老共海軍跑到印尼海域兩個海峽去演練、探底與挑釁(中)

                              老共海軍跑到印尼海域兩個海峽去演練、探底與挑釁(中)

三


若不是中國海軍早已注意到Prof. Mearsheimer所說的問題，就是在Prof. Mearsheimer說了之後才開始注意到Prof. Mearsheimer所說的問題，然後開始研究與測繪這些海峽與水域的水文與海圖，總之，老共一隻海軍艦隊在1/20/2014離開海南島三亞港，巡航西沙群島 ，1/26/2014在靠近馬來西亞沙勞越的James Shaol舉行宣誓典禮，1/29/2014艦隊通過巽他海峽，並藉海上救難及反海盜之名進行演習，艦隊約在1/31/2014進入倫巴海峽，之後往北走，通過印尼的婆羅洲與西里伯斯(蘇拉威西)兩島之間的Makassar 海峽，再往西北走，於2/3/2014進入菲律賓岷答那峨島東方的太平洋水域，並舉行實彈軍事演習，之後，繞行菲律賓群島東方，通過台灣與呂宋之間的巴士海峽，往西航行，於2/11/2014抵達廣東湛江港，這整個航程與行動對美國、台灣、菲律賓與東南亞諸國都極具挑釁性。
我們現在來讀華爾街日報的一則報導(只貼一部分):


“Beijing’s Power Play Exposes Anxieties”
By Trefor Moss & Rob Taylor
Wall Street Journal
2/20/2014

A three-week patrol by a Chinese naval flotilla in Southeast Asian waters has drawn conflicting responses from regional governments, exposing confusion over how to react to China’s rising maritime power.

Two Chinese destroyers and one amphibious landing craft, which may have traveled with a submarine escort, according to security analysts, left southern China on Jan. 20, Chinese state media provided detailed coverage of the patrol, -------

------The Chinese vessels first conducted a patrol of the Paracel Islands, a South China Sea group contested by China and Vietnam, before proceeding to James Shoal, a reef some 50 miles off the coast of Malaysia in South China Sea areas claimed by both China and Malaysia.

The flotilla then proceed beyod waters claimed by Beijingto the Indian Ocean, where it conducted 

The U.S. has refrained from commenting specifically on the Chinese patrol. On Feb. 5, Daniel Russell, the assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, expressed concern during congressional testimony about a “pattern of behavior in the South China Sea” whereby China was seeking to assert control over disputed areas in ways that were “noninconsistent with international law.”


我們再請鄉親們讀一篇評論:

“China makes statement as it sends naval ships off Australia's maritime approaches”
By Rory Medcalf
7 February 2014 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.com/

Australia's strategic environment changed a week ago, even if much of our media did not notice. Last weekend, a Chinese taskforce of three warships steamed south through the Sunda Strait to conduct combat simulations and other exercises in the Indian Ocean, somewhere between Indonesia and Christmas Island.

The vessels, two destroyers and an advanced 20,000-ton amphibious ship capable of carrying some hundreds of marines (pictured), then skirted the southern edge of Java before heading north through the Lombok and Makassar Straits and into the Pacific.

This is the first substantial Chinese military exercise in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean and in Australia's maritime approaches. It seems also to be the first time a Chinese taskforce has transited the Sunda and Lombok straits as alternatives to the Malacca Strait.

With this decidedly Indo-Pacific foray, China is sending many signals, deliberately or not. One is about its ability and ambition to project force through and beyond the South China Sea. Another is its wish to be seen to be interested in protecting its commercial sea lanes into the Indian Ocean. A third is that the People's Liberation Army-Navy will go where it wants when it wants, without necessarily consulting or forewarning local powers.

A fourth is that the islands of East Asia are not a meaningful 'chain' to constrain China's military reach. In that sense, this exercise should be seen alongside a larger activity in the western Pacific last October. 

To be clear, there was nothing illegal or fundamentally hostile about what the Chinese navy has just demonstrated. A greater Chinese security role in the Indian Ocean is inevitable and at one level a corollary of China's economic interests.

Even so, this recent episode is bound to raise questions in national security establishments across the region, including in India and Indonesia as well as in Australia. I will have more to say about that next week in a joint opinion article with prominent Indian strategist Raja Mohan (a Lowy Institute nonresident fellow and incidentally my co-chair in a major Australia-India dialogue that kept us busy this week).

Although the Chinese navy may have surprised us all with the precise timing and nature of its Indo-Pacific venture, nobody can accuse Beijing of a lack of transparency in its public reporting during the event.

Indeed, the coverage of the exercise in the Chinese media and on social media is a textbook case for intelligence analysts and policymakers in how so-called 'open sources' can provide early warning of change in the strategic environment – earlier, I suspect, than much of the secret stuff.

I first learned of the exercise six days ago, with help from a friend who makes a habit of monitoring Chinese-language press, the magic of Google translate, as well as a tweet from American China expert Taylor Fravel. Within another day or two, Chinese state television was proudly reporting, in English and in some technical detail, about the Indian Ocean drill. These and other Chinese reports were more than enough to piece together a clear sense of the route and activities of the three ships, as well as the historic nature of their voyage.

Yet days passed before much of this made it into the international English-language media, and I am yet to see serious news coverage in Australia (the Hindu's excellent China correspondent was a little quicker off the mark).

The precise strategic implications of the Chinese navy's newly-demonstrated ability to operate in Australia's northern approaches are open to debate. Neither China nor Australia wants a confrontational relationship. The idea that China might pose a direct military threat to Australia remains far from mainstream in our strategic debate. Australia has rightly sought to engage China as a security partner in recent years, for instance in disaster-relief exercises.

Even so, it is a safe bet that the voyage of the three Chinese warships Changbaishan, Wuhan and Haikou will prove far more consequential to Australia's strategic future than any number of those certain other vessels in the waters off Indonesia that have so dominated our media and political attention of late.


倫敦的「金融時報」在2/13/2014也有一篇報導，標題是: “Quest for Blue Water Makes Waves”，這則報導就提到The Lowy Institute的亞洲安全事務專家Rory Medcalf所寫的文章，也就是上面那一篇。

(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

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