答覆Mr. Jian Lung Chiou (JLC)、Ppl Of or On Taiwan (POorOT)與Ms. YuYu Carbajal (YYC): 關於「上海公報」中所使用的文字
一
我張貼了「答覆Mr. Jian Lung Chiou於1/31/2014的詢問」之後，得到JLC、POorOT、YYC三位人士與鄉親的回應。
JLC說: //但是，AIT官網上的中文是「承認」，如果以英文為基準，那也是中文翻譯過來的錯誤。//
POorOT說 : “We're of the opinion that 'AIT官網上的中文翻譯' have made many mistakes in the past. Whoever made those mistakes should have their head(s) examined.”
YYC說: //每個人對文字的認知和解讀意思的辦法都不盡相同，但還是以最終解讀權力者為主，老百姓只有關心和接收訊息傳播的義務而已。亦有所謂''官方''是也。//
她又說: //中國講陰陽，美國更會''耍陰使詐''，JＬM還年輕，我相信政治這簡單2個字看起來簡單，實際上從來沒有一個人有辦法說一個準字，''也許應該是說...或...這樣應該更正確''。其實不必你來操這個心，因為自始以來''模糊''就是美國的對台政策，美國從來就不把話說清楚，不把話說清楚的意思就是不把話說死，每年修正幾個字的對台政策報告，由美國智庫、國會通過經由總統發佈，這才算數，絕不是馬英9 也不是你、我、他吵吵鬧鬧所能影響的，別自尋煩惱了。//
二
感謝三位發表評論，我現在進一步加以答覆。
我先答覆YYC。
YYC說: 「''模糊''就是美國的對台政策，美國從來就不把話說清楚，不把話說清楚的意思就是不把話說死」，這個說法十分正確。
但美國對台政策中，也有一些常數、規律與清晰的法則，這是我們必須注意與掌握的。
雖然我們目前在台灣前途解決的process中，只是一個小咖，但是我們也必須傪一腳或發聲，總不能當啞巴或當逃兵。不要忘了 ，華府在北京很囂張及霸道的時候，總是說「台灣前途的解決，要經過台灣人民的同意」[雖然在台灣的本土政權強推「台灣正常化議程」、把華府弄得人仰馬翻、雞飛狗跳時，它就會改口說「台灣前途的解決，要經過台海兩岸人民的同意」，讓台灣人氣結]，換句話說，我們若不發聲，華府想跟北京王二麻子，也找不到好藉口。
三
再來，我要答覆JLC與POorOt，他們兩位即便是在春節假期間，也關注與台灣前途及台灣人的命運有關的議題或話題，所以我不能不肅然起敬。
首先，我們要確認，美中三公報不是條約，所以，我們今天就無需根據「條約法」中所載的若干條款或準則來進行解釋，包括文字[如acknowledge這個字]的含意應以何種文字為準的解釋。
再來 ，我們應該知道當初「上海公報」的談判與草擬的思維與過程。當初由於毛澤東提出了一項新思維，---Read More--- 讓美中兩國在公報中agreed to disagree，讓美中兩國各說各話，以便讓雙方都有很大的迴旋空間，並解決雙方各自的難題，所以我們可以這麼合理地推定，他們雙方對類似”acknowledge”一字的解釋或意含，就不會像條約的談判那樣，一定要去把它定於一尊，而是採取各自表述的方式帶過。這一點，我要請JLC、POorOt以及其他鄉親特別注意。
我們現在來看談判的主角季辛吉怎麼說，雖然他沒有就美方所使用的”acknowledge”這個字的意含加以釐清 ，但我們還是不妨讀讀他的著作。
我們今天要引用的是季辛吉博士(他先擔任尼克森總統的國安顧問，之後，擔任尼克森總統與福特總統的國務卿)所寫的書(“On China”, The Penguin Press, 2011)，這本書是在相關的美國國家檔案被解密之後所出版的，所以資料十分豐富，也很值得注意。
老尼當年訪中，當然得與周恩來會談，會談所觸及的實質議題分三大類:
“The substantive issues had been divided into three categories, the first being the long-term objectives of the two sides and their cooperation against hegemonic powers --- a shorthand for the Soviet Union without the invidiousness of naming it. This would be conducted by Zhou and Nixon and restricted staffs, which included me [Dr. Kissinger]. ----------- Second, ---------- Lastly, there was a drafting group for the final communiqué headed by Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and myself. -------“
老尼這個馬基亞維利的信徒必須顧及台北蔣家政權的感受，他必須採取某種動作，對台灣方面進行安撫 ，倘若不這麼做，連他自己的共和黨內部也會給他很大的壓力:
“While I was en route to China, Nixon had outlined his perspective to the U.S. ambassador in Taipei, who would have the painful task of explaining to his hosts that America in the years ahead would be shifting the emphasis of its China policy to Beijing from Taipei: We must have in mind, and they [Taipei] must be prepared for the fact, that there will continue to be a step-by-step, a more normal relationship with the other --- the Chinese mainland. Because our interests require it. Not because we love them, but because they’re there.------- And because the world situation has so drastically changed.
