一
台灣建州運動於9/2 / 2014年發表了一篇題為「美國「重返亞洲」（透視亞洲）的戰略與政策是一個與「大美和平」（美式和平）及「台灣的安全」的維繫息息相關的斯里 組織單位的業務，它是否被確實執行是建州運動持續與恆久的重大 關切」的文章，我們今天要重申「美國「重返亞洲」（透視亞洲）的戰略與政策是一個與「大美和平」（美式和平）及「台灣的安全」的維繫息息相關的斯里 組織單位的業務，它是否被確實執行是建州運動持續與恆久的重大 關切」，並再度就此議題繼續處理其軍事面的問題[我們在2011 -2012年間發表過幾篇「重返亞洲」的軍事問題的文章。
不過，我們要請鄉親與朋友們先大略重讀下列幾篇文章：
（1）2013年12月12日到2013年12月17日：「台灣地區作戰計畫（代號OPLAN5077-04）」;
（2）2/27 / 2014年：「只要認真執行「重返東亞」的大戰略與「海空一體作戰」，建州運動支持五角大廈新的建軍方案與方向」;
（3）3/3 / 2014年：「關於「重返東亞」的大戰略，「海空一體作戰」的戰略，「福特號」超級航艦與美國國防部長哈格爾裁減陸軍的計劃」;
（4）4- / 17 / 2014年：「「美國轉向亞太」（美國的軸心向亞太）與台灣」;
（5）9/2 / 2014年：「美國「重返亞洲」（透視亞洲）的戰略與政策是一個與「大美和平」（美式和平）及「台灣的安全」的維繫息息相關的嚴肅的事情，它是否被確實執行是建州運動持續與恆久的重大關切」。
二
若要執行「重返亞洲」的戰略，那美國政府的行政部門與軍方就得按下列的幾個步驟去進行：
第一，制訂國家戰略或國家安全戰略。
第二，制訂政策與軍事戰略。
第三，擬訂作戰計劃。
第四，進行兵棋推演與論證。
第五，就「海空一體作戰」（空海戰鬥）的原則進行軍事演習與驗證，並逐步發展出一套在戰場上可操作的軍事準則。
第六，若敵對勢力願意提供機會，則進行作戰，以取得實戰經驗[因為某些特殊狀況出現，也可能在取得實戰經驗之前，取得臨戰經驗或準作戰經驗，這種狀況與經驗已出現與取得數次。
華府現在到底已執行到什麼階段呢？答案是，在第5階段，但過去兩 ，三年，因為美中海軍在東海與南海有若干次的試探性或低強度的挑釁性遭遇，所以美國海軍也取得幾次小規模的臨戰經驗，也就是說， 「重返亞洲」[含蓋印太戰區，即印度洋與太平洋戰區]的戰略也可以說已非正式地進行到第5.5階段。
三
我們現在借「英國廣播公司」與老共的海外喉舌「環球時報」的報導 ，讓鄉親們來看一看美軍為執行「重返亞洲」的戰略所進行的軍事演習。從這些新聞報導來看，第一，我們看不出演習的課目，第二，倘若有些課目涉及到對中國境內若干重要軍事目標的攻擊，這類課目的演習也只能在電腦兵棋與模擬基地中進行。
為了讓更多的鄉親便於了解，我們先張貼老共媒體的報導：
「英記者目擊美對華“備戰”：出動兩大航母戰鬥群，演練美軍“空海一體戰“」
world.huanqiu.com
2014年10月16日
【環球時報綜合報導】// “為什麼美國海軍在演練與中國的戰爭”，以此為題的一篇報導昨天出現在英國廣播公司（BBC）網站，作者是其駐日記者海耶斯。他依據在美國“喬治•華盛頓”號航母上的採訪得出結論：儘管美國人愛說“與中國接觸”，但美軍正在演練的“空海一體戰”就是在準備“ 對華戰爭“，以時間，地點及所目擊的演習內容推算，海耶斯看到的 “對華戰爭演練”很可能就是美軍上月進行的“勇敢之盾”軍演，美國“星條旗報”上月底稱，這場大規模軍演所磨練的“空海一體戰” 會給美國帶來與中國爆發衝突，甚至核戰的危險。在中國學者看來， 海耶斯的採訪結論說出了美軍一線指揮官“以中國為假想敵”的心裡話。一些美國媒體也“以史為鑑”，宣稱美中“存在令人恐懼的戰爭風險。“15日接受”環球時報“採訪的英國學者瓊斯說，美中開戰可能性不高於在太平洋釣到淡水魚。“下個月奧巴馬將來華出席AP 歐盟峰會，美中外交之舞將繼續跳，當然，彼此防範也不會停。“
