一
台灣的產業基礎與資金被老共掏空，根據「紐約時報」一篇文章的論
台灣的產業基礎與資金被老共掏空[就是「去工業化」]，這是經過一個長達二、三十年的漫長過程，這
在李登輝時代，他不但提出「戒急用忍」，嘗試要阻止台灣企業的資
為什麼「戒急用忍」的政策會失敗呢?因為:一、台商，特別是中、
所以，不是李登輝不行，而是無所不用其極、無法無天的老共比他更
台灣之所以會淪落到今天的地步，這與(1)不管台灣死活的許多台
二
今天「紐約時報」在商業版中出現一篇文章，其中有一段這麼說:
[在中國工業化的衝擊中]，亞洲未來最可能的輸家是台灣，從20
建州運動現在把該文張貼出來，讓鄉親們參考:
“From Colonial India, Lessons for a Changed Economy”
By Tyler Cowen
New York Times
8/24/2014
---The Industrial Revolution left a giant in the dust. Today’s trade shocks could do the same to some Western countries.
Commentators have often compared the recent Great Recession of the United States and Europe to the Great Depression of the 1930s. In both cases, asset prices tumbled, financial systems turned insolvent and demand plummeted. One difference is that in the recent case, we mounted a swifter rescue effort than we did in the 1930s; for instance, Ben S. Bernanke, as chairman of the Federal Reserve in the recent crisis, drew upon his academic research in supporting bailouts and reflating the economy.
This comparison is intriguing, but we may be neglecting other, less obvious and yet more unsettling historical parallels for today’s global economy. For all the talk of the Great Depression, we might look at a different exemplar for modern times, 18th- and 19th-century economic history India. That country’s economic retrogression during that era may help us understand the quandary that some parts of the world face today.
In 1750, India accounted for one-quarter of the world’s manufacturing output, but by 1900 that was down to 2 percent. The West became more productive as a result of the Industrial Revolution, and India lost much of its leading export sector, textiles. [在1750年，印度的製造業產出佔全世界25%，但到1900
西方國家工業革命與工業化，它們的生產
This story of India’s loss to foreign competition is documented in “Deindustrialization in 18th and 19th Century India,” a paper by David Clingingsmith, an economics professor at Case Western Reserve University, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, an emeritus professor of economics at Harvard.
Economists are accustomed to emphasizing the benefits of international trade, and these arguments are largely correct. But in India, internal regulations and underdevelopment, combined with British colonial depredations, prevented Indian resources from being redeployed productively. The lesson is that a sufficiently large international trade shock can lead to decades of economic decline in a major economy, especially if that economy isn’t geared to mounting a flexible response.
Today, we’re not used to the idea of declining living standards, because growth throughout the 20th century was the global norm for economies that were not at war. International trade grew rapidly after World War II, but at least in the early postwar years most of that trade was among countries with roughly comparable technologies and real wages. And that trade spurred growth rather than damaging laggard economies.
In the last 20 years, the economic surge of Asia, especially China, has brought a large trade readjustment to the world, one with few parallels with the possible exception of the rise of the Western economies several centuries ago. China’s per capita income, less than $300 in 1984, is now in the range of $10,000. The country is now the world’s second-largest economy, and becoming the largest by one measure. [在過去的20年，亞洲經濟的崛起，特別是中國，已經給世界的貿
Who are some of the possible losers in this radical transformation in the global economy? [在這場全球經濟的劇烈改變中，哪些國家是可能的輸家呢?]
Italy, which is producing less today than it was in the middle of 2000, is undergoing a triple-dip recession. Croatia is in its sixth consecutive year of recession — and joining the European Union didn’t help it much. In France, the economy has slowed to a crawl, but because taxes there are already high, there isn’t much room for further budget adjustment. French citizens expect a great deal from their government, and strikes are a common response to reduced wages or benefits.
These economies have a few features in common: They try very hard to preserve old jobs at high real wages, they are not very flexible at adjusting, and they have not engaged in a major economic restructuring. While China is not the main problem of these economies, Chinese export growth and wage competition may have been a kind of final straw that made old ways unsustainable. [那些可能的輸家有一些共通性: 他們很努力地要去保存付高工資的那些老工作，它們沒有能夠進行彈
If either France or Italy, much less both, is in for 15 or 20 years of economic stagnation, it’s hard to see how the eurozone will avoid another major financial crisis. Portugal and Greece, both of which have been de-industrialized over the last few decades, are also possible candidates for continuing, rather than temporary, retrogression.
In Asia, the most likely future candidate for this problem is Taiwan, where real wages were largely stagnant from 2000 to 2011. In 2012, Taiwan’s trend was even more disturbing: Its economy grew 1.3 percent, but real wages fell 1.6 percent, both adjusted for inflation. Taiwanese capital has flowed into China, creating a new class of Taiwanese millionaires but hollowing out the country’s manufacturing base as capital was reallocated to the mainland. [在亞洲，未來最可能的輸家是台灣，從2000到2011年，它
What about the United States? The chance of an overall economic reversal here is very slim. The American economy is relatively flexible, and various candidates for future growth are strong: technology, health care research, energy and higher education. Despite its slow recovery, the United States probably still has the best fundamentals of any major economy.
That said, this same model of deindustrialization may apply to some parts of old industrial America and to some segments of the American middle class. The median individual income of Americans has not risen since 2000, and more recently median household income is still lower than it was when the economic recovery began in June 2009. Downward wage pressure has been strongest where there is competition from Chinese exports.
It was once an unthinkable question, but we’ve arrived at the scary point where it needs to be asked: What if American median income over the next 15 years keeps stagnating — or maybe even falls?
Our Social Security system, whose receipts are based on wage taxation, could then prove to be a bigger fiscal problem than Medicare. Asset prices would most likely prove overvalued, possibly setting off another financial crash or at least damaging many Americans’ retirements. And the rate of household formation would most likely remain slow, depressing the housing market for the foreseeable future.
India’s economy started to reindustrialize in the late 19th century, but growth remained subpar until the 1990s — a truly long recovery lag. This may sound strange to say, but when it comes to some parts of the Western world, the Great Depression may offer the cheerier analogy.
(Tyler Cowen is a professor of economics at George Mason University.作者是George Mason大學的經濟學教授)
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
沒有留言:
張貼留言