關於
The Formosa Statehood Movement was founded by David C. Chou in 1994. It advocates Taiwan become a territory of the United States, leading to statehood.
簡介
[台灣建州運動]在1994年被周威霖與他的同志們在台灣建立, 這個運動主張[台灣人民在美國政府所認為的適當時機, 透過自決與公投, 加入美國], 第一個階段先讓台灣成為美國的領地, 第二階段再經一次公投成為美國一州.

[台灣成為美國的領地]是台灣前途解決的[中程解決方案], 在台灣成為美國領地之後, 經過一段時間, 台灣領地人民再來進行第二次的公投, 那時公投的選項當然可以包括[台灣成為美國一州].[台灣獨立建國].[台灣繼續做為美國的領地]及其它的方案.

[台灣建州運動]現階段極力主張與強力推動[台灣成為美國的領地], 這應該是 [反國民黨統治當局及中國聯手偷竊台灣主權] 的所有台灣住民目前最好的選擇.

在[舊金山和約]中被日本拋棄的台灣主權至今仍在美國政府的政治監護之中, [台灣建州運動]決心與台灣住民. 台美人.美國政府及美國人民一起捍衛台灣主權, 並呼籲台灣住民將台灣主權正式交給美利堅合眾國, 以維護並促進台灣人民與美國的共同利益.

2015年6月12日 星期五

「美國『重返亞洲』(Pivot to Asia)的戰略與政策是一個與「大美和平」(Pax Americana)及「台灣的安全」的維繫息息相關的serious business,它是否被確實執行是建州運動持續與恆久的重大關切(上壹)

「美國『重返亞洲』(Pivot to Asia)的戰略與政策是一個與「大美和平」(Pax Americana)及「台灣的安全」的維繫息息相關的serious business,它是否被確實執行是建州運動持續與恆久的重大關切(上壹)

---在閱讀本文之前,我們建議鄉親們先閱讀兩三篇文章:

 一是在3/15/2014發表的 「自由世界在東西兩個戰場面對中俄兩個邪惡帝國 ,我們現在活在比以前更危險的年代
(上)http://pehlengsi.blogspot.tw/2015/06/blog-post_71.html
(下)http://pehlengsi.blogspot.tw/2015/06/blog-post_76.html

二是在3/27/2014發表的「美國決策者究竟要把主力擺在東線(東亞),還是西線(歐洲)?(上)http://pehlengsi.blogspot.tw/2015/06/blog-post_46.html
(下)http://pehlengsi.blogspot.tw/2015/06/blog-post_17.html

三是在4/11/2014發表的「許多有『俄羅斯威脅』的歐洲國家的人民都在嚎啾啾,向美國與NATO求救一文。
(上)http://pehlengsi.blogspot.tw/2015/06/nato.html
(中)http://pehlengsi.blogspot.tw/2015/06/nato_8.html
(下)http://pehlengsi.blogspot.tw/2015/06/nato_93.html

---我們最近還會再寫一、兩篇與此議題有關的文章,讓鄉親們更了解歐巴馬及一些國安事務官員、專家、學者與國會議員的看法。

---本文篇幅不短,不習慣閱讀英文的鄉親或同志們請跳過英文的部分。




我們都已經見證,當今這個世界與往昔一樣,歷史沒有在「定於自由國際的秩序這一尊」的地方終結,它仍繼續處於動亂與危險的狀態,現在不但有一個所謂的「不穩定之弧」(an Arc of Instability,從北非的伊斯蘭世界,穿過中東、西亞、中亞,一直到被中國所威脅的亞太地區),還再加上一個想恢復蘇聯帝國或俄羅斯帝國光榮的莫斯科也不甘寂寞,也在製造世界的動亂。

做為台灣的Patriots與Mother Formosa的好兒女的建州派,必須把視野放在全世界所發生的重大事件以及正在蘊釀的重大事件,因為這些事件會對台灣人的命運與前途帶來直接或間接的影響,我們觀察的重點與指標是: 這些事件會給台灣或中國帶來什麼有利或不利的影響? 我們的態度與作法是: 若事件朝某種方向發展,建州派應該採取什麼立場以及應該作什麼,才對台灣人及建州運動有利?

對莫斯科在歐洲所製造的動亂,我們的關切是: 中國是否會在莫斯科在歐洲所製造的亂局中獲利,而台灣是否會受到傷害?這是否會導致美國又陷入兩面作戰的危險?美國有能力與意志再來對付東西兩個戰場的強敵(他們都擁有核武以及其他非傳統的武力)嗎?美國是否願意採取「暫時在歐洲採取守勢,先解決東戰場的強敵中國」的大戰略?