美將軍避談“針對中國”
“你不會總有機會受邀登上美國核動力航母，而在我寫完這些後 ，估計好一陣子都不會再受到邀請了。“海耶斯的報導這樣開頭，是因為他要講述的結論是接受採訪的美軍官員極力迴避的-美國人愛說“與中國接觸”，但一個清晰的事實是，美國海軍正在為與中國潛在的衝突進行演練。
海耶斯的報導發自關島外海，他寫道， 站在“喬治•華盛頓”號的飛行甲板上，那種噪音是我從未體驗過的，幾英尺外，11架F / A-18“超級大黃蜂”戰機列隊等待起飛，15噸重的戰機起飛時， 就像一個小玩具般消失在航母甲板的盡頭，幾秒鐘後，身著各色制服的人冷靜地為下一架戰機起飛做好了準備海耶斯，說，看到眼前這一幕，你很難不感到敬畏，除了美國，世界上沒有任何國家的海軍擁有這麼多類似這樣的“小玩具”，或者像美國海軍這樣展現出一種從容的魅力。不過當他向美國海軍負責公共關係的官員問起一個問題時， 對方並不從容，而是極力迴避，這問題是，美國是否在演練與中國的戰爭。
海耶斯在文中稱，美軍的公共關係官員經常這樣說，“美國海軍並未演練針對任何國家的戰爭“，但海耶斯說，美國海軍兩個航母戰鬥群和200架戰機聚集到關島沿岸，“顯然不是來玩的”，他們演練的是五角大樓如今稱為“空海一體戰”的概念。這個概念最初出現在2009年，是為應對中國崛起所帶來的威脅而“特別定制”的。 在“喬治•華盛頓”號艦橋上，美國第五航母戰鬥群指揮官，海軍少將蒙哥馬利對海耶斯說，軍演的目的是要演練如何對付“一些國家” 越來越提升的“反介入，區域拒止”能力。“當我們說到我們的能力 ，我們所說的是我們要以一種無拘束的方式進入任何我們選擇水域的能力“，蒙哥馬利說，”一些國家正研發越來越複雜的反介入武器， 我們也必須提升我們的戰法，技術以及作戰程序“，他還說，”一些國家已經有能力摧毀衛星或限制衛星通信，所以我們必須演練如何適應電子通信受阻的環境“。
海耶斯說，受訪過程中，蒙哥馬利對軍演細節刻意迴避，並總是用“一些國家”去指代軍演的假想敵。但海耶斯在文中直率地寫出， “一些國家”就是中國。海耶斯說，解放軍的硬實力如今還無法與美國海軍匹敵，今後很長時間也無法匹敵，中國於是致力於發展確保美國航母不能接近中國近海的武器，包括更安靜的潛艇，遠程超音速反艦導彈，最令美國人擔心的則是被稱為航母殺手的中程彈道導彈。正在採訪時，海耶斯突然聽到艦上響起警報，“這是演習！這是演習！ 黑煙升起！黑煙升起！“原來軍演的一項內容是航母受到導彈襲擊， 部分艦體著火，很多人衝上去控制火情。
“空海一體戰”=對華戰爭？
在目擊美軍“備戰”的報導中，海耶斯沒有明言他目擊的是哪一場演習，但從時間，地點和演習內容推算，很有可能是美軍上月在關島附近海域進行的“勇敢之盾2014”演習，美國“星條旗報”9 月28日在分析該演習時曾稱，其所磨練的“空海一體戰”概念包含著與中國爆發衝突的真實風險。文章稱，儘管美國也許歡迎中國和平崛起，（上接第一版）但在西太平洋進行的“勇敢之盾”軍演直率地展示出，華盛頓對於中國崛起是否“和平”實際上是在兩面下注。美軍聚集1.8萬名戰士參與如此規模巨大的演習，是假想一個相當复雜的敵人試圖阻止美軍進入國際海域與空域，儘管美國官員都不說假想敵到底是哪個國家，五角大樓2013年未加密的“空海一體戰” 概述也絕口不提中國，但中國是唯一有能力在西太平洋對美國實施“ 反介入，區域拒止“的國家。美國普林斯頓大學教授弗里德伯格說， “空海一體戰就是為對付中國，毋庸置疑”。
“從某種程度上說，海耶斯的文章說出了美國一些人的心裡話” ，中國人民大學國際關係學院副院長金燦榮15日對“環球時報”說 ，美國社會對中國有四種心態，認為中國走在正確道路上，未來能成為美國的夥伴，認為中國已過於強大，無法再用軍事途徑遏制;認為應繼續採取接觸加遏制戰略應對中國;認為必須與中國死磕硬幹金燦榮說，海耶斯的報導反映的主要是後兩種心態，而上述4種心態中占主流的是第三種，多數美國人看待中國的心態是，朝最好的方向努力，為最壞的結果準備。
