反美的琉球左翼政客持續對美日同盟與「大美和平」(Pax Americana)進行破壞與打擊(下)
第三部分
對這個惱人的議題，「紐約時報」的報導與觀察比較深入與正確，所以我們今天還要再度借重它的報導，來讓台美與台灣鄉親正確掌握沖繩的情勢。駐沖繩的美軍，特別是陸戰隊遠征軍，肩負保衛台灣的重責大任，所以那些主張減少美國的沖繩駐軍或者反對美國在沖繩駐軍的琉球人或日本人，說清楚些，就是美國、日本與台灣人的敵人，但是我們台灣人與台美人與其去詛咒與譴責那些人，還不如歡迎美軍重返並永駐台灣。
根據日裔(也是台裔)美國人長山四男老先生的說法，小布希時代的美國白宮官員(包括小布希總統本人)、國務院官員與國防部官員讀了周威霖寫的「與美國有約」一書的英譯本後，對該書有很高的評價，並認為台灣是美國最理想的基地。倘若此說屬實，美國政府就應排除萬難，讓美軍重返並長駐台灣，無需在西太平洋、南太平洋與東亞地區進行輪調與流浪。
我們現在來讀1/20/2014一則「紐約時報」的報導:
“In a City on Okinawa, Mayor’s Re-election Deals a Blow to Marine Base Relocation Plan”
By Marin Fackler
TOKYO — Efforts to relocate a Marine air base that has been a longstanding irritant in ties between Japan and the United States suffered a new setback on Sunday when voters in a small Okinawan city re-elected a leftist mayor who promised to block construction of a replacement site.
The victory for the mayor of Nago, Susumu Inamine, dealt an embarrassing blow to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has invested his political capital in efforts to restart the long-stalled relocation deal, and who seemed to achieve a breakthrough last month by gaining the support of Okinawa’s governor.
Mr. Abe, a conservative, has vowed to build closer ties with the United States at a time when both nations face growing challenges from a militarily resurgent China and a nuclear-armed North Korea.
The relocation has been fiercely opposed by Okinawans, who want the base — the Marine Corps’ Air Station Futenma — off their island altogether. Opinion polls had forecast a victory for Mr. Inamine, who has opposed the nearly two-decade-old plan to move the base and its noisy helicopters and other aircraft from a heavily populated part of Okinawa to the fishing hamlet of Henoko, in a remote corner of his city.
In a high-profile attempt to swing the election, Mr. Abe had thrown his government’s political weight — and financial resources — behind a challenger in favor of the base plan, Bunshin Suematsu. A week before the vote, the Abe government even dangled the prospect of a half-billion dollars in new public works spending for the city, or the equivalent of more than $8,000 for each of Nago’s 63,000 residents.
Such offers of largess failed to win over Nago’s voters. Mr. Inamine, 68, a former school superintendent who was supported by the Japanese Communist Party and other progressive groups, received 19,839 votes, to 15,684 votes for the conservative, Mr. Suematsu, 65, a former member of the Okinawa prefectural assembly.
“Without the mayor’s approval and consent, this process cannot go forward,” Mr. Inamine told cheering supporters, referring to the base relocation plan. “In order to protect the future for our children, I will not allow a new base to be built.”
Mr. Abe has tried to succeed where his predecessors failed by reviving the deal to relocate Futenma, which was first struck in 1996 to appease anger in Okinawa over the gang rape of a schoolgirl by American military personnel the year before. The lack of progress in the deal has driven a wedge between Japan and the United States, which wants the new air base as part of a sweeping realignment of the Marines included in the Obama administration’s strategic “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific region.
Last month, Mr. Abe appeared to achieve a breakthrough when the governor of Okinawa, Hirokazu Nakaima, dropped his opposition to the project to approve landfill permits for construction of two runways in coral-filled waters off Henoko.
But building the base will also require the use of ports and roads, which must be approved by the mayor. That approval is unlikely to be forthcoming from Mr. Inamine, who was first elected in 2010 on an anti-base platform and during the recent campaign vowed to block any construction “on land or sea.”
