Alger Lim的呼籲: 台灣人各黨派凝聚共識.分進合擊.殊途同歸 (第三篇)---(中)
第三部分
我們在8/16/2013張貼了[答覆Brian Qo老大哥: 續談長山四男博士]一文, 指出現在由幾位台美人(個位數)以及一些台灣人鄉親在洛杉磯組建了一個基金會, 但他們卻以[政府]的名義在進行活動, 他們希望透過一位可敬的長老在華府替他們活動, 以與美國政府建立關係, 也就是政府與政府之間的關係, 我們已經說過, 這項努力是絕對不可能成功的, 理由不是那位可敬的老先生沒有能力, 而是那個以[政府]自稱的基金會沒有代表性(對美國政府而言, 經過民選產生的[在台灣的統治當局]才有代表性), 還有一個原因, 美國政府不會在東亞的局勢沒有重大的改變之前, 透過與沒有代表性的[政府]進行所謂[政府與政府]之間的接觸而來自尋煩惱或自找麻煩.
我們今天還要告訴鄉親們, 我們在本文中所指的那位可敬的老先生曾被台美某一知名媒體的負責人稱為[白宮首席顧問], 我們今天要引用一些資料來告訴大家, 這位老先生在華府擔任某項職務時, 也正是台灣本土政權的[台灣正常化議程]被打壓的最殘酷的期間, 換句話說, [希望促成台灣國的實現]的老先生在他能夠[上達天聽].[與小布希總統有面對面溝通的機會]以及[與國務卿萊斯十分麻吉]的期間, 他對[台灣正常化議程]以及[台灣國的建立]也無能為力, 不但無能為力, [台灣正常化的議程]還在他能[上達天聽]的期間完全被打趴, 還搞得許多台灣人對美國政府十分不滿, 甚至怨恨.
我無意澆台灣與美國獨派朋友們的冷水, 也無意傷害這些朋友們的感情, 但是我必須很忠實地把9/11恐怖攻擊之後小布希執政時期對[台灣獨立建國的議程]是如何地不友善與打壓的真相說出來, 我不是用我自己的話說, 我是借用小布希時代的美國政府官員的發言或者他們所寫的書所表達的觀點來說, 這樣會比較有說服力.
首先我們來看一看小布希第一個任期的國務院東亞事務助卿James A. Kelly的談話:
"Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan" , James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony at a hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, April 21, 2004
Core Principles
It is useful to reiterate the core principles of our policy:
* The United States remains committed to a our China policy based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act;
* The U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it;
* For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising prudence in managing all aspects of cross-Strait relations. For both sides, it means no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan s status;
* The U.S. will continue the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act; and
* Viewing any use of force against Taiwan with grave concern, we will maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.
Our foremost concern is maintaining peace and stability in order to advance U.S. interests, spare the region the dangers of war, safeguard Taiwan's democracy, and promote China s constructive integration into the global community as well as the spread of personal freedom in China. Because the possibility for the United States to become involved in a cross-Strait conflict is very real, the President knows that American lives are potentially at risk.
Our one-China policy reflects our abiding commitment to preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait so long as there are irreconcilable differences.
Status Quo Message Aimed at Both Sides
The President's message on December 9 of last year during P.R.C. Premier Wen Jiabao s visit reiterated the U.S. Government s opposition to any unilateral moves by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. This message was directed to both sides.
The President and the senior leadership of this administration consistently make clear to Chinese leaders that the United States will fulfill its obligations to help Taiwan defend itself, as mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act. At the same time we have very real concerns that our efforts at deterring Chinese coercion might fail if Beijing ever becomes convinced Taiwan is embarked on a course toward independence and permanent separation from China,
and concludes that Taiwan must be stopped in these efforts.