“星條旗報”在分析“空海一體戰”的巨大風險時稱，該理論主張在戰爭一開始先利用黑客部隊對中國“制盲”，為破壞中國的導彈和通信系統，美國需要轟炸中國本土一些軟目標，如超地平線雷達。 美國國防大學學者哈莫斯說，“空海一體戰是個沒有戰略的概念，也是最危險的概念“，美國的戰略選擇應該是最低程度降低與中國衝突的規模。哈莫斯說，如果中國先從空間和網絡對美國發動襲擊，美國再用“空海一體戰”回擊成功的可能性會降低，想摧毀中國路基導彈發射系統的目標也難以實現，中國如今的固體燃料導彈幾分鐘內就能發射，移動導彈發射架也難以被發現，“我們在海灣戰爭時想獵殺飛毛腿導彈都沒成功，想像一下中國有多麼遼闊的幅員。“哈莫斯還說 ，由於常規導彈與核導彈有時難以分辨，“空海一體戰”還有引發美中核戰的可能，美國理性的做法應是對中國實施遠程封鎖，如控制馬六甲海峽“勒死中國”。
“美國有幾百套對華作戰計劃，中國對美作戰計劃差不多也有這麼多，兩國軍方對此應都清楚“，15日，一位不願透露姓名的中國學者對“環球時報”說，儘管中日釣魚島爭端被認為是中美衝突的可能誘因，但更有可能的誘因是2016年民進黨在台灣上台，推行“ 台獨“，美國人擔心中國”反介入“能力提升會讓美國難以”保衛台灣“。另外，據”美國之音“14日稱，美國國會美中經濟與安全審議委員會11月將推出報告，指稱中國軍力崛起將挑戰美國的海軍優勢，而這關係到美國的根本利益。
“霸權的 虛偽”
“技術上，中國擁有空射導彈，超音速導彈和可擊中水面目標的彈道導彈，天上有隱形戰機，水下有自主研發的核潛艇，水面上有導彈驅逐艦，護衛艦等最新一代戰艦“，中國海軍專家劉江平15日對 “環球時報”說，“該有的反介入手段中國都有了”，美國因此戒心大增，頻頻模擬演練西太平洋戰事。在接受海耶斯採訪時，蒙哥馬利自誇美軍“為亞太和平穩定貢獻70年”，稱不論在南海還是東海， 美國都在維護穩定，保衛盟友，確保對手不採取非法或不透明行動。 劉江平說，美國這套說辭非常虛偽，是拿中國當藉口介入亞太，“美國人說在它想去的海域要不受限制地行動，意味著中國要犧牲或軟化自己的安全底線“。
有分析認為，美國對華種種表現，可以歸結為對中國崛起的不適應，曾任北約歐洲盟軍最高司令的美國退役將軍克拉克說，美國原本希望中國取得驚人的經濟崛起後就能產生一些轉變，但事實恰恰相反 ，中國變得更自信，更強硬了，越來越多地將美國看做競爭者以及潛在的對手。美國面臨的更深層戰略問題在於中國對二戰後美國建立的全球機制所構成的根本挑戰。克拉克說，10年之後，中國經濟總量可能超越美國，軍事實力將頗為強大，就算沒有軍事衝突，西太平洋的力量均勢也將影響中國到底是傾向於強勢還是妥協。
“美中開戰的可能性不會高於在太平洋裡釣到淡水魚”，英國國際關係學者加文•瓊斯15日對“環球時報”說，除非美中在地區政策上爆發嚴重分歧，或在地區利益上出現嚴重的分配不均，美中政府不會走到兵戎相見的地步。
“俄羅斯之聲”稱，習近平與奧巴馬11月在APEC峰會的會晤將成為中美未來走向的風向標，但學界相信，美中兩國關係主調還是既對抗，又合作“//
四
接下來，我們來讀「英國廣播公司」的報導:
“BBC: IT IS CLEAR THE US NAVY IS PRACTICING FOR WAR WITH CHINA”( 英國廣播公司: 很清楚地，美國海軍正在演練與中國的戰爭)
-----The US prefers to talk about engaging with China, but it is clear its navy is now also practising for a potential conflict, reports the BBC’s Rupert Wingfield-Hayes.
