Alger Lim的呼籲: 台灣人各黨派凝聚共識.分進合擊.殊途同歸 (第三篇)---(下)
第五部分
接下來我們看小布希第二個任期的國務院東亞事務副助卿Thomas J. Christensen怎麼說:
"A Strong and Moderate Taiwan"
Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council
Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, Maryland
September 11, 2007
My remarks represent the agreed views of the United States Government. I invite you to consider my comments in that light.
This conference is timely. In the year ahead, we will again celebrate Taiwan's democracy, and we will also closely follow how Taiwan's leaders navigate the often difficult circumstances in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Their actions will be a major factor in determining whether the interests of their people are protected; whether Taiwan will continue to flourish in an environment of peace and security; or whether all that Taiwan has achieved might be put at risk by cross-Strait tensions or, worse still, conflict.
For reasons that I will elaborate in a moment, the United States has an abiding interest in a stable and peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait in which Taiwan thrives. Anything that makes Taiwan stronger and safer is good for the United States, and, for obvious reasons, is also good for the people of Taiwan. Anything that places such peace and stability at risk runs directly against the interests of the United States. For these reasons, we look to Taiwan to adopt strategies toward cross-Strait relations that combine strength - both military and economic - with moderation. When we see policies that diverge from these goals, we owe it to ourselves and to the Taiwan people to speak out.
Origins of U.S. Interest
I would first like to address two fundamental questions: why does the United States care about Taiwan's security, and what is the basis for our expression of views on this important subject? The answers to the first are straight-forward. As a Pacific power with global interests and obligations, the United States has a natural interest in peace throughout Asia. Because the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint for conflict, the area demands our constant attention. Meanwhile, through our decades of close friendship with the people of Taiwan, we have acquired deep admiration for their achievements under difficult circumstances and a special concern for their democracy, freedom from coercion, and prosperity. A successful Taiwan is a beacon for East Asia and beyond. Finally, U.S. support for Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. domestic law in the Taiwan Relations Act. In short, strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security.
The same arguments, in turn, give us a legitimate voice on issues touching on Taiwan security. Naturally, judgments about how to defend Taiwan rest ultimately with the people of Taiwan, as articulated through their democratic institutions. We respect that prerogative. At the same time, to defend our own interests, satisfy our legal obligations, and, indeed, support people whom we regard as old friends, we believe we are right to express our views, including our real concerns, regarding Taiwan's security policies. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwan people will decide for themselves how to respond to the views expressed by their friends in the United States.
With that, I would like to speak today about Taiwan's security in the broadest sense and about the factors that are critical to sustaining it. Everything I say here is based on a recognition of the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing's refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our unilateral capability to respond to such coercion, if our President were so to choose. Actions speak louder than words, and no one on either side of the Strait has an excuse for being ignorant of U.S. expectations and determination to protect our own interests. At the same time, our resolute defense of these interests has benefited the region for decades, providing the indispensable conditions for stability in the Strait, a dramatic increase in prosperity on both sides, rich and growing cross-Strait connections, and a democratic transformation on Taiwan that is an inspiration to the world.
The Need for Taiwan's Strength and Moderation
As I stated at the outset, the United States believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to the immediate and long-term security needs of the people of Taiwan. Anything less than strength and moderation leaves Taiwan vulnerable, endangers regional peace, and potentially threatens U.S. interests. Let me address these two fundamental elements in turn.
A Strong Taiwan
接下來我們看小布希第二個任期的國務院東亞事務副助卿Thomas J. Christensen怎麼說:
"A Strong and Moderate Taiwan"
Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council
Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, Maryland
September 11, 2007
My remarks represent the agreed views of the United States Government. I invite you to consider my comments in that light.
This conference is timely. In the year ahead, we will again celebrate Taiwan's democracy, and we will also closely follow how Taiwan's leaders navigate the often difficult circumstances in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Their actions will be a major factor in determining whether the interests of their people are protected; whether Taiwan will continue to flourish in an environment of peace and security; or whether all that Taiwan has achieved might be put at risk by cross-Strait tensions or, worse still, conflict.
For reasons that I will elaborate in a moment, the United States has an abiding interest in a stable and peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait in which Taiwan thrives. Anything that makes Taiwan stronger and safer is good for the United States, and, for obvious reasons, is also good for the people of Taiwan. Anything that places such peace and stability at risk runs directly against the interests of the United States. For these reasons, we look to Taiwan to adopt strategies toward cross-Strait relations that combine strength - both military and economic - with moderation. When we see policies that diverge from these goals, we owe it to ourselves and to the Taiwan people to speak out.
Origins of U.S. Interest
I would first like to address two fundamental questions: why does the United States care about Taiwan's security, and what is the basis for our expression of views on this important subject? The answers to the first are straight-forward. As a Pacific power with global interests and obligations, the United States has a natural interest in peace throughout Asia. Because the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint for conflict, the area demands our constant attention. Meanwhile, through our decades of close friendship with the people of Taiwan, we have acquired deep admiration for their achievements under difficult circumstances and a special concern for their democracy, freedom from coercion, and prosperity. A successful Taiwan is a beacon for East Asia and beyond. Finally, U.S. support for Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. domestic law in the Taiwan Relations Act. In short, strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security.
The same arguments, in turn, give us a legitimate voice on issues touching on Taiwan security. Naturally, judgments about how to defend Taiwan rest ultimately with the people of Taiwan, as articulated through their democratic institutions. We respect that prerogative. At the same time, to defend our own interests, satisfy our legal obligations, and, indeed, support people whom we regard as old friends, we believe we are right to express our views, including our real concerns, regarding Taiwan's security policies. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwan people will decide for themselves how to respond to the views expressed by their friends in the United States.
With that, I would like to speak today about Taiwan's security in the broadest sense and about the factors that are critical to sustaining it. Everything I say here is based on a recognition of the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing's refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our unilateral capability to respond to such coercion, if our President were so to choose. Actions speak louder than words, and no one on either side of the Strait has an excuse for being ignorant of U.S. expectations and determination to protect our own interests. At the same time, our resolute defense of these interests has benefited the region for decades, providing the indispensable conditions for stability in the Strait, a dramatic increase in prosperity on both sides, rich and growing cross-Strait connections, and a democratic transformation on Taiwan that is an inspiration to the world.
The Need for Taiwan's Strength and Moderation
As I stated at the outset, the United States believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to the immediate and long-term security needs of the people of Taiwan. Anything less than strength and moderation leaves Taiwan vulnerable, endangers regional peace, and potentially threatens U.S. interests. Let me address these two fundamental elements in turn.
A Strong Taiwan