尼克森總統任內的口述歷史與雷根總統日記(上)

尼克森總統任內的口述歷史與雷根總統日記(上)

一

我們在前幾天藉卡特總統的「白宮日記」來了解卡特政府的對台政策，今天我們藉一本口述歷史及「雷根日記」來了解。

這部口述歷史是Nixon: An Oral History of His Presidency by Gerald S. & Deborah H. Strober (Harper Collins Publishers, 1994)，我們用的是Chapter 5: Foreign Affairs其中的幾節: The Two Chinas, President Nixon’s Historic Visit to the People’s Republic of China, The Meeting with Mao Tse-Tung & The Shanghai Communique (pp.129-137)。

我們從這一本口述歷史知道，至少有兩位人士反對尼克森打開中國之門與訪中。

H. R. Haldeman[Haldeman是尼克森總統的白宮幕僚長，1969-1973，因水門案被判刑]說: “There was opposition in the White House. Pat Buchanan, who at that time was a major speechwriter, thought it was a sellout of the Taiwanese. Some of the President’s backers in Congress, and in the country also, had that view. Nixon knew there would be flak, but that the ultimate results would override the opposition.” [Patrick J. Buchanan是美國政壇出名的保守派，他在尼克森擔任總統期間擔任尼的演說主要撰稿人，他反對尼與北京結盟，他後來曾三度參加共和黨總統初選，但沒有出線。]

William A. Rusher[Rusher是著名的右翼雜誌The National Review的副總兼社長，1957-1988]說: “This man [指尼克森] had been the principal friend of the Republic of China in the United States for twenty years, and then he turned around, with cool precision --- a politician without any principles at all. He proceeded to double-cross them --- one of the greatest historical double-crosses of all time. He would justify having done it on the grounds that he was president and was fighting the Cold War. I have since asked what in the world we got from this. I don’t see that he solved the problem of China at all. I suppose we got some listening posts in China against Russia. Now, I guess, we have listening posts in Russia against China.” [Rusher表達他對尼克森的不屑，他認為尼與北京結盟，並沒有為美國爭到什麼。]

比較重要的是關於上海公報的口述歷史，這一部分只有Marshall Green與Winston Lord[他隨尼克森訪中擔任記錄員，後來擔任重要智庫The Council on Foreign Relations的總裁，1985-1989年間擔任美國駐中國大使，1993-1997擔任美國國務院亞太事務助卿]表達了意見，Winston Lord說的不重要，Marshall Green說的比較值得我們提:

Marshall Green說: “The Shanghai Communique could have been a disaster. It ------ left the implication that we stood behind all of our treaties in East Asia, but it excluded reference to our treaty obligations to Taiwan. Kissinger was very mad at me for finding the mistake in the communiqué, because I put him in an embarrassing position vis-à-vis the president: he had bound Nixon to a document which was wide open to criticism from the right wing. There was a stormy session when the president found out about it. Kissinger wrote about the incident in his book, The White House Years. The president is storming up and down in his underwear, swearing he will get even with the State Department. My guess is that the president was storming up and down because he was mad at Kissinger for this serious oversight. I hope that the history will be written correctly.”

Marshall這段話十分重要，所以我必須特別加以解釋[在親日與親台的美國的保守派眼中，William Rogers之後的美國國務院已變成親共或親中的大本營，在尼克森與季辛吉掌控了美國的外交政策的方向與制訂之後，William Rogers國務卿的國務院已變成可有可無，而且逐漸被紅色勢力入侵，尼季兩人對當時的國務卿完全不看在眼裡，當國務院官員對上海公報的內容初稿加以挑裼時，據說尼克森十光火，認為國務院跟他搗蛋]，他說: 尼克森氣急敗壞，穿著內衣內褲，奔上跑下，暴跳如雷，發誓要向國務院討公道。這段描述十分傳神。