Not only has the BBC noticed that the US has been preparing for a war with China, the Yale Journal of International Affairs published an article in June of 2013 entitled “Who Authorized Preparations For War With China?”
The article boldly states that the Pentagon has concluded that the time for war with China is now. [2013年6月的耶魯「國際關係雜誌」刊登了一篇文章，標題是
Accompanying economic hardships, historically wars are started. Kind of a ‘wipe the slate clean and start over’ move.
Of course, our government touts that our economy has been recovering, which is rubbish. They will not only use a war to wipe things ‘clean’, but also use war to blame an economic collapse on so they don’t take the fall.
You don’t get invited out on a US nuclear aircraft carrier all that often, and after writing this I might not get invited back for a while.
On the flight deck of the USS George Washington the noise is like nothing I’ve ever experienced. A few feet from where I am standing, 11 F/A-18 Super Hornets are lining up to be launched.
The first one is hooked on to the catapult; there is a massive crescendo as its engines roar to full re-heat. Then, in a cloud of white steam, the 15-tonne jet is thrown down the deck and off the end of the ship like a toy.
Seconds later, the deck crew in their multi-coloured smocks are calmly lining up the next one.
Watching the US Navy close up like this, it is hard not to be slightly awed. No other navy in the world has quite the same toys, or shows them off with the same easy charm.
But as I stand on the deck filming my report on how “the US is practising for war with China”, I can see my host from the Navy public affairs office wincing.
You get used to hearing the PR rhetoric: the US Navy “is not practising for war with any specific country”. But the US Navy has not assembled two whole carrier battle groups and 200 aircraft off the coast of Guam for a jolly, either. This is about practising what the Pentagon now calls “Air Sea Battle”. [我們一直習慣聽到這樣的公關辭令: 美國海軍不針對任何特定國家進行作戰演習。但是美國海軍絕不可能
It is a concept first put forward in 2009, and it is specifically designed to counter the rising threat from China.
A few minutes later I am standing on the bridge of the George Washington with Rear Adm Mark Montgomery, the commander of Carrier Strike Group Five. The forces under his command are practising for what he calls an “anti-access, area denial” scenario.
“When we talk about our capabilities,” he says, “we are talking about our capabilities to operate in unrestricted way in the waters of our choice”.
“As some countries have been developing increasingly complex anti-access weapons, we have to develop our tactics, techniques and procedures to continue to operate in an unfettered manner.”
Rear Adm Montgomery won’t discuss the specifics of the exercise. But his ships and aircraft face an increasingly complex web of threats, from beneath the water, from air, land, from cyberspace and from space. [作戰演習的指揮官不願意討論演習的細節，但由於他所指揮的戰鬥
“It’s generally understood that some countries have the ability to remove satellites or to limit satellite communications,” he says, “so we have to practise working in a communications-denied environment.” [由於包括中國在內的國家有能力破壞美國的軍事、偵察與通訊衛星
China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy is still no match for the US Navy, and won’t be for a very long time. Instead, China has been developing other weapons designed to keep America’s precious carriers far away from China’s shores. [中國海軍現在仍難與美國匹敵，在今後很長的一段時間，也仍將如
底下這篇文章與報導也是英國廣播公司發表的，不習慣閱讀英文的鄉
“Why is the US Navy practising for war with China?”
By Rupert Wingfield-Hayes
BBC News, USS George Washington off Guam
10/14/2014
---The US prefers to talk about engaging with China, but it is clear its navy is now also practising for a potential conflict, reports the BBC's Rupert Wingfield-Hayes.
You don't get invited out on a US nuclear aircraft carrier all that often, and after writing this I might not get invited back for a while.
On the flight deck of the USS George Washington the noise is like nothing I've ever experienced. A few feet from where I am standing, 11 F/A-18 Super Hornets are lining up to be launched.
The first one is hooked on to the catapult; there is a massive crescendo as its engines roar to full re-heat. Then, in a cloud of white steam, the 15-tonne jet is thrown down the deck and off the end of the ship like a toy.
Seconds later, the deck crew in their multi-coloured smocks are calmly lining up the next one.