We applaud the success of democracy in Taiwan and the dedication of Taiwan's people to the rule of law. This position is consistent with the deeply held values of the American people. Taiwan is a most complex and, in some ways, inconsistent polity. Its economic participation in the mainland Chinese economy is at an unprecedented level, yet it is now undeniable that Taiwan identity has emerged as a political and social issue on the island that figures in election campaigns. However, reliable polling also consistently demonstrates that a clear majority of Taiwan residents prefer the continuation of the status quo to either independence or reunification. The U.S. strongly supports Taiwan's democracy, including the right of its people to elect their leaders and make the full range of decisions about their security, economy, foreign relations, and other issues. But we do not support Taiwan independence. A unilateral move toward independence will avail Taiwan of nothing it does not already enjoy in terms of democratic freedom, autonomy, prosperity, and security. Realistically, such moves carry the potential for a response from the P.R.C. a dangerous, objectionable, and foolish response -- that could destroy much of what Taiwan has built and crush its hopes for the future. It would damage China, too. We,
in the United States, see these risks clearly and trust they are well
understood by President Chen Shui-bian and others in Taiwan.
While strongly opposing the use of force by the P.R.C., we must also acknowledge with a sober mind what the P.R.C. leaders have repeatedly conveyed about China's capabilities and intentions. The P.R.C. refuses to renounce the use of force regarding Taiwan despite our consistent representations stating they should do so. P.R.C. leaders state in explicit terms that China considers
Taiwan's future a vital national interest and that the P.R.C. would take military action in the event Taiwan declares independence. While we strongly disagree with the P.R.C.'s approach, and see military coercion as counter-productive to China's stated intent to seek a peaceful outcome, it would be irresponsible of us and of Taiwan's leaders to treat these statements as empty threats.
What is more, P.R.C. military modernization and the increasing threat to Taiwan indicate to us that Beijing is preparing itself to react in just such a possibility. We encourage the people of Taiwan to regard this threat equally seriously. We look to President Chen to exercise the kind of responsible, democratic, and restrained leadership that will be necessary to ensure a
peaceful and prosperous future for Taiwan.
There are uncomfortable realities, yet they are facts with which we must grapple. As Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly and bluntly if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely impact U.S. security interests or have the potential to undermine Taiwan's own security. There are limitations with respect to what the United
States will support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its constitution. We are uncertain about the means being discussed for changing the constitution. We do no one any favors if we are unclear in our expectations or obfuscate where those limitations are. The President's policy regarding our opposition to
unilateral changes to the status quo will be reinforced in this dialogue with Taiwan about its political evolution.
Taiwan is a success story for democracy in Asia and around the world. We feel strongly that others can benefit from knowing more about Taiwan's achievements. We will explore with our friends in Taiwan how they may be able to promote their story to a global audience, and how we can help to make Taiwan's
instructive example available to all countries that are attempting to institute democratic reforms. We can only do this, Taiwan can only do this if it avoids unilateral steps that risk destroying all that it has accomplished.
The United States and Cross-Strait Differences
Our position continues to be embodied in the so-called "six assurances" offered to Taiwan by President Reagan. We will neither seek to mediate between the P.R.C. and Taiwan, nor will we exert pressure on Taiwan to come to the bargaining table. Of course, the United States is also committed to make available defensive arms and defensive services to Taiwan in order to help Taiwan meet its self-defense needs. We believe a secure and self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political interaction and dialogue with the P.R.C., and we expect Taiwan will not interpret our support as a blank check to resist such dialogue.
In the final analysis, the Taiwan issue is for people on both sides of the Strait to resolve. This is the only way a peaceful and durable solution can be found and it is a vital element in guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia. Taiwan faces many challenges in the years ahead, and recurring
crises with Beijing can only interfere with the central tasks of promoting democracy, ensuring economic growth, advancing the popular welfare, and enabling Taiwan's security. Beijing likewise faces daunting challenges in overcoming poverty and backwardness, establishing the rule of law, and beginning a process of political reform and opening up. China would gain
nothing from a conflict. It would undermine a historic transformation through which China has become a respected member of the international community. War in the Strait would be a disaster for both sides and set them back decades, and
undermine everything they and others in the region have worked so hard to achieve. We continue to urge Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue as soon as possible through any available channels, without preconditions.
