---孤立主義、姑息主義與現實政治派的大本營之一的智庫Cat
---Carpenter說: "Officially or tacitly accepting Chinese primacy in East Asia may prove to be the least bad option available." [美國正式接受或默許中國在東亞的優越地位，可能會被證明為最不
一
美國的國安、國防、戰略與外交智庫形形色色，填滿了政治光譜中的
在美國這些令人不安的智庫與令人側目的國安外交專家學者之中，有
Carpenter基本上是所謂的「對中調適派」、「姑息主義派
二
Carpenter這一派人的評論與報告，基本上是在他們所屬的
在我們請台灣與台美鄉親們閱讀該文之前，我們先請大家閱讀老共在
「美媒：美國應考慮承認中國地區主導國地位」
2014年9月3日02:22
來源：僑報網
作者：陳高正
【僑報網編譯陳高正9月2日報導】// 華盛頓當前採取的對華政策，打的是“接觸”錯綜複雜（congag 鍵相）政策。
“赫芬頓郵報”網站近日刊文指出，“接觸”政策主要就兩國經貿往來而言，因為中國是美國的第三大貿易夥伴國，且中國金融機構持有美國約1.3萬億美元的債務，而“遏制”政策主要就美國的戰略利益考量而言，因為美國在加強與日本，韓國，菲律賓，澳大利亞等傳統盟友的軍事聯繫的同時，眼下又在尋求與越南，印度等國建立新興夥伴關係，此舉部分是為回應各方期待，以共同遏制北京日益增長的地區影響力。
自上世紀70年代初尼克松政府開啟中國“破冰之旅”至本世紀早些時候，歷屆美國政府均強調對華以“接觸”為主，但小布什上台以後 ，直至今天的奧巴馬政府，開始轉向“遏制”。儘管“遏制”政策是含蓄的，不明確的，卻有加強的趨勢。華盛頓慫恿其東亞盟友加強協防，以應對更大範圍內的地區突發事件，尤其是奧巴馬上台以來的這些年，美國更傾向於偏袒越南，菲律賓等與中國有領土爭端的國家， 更不用說日本了。
種種“非正式”的“遏制”行為當然騙不了任何人，尤其是中國政府 ，但是，這樣走下去，兩國最終可能“擦槍走火”。就此，美國應該認真思考，是否還有對抗更少，可以持續更久的對華政策？
事實上，中國憑藉龐大的人口數量和不斷增長的經濟和軍事實力，注定成長為東亞主導國，但想讓美國接受這種可能性，爭議在所難免， 即使有那麼一點點暗示，也會激起關於“綏靖政策”（appeas 鍵相）的尖銳指責。“綏靖政策”是指對侵略者採取的姑息縱容政策，由於上世紀30年代後期西方國家對希特勒領導下的德國採取“綏靖政策”，進而導致災難性的後果，該名詞有了令人憎惡的涵義。
其實，比起上世紀30年代所造成的災難性後果，所謂的“綏靖政策 “歷史更為久遠，成功果實更為豐碩。早在19世紀90年代，英國就曾採取過溫和的“綏靖政策”，美國是其中的主要受益者當年。， 英國在回應委內瑞拉與鄰近一處英國殖民地邊界爭端時，倫敦有個選擇，即要么與實力日益增長的美國對峙，要么承認美國的地區主導國地位並接受華盛頓的政策偏好。要知道，美國當時提出了“門羅主義 “（門羅主義），阻止歐洲勢力干涉西半球事務。最終，英國選擇了後者，從而結束了兩國數十年來的各種爭端，並為以後兩國結成親密盟友打下了基礎。
由此推論，美國政府至少應該考慮，若對中國採取類似的讓步政策， 是否可能與中國建立起一種新型的，可以極大減少爭議的關係？與此同時，是否可以保證美國在西太平洋的重要利益不受損？換句話說， 現在是不是到了可以認可中國“門羅主義”的時候？美國是否可以承認中國如今是東亞的地區主導國？倘若可以，有必要對這樣的劇烈改變作個說明，即北京不僅應接受“門羅主義”的原始邏輯，還應接受 “羅斯福推論”（羅斯福推論）。“羅斯福推論”由西奧多•羅斯福總統（美國第26任總統，後來擔任總統的富蘭克林•羅斯福是其遠房堂侄） 提出，向英國及其他歐洲勢力保證，美國會維持西半球運行秩序，並規範該地區內“不負責任”的政權，對中國而言，朝鮮就是一例。
然而，即使中國願意配合美國成為地區秩序的維護國，想讓美國認可中國“門羅主義”，仍有兩大主要障礙。
其一，日本既是美國在東亞的盟友，也是中國不容分說的競爭對手。 若美國認可中國“門羅主義”，就意味著與日本解除盟友關係，而東京也不一定會接受地區第二的位置，這樣一來，東亞的穩定前景堪憂 。
其二，美中兩國政治體系有著極大的不同。英國承認美國為地區主導國比較容易，因為兩國均是資本主義國家，且共同享有主要的文化特徵，但中國是社會主義國家，從地緣政治學的角度來看，要讓美國信任中國，不是那麼容易。
但是，無論是「正式承認“還是”默認“中國為東亞地區主導國，對美國而言，可能是“最不壞”的選擇，不管怎樣，“接觸加遏制”政策趨於不穩定，華盛頓的政策制定者是否應該在與北京關係緊張之前 ，考慮一下對華政策備選項？//
三
「僑報」這種匪報一見到Carpenter的評論與主張，當然如
“Should Washington Consider Accepting a Chinese Monroe Doctrine?”
By Ted Galen Carpenter
Huffingtonpost.com
Posted: 08/26/2014 4:26 pm EDT
//Washington has pursued a policy toward China that some American scholars have dubbed "congagement"--a mixture of engagement and containment.
The engagement component is primarily economic in nature. China is America's third largest trading partner, and Chinese financial institutions now hold some $1.3 trillion in U.S. government debt.