隨尼季訪中的Marshall Green在一行391人中排名第8，他當時的官階與職務是國務院的亞太事務助卿，層級不低。是他發現了「上海公報」原稿中對台灣的利益有重大損害、且會被美國政壇親台的右翼勢力拿來攻擊尼克森政府的把柄的條款與文字 ，並立即向國務卿報告，國務卿立即向尼克森反映，尼克森十分光火，但還是做了些彌補與修正。倘若沒有這些彌補與修正，Marshall說，那就會對台灣與尼克森政府帶來災難[ “The Shanghai Communique could have been a disaster.” ]，因為Marshall發現了重大錯誤，但也將季辛吉置於在尼克森面前陷入尷尬的處境，所以老季對Marshall十分生氣。

Marshall最後說: “My guess is that the president was storming up and down because he was mad at Kissinger for this serious oversight. I hope that the history will be written correctly.”他認為尼克森的光火不是針對國務院或他，而是對老季的疏忽光火，他希望這段歷史未來能夠被正確地寫出來。

我們未來會談老季在”The White House Years” 這本回憶錄中相關的記載。

二

既然提到「尼(克森)周(恩來)上海公報」，我們現在就把已經解密、存放於The National Security Archives的 「尼周會談記錄」等文件張貼出來。

Nixon's Trip to China
Records now Completely Declassified,
Including Kissinger Intelligence Briefing and Assurances on Taiwan
by William Burr
Posted - December 11, 2003

In their accounts of the historic February 1972 trip to China, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger focus on the February 21 meeting with Mao Zedong as well as the talks with Zhou Enlai on the Vietnam War, Taiwan, and the Shanghai Communique. Both kept secret one of the trip's more remarkable episodes -- Kissinger's top secret intelligence briefing to the Chinese on Soviet military forces arrayed against China. They also kept secret some of their talks with Zhou; Kissinger later claimed that Zhou "spent very little of our time on" Taiwan, but actually Nixon and Kissinger went to some length to mollify his concerns about the possibility of Taiwanese independence and prospective Japanese influence over Taiwan. After years of declassification requests and appeals, the National Security Archive publishes here for the first time the intelligence briefing to the Chinese and the complete texts of Nixon's conversations with Zhou, including the assurances on Taiwan.

Richard Nixon's trip to China in February 1972 was a critically important moment in the early history of the Sino-American rapprochement. Keeping Secretary of State William Rogers out of the talks, Nixon and Kissinger met privately with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai where they confirmed understandings on sensitive issues such as Taiwan and the normalization of diplomatic relations. Nearly ten years ago, the National Security Archive filed a mandatory review request with the National Archive's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff for declassification review of the memoranda of conversations (memcons) for the Nixon-Mao-Zhou Enlai meetings. While the Nixon-Mao memcon had been declassified separately among State Department records at the National Archives, the memcons of the Nixon-Zhou talks were finally released in the spring of 1999. Three of them, however, were released with a significant number of excisions. The National Security Archive promptly filed an appeal with the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, which rejected it two years later on the grounds that declassification would harm U.S. foreign relations and national security. The next step, taken in June 2001, was an appeal to the Interagency Security Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the "court of last resort" for the mandatory review process. ISCAP enhanced its already remarkable reputation by approving complete release of the memcons in the fall of 2002. Possibly because of understaffing, the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff delayed releasing the documents until 14 November 2003. ---Read More---