老季回憶 ，他與他的助理於1971年10月再度去北京，與中方以老季所草擬及老尼所批准的「上海公報草案」正式開始就公報的內容進行談判:
“The discussion on the communiqué began conventionally enough. I tabled a draft communiqué that my staff and I had prepared and Nixon had approved. In it, both sides affirmed their devotion to peace and pledged cooperation on outstanding issues. The section on Taiwan was left blank. Zhou accepted the draft as a basis for discussion and promised to present Chinese modifications and alternatives the next morning. All this was conventional communiqué drafting.” [請鄉親們注意，在這個時間點，有關台灣的條款仍是空白。]
但請大家注意，老季說，隨後老毛介入，他的非傳統或非制式想法給「上海公報」的談判及草擬帶來革命性的改變，美中雙方因而取得重大進展與突破。老毛的想法是，讓美中雙方在「上海公報」中各說各話，雙方agreed to disagree，求同存異[老季這段陳述很重要 ，讓世人知道，是由於老毛的新approach或新思維給公報的草擬帶來突破]:
“What happened next was not. Mao intervened by telling Zhou to stop the drafting of what he called a ‘bullshit communiqué.’ He might call his exhortations of Communist orthodoxy ‘empty cannons’; he was not prepared to abandon them as guidelines for Communist cadres. He instructed Zhou to produce a communiqué that would restate Communist orthodoxies as the Chinese position. Americans could state their view as they choose. ---------- China was not afraid to avow its differences with America. Zhou’s draft (and mine) was the sort of banality the Soviets would sign but neither mean nor implement.”
“Zhou’s presentation followed his instructions from Mao. He put forward a draft communiqué that stated the Chinese position in uncompromising language. It left blank pages for our position, which was expected to be comparably strong to the contrary. There was a final section for common positions.
老季說他最先感覺到很驚訝，有些不適應，但很快地他就認為，這是解決雙方的難題的好辦法:
“At first, I was taken aback. But as I reflected, the unorthodox format appeared to solve both sides’ problem. EACH COULD REAFFIRM ITS FUNDAMENTAL CONVICTIONS, which would reassure domestic audiences and uneasy allies. The differences had been known for two decades. The contrast would highlight the agreements being reached, and the positive conclusions would be far more credible. Without the ability to communicate with Washington in the absence of diplomatic representation or adequate secure communication, I was confident enough of Nixon’s thinking to proceed.
他接著說: “In this manner, a communiqué issued on Chinese soil and published by Chinese media enabled America to affirm its commitment to ------------ The Chinese draft of the communiqué was, of course, equally expressive of CONTRARY VIEWS.---------”
他談到「台灣」這個議題在老季第一次偷偷到中國時，就已開始談:
“The sustainability of the strategy depended on whether progress could be made on Taiwan. By the time Taiwan was discussed during the Nixon trip, the parties had already explored the subject, starting with the secret visit seven months earlier.