Watching the US Navy close up like this, it is hard not to be slightly awed. No other navy in the world has quite the same toys, or shows them off with the same easy charm.
But as I stand on the deck filming my report on how "the US is practising for war with China", I can see my host from the Navy public affairs office wincing.
You get used to hearing the PR rhetoric: the US Navy "is not practising for war with any specific country". But the US Navy has not assembled two whole carrier battle groups and 200 aircraft off the coast of Guam for a jolly, either. This is about practising what the Pentagon now calls "Air Sea Battle".
It is a concept first put forward in 2009, and it is specifically designed to counter the rising threat from China.
A few minutes later I am standing on the bridge of the George Washington with Rear Adm Mark Montgomery, the commander of Carrier Strike Group Five. The forces under his command are practising for what he calls an "anti-access, area denial" scenario.
"When we talk about our capabilities," he says, "we are talking about our capabilities to operate in unrestricted way in the waters of our choice".
"As some countries have been developing increasingly complex anti-access weapons, we have to develop our tactics, techniques and procedures to continue to operate in an unfettered manner."
Rear Adm Montgomery won't discuss the specifics of the exercise. But his ships and aircraft face an increasingly complex web of threats, from beneath the water, from air, land, from cyberspace and from space.
"It's generally understood that some countries have the ability to remove satellites or to limit satellite communications," he says, "so we have to practise working in a communications-denied environment."
China's People's Liberation Army Navy is still no match for the US Navy, and won't be for a very long time. Instead, China has been developing other weapons designed to keep America's precious carriers far away from China's shores.
These include new quieter submarines, long-range hypersonic anti-ship missiles and, perhaps most worrying, very accurate medium range ballistic missiles that have been dubbed "carrier killers".
As if on cue, an alarm bell starts ringing. A voice comes on the public address system:
"This is a drill, this is a drill! Black smoke, black smoke!"
The George Washington is under simulated attack. Part of the ship is reported to be on fire. Teams rush to contain the damage.
For the last 10 years, China's most important, and oft-repeated, political slogan has been "peaceful rise". It is designed to reassure Beijing's neighbours its growing military might is no threat.
But since President Xi Jinping came to power last year, there has been a distinct change. China is now asserting claims well beyond its own coastline.
Its ships are aggressively patrolling the Senkaku, or Diaoyu, islands in the East China Sea, long controlled by Japan. It is spending billions building new islands in the South China Sea.
In August a Chinese fighter jet confronted a US surveillance plane in international airspace over the South China Sea, repeatedly buzzing it and, according to the US Navy, closing to within 20ft (6m).
According to Rear Adm Montgomery, all this makes the US Navy's role in the region even more vital.
"The US Navy is one of the single greatest contributors to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region," he says. "We have been for nearly 70 years".
"I think the US Navy plays a good role whether it is in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Philippine Sea, stabilising things, assuring partners and dissuading adversaries from taking actions that are non-transparent or illegal."
China's leaders would no doubt disagree. Beijing's long-term aim is to dominate the waters close to its shores. If the US Navy tries to stop it, might that not make conflict more likely?
But from Tokyo to Taipei, Manila to Hanoi, there are governments that are very happy to see America's great carrier battle groups sailing these waters.
五
美國與英國的主流報紙的週日版或週末版的份量總是很夠，內容也很
“Deep Threat” (來自深海的威脅)
By Jeremy Page
Wall Street Journal
10/25/2014
---With a far-ranging fleet of new submarines, China is rattling Asia’s balance of power, challenging the U.S. and risking an undersea contest. Echoes of Tom Clancy and the Cold War? (由於中國擁有一支新的遠洋潛艇部隊，它正在破壞亞洲的權力平衡
One Sunday morning last December, China’s defense ministry summoned military attachés from several embassies to its monolithic Beijing headquarters.
To the foreigners’ surprise, the Chinese said that one of their nuclear-powered submarines would soon pass through the Strait of Malacca, a passage between Malaysia and Indonesia that carries much of world trade, say people briefed on the meeting.
Two days later, a Chinese attack sub—a so-called hunter-killer, designed to seek out and destroy enemy vessels—slipped through the strait above water and disappeared. It resurfaced near Sri Lanka and then in the Persian Gulf, say people familiar with its movements, before returning through the strait in February—the first known voyage of a Chinese sub to the Indian Ocean.
