demand.
A second approach is to mount an all-court press on the U.S. to abandon its security commitment to Taiwan and repeal the TRA. Several U.S. academics have aired such a viewpoint , but to no avail. However, in Washington policy circles, retired ranking officials, such as Admiral Bill Owens, Vice-Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff, and Admiral Joseph Prueher, former Commander of the Pacific Command and former U.S. ambassador to China also took up Beijing’s cause, calling for President Obama to recognize the reality of a rising China and reconsider U.S. security ties to Taiwan.
A third approach is the threat of force against both Taiwan and the U.S. The PRC has deployed more than 1,500 ballistic and cruise missiles against Taiwan, improvement of the cross-strait relations since 2008 notwithstanding. Beijing is waging an intense political and psychological warfare both to deter Taiwan from seeking an independent statehood and compel President Ma Ying-jeou and his Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to start political talks leading to Taiwan’s eventual unification with China.
Furthermore, the PRC military has built up considerable “anti-access” and area-denial” capabilities. The strategy serves two purposes: to deter and defeat U.S. intervention in China’s possible use of force against Taiwan, and to uphold China’s hegemony in East Asia in contention with the U.S. Washington has not lost sight of China’s threat.
Taiwan Must Choose
Hence, The Obama administration issued in January the latest U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance in response to the forthcoming challenge. The Guidance underlies a heightened commitment to security in Asia and maps out a comprehensive plan to strengthen political, economic and military cooperation with allies and friends, including Taiwan.
Terrorism, nuclear proliferation and other threats require a shared and coordinated response. The Pentagon faces US$500 billion in defense budget cuts over the next 10 years; would U.S. allies share the burden for their own sake? When the American and allied forces moved into Afghanistan in October 2001 to fight Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party government lost no time in delivering 100 big military trucks to help with the Allies’ logistics and humanitarian relief operations in the war zones and, for several years, contributed US$20 million annually to the war on terror.
Will Taiwan’s KMT regime interact with the new U.S. strategy? And how? Is the Ma government willing to provide regional host support or other forms of burden-sharing to sustain and bolster the U.S. security presence in East Asia? This is especially critical, as Ma has been criticized for being excessively tilting toward the PRC, at the expense of Taiwan’s relations with the U.S. Taiwan must recognize who is its foes and who is its friend, and make the correct choice.
Obviously, the PRC is not Taiwan’s friend, as it has tried to isolate Taiwan in the international society and sought to annex Taiwan by economic and political means. Taiwan belongs to the community of democracies and should play an expanded and constructive role in the U.S. strategic pivot to Asia and in the world community.
Taiwan’s Expanded and Constructive Role
In December 2011, Rajiv Shah, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development(USAID) was in Taiwan to solicit Taiwan’s help in the U.S. global development aid programs. It would be wise for Ma’s government to take up the USAID invitation and actively participate in the U.S. global partnership projects to eliminate hunger and disease as well as promote social and economic development in less-developed countries. If Taiwan hopes to be seen as a responsible international stakeholder, Ma’s government must reverse its policy of “diplomatic truce” designed to accommodate Beijing, and desist from further cutting its foreign aid budget. In 2010, Taiwan spent US$ 380 million in foreign aid, or only 0.1 percent of its GDP, well below the UN standard of 0.7 percent. Worse, in 2012, Ma’s government may cut foreign aid by 13 percent.
To be worthy of a U.S. ally, Taiwan should strengthen its anti-proliferation security measures to forestall exports of precision instruments and dual-use high-tech components to Iran for research and production of nuclear arms and missiles. Likewise, Taiwan should stop or substantially reduce imports of oil from Iran, as Japan and Korea are doing, so as to reinforce U.S. sanctions on Iran.
In 2010, the PRC was the destination of 41.7 percent of Taiwan’s exports, and 83.8 percent of Taiwan’s outward investments. In 2011, the export and investment figures were respectively 40.2 percent and 79.6 percent. Taiwan’s over-dependence on China is dangerous, even without political complications. To redress the imbalance, Taiwan must enhance trade and investment connections with the U.S , the world’s largest economy, and with Japan and India.
Furthermore, Taiwan must foster security cooperation with the U.S., Japan and other democracies, instead of joint efforts with the PRC to safeguard sovereignty over disputed areas in the South China Seas, as Beijing-affiliated scholars have urged. It is imperative that an island-nation like Taiwan works closely the U.S. Japan and other democratic friends in the region to safeguard security and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and all the waterways surrounding Taiwan. As a member of the community of democracies, Taiwan must make its position clear that territorial disputes in East Asia and the South China Sea should be settled through peaceful means in a multi-lateral international forum and on the basis of international law.