「台灣」這個議題在老尼踏上中國的土地後，當然得繼續談下去:
“---------This was a particular challenge with respect to Taiwan, where the margin for concession for both sides was narrow. We therefore from the beginning put forward views on Taiwan we judged necessary for a constructive evolution. Nixon advanced these on February 22 [, 1972] as five principles [我在1/26/2014發表的「尼克森總統任內的口述歷史與雷根總統日記」一文中，提到尼克森「美中關係五原則」，請大家參考]distilled from previous exchanges during my July and October meetings. They were comprehensive and at the same time also the limit of American concessions. The future would have to be navigated within their framework. They were: an affirmation of a one China policy; that the United States WOULD NOT SUPPORT INTERNAL TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS; that the United States WOULD DISCOURAGE ANY JAPANESE MOVE INTO TAIWAN (a matter, given history, of special concern to China); SUPPORT FOR ANY PEACEFUL RESOLUTION BETWEEN BEIJING AND TAIPEI; and commitment to continued normalization. On February 24, Nixon explained how the Taiwan issue might evolve domestically as the United States pursued these principles. His intention, he affirmed, was to complete the normalization process in his second term and withdraw American troops from Taiwan in that time frame --- though he warned that he was in no position to make any formal commitments. -----------“
中國外交界的重要官員喬冠華[後來成為中國外長]與老季草擬「上海公報」最後留白那一部分。
“Principle and pragmatism thus existing in ambiguous equilibrium, Qiao Guanhua and I drafted the last remaining section of the Shanghai Communique. The key passage was only one paragraph, but it took two nearly all-night sessions to produce, --------“ 老季所說的關鍵性的那一段，就是美國宣示立場以及給北京若干承諾那一段:
“The U.S. side declared: THE UNITED STATES ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT MAINTAIN THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA AND THAT TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA.-------------“
說到這裡，我們必須說”ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT”這個詞被使用是有故事，也有玄機的。
我在「尼克森總統任內的口述歷史與雷根總統日記」一文中，曾跟鄉親們提起尼克森執政時期的美國國務院官員Marshall Green告訴世人一段秘辛。他回憶並口述: 當國務院官員對上海公報的內容初稿加以挑剔時，尼克森十分光火，認為國務院跟他搗蛋，Marshall Green說: 尼克森氣急敗壞，[不顧形象] 穿著內衣內褲，奔上跑下，暴跳如雷，發誓要向國務院討公道。
老尼為何暴跳如雷?根據Marshall的回憶，是國務院官員發現了「上海公報」原稿中對台灣的利益有重大損害、且會被美國政壇親台的右翼勢力拿來攻擊尼克森政府的把柄的條款與文字 ，因而立即向國務卿報告，國務卿立即向尼克森反映，尼克森十分光火，但還是做了些彌補與修正。倘若沒有這些彌補與修正，Marshall說，「那就會對台灣與尼克森政府帶來災難 」(“The Shanghai Communique could have been a disaster.”)
到底是什麼文字如此關鍵而會對台灣造成災難，因而迫使尼克森最後還是選擇修正了呢?
Marshall沒有說。
但我們若讀當年老季與老尼與中方就「上海公報」的內容進行談判與草擬的助理與隨從之一的John Holdridge後來寫的一本透露不少內幕的書(JohnHoldridge: Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997)中的記載，我們就可以得出答案。
Holdridge[他後來成為國務院亞太事務助卿]說，老季在「上海公報」的初稿中使用「台海兩岸所有的人民」這一詞，但國務院認為，當時就有台灣獨立運動，有些台灣人並不認為自己是「中國人」，而且也不認為「台灣是中國的一部分」，所以若在公報中硬說「台海兩岸所有的人民都認為只有一個中國而且台灣是中國的一部分」，是不正確的，美國頂多只能說 「台海兩岸所有的中國人」，這樣就能給台灣人或有台灣認同的台灣住民留下生存的空間。
四
話題再回到老季那本書，他提到了”acknowledge”這個magic word，但對我們今天的問題的澄清沒什麼幫助。他說:
“This paragraph[指上面”The U.S. declared-------“那一段] -------The United States dealt with the one China policy by acknowledging the convictions of Chinese on either side of the Chinese dividing line. The flexibility of this formulation permitted the United States to move from “acknowledge” to “support” in its own position in the decades since. Taiwan has been given an opportunity to develop economically and internally. China achieved recognition of its ‘core interests’ in a political connection between Taiwan and the mainland. The United States affirmed its interest in a peaceful resolution. [老季為自己表功]
不過，老季終究是聰明人，他知道他與尼克森搞出的「上海公報」有一天可能會被老共加以挑戰及測試。
這一天可能不久就會來臨，因為共軍軍頭已越來越有自信，也越來越不耐 ，他們非要找周邊地區的小羔羊下手不可，否則他們就會覺得日子過得太乏味，也太無聊。
台灣會是那隻將被中國惡狼撲殺與啃食的小羔羊嗎?我們必須做最壞的打算，並做最好的準備。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
我張貼了「答覆Mr. Jian Lung Chiou於1/31/2014的詢問」之後，得到JLC、POorOT、YYC三位人士與鄉親的回應。
JLC說: //但是，AIT官網上的中文是「承認」，如果以英文為基準，那也是中文翻譯過來的錯誤。//
POorOT說 : “We're of the opinion that 'AIT官網上的中文翻譯' have made many mistakes in the past. Whoever made those mistakes should have their head(s) examined.”