The containment component is primarily strategic in nature, especially as the United States has moved to strengthen its military ties with such traditional allies as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia, as well as develop such ties with new strategic partners (e.g., Vietnam and India). Those moves are motivated, at least in part, by a desire by the various parties to contain Beijing's growing regional power and influence.
Beginning with the Nixon administration's initial outreach to the Chinese government in the early 1970s, and continuing through successive administrations until the early years of the 21st century, the engagement aspect in U.S. policy was dominant. But during the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the emphasis shifted.
Containment, albeit implicit rather than explicit, has now become the principal feature -- and that trend is accelerating. Washington prods its East Asian allies to devote greater efforts to defense, and U.S. officials seek to transform the bilateral alliances with those nations to cover broader, regional security contingencies. Especially during the Obama years, U.S. policy has tilted in favor of countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which are embroiled in territorial disputes with China involving the South China Sea, and has backed Japan in its contentious confrontation with Beijing over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.
Such informal manifestations of containment deceive no one -- least of all, Chinese officials. Washington's current strategy is fomenting growing tensions with China, and those could ultimately lead to a military collision in East Asia between the two powers. [華府目前的戰略是在增強與中國之間的緊張關係，華府那些作為最
RECOGNIZE CHINA'S REGIONAL PREEMINENCE
One admittedly controversial option would be to accept the likelihood that China, by virtue of its greater population and mounting economic and military capabilities, is destined to become the dominant power in East Asia. Even the hint of recognizing Chinese regional pre-eminence, though, always produces shrill allegations of "appeasement." And that term has an especially odious connotation because of the disastrous appeasement policy that the Western powers pursued toward Adolf Hitler in the late 1930s.
But so-called appeasement has a much longer and more productive history than the calamitous 1930s model would suggest. Indeed, the United States was the principal beneficiary of a milder version that Britain adopted in the 1890s.