The message was clear: China had fulfilled its four-decade quest to join the elite club of countries with nuclear subs that can ply the high seas. The defense ministry summoned attachés again to disclose another Chinese deployment to the Indian Ocean in September—this time a diesel-powered sub, which stopped off in Sri Lanka. [中國已經實現了它四十年來要以核子潛艇加入頂尖國家的俱樂部以
China’s increasingly potent and active sub force represents the rising power’s most significant military challenge yet for the region. Its expanding undersea fleet not only bolsters China’s nuclear arsenal but also enhances the country’s capacity to enforce its territorial claims and thwart U.S. intervention. [中國所建立的核子潛艇部隊不僅能增強中國的核武庫，還能強化中
China is expected to pass another milestone this year when it sets a different type of sub to sea—a “boomer,” carrying fully armed nuclear missiles for the first time—says the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, or ONI. [中國被認為在今年就可以到達一個新的里程碑，亦即它將可部署一
China is hardly hiding its new boomers. Tourists could clearly see three of them at a base opposite a resort recently in China’s Hainan province. On the beach, rented Jet Skis were accompanied by guides to make sure riders didn’t stray too close.
These boomers’ missiles have the range to hit Hawaii and Alaska from East Asia and the continental U.S. from the mid-Pacific, the ONI says.
“This is a trump card that makes our motherland proud and our adversaries terrified,” China’s navy chief, Adm. Wu Shengli, wrote of the country’s missile-sub fleet in a Communist Party magazine in December. “It is a strategic force symbolizing great-power status and supporting national security.”
To naval commanders from other countries, the Chinese nuclear sub’s nonstop Indian Ocean voyage was especially striking, proving that it has the endurance to reach the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s headquarters in Hawaii.
“They were very clear with respect to messaging,” says Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, a former submariner who commands the U.S. Seventh Fleet, “to say that, ‘We’re a professional navy, we’re a professional submarine force, and we’re global. We’re no longer just a coastal-water submarine force.’ ”
In recent years, public attention has focused on China’s expanding military arsenal, including its first aircraft carrier and stealth fighter. But subs are more strategically potent weapons: A single one can project power far from China and deter other countries simply by its presence.
China’s nuclear attack subs, in particular, are integral to what Washington sees as an emerging strategy to prevent the U.S. from intervening in a conflict over Taiwan, or with Japan and the Philippines—both U.S. allies locked in territorial disputes with Beijing. [中國的核子攻擊潛艇是華府所指出的中國準備在因台灣或日本或菲
And even a few functional Chinese boomers compel the U.S. to plan for a theoretical Chinese nuclear-missile strike from the sea. China’s boomer patrols will make it one of only three countries—alongside the U.S. and Russia—that can launch atomic weapons from sea, air and land.
“I think they’ve watched the U.S. submarine force and its ability to operate globally for many, many years—and the potential influence that can have in various places around the globe,” says Adm. Thomas, “and they’ve decided to go after that model.”
China's nuclear-sub deployments, some naval experts say, may become the opening gambits of an undersea contest in Asia that echoes the cat-and-mouse game between U.S. and Soviet subs during the Cold War—a history popularized by Tom Clancy's 1984 novel "The Hunt for Red October."
Back then, each side sent boomers to lurk at sea, ready to fire missiles at the other’s territory. Each dispatched nuclear hunter-killers to track the other’s boomers and be ready to destroy them.
The collapse of the Soviet Union ended that tournament. But today, as China increases its undersea firepower, the U.S. and its allies are boosting their submarine and anti-sub forces in Asia to counter it.
Neither China nor the U.S. wants a Cold War rerun. Their economies are too interdependent, and today’s market-minded China doesn’t seek global revolution or military parity with the U.S.
Chinese officials say their subs don’t threaten other countries and are part of a program to protect China’s territory and expanding global interests. Chinese defense officials told foreign attachés that the subs entering the Indian Ocean would assist antipiracy patrols off Somalia, say people briefed on the meetings.
Asked about those meetings, China’s defense ministry said its navy’s activities in the Indian and Pacific Oceans “comply with international law and practice, and we maintain good communication with all relevant parties.”
Submarines help Beijing fulfill international duties without changing its defense policy, says China’s navy spokesman, Sr. Capt. Liang Yang. “If a soldier originally has a handgun, and you give him an assault rifle, you’ve increased his firepower, but his responsibilities haven’t changed.” He declines to comment on boomer patrols.
Still, the U.S. has moved subs to the forefront of its so-called rebalancing, a strategy of focusing more military and diplomatic resources on Asia. Sixty percent of the U.S. undersea force is in the Pacific, U.S. naval commanders say, compared with half the U.S. surface fleet. The U.S. Navy plans to station a fourth nuclear attack sub in Guam next year, they say.