While the newly released information in the Nixon-Zhou talks is interesting, none of it was so sensitive that it could not have been released years ago. Some of the excisions had to do with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and the 1971 South Asia War but most relate to two preoccupations of the Chinese leadership: 1) fear of renewed Japanese expansion, and 2) opposition to Taiwanese independence. The late 1960s and early 1970s was a period when Japan's export successes were catching attention throughout the industrialized world, not least in the United States where some industries were feeling the brunt of Japanese competition. As orthodox Marxists, the Chinese leadership easily assumed that economic expansion would develop into political and military expansion, a revival of the Japanese imperialism that had caused so much devastation in China only a few decades earlier. In keeping with this, Zhou expressed concern about the possibility of Japanese expansion into South Korea and Taiwan, with Nixon and Kissinger assuring him that as long as the United States had a security treaty with Japan, Washington would be in a position to check any Japanese tendencies toward militarism and political expansionism. With the U.S. committed to pulling its forces out of Taiwan, Zhou expressed anxiety not only about the revival of Japanese influence in its former colony, but also about the prospects for an independent Taiwan. The forces pushing for independence were small, but Zhou was nonetheless concerned and wanted assurances that Washington would not support any movement that was inconsistent with the concept of "one China."
Why security reviewers working with the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff sought to block complete declassification of these memcons is puzzling. Granting that some of the discussion remained sensitive during the 1970s, by the time that the Nixon project made the initial denials in 1999 and 2001, so much information had been declassified relating to the touchier portions of these documents that there could be no legitimate reasons to maintain their classification. Indeed, details on Beijing's concerns about Japanese expansion, possible Japanese influence in Taiwan and South Korea, and the Taiwanese independence movement had already been declassified in the Nixon National Security Files and State Department records at the National Archives. Concerns about harm to U.S. foreign policy were greatly exaggerated; its earlier decisions on the withholdings are a telling example of the overclassification problem in the U.S. government secrecy system.

The release of the Kissinger intelligence briefing to the Chinese on 23 February 1972 shows much better judgment. After it initially denied the Archive's mandatory review request in the spring of 2002, the Nixon Project released, in response to an appeal, the memcon of the intelligence briefing. Kissinger's intelligence briefings to the Chinese have long been a subject of discussion, but this is the first one to be declassified. Perhaps the ISCAP decision on the Nixon-Zhou talks made the Nixon Project and the National Archives less hesitant to declassify once sensitive documents, such as this one, that had long been overtaken by events. In light of their pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union at the same time, Nixon and Kissinger had understandable reasons for assigning a high classification to secret briefings on Soviet military forces arrayed against China. Now that so much information has been released on triangular diplomacy, however, this document was ripe for declassification, which the Nixon Project recognized, after some hesitation.

Documents

Document 1: Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10 p.m. - 6:10 p.m.

Location of original: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, box 87, Memoranda for the President Beginning February 20, 1972
Newly Released Material: Pages 5 and 10-12 [New information appears in brackets]

The Nixon Project made several withholdings from this memcon, during which Nixon and Zhou reviewed the Taiwan issue, the U.S. military posture, Sino-American relations during the 1940s, and the Vietnam War negotiations. Key statements in the conversation (see page 5) were those in which Nixon provided the basis for what has been U.S. policy on Taiwan ever since. While Nixon said that the United States would not support "any" Taiwanese independence movement and asserted that Taiwan was "part of China,"[請注意，尼克森聲稱「台灣是中國的一部分」還好 「上海公報」不是這麼說。]

he also stated that Washington supported a "peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issues." These statements were in private; no president publicly declared non-support for Taiwanese independence until President Bill Clinton visited China in 1998. The government's excisions from this document set the tone for the other Nixon-Zhou memcons: With his concerns about Japanese expansion and Taiwan, Zhou worried that Japan would "move into" Taiwan or at least foment Taiwanese independence. [中方擔心日本勢力進入台灣，增強台灣獨立的力量] Nixon assured that he would work against such an outcome. Recognizing China's long-standing opposition to the US-Japan security treaty, Nixon argued that Beijing should accept the treaty because it gave U.S. influence over Tokyo on such matters as Taiwan policy. Other passages that were excised include Nixon's statement on the U.S. hard anti-Soviet line during the South Asian war and the arrangements for Kissinger to give an intelligence briefing on Soviet forces threatening China (see document four).

Document 2: Memorandum of Conversation, 23 February 1972, 2:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.