After Mr. Inamine’s victory late Sunday night, hundreds of supporters gathered at his campaign office, some in tears, others vowing angry defiance.
“If anything, we feel Mr. Nakaima betrayed us by flip-flopping,” Etsuko Urashima, 65, a writer who lives in Nago, said by phone. “That made us want to say even more loudly, ‘No base!’ ”
Mr. Inamine’s re-election leaves Mr. Abe’s governing Liberal Democratic Party with a tough decision. It can either wait another four years until the city’s next mayoral election in hopes of electing a conservative candidate, or try to force construction over the current mayor’s objections — a move that political analysts said could set off huge protests.
“I don’t think the Abe government is just going to give up easily,” said Akira Kimura, an international relations specialist at Kagoshima University, “but this could quickly come to a head if Mr. Abe tries to force construction.”
In Tokyo, governing party lawmakers expressed disappointment with the result. They said the outcome would not change their plans to relocate the base, which they said would ultimately lead to a reduction in the American presence as thousands of Marines are redeployed to Guam, Australia and Hawaii.
“We will continue to work for the development of Okinawa and reduction of the base presence,” said Takeo Kawamura, chairman of the party’s election strategy committee.
Arguments that the relocation will lessen their burden have failed to sway many Okinawans, who view Futenma as a symbol of what they see as an onerous American presence that contributes to pollution and crime on their tropical island. They also rail against what they call their island’s disproportionate sacrifice: more than half of the 50,000 United States military personnel in Japan are currently stationed on Okinawa.
During the campaign for mayor, Mr. Inamine dismissed the offers of money from Tokyo as an effort to buy votes and silence grievances.
“Nago’s residents will be the ones who choose Nago’s mayor,” he said Saturday. “Nago’s residents choose to reject Henoko.”
第四部分
雖然沖繩的反美左翼勢力反對美軍駐紮沖繩，但安倍政府不為所動，話雖如此， ---Read More--- 基地建設需要聯外道路及若干周邊設施，這些都需要取得名護市長稻嶺進,的合作與許可 ，這個反美的左翼小政客擁有當地的民意基礎，所以安倍政權還有得苦頭吃，很難稱心如意。
我們現在來讀一篇報導的一部分，看日本政府怎麼說:
“Japan Undeterred by Anti-U.S. Base Mayor’s Re-election”
By Yuriko Nagano
Associated Press
1/20/2014
TOKYO – The Japanese government said today it would push forward with a long-stalled agreement to relocate a U.S. military base within Okinawa, despite the re-election of a mayor who opposes the plan.
A government spokesman said building the base in Nago is the only solution, given all the factors involved.
“We remain unchanged on continuing steadily with the plan,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said.
His comments come a day after Nago Mayor Susumu Inamine, who vowed to block construction of the base by denying permits for the project, won a hard-fought contest against a pro-base opponent supported by Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
第五部分
在沖繩的反美左翼份子成為老共的同路人的同時，美國的戰略家與軍事家普遍已有「中國現在已在挑戰與破壞美國的世界領導權」的認知與共識(美國國安與外交界的菁英階層有此共識，對包括台灣人在內的亞太地區人民是好事)，光是最近我們就在美國的主流媒體讀到了兩篇這反映這種共識的文章，現在我們把它們轉貼出來，讓鄉親們讀一讀:
“HEAR China’s Roar” (或”Why the Suddenly Aggressive Behavior by China?”)
By Gary Schmitt
The Los Angeles Times
1/10/2014
It would be difficult to believe that China's leaders didn't expect a negative reaction from its neighbors and the United States when it announced the creation of an expansive air defense identification zone over the East China Sea in late November. But that raises the question of why those leaders are behaving the way they are when China has so many domestic problems that need urgent attention, and when China's continued growth and ability to deal with those problems depends on a stable international order. Why pick fights now?
Indeed, for many years, the public rhetoric from Beijing was centered on China's "Peaceful Rise." Unlike the emergence of other great powers, China's move to the front ranks of nation-states would not, the Chinese argued, be accompanied by a militancy aimed at displacing hegemonies.
