一
老共這個邪惡與自肥的恐怖統治集團還有依附它的、為老共的統治合
總之,他們知道,若「佔中行動」成功,且將一把野火往中國本部及
二
建州運動先請台灣與台美鄉親讀老共的「環球時報」在10/22/
「占中勢力莫成全球反華陣營新成員」
[我們使用台灣的老K的中央社所製作的繁體文版]
//
圍繞占中的外部政治形勢越來越清晰。西方反華勢力對它全面支持,
無論占中積極分子及它的港內支持者最初有什麼樣的目的,他們都應
反華勢力似乎要形成一個擴大了的新陣營,香港極端勢力成為它的新
我們的勸告是,香港占中勢力須審時度勢,不要不顧一切往這個危險
對參與占中的香港青年學生,我們尤其要多說幾句話。蓬勃發展的中
占中如果發生在其他國家和地區,與它發生在中國最繁榮的特別行政
如果香港占中勢力繼續往前拱,必將導致國際反華力量更大規模、以
歷史的激流中,常會發生一些難以思議的角色轉換,一個陣營的邊緣
以西方為中心的外部勢力會繼續為香港占中者喝彩,那些早年跑出去
如果不是,請那些學生早早離開。
至於極少數視社會主義中國為死敵的人,這個國家自會有對付他們的
三
靠蘇聯與共產國際的扶植而起家並拿到政權與天下的老共最害怕他們
上面那篇文章的主旨就是老共呼籲香港的民主派,不要與境外的自由
氣急敗壞的老共當然不會忘記要恐嚇境外的民主勢力,「環球時報」
四
老共對世界各地所發生的顏色革命極為敏感,他們已到談顏色就立即
我們現在張貼一篇文章,這篇文章可以反映老共的恐懼:
「決不任由“佔中”者鬧“顏色革命”」
作者:陸政平
環球時報
10/23 /2014
香港的違法“佔中”行動從一開始起,美、英等西方國家的傳媒機構
第一,借助所謂的“民主”問題發酵。格魯吉亞“玫瑰革命”、烏克
第二,鼓動大規模、有組織的街頭政治。“玫瑰革命”中數万名大學
第三,煽動不明真相的青年學生打頭陣。香港的青年學生組織“學聯
第四,挑動警民衝突,妖魔化警察。“佔中”集會一直把矛頭對準警
第五,政治符號鮮明。“顏色革命”大多以某種顏色或者鮮花作為政
第六,境內外媒體配合包裝炒作。所有“顏色革命”一旦爆發,其境
第七,以迫使領導人下台及對抗、推倒政府為目的。如同其他“顏色
第八,獲得外國勢力幕後支持。許多西方政府以及非政府組織向“顏
西方人常說,如果一個東西看起來像鴨子,走起路來像鴨子,叫起來
值得警惕的是,發生“顏色革命”的國家之後幾乎都出現了社會動盪
(作者是北京時評人)
五
鄉親們看清楚了嗎?老共如此鬼叫: 「香港是中國的香港,在香港搞“顏色革命”,包括香港同胞在內的
六
就在香港民主派與青年學生努力要在香港建立民主政治與真正的普選
“The myopic western view of China’s economic rise”(西方對中國經濟崛起的短視)
By Martin Jacques
The Financial Times
10/23/2014
---The reforms that count tend to conform to the western model, writes Martin Jacques
In the west there is an underlying assumption that the Achilles heel of China is its political system. Since the country lacks western-style democracy, its system of governance is unsustainable. Ultimately, China will be obliged to adopt our kind of political system. [在西方有一項假設: 中國的致命軟腹是它的政治體系,由於中國缺乏西式的民主政治,它
Yet China’s governance system has been remarkably successful for more than three decades. It has presided over the greatest economic transformation in modern history. [然而中國的統治體系在過去這三十年來,顯示的是它十分成功,在
The state is highly competent, able to think strategically, while at the same time pragmatic and experimental. It has presided over rapidly rising living standards and enjoys a great deal of popular support. The idea that sooner or later – the western assumption has generally been sooner – public support will evaporate is far-fetched. On the contrary, with economic growth still rapid and living standards rising similarly, it seems more likely that the regime will enjoy growing rather than declining support. [中國這個國家是高度有能力的,同時能夠從事戰略性的思考,同時
We should not, however, regard support for the regime as simply a function of economic growth. It has become almost axiomatic in the west to believe that democracy is the sole source of a regime’s legitimacy. This is mistaken. The legitimacy of the Chinese state lies deep in the country’s history. Along with the family, the state is one of the two most important institutions. For at least two millennia the state has been seen as the guardian and embodiment of Chinese civilisation. This is the key source of its legitimacy. [在西方 ,相信民主政治是一個政權取得合法性的唯一來源幾乎已經變成無需
Some of the other characteristics of the state – the emphasis on meritocracy, state competence and an essentially familial concept of the relationship between the state and the people – are similarly deeply rooted.