Location of original: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, box 87, Memoranda for the President Beginning February 20, 1972
Newly Released Material: Pages 18, 19, 21, 31, and 39 [New information appears in brackets]

In this conversation, Nixon, Zhou, and Kissinger discussed the 1962 Indo-Chinese war, South Asian conflicts, U.S. politics and Sino-American normalization, the Korean peninsula, U.S.-Soviet detente, and Sino-Soviet tensions and their background. Some of the details initially withheld from this document also relate to Japan, with Nixon assuring Zhou that Washington would discourage any Japanese "military intervention" in South Korea. Nixon restated the point that close US-Japan relations were necessary to give the US leverage on Japan's policy toward Korea or Taiwan. Again, to mollify Zhou's concerns over Japanese expansion, Nixon made a general commitment that the U.S. would "restrain the Japanese from going from economic expansion to military expansion." [中方表達對日本勢力擴張的關切，搞得美國必須給中方一些承諾與安撫] Also withheld from the document was a brief exchange on Soviet "subversion" in Yugoslavia and the sailing of Soviets nuclear submarines through the Suvarov Straits during the South Asian war.

During the talks with Zhou, Nixon also made what amounted to a general security guarantee for China. Noting that during the South Asian crisis he had been ready to "warn the Soviet Union against undertaking an attack on China," Nixon went even further, declaring that the "US would oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to engage in aggressive action against China." That Nixon and Kissinger had no idea what the United States could do to support the Chinese in a confrontation with the Soviets was necessarily unstated. Kissinger's NSC staff had once looked into the issue and only came up with a proposal for a UN resolution; the U.S. was not likely to go to war with the Soviets over China. Nevertheless, Nixon brought the issue up again, this time, during a toast at a banquet in Shanghai, Nixon declared that the "American people" were dedicated to the "principle" that "never again shall foreign domination, foreign occupation, be visited upon this city or any part of China or any independent country in this world."

Document 3: Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15 p.m. - 8:05 p.m.

Location of original: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, box 87, Memoranda for the President Beginning February 20, 1972
Newly Released Material: Pages 5, 11-15, and 25-28 [New information appears in brackets]

In this conversation, Nixon, Zhou, and Kissinger discussed the Shanghai communiqué, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam negotiations, the Korean War POW issue, Cambodia and the Vietnam War, South Asian conflicts, and the Middle East. Apart from a critical comment about India's ingratitude about U.S. aid, most of the newly released portions concern Japan and Taiwanese issues, ranging from the leak of a State Department memo on Taiwan to the Japanese to Kissinger's scorn over the "unreliability" of Japanese journalists. On Japanese foreign policy, Nixon again pledged to "restrain" any Japanese tendencies toward expansionism in the "interest of peace in the Pacific." [中方表達對日本勢力擴張的關切，搞得美國必須給中方一些承諾與安撫]When Zhou expressed concern about a possible Japanese military role in South Korea, Nixon assured him that Washington would use its "influence" to "discourage" Japanese intervention there. During one of the exchanges on Taiwan, Nixon commented that without having forces in Japan, the U.S. would have no influence over Tokyo's Taiwan policy -- the Japanese would not "pay attention." While he was trying to encourage Zhou to take a more positive view of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, the latter continued to hold by the goal of a "peaceful, independent, and neutral Japan." To the extent that Japan's successful economic expansion had become a worrisome problem, Zhou later suggested, it was an American responsibility: the United States had let Japan "fatten herself," now Japan is developing "too rapidly" and has become a "heavy burden on you" (a likely reference to U.S. trade deficits).
The largest excised section, focusing on the Peng Meng-min affair [這裡顯示中方用了很大的精力與心思，在討論與對付彭明敏與「台灣獨立運動」的問題，這導致美方向中方承諾「不支持台灣獨立」], reflects Beijing's concern about the Taiwanese independence movement. Bitterly opposed to the Nationalist regime imposed by mainlanders led by Chiang Kai-shek, native-born Taiwanese had created an underground pro-independence movement, which elicited sympathetic reactions in the United States. Peng, an international relations professor at National Taiwan University and a former diplomat, had turned into an opponent of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship and a supporter of independence. During the mid-1960s, Peng was arrested on sedition charges and sentenced to eight years in prison, but international protest led to the commutation of his sentence after he had served seven months. Peng remained under close surveillance but secretly fled to Sweden in early 1970, with the help of local supporters and the Swedish chapter of Amnesty International. While in Sweden, Peng applied for a U.S. visa so he could hold a research position at the University of Michigan's Chinese Studies program. The Nixon White House had been none too happy about Peng's visa application -- and Vice President Agnew opposed it altogether -- but Kissinger and the State Department decided that it was better to approve the visa than face "congressional and public criticism which would prove harmful to U.S. policy" toward Taiwan. Peng's status as a former participant in Kissinger's international seminar at Harvard may have softened Kissinger's attitude in this instance. The State Department granted the visa in September 1970.