China would not, its interlocutors with the West said, follow in the footsteps of Wilhelmine Germany, Imperial Japan or, for that matter, 1890s America. Chinese behavior was to be governed by former leader Deng Xiaoping's admonition that it would "not seek leadership" and would "maintain a low profile." Until China could exercise preeminence, it was best, Deng advised, to "hide our capacities and bide our time."
With good reason. China's remarkable leap from impoverished nation to the second-largest economy in the world has been made possible by an international economic order that it has taken full advantage of. Beijing has every reason not to kill the golden goose of globalization by turning the attention of the region's other powers from trade and business to matters of security and armaments. Nor would one think that China would want to challenge the United States now since, arguably, it is American power and leadership that has largely kept the world's trading system humming by keeping both the great commons free and cataclysmic wars among the great powers from happening.
So, again, why the aggressive behavior now?
One answer Sinologists give is bureaucratic: The military made me do it. The argument here is that China's civilian leaders, who are always looking for ways to increase their own support within the competing factions of the Communist Party, will accordingly give the military more resources and more leeway to garner that support.
But there is no solid evidence to support this thesis, and it runs counter to what we know about how one-party states operate. Keeping the folks with the guns and the tanks under the party leadership's control is a ruling axiom that no senior Chinese Communist Party official would intentionally ignore. And since taking over the party's reins in November 2012, President Xi Jinping has left little doubt as to who is in charge of military and security affairs.
The other argument offered to explain recent Chinese behavior is linked to American weakness. In 2009, with the great recession underway, the Obama administration's grand strategic outreach to Beijing was seen by the Chinese as a sign of U.S. retreat. Talk at the time from senior American officials of a possible G-2 and President Obama's statement that "the relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century," making "it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world" appeared to convince that Chinese that its rise to the top might be occurring faster than anticipated because of a more precipitous U.S. decline.
This narrative has only increased as the administration's planned "pivot" to Asia has been undercut by declining defense budgets and doubt that the Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade agreement will be concluded anytime soon.
However, perceived U.S. weakness cannot be the whole story, even if it's an important part. What are also at play are Chinese ambitions. China's leaders want their nation to be a great power; they want China, as in its imperial past, to have a predominant say in the region. Xi's earliest speeches and appearances were to stoke the "Chinese Dream," and it was on his watch that Chinese passports were issued with watermark maps that included territories claimed by Japan, Vietnam the Philippines and India.
From Beijing's perspective, the United States is the region's interloper and the principal obstacle to obtaining that goal of predominance. And, like individuals, nations can be envious and resentful of those they perceive as standing in the way, even when economic and trade ties are substantial. One has only to remember the dynamic between Wilhelmine Germany and Britain in the years leading up to World War I to appreciate the need to design policies that face up to this reality so as to avoid a similar disaster.
When Deng spoke of China maintaining a low profile, it was, after all, only until it was safe to exercise its power openly. One can certainly question whether China has reached that point. But that is the problem with grand ambitions; they are difficult to stifle or retreat from.
If one had to predict, dealing with Beijing in the year ahead is not likely to get any easier — if anything, it may be even more difficult.
(Gary Schmitt is director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.)
接下來，我們來讀老戰略家Edward Luttwak的大作:
“China’s Risky Flirtation with Military Adventurism”
By Edward Luttwak
1/2/2014
On Dec. 5, a Chinese naval vessel deliberately attempted to block a U.S. Navy cruiser in international waters. In a startling revelation, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has confirmed to the press that at one point only 100 yards separated the two vessels. That raises an important question: Why did the Chinese commanders think it a good idea to provoke a near-collision with a U.S. warship?
A growing record of encounters suggests that Chinese naval officers have career incentives to act provocatively, even at the risk of deadly incidents. So do their counterparts in the army. Forces under the Lanzhou Military Region, in China's west, thought it smart to seize Indian-controlled terrain in Ladakh this April. They retreated only when the Indians threatened to cancel a state visit. Similarly, the China Coast Guard has been intrusively patrolling the waters around the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, even entering Japanese territorial waters in recent days.