In response to a nasty boundary dispute between Venezuela and a neighboring British colony, London faced a stark choice. It could confront an increasingly powerful United States, which was mightily annoyed at what it perceived as a challenge to Washington's cherished Monroe Doctrine barring European interference in the Western Hemisphere. The alternative was to concede that the United States was now the dominant power in that region and to accept Washington's policy preferences. British officials chose the latter course, a move that ended decades of tensions between the two countries over various issues and created the foundation for what would ultimately become an extremely close alliance.
U.S. officials need to at least consider whether a similar concession might create the basis for a new, far less contentious, relationship with China while still protecting important American interests in the Western Pacific.
In other words, is it time to recognize a Chinese equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine in East Asia -- accepting that China is now the pre-eminent regional power? There are essential caveats to such a dramatic policy shift. At a minimum, Beijing would need to embrace not only the original logic of the Monroe Doctrine, but also the so-called Roosevelt Corollary. The latter, adopted during Theodore Roosevelt's administration, promised Britain and the other European powers that the United States would maintain order in the Western Hemisphere and discipline irresponsible governments in the region.
That requirement would have direct applicability to a preeminent role by Beijing in East Asia. Specifically, China would need to accept responsibility for preventing rogue powers like North Korea from disrupting regional peace and tranquility. Even if that meant direct Chinese action to remove an offending regime in Pyongyang, Beijing would need to be willing to undertake such action. Reducing the danger of North Korean aggression against its East Asian neighbors (and perhaps someday even against the United States) would provide a significant benefit to America.
Beijing's willingness to undertake that responsibility would be a crucial prerequisite for any U.S. decision to accept China's regional preeminence. Unwillingness on Beijing's part to embrace the role of stabilizer would greatly reduce the appeal of a more accommodating U.S. policy.
Even with a responsible Chinese policy, there would be significant obstacles and objections to U.S. recognition of a Chinese equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine. Two problems especially stand out.
The United States was, by far, the leading power in the Western Hemisphere by the late 19th century, and it would become even more dominant in the subsequent decades. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina were no more than anemic competitors. Britain could proceed with confidence that, if it conceded hemispheric preeminence to the United States, Washington could maintain stability without serious challenge.
BUT JAPAN IS STILL CHINA'S COMPETITOR
Today's geostrategic environment in East Asia is much more complex. Although China is the leading regional power, it faces a credible competitor in Japan, which is also a U.S. treaty ally. Not only would Washington have to extricate itself from the alliance with Japan, there is no certainty that Tokyo would accept second place in the regional status hierarchy. The prospects for stability in East Asia, therefore, would be murkier.
An even more serious obstacle to applying the Monroe Doctrine model to East Asia is the great difference in political systems between the United States and China. It was reasonably easy for London to concede regional primacy to Washington, since both countries were liberal, capitalist democracies. Moreover, both of them shared major cultural features. Such unifying factors are absent in the Sino-American relationship. China is still a one-party, nominally communist, state, and it would not be easy for U.S. policymakers to place trust regarding geostrategic behavior in such a country.
Still, Washington should not summarily dismiss the Monroe Doctrine model as a basis for U.S. policy toward China in the coming decades. Given Beijing's rapidly rising economic and military clout, it will become difficult, perhaps prohibitively so, for Washington to maintain U.S. hegemony in a region thousands of miles distant from the American homeland.
Officially or tacitly accepting Chinese primacy in East Asia may prove to be the least bad option available. And if China should gradually democratize, that option may become quite reasonable and attractive. In any case, U.S. policymakers need to consider alternatives to the fraying congagement model before a crisis erupts in relations with Beijing.//
鄉親們讀完後別驚慌，但要警惕，警惕美國內部有提出怪誕與乖張的
建州派永遠也不會接受中國這個「新邪惡帝國」所欲建立的"Pax
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
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