「美國之音網站」今天有一篇文章或報導談到「中國是否會在莫斯科在歐洲所製造的亂局中獲利」這個話題與問題,其中有一段說: “China may win out” from the Ukraine crisis? asked Martha Brill Olcott, a longtime scholar of Russia and Central Asian politics. “I think the word is ‘will.’ China ‘will’ absolutely benefit.” [中國是否將從烏克蘭危機獲利獲勝長期研究俄羅斯與中亞政治的Martha Brill Olcott問道她自己給的答案是: 我認為答案是肯定的,中國絕對會從這個事件獲利。]

若從這幾天情勢的演變與惡化來看,美歐跟俄羅斯邁向新冷戰的路子好像已在進入不歸點,這當然會便宜了野心勃勃的老共與老中,這是建州運動最擔心的發展,這也是我們為何在數月前就未雨綢繆、為華府獻策的原因。我們認為: 倘若美國、日本與歐洲國家面臨在歐亞大陸兩面作戰的態勢,我們建議把重兵放在亞太,先以優勢的海空武力及其他非傳統的力量,迅速將在東線展現軍事肌肉的老共加以解決,然後再集中優勢兵力,解決在西線戰場的俄羅斯武力。建州派發現,有一些戰略家與建州派採取相同或類似的大戰略,例如華府的智庫The Center for the National Interest的總裁Dimitri Simes,在談及國務院的官員Victoria Nuland在歐巴馬政府中推動對俄羅斯的強硬政策時,就說: “But a realistic strategy would be to have some form of modus vivendi with Russia, especially at a time when China is becoming much more important for the US.” Dimitri的意思是說,美國對俄羅斯應該在現階段採取某種形式的權宜之策,因為現在中國對美國是一個比較重要的問題。老共當然希望也樂見美國的注意力被引向其他地區,而且最好就陷在那裡,好讓老共趁機在亞太地區獨霸或為所欲為。]

建州運動現在把在「美國之音網站」發表的一篇文章張貼出來,讓鄉親們參考。



“China May Be Biggest Winner From Ukraine Crisis” (中國可能是烏克蘭危機最大的贏家)
By Mike Eckel
September 01, 2014
VOAnews.com

Thousands of miles away from the Ukrainian battlefields of Donetsk and Novoazovsk sits the country that may end up being the largest beneficiary of the turmoil along Russia’s southwest border: China.

With Russian President Vladimir Putin rewriting the playbook on security in post-Cold War Europe, Beijing has watched warily 3,700 miles to the east, though without protest or interference.

Its abstention from a U.N. Security Council resolution vote in March that condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea was unusual, given Beijing’s traditional stance on such votes, but it comes as bilateral ties have been on the upswing for years now.

Two generations ago, ties between Leonid Brezhnev’s Russia and Mao Zedong’s China were fraught. The two fought small-scale skirmishes in 1969 along the Ussuri River border (the Wusuli in Chinese) that almost resulted in war.


That’s a distant memory now.

“China may win out” from the Ukraine crisis? asked Martha Brill Olcott, a longtime scholar of Russia and Central Asian politics. “I think the word is ‘will.’ China ‘will’ absolutely benefit.”

Strategic goals

Where neighboring countries are concerned, the only nation with a military currently capable of taking on Russia’s full scale is China.

Russia has plenty to be wary of: tens of millions of Chinese live across the border from a Russian region that is virtually devoid of people and home to an astounding wealth of natural resources.

Most of the population is packed into the tiny sliver of land on the Pacific coast known as Primorye, a sliver that blocks China from having access to the Sea of Japan.

Goodwill with Beijing is important, and by keeping China unthreatened, Moscow helps secure its “strategic rear,” said Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“It’s important for them, and I think particularly for Russia, to create mutual vulnerabilities which helps to secure those rears so that China will not move in the direction of Russia in a military way,” Kuchins said at a recent roundtable discussion in Washington.

Where China benefits from the Ukraine crisis most is because of the distraction, said Robert Daly, who heads the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.

Russia’s actions divert attention from China’s own simmering internal conflicts.
Equally, Beijing benefits because Washington is focused on the security needs of its European allies, rather than the four-year-old “pivot to Asia” that some in China viewed as threatening.

“The single biggest benefit is that for China, events in Ukraine, Iraq, Syria; these are the latest major events that distract the United States from carrying out the rebalance to the East,” Kuchins said.

Geographic aims

In former Soviet Central Asia – home to countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – Russia and China, and to a lesser degree the United States, Turkey and Europe, have been engaged in a slow-motion chessboard shuffle, trying to build new relationships or bolster old ones.

The Kremlin’s influence over its former republics isn’t what it used to be, but Moscow has sought to build on longstanding cultural, linguistic, economic and social ties to make sure it can still pull levers when it has to.

China joined a Russia-led security group comprised mainly of Central Asian nations known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Set up in 2001, the SCO was ostensibly aimed at monitoring regional terrorist threats, though many analysts viewed it also as a way for the two rivals to keep a close eye on one another.

It’s also a way to minimize influence of the United States, which fostered close military ties with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan after the Sept. 11 attacks but whose influence has since diminished.

The Ukraine crisis was a wake-up call for Central Asian leaders, experts say, particularly for those countries with sizable Russian populations like Kazakhstan.
“Internally, in Central Asia, at high levels, there’s really been the sense that there’s a crisis time coming in Russia, and the question was when,” said Olcott, who has ties to many of the region’s elites.

“It’s going to make it easier for the Chinese to get what they want. It certainly will change how the SCO is going to operate, leaving Russia potentially even more isolated both in the SCO and Central Asia more broadly," she said.