It was different during the Cold War. In spite of countless encounters between American and Soviet aircraft and warships, as well as the famous set-to between the U.S. and Soviet armies at "Checkpoint Charlie" in the heart of Berlin, there were very few dangerous incidents. Soviet officers knew that "adventurism" was a career-ending offense.
Yet in the Chinese case, Communist Party leaders apparently encourage it. The state media vigorously endorse each act of military adventurism. Why should this be? After all, the risks of escalation are enormous.
With all due respect for the China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning—which the USS Cowpens was monitoring from a safe distance when the Dec. 5 incident occurred—today's Chinese navy is a set of easy targets for America's aircraft carriers and attack submarines. The USS Cowpens is a near 10,000-ton missile cruiser.
Likewise, Japan's navy could sweep the seas around the Senkakus of any intruding Chinese coast guard or naval vessels, including the entire Liaoning flotilla. So why is Beijing risking humiliating defeat?
The inescapable conclusion is that since 2008 China's leaders have abandoned the "peaceful rise" policy that Deng Xiaoping launched in 1978 and senior strategist Zheng Bijian spelled out in 2003. To rise economically, China needed a receptive world environment in which its exports, imports and incoming investments would be unimpeded. Deng's policy—threaten nobody, advance no claims and don't attack Taiwan—was brilliantly successful, as the U.S. actively favored China's economic growth and other countries followed suit, to the great benefit of the Chinese people, and us all.
Everything changed after 2008. Interpreting the global financial crisis as a harbinger of collapsing American power, Beijing abruptly revived its long-dormant claim to most of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, rebuffed friendly overtures from Japanese politicians and instead demanded the Senkakus, and declared ownership of vast portions of the South China Sea hundreds of miles from any Chinese coast but well within the exclusive economic zones of the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam.
China's demands are now asserted even on its passports, which are decorated with a map that on close inspection includes South Korean waters. The seven countries under pressure have naturally reacted by coalescing against China, at least diplomatically, and in some cases substantively—as in the informal India-Japan-Vietnam arrangement that is endowing the hard-pressed Vietnamese navy with modern submarines. China's bombastic proclamation last month of an Air Defense Identification Zone that overlaps with both Japan's and Korea's, may even improve the fraught relationship between those two countries.
Chinese leaders now complain of being confronted by emerging coalitions from South Korea to India, and they blame the U.S. for it all. But despite Washington's famous "pivot," it wasn't the cunning malevolence of the U.S. State Department that turned China's neighbors against it.
Rather, it was the Chinese government itself—country by country, demand by demand. The latest demand, after the Air Defense Identification Zone affair, is that Japan should not increase its military spending—i.e., that it should refrain from reacting to daily Chinese threats.
Some observers see a clever long-term scheme of systematic intimidation at work. Others insist that it cannot be clever to quarrel with seven neighbors at once. Nor does it make sense for a rising China to alarm everybody prematurely, causing them to unite diplomatically and even perhaps commercially against Chinese interests.
China's Communist Party leaders have been competent in managing a vast and dynamic economy, and their repression is also very skillful in minimizing visible brutality (except against minorities). For these reasons, there is an assumption by many outsiders that the leadership is equally proficient in foreign policy.
Unfortunately, the actual evidence so far is that we are witnessing a prolonged outbreak of feckless nationalism and militarism that evokes the sinister precedent of pre-1914 Germany. This was a country that had the world's best universities, the most advanced industries and the strongest banks. It lacked only the strategic wisdom of persisting in its own "peaceful rise."
(Mr. Luttwak is author most recently of "The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy" (Harvard, 2012))
中國人過早地與迫不及待地露出了囂張與猙獰的面目、霸道與黷武的本質、侵略與擴張的本性，對台灣人與世人都是好事，若他們沉得住氣，在二十年後才露出狐狸尾巴，那對台灣人與中國周邊地區其他國家的人民就會是更大的災難，因為中國人若不露出狐狸尾巴，美國的菁英階層與統治階層會出現許許多多的賣台派、棄台派、對日疏離派、親中派、對中姑息派與對中調適派，這些人的出現與聒噪是美國的不幸，更是亞太地區人民的大不幸，台灣人更慘，將會葬送在這些人的手裡。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