Since December, the U.S. has positioned six new P-8 anti-submarine aircraft in Okinawa, Japan. The U.S. has also revitalized an undersea microphone system designed to track Soviet subs and is testing new technologies such as underwater drones to search for Chinese subs.
Several nearby countries, including Australia, have said they plan to expand or upgrade their submarine and anti-sub forces. Vietnam, which is embroiled in a territorial dispute with China, has since December received at least two of the six Russian-made attack subs it has ordered.
Australia’s navy chief, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, told a parliamentary committee on Wednesday that the 12 subs his country is buying to replace its six-strong current fleet would need to operate far afield, potentially in contested areas of the South China Sea. “There are other nations in the area that are building their submarine forces as well,” he said. “The issue for us is to be able to consider that we may need to counter those things.”
Rear Adm. Phillip Sawyer, the commander of U.S. submarine forces in the Pacific, says that many more submarines are now operating in the region than during the Cold War. “One of my biggest concerns truthfully is submarine safety,” he says on a recent dive aboard the USS Houston, a nuclear-attack sub based in Hawaii. “The more submarines you put in the same body of water, the higher the probability that they might collide.”
China now has one of the world’s biggest attack-sub fleets, with five nuclear models and at least 50 diesel models. It has four boomers, the ONI says.
Beijing’s quest for a nuclear-sub fleet dates to the 1960s, say Chinese historians. Mao Zedong once declared, “We will build a nuclear submarine even if it takes us 10,000 years!”
China has used diesel subs since the 1950s, but they have proved easy to find because they must surface every few hours. Nuclear subs are faster and can stay submerged for months. China launched its first nuclear sub on Mao’s birthday in 1970 and test-fired its first missile from underwater in 1988, although its first boomer never patrolled carrying armed nuclear missiles, U.S. naval officers say.
Adm. Liu Huaqing, the founder of China's modern navy, outlined the role of nuclear attack subs in his overall strategy in the 1980s,
Chinese historians say. He saw China as constrained by U.S. forces aligned in both a "First Island Chain" stretching from southern Japan to the Philippines and a "Second Island Chain" from northern Japan via Guam to Indonesia. He argued that China should establish naval dominance within the first chain by 2010, within the second chain by 2020 and become a global naval power by 2050.
China officially unveiled its nuclear undersea forces in October 2013 in an unprecedented open day for domestic media at a nuclear-sub base. Its capabilities aren’t close to those of the U.S., which has 14 boomers and 55 nuclear attack subs.
The U.S. concern is how to maintain that edge in Asia when the Navy projects that fiscal constraints will shrink its attack-sub fleet to 41 by 2028.
Beijing isn’t likely to try matching the U.S. sub force, having studied the way the Cold War arms race drained the Soviet Union’s finances. “We’re not that stupid,” says retired Maj. Gen. Xu Guangyu, a former vice president of the People’s Liberation Army Defense Institute.
“But we need enough nuclear submarines to be a credible force—to have some bargaining chips,” he says. “They must go out to the Pacific Ocean and the rest of the world.”
China's hunter-killers pose the immediate challenge to the U.S. and its partners. Adm. Sawyer has tracked them for more than a decade, first as a commander of U.S. subs in Japan and Guam and now from his headquarters in Pearl Harbor.
On his desk is a glass-encased naval chart with white labels marking China’s submarine bases. Drawn on the map are two lines marking “First Island Chain” and “Second Island Chain.”
Over the past few years, Chinese attack subs have broken beyond the first chain to operate regularly in the Philippine Sea and have started patrolling year-round, Adm. Sawyer says. Penetrating the second chain is the next logical step, he adds: “They are not just building more units and more assets, but they’re actually working to get proficient with them and understand how they’d operate in a far-away-from-home environment.”
Adm. Sawyer declines to say whether China has sent a sub as far as Hawaii but says the December Indian Ocean expedition shows that it has “the capability and the endurance” to do so.
That was a Shang-class sub, a type naval experts say China first launched in 2002 that can carry torpedoes and cruise missiles. In peacetime, China would probably use these hunter-killers to protect sea lanes, track foreign vessels and gather intelligence, naval experts say. But in a conflict, they would likely try to break through the First Island Chain to threaten approaching vessels and disrupt supply lines.
Still, the two recent sub voyages highlighted a weak point for China. Its subs must use narrow straits to reach the Pacific or Indian Oceans. Those chokepoints—among them, the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, Luzon and Miyako Straits—can be relatively easily monitored or blockaded.