(Dr. Parris H. Chang, professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University, is Chair Professor of General Education at Toko University and CEO of Taiwan Institute of Political, Economic and Strategic Studies. Previously, he was Deputy Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council.)
附錄二
“Taiwan’s Crucial Role in the US Pivot to Asia”
By Michael Mazza
7/9/2013
www.aei.org
The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia aims to improve security, prosperity, and human rights in the region, with particular focus on security efforts. Taiwan and the United States have a long-standing but often-underemphasized security partnership that could play a significant role in this effort. Because of its proximity to and knowledge of China, Taiwan is uniquely equipped to help US efforts to (1) expand presence and access in the region by ensuring US forces can utilize facilities on the island in the event of a conflict; (2) build partnership capacity by improving its self-defense capabilities; and (3) improve military innovation by sharing experience, technology, and intelligence with the United States. Rather than fearing damaging bilateral ties with China, the United States should take advantage of the benefits this important partnership can offer.
Key points in this Outlook:
• Although Taiwan’s potential role in the US pivot to Asia has been largely ignored, the island nation is uniquely poised to be an important partner in the security component of that effort.
• The United States should help Taiwan shore up its air and sea defenses so that it can assist in deterring potential Chinese aggression, thus contributing to stability in the region.
• Taiwan is positioned to contribute important cyber knowledge, communications capabilities, and intelligence to US defense efforts in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Republic of China (ROC), on Taiwan, is one of America’s oldest security partners. The formal relationship dates back at least as far as the early days of America’s participation in World War II, when the famed US Flying Tigers began flying combat missions over China against the Japanese. US and Republican Chinese forces fought side by side in Burma during the war and stood together against communism during the Cold War.
Ironically, faced with a reemergent People’s Republic of China on the mainland, which is posing a significant and growing threat to regional security for the first time since the mid-20th century, the United States has not attempted to reinvigorate its relationship with Taiwan. This is all the more peculiar at a time when the United States is supposedly pivoting its foreign, defense, and trade policies to focus on Asia.
The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia—also called the “rebalance”—is more than 18 months old. In a November 2011 speech to the Australian parliament, President Obama announced that he had “made a deliberate and strategic decision—as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.”[1]
The president described three pillars of his new Asia policy: ensuring security, promoting prosperity, and supporting human rights. Listing security first was deliberate. Security and peace enable continued prosperity and advancements on questions of human rights.
In describing how the United States would seek security, the president discussed defense modernization, the five US alliances in Asia (with Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand), outreach to Southeast Asian states, and engagement with regional organizations. Nowhere in his speech did he mention Taiwan—which knows China better than anyone and occupies key geostrategic territory—or the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the United States to supply arms to Taiwan and to ensure its own capacity to come to Taiwan’s aid in the case of conflict.
This neglect on the part of the Obama administration comes from a desire to avoid the supposed risk of offending China and damaging bilateral ties. But such logic is shortsighted. No, China will not like a cozier US-Taiwan defense relationship. But such a relationship would serve to stabilize the region, better deter China from using coercion or force against the island, and ensure continued peace in the Taiwan Strait. If the military pillar of the Asia pivot is meant to deter Chinese adventurism, there is little question that Taiwan has an important role to play in ensuring that outcome.
The US military rebalance to the Asia-Pacific includes three primary lines of effort:
• Expanding presence and access.
• Building partnership capacity.
• Military innovation.
These three pillars are mutually reinforcing: any one would be ineffective without the others. To date, Washington has largely neglected Taiwan in carrying out this policy. Taiwan, however, may be able to contribute to all three efforts.
Expanding Presence and Access
Two of the US Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) attempts to expand presence in Asia have been quite visible. In November 2011, then Australian prime minister Julia Gillard and President Obama announced that starting in 2012, Australia would “welcome deployments of a company-size rotation of 200 to 250 Marines in the Northern Territory for around six months at a time.” Over several years, that presence would increase to approximately 2,500 Marine personnel, or a full Marine Expeditionary Unit.[2] This rotational presence enables US Marines to more regularly exercise with their Australian counterparts and with partners throughout Southeast Asia. They are also poised to quickly respond to a crisis—whether natural or manmade—in the region.