“The Central Asians are clearly afraid of Russia, but it’s not clear the Russians have the ability. ... The question for the Central Asians will be: Does Russia have the capacity to do this at the same time?” Olcott added.

Economic needs

The Kremlin has looked to the East for years as a hedge against the possibility that European markets might suddenly be less welcoming to Russian products.

Above all, this is about oil and gas. Russia is currently the dominant source for Europe’s energy needs. But disputes with Ukraine that predate the current crisis have led to calls in European capitals to diversify away from Russian sources.

So Russia has turned east. Gas from the Pacific island of Sakhalin is flowing via the Primorye region, and a spur cutting south from the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline brings more than 300,000 barrels a day south into the industrial city of Daqing.

The $400 billion, 30-year deal signed in May to bring gas from Siberian fields into China’s northern industrial regions is the biggest example to date of Russia’s turn to eastern markets. Most industry watchers, however, think Beijing got the better deal.

“With Putin, he was very much on the back foot here, big time. He wanted to say to the Europeans, we don’t have to sell it to you. He wanted to say to the Europeans that you can stick your gas where the sun don’t shine,” said Malcolm Graham-Wood, with the British energy consultancy HydroCarbon Capital.

"But “it’s massively Chinese weighted. Putin is selling Russian gas on the cheap, at a big discount… The clear winner is China. They’re taking the long view on this,” he said.

Oil and gas may be primary, but there are other trade opportunities lurking.

The Kremlin’s imposition of retaliatory sanctions last month barred many consumer products from European and North American countries.

Chinese entrepreneurs are already gearing up to fill the holes in Russian supermarkets shelves, said one executive at a company called Shandong Goodfarmer, the largest Chinese exporter of apples, garlic and ginger.

“With an entire year of the ban, the Russian produce market is bound to experience a shortage of supply in the coming year, which is a huge opportunity for the Chinese produce industry,” Lu Zuoqi told the trade publication, freshfruitportal.com, on Aug. 12.

Military means

China’s military doesn’t want for manpower. With an estimated 2.2 million personnel, the People’s Liberation Army is the world’s largest.

Where its shortcomings are is in sophisticated technologies that would make another military superpower think twice about intervening in places that Beijing considers its core strategic interest.

Russia’s military spending is on the upswing: up 92 percent in nominal terms since 2010, according to IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. Russia’s weapons makers – think Sukhoi, MiG, Zvezda, Almaz-Antey – are happy to benefit from this largesse, but the Defense Ministry isn’t their only client.

State-run arms dealer Rosoboronexport has been expanding its customer base for years, trying to gain market share from the world’s largest arms dealer, the United States.

Moscow has sold diesel attack submarines to Vietnam and Sukoi fighter jets and Mil helicopters to India in past years.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that since 2009, half of all Russian arms sales went to India and China.

China is also opening the budget spigots for military spending.

Its 2014 military budget was set at 12.2 percent over previous years. Stepping up purchases is a priority, but so is developing indigenous systems, particularly for theater-specific weapons known as “access-denial.”

The idea is to build an arsenal that can keep unwanted intruders (think the United States) out of places China doesn’t want it to be (think the Taiwan Strait). Russian-built S-300 anti-aircraft defense systems or Kh-35 anti-ship missiles fit that bill nicely Submarines as well as aircraft carriers fit that bill, too. China’s first is a Soviet ship inherited by Ukraine after 1991 and then overhauled and sold to Beijing.

The idea is “to raise the cost of US/NATO intervention virtually anywhere,” Kuchins, of CSIS, said. “That’s useful for the Chinese, that’s useful for the Syrians, that’s useful for a number of other clients. This puts an emphasis on anti-air, and anti-ship technologies, key for Russian arms sales.”

Domestic agenda

China has been less than happy about Putin’s decision to foment insurgency in another country. That’s because China has plenty of internal unrest of its own to handle: the Tibetans, the Uighurs, for example, analysts say.

The Ukraine crisis may end up changing that calculus as Russia, seeking to build goodwill with Beijing, moves to openly back China in its own territorial disputes. East China Sea, anyone?

“The Russians may move from their studied neutral opposition vis-a-vis Chinese territorial disputes in the East in order that the Chinese might support the Russians so that they have more running room in the areas that the Russians are more concerned about,” Kuchins said.

At the Security Council vote, when Western powers pushed a resolution condemning Russia for annexing Crimea, Beijing abstained rather than vetoed the measure alongside Moscow. Some experts interpreted that as a rebuke to Russia.

Others, however, said the abstention, along with Beijing’s unwillingness to join in Western sanctions against Russia, is a better indicator of the emerging policy between the two giants.

“Such a stance by China should be interpreted as nothing other than benevolent neutrality toward the Kremlin,” said Artyom Lukin, deputy director of the School of Regional and International Studies at Russia’s Far Eastern Federal University, in an article published in March.

“One may suspect that, in exchange, Beijing would expect from Moscow the same kind of ‘benevolent neutrality,’ for example, regarding its actions in East Asia and the Western Pacific,” he said.


(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

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