YYC說: //每個人對文字的認知和解讀意思的辦法都不盡相同，但還是以最終解讀權力者為主，老百姓只有關心和接收訊息傳播的義務而已。亦有所謂''官方''是也。//
她又說: //中國講陰陽，美國更會''耍陰使詐''，JＬM還年輕，我相信政治這簡單2個字看起來簡單，實際上從來沒有一個人有辦法說一個準字，''也許應該是說...或...這樣應該更正確''。其實不必你來操這個心，因為自始以來''模糊''就是美國的對台政策，美國從來就不把話說清楚，不把話說清楚的意思就是不把話說死，每年修正幾個字的對台政策報告，由美國智庫、國會通過經由總統發佈，這才算數，絕不是馬英9 也不是你、我、他吵吵鬧鬧所能影響的，別自尋煩惱了。//
二
感謝三位發表評論，我現在進一步加以答覆。
我先答覆YYC。
YYC說: 「''模糊''就是美國的對台政策，美國從來就不把話說清楚，不把話說清楚的意思就是不把話說死」，這個說法十分正確。
但美國對台政策中，也有一些常數、規律與清晰的法則，這是我們必須注意與掌握的。
雖然我們目前在台灣前途解決的process中，只是一個小咖，但是我們也必須傪一腳或發聲，總不能當啞巴或當逃兵。不要忘了 ，華府在北京很囂張及霸道的時候，總是說「台灣前途的解決，要經過台灣人民的同意」[雖然在台灣的本土政權強推「台灣正常化議程」、把華府弄得人仰馬翻、雞飛狗跳時，它就會改口說「台灣前途的解決，要經過台海兩岸人民的同意」，讓台灣人氣結]，換句話說，我們若不發聲，華府想跟北京王二麻子，也找不到好藉口。
三
再來，我要答覆JLC與POorOt，他們兩位即便是在春節假期間，也關注與台灣前途及台灣人的命運有關的議題或話題，所以我不能不肅然起敬。
首先，我們要確認，美中三公報不是條約，所以，我們今天就無需根據「條約法」中所載的若干條款或準則來進行解釋，包括文字[如acknowledge這個字]的含意應以何種文字為準的解釋。
再來 ，我們應該知道當初「上海公報」的談判與草擬的思維與過程。當初由於毛澤東提出了一項新思維，
我們現在來看談判的主角季辛吉怎麼說，雖然他沒有就美方所使用的”acknowledge”這個字的意含加以釐清 ，但我們還是不妨讀讀他的著作。
我們今天要引用的是季辛吉博士(他先擔任尼克森總統的國安顧問，之後，擔任尼克森總統與福特總統的國務卿)所寫的書(“On China”, The Penguin Press, 2011)，這本書是在相關的美國國家檔案被解密之後所出版的，所以資料十分豐富，也很值得注意。
老尼當年訪中，當然得與周恩來會談，會談所觸及的實質議題分三大類:
“The substantive issues had been divided into three categories, the first being the long-term objectives of the two sides and their cooperation against hegemonic powers --- a shorthand for the Soviet Union without the invidiousness of naming it. This would be conducted by Zhou and Nixon and restricted staffs, which included me [Dr. Kissinger]. ----------- Second, ---------- Lastly, there was a drafting group for the final communiqué headed by Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and myself. -------“
老尼這個馬基亞維利的信徒必須顧及台北蔣家政權的感受，他必須採取某種動作，對台灣方面進行安撫 ，倘若不這麼做，連他自己的共和黨內部也會給他很大的壓力:
“While I was en route to China, Nixon had outlined his perspective to the U.S. ambassador in Taipei, who would have the painful task of explaining to his hosts that America in the years ahead would be shifting the emphasis of its China policy to Beijing from Taipei: We must have in mind, and they [Taipei] must be prepared for the fact, that there will continue to be a step-by-step, a more normal relationship with the other --- the Chinese mainland. Because our interests require it. Not because we love them, but because they’re there.------- And because the world situation has so drastically changed.