Plainly, Peng's status grated on Zhou: he had already brought it up with Kissinger during the secret trip suggesting that the CIA was behind the escape. Zhou brought up the issue of possible U.S. complicity again during the talks with Nixon, but Kissinger denied it and observed that left-wing groups had helped Peng escape. In any event, both Nixon and Kissinger assured Zhou that they would not support Taiwanese independence, although they were careful to note that that they could not use force to halt it if it came to pass. As Zhou suggested, Chiang kai-shek could repress pro-independence forces because the idea of an independent Taiwan was as anathema to him as it was to Zhou. Peng remained a thorn in Beijing's side; after political conditions on Taiwan had improved, he returned and ran as the presidential candidate of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. While Peng had little chance of winning, the campaign elicited a large Chinese naval demonstration and missile shots over Taiwan, one of the major episodes in the 1995-96 crisis over Taiwan.

Document 4: Memorandum of Conversation, 23 February 1972, 9:35 a.m. - 12:34 p.m.

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, HAK Office Files, box 92, Dr, Kissinger's Meetings in the PRC During the Presidential Visit February1972.

The shared antagonism toward the Soviet Union was a crucially important dimension of the Sino-American rapprochement, and to enhance Beijing's confidence in American power as well as to bring the two governments closer together, Kissinger wanted the Chinese to have the best intelligence information available on Soviet military forces. Kissinger's first disclosure of intelligence information to Beijing may have occurred in November 1971, during the Indo-Pakistan War. When meeting with UN Ambassador Huang Hua, he provided details on Indian forces arrayed against Pakistan and later offered him a more general briefing on the "disposition of Soviet forces." (Note 12) Huang did not take up that offer but General Alexander Haig, Kissinger's deputy, restated it when he met with Zhou in January 1972. Haig offered "unilaterally and without any reciprocity" on China's part "our assessment of the Soviet threat which exists against the People's Republic." He also told Zhou that when Nixon and Kissinger arrived in February, the latter would be "ready to to discuss the modalities of furnishing this information." The manner in which Haig made the offer relieved Zhou of having to reply on the spot, much less to say anything suggesting that Beijing wanted or needed such information.

After Kissinger arrived in Beijing on 21 February, he held a private talk with Zhou (after the Nixon-Mao meeting) where he offered to share "some information on dangers we confront in the military field." The next day, speaking with deputy foreign minister Qiao Guanhua, Kissinger observed that when meeting the next morning he would, in accordance with Nixon's wishes, provide "some information of a more sensitive nature." He further suggested that it would be "more beneficial" if someone with military expertise were at the meeting. As the Chinese had never asked for such a briefing, Qiao simply stated, "we will study that." When Kissinger observed that, "We will do that so that in any future crisis we both know militarily what the problem is," Qiao was more positive, saying "Good." As noted earlier, during the afternoon meeting with Zhou on 22 February, Nixon briefly mentioned the arrangements for a briefing that he had approved.

When Kissinger met with Qiao the next morning, in attendance was the influential Marshal Ye Jianying whom Kissinger had first met at the Beijing airport in July 1971. After some discussion of the Shanghai Communiqué and the importance of secrecy for the briefing, Kissinger gave a run-down of Soviet forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet border, including ground forces, tactical aircraft and missiles, strategic air defenses, and strategic attack forces. The briefing was detailed, with specific numbers of on Soviet divisions, aircraft, missiles, etc. Kissinger gave special attention to nuclear forces, providing considerable detail on four types of tactical missiles, including the explosive yield of their nuclear warheads. After Kissinger discussed the FROG, he admitted unfamiliarity with the names of the other two tactical missiles and did not bother to give them to the Chinese. The second missile was most likely the now well-known SCUD (or SS-1B) while the third unnamed system was probably the SCALEBOARD (or SS-12). The fourth, a naval cruise missile with a range of 300 nautical miles, was probably one version or the other of the SHADDOCK (or SS-N-3). Perhaps Kissinger did not know (or did not remember) that NATO military experts devised the often strange nomenclature for Soviet weapons systems.