Gillard and Obama also announced that US military aircraft would have greater access to the Royal Australian Air Force’s bases in the country’s north. Although the relatively small number of Marines and their distance from the most likely regional hotspots for US involvement limits their substantive contribution to regional security, the deployment at least sends a positive message to the region.
Last year, Singapore similarly agreed to welcome a rotational deployment of US Navy littoral combat ships (LCSs). The first ship arrived in Singapore in April, and the strategically located Southeast Asian country will eventually host four LCSs at a time. This access arrangement will enhance the Navy’s ability to engage in more regular port calls and combined exercises in Southeast Asia.
These LCSs, depending on the modules with which they are equipped, will be ideally positioned to carry out antipiracy, antisubmarine warfare, and other missions in the South China Sea. As with the new Marine Corps rotations in Australia, the LCS presence in Singapore is more style than substance and unlikely to significantly deter Chinese or North Korean adventurism.
Perhaps less visible, but no less important, has been DoD’s pursuit of expanded access arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. Here, Washington has seen the greatest progress in its talks with the Philippines. The two countries have recently settled on an agreement that will increase the rotation of US forces through the Philippines and grant US forces more access to former US outposts Subic Bay and Clark Air Base.
"If the military pillar of the Asia pivot is meant to deter Chinese adventurism, there is little question that Taiwan has an important role to play in ensuring that outcome."
Of the military pivot’s three pillars, Taiwan is least able to contribute to US efforts to expand presence and access in Asia. It should be noted that no US-China treaty bans American forces from Taiwan. In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, a document with no legal standing, the United States affirmed “the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan.”
Although this objective was met for a time, starting in 2005 US defense attachés were once again posted to the American Institute in Taiwan, the unofficial US embassy there.
Still, although there may be good geostrategic reasons for greater numbers of US forces to be present on Taiwan—such as enhanced capacity for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; conventional deterrence; and sea line security—neither Washington nor Taipei has any political appetite for such a change. Both capitals are likely to consider the deployment of US troops to the island as too provocative for Beijing and potentially damaging for US-China and cross-strait relations.
Yet Taiwan can take steps to ensure that US forces would have access to the island’s facilities during a time of crisis, even in the absence of a formal access agreement. Taiwan, for example, could invest in infrastructure that would enable the island to serve as a logistics hub for US forces in the event of a conflict to the island’s north or in the South China Sea. Along similar lines, Taiwan might stockpile supplies that would be of use to American forces operating in the region. Doing so would complicate China’s war planning, improve deterrence, and enhance America’s ability to come to the aid of Taiwan and other allies during an emergency, all without provoking Beijing in the way that formal access arrangements or actual US presence would.
Building Partnership Capacity
The Obama administration has recognized that one of the most effective ways of avoiding conflict in Asia is to ensure that American allies and partners have the capacity to defend themselves. The president’s 2012 strategic guidance to the Department of Defense promised to “expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.”[3] Speaking at the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue several months later, then–secretary of defense Leon Panetta put a finer point on it: “We will play an essential role in promoting strong partnerships that strengthen the capabilities of the Pacific nations to defend and secure themselves.”[4]
In large part, this effort will rely on continuing large annual and biennial multinational military exercises throughout the region. DoD will also, ideally, expand the number of maneuvers it leads and the number of countries with which it exercises. For example, Burma was invited for the first time to observe this year’s Cobra Gold, an annual exercise that the United States and Thailand colead. Other regular participants have included Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. The US Navy has likewise conducted drills with its Vietnamese counterpart, with exercises focusing on noncombat scenarios like search-and-rescue missions and maritime navigation.
In additional to expanding exercises, the United States has also transferred military items to partner nations. The flagship of the Philippine navy, for example, is a retired US Coast Guard cutter; Manila has thus far purchased two of these vessels from the United States. Although not modern warships, they do enhance the Philippines’ ability to patrol and defend its own waters. Japan, Australia, and Singapore will purchase F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and South Korea will likely follow suit. Further afield, India has also bought a number of high-end defense articles from the United States in recent years, including C-130J, C-17, and P-8I aircraft, as well as Apache helicopters and munitions.
The Obama administration has permitted some arms sales to Taiwan, but it has not been proactive on this front. In 2010, the administration released several items for sale that had earlier been approved by the Bush administration, including PAC-3 missile defense interceptors, Black Hawk helicopters, and refurbished Osprey-class mine hunting ships. In 2011, the administration approved the sale of upgrades for Taiwan’s F-16A/B fighters. Troublingly, the White House has not approved those items that Taiwan needs most: new F-16C/D fighter jets and submarines.