老季回憶 ，他與他的助理於1971年10月再度去北京，與中方以老季所草擬及老尼所批准的「上海公報草案」正式開始就公報的內容進行談判:
“The discussion on the communiqué began conventionally enough. I tabled a draft communiqué that my staff and I had prepared and Nixon had approved. In it, both sides affirmed their devotion to peace and pledged cooperation on outstanding issues. The section on Taiwan was left blank. Zhou accepted the draft as a basis for discussion and promised to present Chinese modifications and alternatives the next morning. All this was conventional communiqué drafting.” [請鄉親們注意，在這個時間點，有關台灣的條款仍是空白。]
但請大家注意，老季說，隨後老毛介入，他的非傳統或非制式想法給「上海公報」的談判及草擬帶來革命性的改變，美中雙方因而取得重大進展與突破。老毛的想法是，讓美中雙方在「上海公報」中各說各話，雙方agreed to disagree，求同存異[老季這段陳述很重要 ，讓世人知道，是由於老毛的新approach或新思維給公報的草擬帶來突破]:
“What happened next was not. Mao intervened by telling Zhou to stop the drafting of what he called a ‘bullshit communiqué.’ He might call his exhortations of Communist orthodoxy ‘empty cannons’; he was not prepared to abandon them as guidelines for Communist cadres. He instructed Zhou to produce a communiqué that would restate Communist orthodoxies as the Chinese position. Americans could state their view as they choose. ---------- China was not afraid to avow its differences with America. Zhou’s draft (and mine) was the sort of banality the Soviets would sign but neither mean nor implement.”
“Zhou’s presentation followed his instructions from Mao. He put forward a draft communiqué that stated the Chinese position in uncompromising language. It left blank pages for our position, which was expected to be comparably strong to the contrary. There was a final section for common positions.
老季說他最先感覺到很驚訝，有些不適應，但很快地他就認為，這是解決雙方的難題的好辦法:
“At first, I was taken aback. But as I reflected, the unorthodox format appeared to solve both sides’ problem. EACH COULD REAFFIRM ITS FUNDAMENTAL CONVICTIONS, which would reassure domestic audiences and uneasy allies. The differences had been known for two decades. The contrast would highlight the agreements being reached, and the positive conclusions would be far more credible. Without the ability to communicate with Washington in the absence of diplomatic representation or adequate secure communication, I was confident enough of Nixon’s thinking to proceed.
他接著說: “In this manner, a communiqué issued on Chinese soil and published by Chinese media enabled America to affirm its commitment to ------------ The Chinese draft of the communiqué was, of course, equally expressive of CONTRARY VIEWS.---------”
他談到「台灣」這個議題在老季第一次偷偷到中國時，就已開始談:
“The sustainability of the strategy depended on whether progress could be made on Taiwan. By the time Taiwan was discussed during the Nixon trip, the parties had already explored the subject, starting with the secret visit seven months earlier.