Moreover, China’s anti-sub capabilities remain relatively weak. U.S. subs can track their Chinese counterparts even near China’s shores, where U.S. ships and planes are vulnerable to Chinese aircraft and missiles, American naval officers say.
Adm. Sawyer declines to say whether the U.S. tracked the Shang or how close U.S. subs get to China, saying only: “I’m comfortable with the U.S. submarine force’s capability to execute whatever tasking we’re given.”
The USS Houston returned recently from a seven-month deployment to the Western Pacific. Its commanding officer, Cmdr. Dearcy P. Davis, declines to say exactly where the sub went but adds, “I can say that we went untracked by anyone. We have the ability to break down the door if someone [else] can’t. That’s not trivial.”
China’s missile-carrying boomers present a longer-term challenge.
From the Lan Sanya beach resort in Hainan, guests can easily make out the matte-black hulls of what naval experts say are three of China’s new boomers, known as the Jin-class, and one Shang-class attack sub. As he threw open a hotel room’s curtains, a bellboy beamed with pride and pointed out the vessels across the bay. “Better not go that way,” joked a Jet Ski guide on a recent ride. “They might shoot at us.”
China hasn’t said when it might launch boomer patrols. But Western naval officers saw the October nuclear-sub event as a signal that the Jin subs and their JL-2 missiles were ready to start.
Adm. Jonathan Greenert, a former submariner who is now the U.S. chief of naval operations, says that the U.S. is waiting to see how China will use its new boomers. “Is it an occasional patrol they’re going to choose to do? Is it going to be a continuous patrol? Are they going to try to be sure that this patrol is totally undetected?” he says. “I think that’s all going to be in the equation as to our response.”
Soviet boomers ventured far into the Pacific and Atlantic into the 1970s because their missiles couldn’t reach the U.S. from Soviet waters. As missile ranges increased, Soviet subs retreated to so-called bastions, such as the Sea of Okhotsk. The U.S. deployed hunter-killers around those bastions.
Similar dynamics are at play as China decides whether to send its own boomers into the Pacific. Their JL-2 missiles can travel about 4,600 miles—possibly enough to strike the U.S. West Coast from East Asia, the ONI says. To strike more U.S. targets, they would need to lurk throughout the Pacific.
But China’s boomers probably couldn’t pass undetected through many straits, say U.S. officers and Chinese experts. “The Jin class is too noisy: It’s probably at the level of the Soviets between 1970 and 1980,” says Wu Riqiang, a former missile specialist who studies nuclear strategy at Beijing’s Renmin University. “As long as you are noisy, you won’t even go through the chokepoints.”
Early in the Cold War, the U.S. built a network of seabed microphones to listen at chokepoints leading to the Pacific and Atlantic. In recent years, the U.S. has revitalized parts of that network, called the Sound Surveillance System, or Sosus. The U.S. is also now adding mobile networks of sensors—some on underwater drones—and seeking surveillance data from Asian countries.
Meanwhile, China is trying to replicate Sosus, say several naval experts. A government-backed scientific journal reported last year that China had built a fiber-optic acoustic network in the South China Sea.
Over the short term, Prof. Wu says, China will probably keep its boomers near its coast, possibly in the South China Sea, which is deepest and furthest from U.S. bases. That, say some naval officers, may explain why China keeps its Jin-class subs in Hainan and why it is pressing territorial claims and hindering U.S. surveillance there.
Last November, China declared an "air-defense identification zone" over the East China Sea and warned of measures against aircraft that entered without identifying themselves in advance. Many U.S. officials expect China to do the same over the South China Sea, although Chinese officials say they have no immediate plans for that.[這一段只有網路版才有]
In August, the Pentagon said a Chinese fighter had flown dangerously close to a U.S. P-8 near Hainan. China’s defense ministry publicly said that its pilot flew safely and asked the U.S. to cease such operations.
The problem with confining boomers to the South China Sea is that Beijing fears that missiles fired from there could be neutralized by the next stages of a U.S. regional missile-defense system, Chinese nuclear experts say.
Prof. Wu, who has taken part in nuclear-strategy negotiations with the U.S., predicts that over the next two decades, China will make quieter boomers that can patrol the open sea even as the U.S. pursues a global missile-defense system.
“I hope the U.S. and China can break this cycle,” he says, “but I’m not optimistic.”
(Rob Taylor in Canberra contributed to this article.)
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
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