Taiwan does not have the opportunity—as Japan does—to assist weaker partners in developing their defense capabilities. As a US partner, however, it can and should focus on advancing its own capacity for self-defense.
Given its location, the island of Taiwan is of great geostrategic importance. In a sense, it is the cork that keeps Chinese maritime and air forces bottled up within what China calls the “first island chain”—a string of islands running from Japan in the north, through Japan’s Ryukyu chain to the Philippine island of Luzon, and then skirting the southern and western perimeters of the South China Sea. Even though no US troops are stationed on Taiwan, the island’s continued de facto independence is crucial for America’s forward defense perimeter, which since World War II has sought to keep would-be aggressors from approaching the United States via the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan fell into unfriendly hands, moreover, America would find it increasingly difficult to defend its Asian treaty allies, notably Japan and the Philippines.
Taiwan, then, can best contribute to the Pentagon’s rebalance by ensuring that it can adequately defend itself against Chinese aggression. Recent trends in Taiwan’s defense spending, however, suggest that the island is not dedicating sufficient resources to that task.
According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, since 2001, Taiwan’s annual defense budget growth has averaged only 0.5 percent, and this is at a time when Taiwan’s military is shifting to what should be a much more expensive, all-volunteer force. By comparison, China’s defense budget has grown an average of 12.2 percent yearly over the same period and 213.9 percent overall from 2001 to 2011 as compared to Taiwan’s 3.5 percent.[5]
Over the past decade, Taiwan’s defense spending has accounted for between 1.9 and 2.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). By comparison, Georgia—which like Taiwan faces a considerable military threat from a giant neighbor but which has per capita GDP only one-sixth that of Taiwan—has dedicated over 5 percent of GDP to defense spending since 2006, hitting 9.2 percent in 2007 (before, not in reaction to, the Russian invasion in 2008).
Although Taiwan has experienced slower economic growth of late, it is, by any measure, a prosperous country. Taipei should at the very least meet its own goal of spending 3 percent of GDP on defense. Failure to do so will not only limit the effectiveness of Taiwan’s armed forces, but also risk empowering those in the United States who argue that since Taiwan does not defend itself, neither should America.
Of course, Taiwan’s defense capability is a question not of simply how many dollars are spent but of how they are spent. The military should be able to respond to the full range of potential Chinese actions, from a relatively low-intensity scenario (such as a partial naval blockade) to the highest-intensity option (a full-scale invasion). Such preparedness requires a wide range of defense capabilities.
A combination of advanced air defenses and modern tactical fighter aircraft are necessary, first so that Taiwan can control its own airspace and, second, so that the ROC Air Force can carry out limited retaliatory strikes on the mainland if need be. To that end, Taipei should continue lobbying both the Obama administration and Capitol Hill to approve the export to Taiwan of new F-16C/Ds. Although the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND’s) requirement for “next-generation fighters,” as articulated in its recent Quadrennial Defense Review, is sensible over the long term, the realities of America’s recent arms sales track record and of the F-35’s development challenges make this an unrealistic option during the next decade if not longer.[6] New F-16s remain MND’s only viable option if Taiwan is to maintain an effective air force in the coming years.
"Taiwan can best contribute to the Pentagon's rebalance by ensuring that it can adequately defend itself against Chinese aggression."
At sea, Taiwan needs a mix of traditional and asymmetric systems. To maintain a capability to keep open safe transit corridors during a blockade, submarines are crucial. Quiet, diesel-powered submarines would also enhance Taiwan’s ability to interdict surface vessels entering the northern or southern approaches of the Taiwan Strait. Fast-attack missile boats, meanwhile, would grant Taiwan a much-needed sea denial capability. MND’s decision to develop a new 500-ton stealth corvette is a positive development.[7]
The US Naval War College’s Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes have made the case that the ROC Navy should rely more heavily on such vessels than on traditional large surface combatants.[8]Writing for the Diplomat, Holmes argued that Taiwan could “disperse large numbers of small combatants to hardened sites . . . around the island’s rough coast. Such vessels could sortie to conduct independent operations against enemy shipping. Or, they could mass their firepower in concerted ‘wolf pack’ attacks on major PLAN formations.”[9]Taiwan does not have the resources to match China’s investments in destroyers and frigates, but if the ROC Navy fields innovative capabilities and develops innovative ways of operating, it could make life miserable for the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Taiwan Strait.