「台灣」這個議題在老尼踏上中國的土地後，當然得繼續談下去:
“---------This was a particular challenge with respect to Taiwan, where the margin for concession for both sides was narrow. We therefore from the beginning put forward views on Taiwan we judged necessary for a constructive evolution. Nixon advanced these on February 22 [, 1972] as five principles [我在1/26/2014發表的「尼克森總統任內的口述歷史與雷根總統日記」一文中，提到尼克森「美中關係五原則」，請大家參考]distilled from previous exchanges during my July and October meetings. They were comprehensive and at the same time also the limit of American concessions. The future would have to be navigated within their framework. They were: an affirmation of a one China policy; that the United States WOULD NOT SUPPORT INTERNAL TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS; that the United States WOULD DISCOURAGE ANY JAPANESE MOVE INTO TAIWAN (a matter, given history, of special concern to China); SUPPORT FOR ANY PEACEFUL RESOLUTION BETWEEN BEIJING AND TAIPEI; and commitment to continued normalization. On February 24, Nixon explained how the Taiwan issue might evolve domestically as the United States pursued these principles. His intention, he affirmed, was to complete the normalization process in his second term and withdraw American troops from Taiwan in that time frame --- though he warned that he was in no position to make any formal commitments. -----------“
中國外交界的重要官員喬冠華[後來成為中國外長]與老季草擬「上海公報」最後留白那一部分。
“Principle and pragmatism thus existing in ambiguous equilibrium, Qiao Guanhua and I drafted the last remaining section of the Shanghai Communique. The key passage was only one paragraph, but it took two nearly all-night sessions to produce, --------“ 老季所說的關鍵性的那一段，就是美國宣示立場以及給北京若干承諾那一段:
“The U.S. side declared: THE UNITED STATES ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT MAINTAIN THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA AND THAT TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA.-------------“
說到這裡，我們必須說”ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT”這個詞被使用是有故事，也有玄機的。
我在「尼克森總統任內的口述歷史與雷根總統日記」一文中，曾跟鄉親們提起尼克森執政時期的美國國務院官員Marshall Green告訴世人一段秘辛。他回憶並口述: 當國務院官員對上海公報的內容初稿加以挑剔時，尼克森十分光火，認為國務院跟他搗蛋，Marshall Green說: 尼克森氣急敗壞，[不顧形象] 穿著內衣內褲，奔上跑下，暴跳如雷，發誓要向國務院討公道。
老尼為何暴跳如雷?根據Marshall的回憶，是國務院官員發現了「上海公報」原稿中對台灣的利益有重大損害、且會被美國政壇親台的右翼勢力拿來攻擊尼克森政府的把柄的條款與文字 ，因而立即向國務卿報告，國務卿立即向尼克森反映，尼克森十分光火，但還是做了些彌補與修正。倘若沒有這些彌補與修正，Marshall說，「那就會對台灣與尼克森政府帶來災難 」(“The Shanghai Communique could have been a disaster.”)
到底是什麼文字如此關鍵而會對台灣造成災難，因而迫使尼克森最後還是選擇修正了呢?
Marshall沒有說。
但我們若讀當年老季與老尼與中方就「上海公報」的內容進行談判與草擬的助理與隨從之一的John Holdridge後來寫的一本透露不少內幕的書(JohnHoldridge: Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997)中的記載，我們就可以得出答案。
Holdridge[他後來成為國務院亞太事務助卿]說，老季在「上海公報」的初稿中使用「台海兩岸所有的人民」這一詞，但國務院認為，當時就有台灣獨立運動，有些台灣人並不認為自己是「中國人」，而且也不認為「台灣是中國的一部分」，所以若在公報中硬說「台海兩岸所有的人民都認為只有一個中國而且台灣是中國的一部分」，是不正確的，美國頂多只能說 「台海兩岸所有的中國人」，這樣就能給台灣人或有台灣認同的台灣住民留下生存的空間。
四
話題再回到老季那本書，他提到了”acknowledge”這個magic word，但對我們今天的問題的澄清沒什麼幫助。他說:
“This paragraph[指上面”The U.S. declared-------“那一段] -------The United States dealt with the one China policy by acknowledging the convictions of Chinese on either side of the Chinese dividing line. The flexibility of this formulation permitted the United States to move from “acknowledge” to “support” in its own position in the decades since. Taiwan has been given an opportunity to develop economically and internally. China achieved recognition of its ‘core interests’ in a political connection between Taiwan and the mainland. The United States affirmed its interest in a peaceful resolution. [老季為自己表功]
不過，老季終究是聰明人，他知道他與尼克森搞出的「上海公報」有一天可能會被老共加以挑戰及測試。
這一天可能不久就會來臨，因為共軍軍頭已越來越有自信，也越來越不耐 ，他們非要找周邊地區的小羔羊下手不可，否則他們就會覺得日子過得太乏味，也太無聊。
台灣會是那隻將被中國惡狼撲殺與啃食的小羔羊嗎?我們必須做最壞的打算，並做最好的準備。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
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