When the state has functioned poorly, then so has China, the classic example being during the century of humiliation from the first opium war to 1949. The Communist party’s achievement in recent decades has, not least, been its reinvention of the state and the restoration, in a modern context, of its main historical characteristics – its pivotal status, competence, meritocracy, legitimacy and efficacy – following their disastrous decay over the previous century. [當國家這個制度運作得很差,中國也就不堪聞問,最經典的例子就
There is a tendency to see Chinese government as unchanging. This is because in the west the only reforms that we really count are those that appear to move the country towards the western model. In fact, government has been through huge and constant reform since 1978, far greater than anything that has taken place in the US or the UK. It is inconceivable that the Chinese state could have masterminded such a huge economic transformation if it too had not been the subject of profound reform. This process will continue, probably even more dramatically.
Rather than dismiss the Chinese governing system as fragile and tenuous, we need to understand what has been, by the standard of the past three decades, an extraordinarily successful institution, one that the world will increasingly come to recognise it must learn from. [我們不但不應把中國的統治體系視為脆弱的與纖弱的,相反地,我
Hitherto it has been assumed that China, rather than western democracies, will face chronic problems of governance. We have become deeply ahistorical about western democracy, viewing it as some kind of eternal and ideal solution to the problem of governance. Yet it is clear that American democracy has become increasingly dysfunctional, short-term, polarised and subject to capture by vested interests, in particular the 1 per cent. [我們西方人對西方的民主政治已經變得十分ahistorica
There are strong historical reasons for believing that western democracies may face a difficult and uncertain future. Their past success has been based on two underlying conditions: firstly, the fact that the west has for at least two centuries dominated the world, bringing huge economic advantages and bestowing on their political elites great status and prestige; and secondly, their populations have for a long time enjoyed rising living standards. Neither can be relied upon in the future. [有很強的歷史理由來相信,西方的民主政體可能會面臨一個困難的
The west is in decline, Europe rampantly so. Some estimates suggest that by 2030 China could account for a third of global output and be twice the size of the US economy. American power would then be a pale shadow of what it is today. This is bound to affect how the American people regard their political elite and political system. Furthermore, with strong evidence that living standards have been static for many people in the US and western Europe, the outlook is uncertain. [西方在衰落,歐洲特別是如此,相反地,有些預估認為,在203
Rising powers tend to enjoy strengthening domestic support, while declining ones incur their citizens’ discontent. We should not discount the possibility that the problems of governance will become more acute in the west than China.
(The writer is the author of ‘When China Rules The World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order’)
七
Martin這篇文章出現在日裔美國學者Francis Fukuyama出版了 “Political Order and Political Decay”( 政治秩序與政治衰落)之後,Francis對美國與其他西方國家
Martin的觀點連中國的菁英都不敢相信,理由很簡單,若中國
要批判Martin並不難,我們將會再另行為文,來處理他的謬論
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
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