On land, ROC forces should be able to prevent, or at least delay, PLA forces from establishing a beachhead. A fight for control of the island would be the most stressful scenario for both Taiwan’s military and society. As several colleagues and I argued in 2009:
Ground forces should be ready both to fight the PLA and to provide for the population’s safety and well-being. . . . Military units should maintain a high level of mobility and be able to move quickly around the island. Troops will also need to maintain rear area security in times of crisis and have the capability to counter PLA special forces operations. . . . As part of a comprehensive strategy, the ROC should be prepared to mount a sustained ground resistance, even in the event that Taipei is occupied. Strategic endurance involving an effective, long-term, organized resistance could enhance deterrence by raising the costs of an amphibious invasion and forcible occupation of the island.[10]
If Taiwan fields a force such as that described in the preceding paragraphs, it will contribute to Washington’s stated effort to shore up its own defense posture in Asia. If Taiwan and other individual states in Asia can deter aggression, that will alleviate pressure on US forces to be everywhere at all times and will undermine the arguments of those who believe that the United States should not defend countries that do not defend themselves. Countering that charge is especially important in the case of Taiwan, which does not have a formal defense treaty with the United States and is still viewed by some as an obstacle to better Sino-American relations.[11]
By enhancing its own defense capabilities, Taiwan can complement US efforts to build partnership capacity across Asia. Improved defenses among all of America’s Asian partners will contribute to stability in the region, a central goal of the US rebalance to Asia.
Military Innovation
DoD’s pivot to Asia cannot be limited to simply deploying more assets to the region and aiding others in bulking up their militaries. Forces in the region must be capable of operating safely and defeating possible adversaries. Given the nature of China’s military modernization, those are becoming more difficult tasks.
Indeed, China is posing a new kind of challenge for US air and maritime forces in particular: namely, the fielding of effective, high-tech, anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2/AD). Last year’s Defense Strategic Guidelines described the challenge in general terms:
In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged. In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus. States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well.Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.[12]
In other words, Beijing is developing capabilities designed to hold US forces distant from Chinese shores so as to prevent or complicate American intervention in a conflict in China’s so-called “near seas.” To address this challenge, DoD has developed a new operational concept: Air-Sea Battle. General Norton A. Schwartz (US Air Force) and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert (US Navy) described the concept in an article for theAmerican Interest last year:
With Air-Sea Battle, we are reinvigorating the historic partnership between our two departments to protect the freedom of the commons and ensure operational access for the Joint Force. Air-Sea Battle provides the concepts, capabilities and investments needed to overcome the challenges posed by emerging threats to access like ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced submarines and fighters, electronic warfare and mines. . . . Air-Sea Battle relies on highly integrated and tightly coordinated operations across warfighting domains—for example, using cyber methodologies to defeat threats to aircraft, or using aircraft to defeat threats on and under the sea.[13]
According to Schwartz and Greenert, Air-Sea Battle will require “resilient communications networks,” “new models for command and control” to better integrate air and naval forces, and a capability to “attack adversary systems wherever needed to gain access to contested areas.”[14]
Taiwan is situated well within the reach of China’s A2/AD capabilities. Whenever ROC forces operate—whether they are exercising or carrying out routine patrols—they are operating in an A2/AD environment. They thus face similar challenges to their American counterparts and may develop some similar solutions. Taiwan can assist the US military’s Air-Sea Battle efforts in two primary ways: first, by sharing experience and technology and, second, by sharing intelligence.
Cyber. No country has more experience than Taiwan in dealing with cyberintrusions emanating from the People’s Republic of China. The United States may be the biggest, juiciest target for Chinese hackers, but Taiwan is their primary concern. Taiwan is, in effect, on the front line of the growing confrontation in cyberspace between China and the United States and its allies. According to Chuang Ming-hsiung, chief of the Taiwan Criminal Investigation Bureau’s High-Technology Crime Prevention Center, “Before China releases a virus to the United States, it will test it on Taiwan. That’s why Taiwan has a faster response rate than the United States. This is Taiwan’s soft power.”[15]
Media reports have focused on cybertheft of information from companies in Taiwan or on attempted intrusions of the National Security Bureau, but People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hackers are surely also targeting Taiwan’s armed forces, particularly their command-and-control networks. Chinese cyberunits may be more aggressive in going after these networks than those of American forces, as they may have determined that doing so is not as risky.