When Kissinger concluded his presentation, he emphasized that except for Nixon and those Americans present, "nobody in our government" knew about it, even the "intelligence people" who had prepared the information. While Kissinger, through Nixon's approval, had the authority to disclose the information to the Chinese, undoubtedly Deputy of Central Intelligence Richard Helms would have wanted to vet the briefing in the name of protecting sources and methods. In any event, Marshall Ye expressed his gratitude to Kissinger, saying that not only was the information "very useful" but that it also was an "important indication" of the U.S.'s "willingness to improve our relations." This would not be the last of such presentations; they were regular features of Kissinger's visits to China until October 1975, when relations had soured and the Chinese rejected his offer of a "special briefing."

After the intelligence briefing, Kissinger reviewed U.S.-Soviet negotiations then in play on a number of issues, such as the European Security Conference (later known as the Conference on European Security and Cooperation), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, SALT, and economic agreements, among others. This was part of the Nixon-Kissinger confidence-building effort so that the Chinese would not feel that Moscow and Washington were in "collusion" against China but also had an opportunity to comment on the negotiations. When the Nixon Project originally released this material (pp. 14-23), it withheld the opening pages containing the intelligence presentation.

Document 5
Memorandum of Conversation, Friday, February 25, 1972 - 5:45 p.m.-6:45 p.m.

Discussions of Sino-Soviet relations, Japan, the Middle East and North Africa, and Portuguese colonial policy. During the discussion of the Soviet Union, Nixon notes that Moscow is?"pathological" on the subject of Sino-American relations; it is the "only major nation attacking this trip." After Kissinger adds that "Japan and India are not ecstatic," Nixon observes that "they can't do anything about it."

Document 6
Memorandum of Conversation, Saturday, February 26, 1972 - 9:20 p.m.-10:05 p.m.

Plenary session reviewing foreign ministers discussions. The conversation is more commonplace, except for Zhou's apology for the prearranged appearance of a group of children "to prettify" the Ming Tombs during Nixon's excursion there. Zhou acknowledges that the U.S. press coverage of the incident reported that the children "gave a false appearance." As Kissinger later recalled, Nixon handled Zhou's admission of a "cover up" gracefully and then warned him that U.S. journalists and Congressmen could "poison" Sino-American relations.

Document 7
Memorandum of Conversation, Monday, February 28, 1972 - 8:30-9:30 a.m.

Discussion of joint communiqué, future U.S.-PRC relations, and the Vietnam negotiations. Nixon assures Zhou that no one outside a small circle would learn that they had discussed India, Japan, and the Soviet Union: "under no circumstance will we embarrass him or his government, by implication or otherwise, that those subjects were discussed."

美國國會研究處亞洲安全事務研究員簡淑賢(Shirley A. Kan)的一項研究報告指出，尼周會談後得出的美中關係「五項原則」，包括美方「將不支持台灣獨立運動」:

China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China”
Policy—Key Statements from Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei，其中有一條內容如下:

Nixon’s “Five Principles” in Secret Talks with Zhou Enlai
February 22, 1972

Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined.

Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement.

Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the U.S. has influence with Japan—we have in this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister’s government—we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so.

The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out. And related to that point, we will not support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the Mainland.

Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. We know that the issue of Taiwan is a barrier to complete normalization, but within the framework I have previously described, we seek normalization and we will work toward that goal and will try to achieve it.

簡淑賢所記載的另一條內容如下:

Kissinger’s Secret Talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai80
July 9, 1971

As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a “two Chinas” solution or a “one China, one Taiwan” solution.

[On Zhou Enlai’s question of whether the United States would support the Taiwan Independence movement]: We would not support this.

(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)