Taiwan should be developing means to defend its military networks against cyberattacks and to neutralize attackers. Primary efforts to do so will likely remain in the cyber realm, but Taiwan’s military intelligence services should also work to identify and locate cyberunits on the mainland. In the event of a conflict, Taiwan and partner militaries should have the option to respond to cyberoffensives with kinetic means (with precision-guided munitions launched from sea, air, or land).
"No country has more experience than Taiwan in dealing with cyberintrusions emanating from the People’s Republic of China."
As Taiwan’s cyberwarriors learn to anticipate or rapidly identify and counter Chinese attacks, they should offer to share knowledge and technology with their American counterparts. Indeed, Taipei should consider inviting American military cyberexperts to regularly observe Taiwan’s cyberoperations. Taiwan’s expertise in this area can help ensure that American forces do not remain vulnerable to Chinese cyberattacks, mitigating one aspect of China’s A2/AD threat.
Command and Control. A primary target of China’s A2/AD capabilities is American command and control, which is enabled by a constellation of military communications satellites. These satellites are vulnerable, and the PLA has accordingly been developing antisatellite weapons to neutralize them. Kinetic kill vehicles, directed-energy weapons, and advanced jammers will allow the PLA to temporarily disable, if not destroy, US military communications satellites as well as imaging and intelligence satellites. In short, China is developing a capacity to blind, deafen, and silence US forces, eliminating a key advantage American forces have over their adversaries.
The US Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program will employ high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to complement space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. UAVs are much less costly than satellites and much easier to replace. Could US forces adopt a similar approach for command, control, and communications, at least at the theater level?
Taiwan’s military should experiment with just such a system for its own communications needs. Airborne, joint communications relays would enable dispersal of land, maritime, and air forces across, above, and out to sea from the mountainous island. An inner-atmosphere UAV “constellation” would consist of numerous aircraft aloft at once to allow for nearly uninterrupted communications should any units be destroyed; decoys could likewise be employed to confuse enemy munitions. Caches of communications UAVs would need to be maintained for rapid replacement of downed aircraft. The system would complement, rather than replace, Taiwan’s current hard-line and wireless communications.
If Taiwan can make such a system work in a hostile environment, it could provide invaluable assistance to Pentagon planners looking for ways to overcome China’s threats to America’s space-based systems. With early American participation in designing the system, it could even be designed for interoperability with US forces; in the event of a conflict in which US command-and-control networks are damaged, American forces could piggyback on Taiwan’s UAV constellation, easing operations in a contested environment.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Taiwan can most directly support the US defense posture in Asia by sharing intelligence. Via UAVs as well as ground-based and undersea sensors, Taiwan can develop a level of sustained, comprehensive, localized maritime domain awareness that the United States cannot given its more varied responsibilities and geographically diverse concerns. If Taiwan’s armed forces can maintain a comprehensive picture of what is happening on, above, and under the waters in the Taiwan Strait and around the island, it will serve to deter China (by making strategic, operational, and tactical surprise much more difficult) and enhance the ability of the US Navy and Air Force to confidently operate off China’s southeastern seaboard.
If Taiwan can establish comprehensive maritime domain awareness, it will likewise contribute to Japan’s security and to security in the South China Sea. Knowledge of Chinese naval and air movements will allow the United States and its allies to forecast possible confrontations at sea and, again, deter China from engaging in provocative deployments. During a conflict, Taiwan’s ISR could complement and in an emergency supplement America’s own ISR networks. Most importantly, US awareness of China’s maritime assets near Taiwan will help the United States blunt or overcome the PLA’s A2/AD capabilities.
Conclusion
As keeping the peace in Asia has become a more challenging task, the Obama administration has wisely emphasized the defense aspects of its policy for the region. Yet even as it has done so and as it has considered how close allies likes Japan and South Korea can enhance regional stability, Taiwan’s potential to play a crucial role in the pivot has been overlooked. Taiwan’s track record as a US partner, its military and technological capabilities, and its geostrategic importance all merit the island greater consideration from American defense planners—not only as a potential hotspot for conflict but also as a democratic society that can contribute to broader Asian security.
Taiwan, of course, can take steps to make such consideration more likely. By adequately investing in its own military and by experimenting with innovative approaches to the Chinese military challenge, Taiwan can make itself into a more dependable and more valuable security partner for the United States. That could have positive implications for all aspects of the US-Taiwan relationship.
台灣獨立建國聯盟
www.wufi.org.tw
敬悼蔡同榮前主席 台灣獨立建國聯盟前主席蔡同榮先生，因出血性腦中風於今日凌晨辭世，享壽79歲。...
沒有留言:
張貼留言