第四部分
現在我來提醒鄉親們, Kelly助卿非常坦誠地說: "Because the possibility for the United States to become involved in a cross-Strait conflict is very real, the President knows that American lives are potentially at risk." 換句話說, 美國知道如果台灣的獨派追求台灣獨立建國就會導致台海衝突的可能性(請獨派的朋友注意, 這不是建州派說的, 這是小布希政府說的), 而且美國因此被捲入一場衝突的可能性會變得十分的真實, 美國總統因而了解美國子弟的生命可能會冒著風險.
Kelly助卿又說: "There are uncomfortable realities, yet they are facts with which we must grapple. As Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly and bluntly if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely impact U.S. security interests or have the potential to undermine
Taiwan's own security." 這段話是在告訴我們台灣人以及台灣本土政權, 在我們進行民主深化時, 我們不免要朝台灣獨立建國或者台灣法理獨立的方向前進, 這時就會帶著絕對影響美國的安全利益或者對台灣的自身的安全會有潛在的危害的可能性, 換句話說, 在台灣本土政權執政時, 美國政府會[嚴加看管], 這就是在本文所指的那位老先生即使能夠[上達天聽], 他也無法對小布希政府在台海政策上產生任何影響力的原因.
我們在8/16/2013張貼了[答覆Brian Qo老大哥: 續談長山四男博士]一文, 指出現在由幾位台美人(個位數)以及一些台灣人鄉親在洛杉磯組建了一個基金會, 但他們卻以[政府]的名義在進行活動, 他們希望透過一位可敬的長老在華府替他們活動, 以與美國政府建立關係, 也就是政府與政府之間的關係, 我們已經說過, 這項努力是絕對不可能成功的, 理由不是那位可敬的老先生沒有能力, 而是那個以[政府]自稱的基金會沒有代表性(對美國政府而言, 經過民選產生的[在台灣的統治當局]才有代表性), 還有一個原因, 美國政府不會在東亞的局勢沒有重大的改變之前, 透過與沒有代表性的[政府]進行所謂[政府與政府]之間的接觸而來自尋煩惱或自找麻煩.
我們今天還要告訴鄉親們, 我們在本文中所指的那位可敬的老先生曾被台美某一知名媒體的負責人稱為[白宮首席顧問], 我們今天要引用一些資料來告訴大家, 這位老先生在華府擔任某項職務時, 也正是台灣本土政權的[台灣正常化議程]被打壓的最殘酷的期間, 換句話說, [希望促成台灣國的實現]的老先生在他能夠[上達天聽].[與小布希總統有面對面溝通的機會]以及[與國務卿萊斯十分麻吉]的期間, 他對[台灣正常化議程]以及[台灣國的建立]也無能為力, 不但無能為力, [台灣正常化的議程]還在他能[上達天聽]的期間完全被打趴, 還搞得許多台灣人對美國政府十分不滿, 甚至怨恨.
我無意澆台灣與美國獨派朋友們的冷水, 也無意傷害這些朋友們的感情, 但是我必須很忠實地把9/11恐怖攻擊之後小布希執政時期對[台灣獨立建國的議程]是如何地不友善與打壓的真相說出來, 我不是用我自己的話說, 我是借用小布希時代的美國政府官員的發言或者他們所寫的書所表達的觀點來說, 這樣會比較有說服力.
首先我們來看一看小布希第一個任期的國務院東亞事務助卿James A. Kelly的談話:
"Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan" , James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony at a hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, April 21, 2004
Core Principles
It is useful to reiterate the core principles of our policy:
* The United States remains committed to a our China policy based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act;
* The U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it;
* For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising prudence in managing all aspects of cross-Strait relations. For both sides, it means no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan s status;
* The U.S. will continue the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act; and
* Viewing any use of force against Taiwan with grave concern, we will maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.
Our foremost concern is maintaining peace and stability in order to advance U.S. interests, spare the region the dangers of war, safeguard Taiwan's democracy, and promote China s constructive integration into the global community as well as the spread of personal freedom in China. Because the possibility for the United States to become involved in a cross-Strait conflict is very real, the President knows that American lives are potentially at risk.
Our one-China policy reflects our abiding commitment to preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait so long as there are irreconcilable differences.
Status Quo Message Aimed at Both Sides
The President's message on December 9 of last year during P.R.C. Premier Wen Jiabao s visit reiterated the U.S. Government s opposition to any unilateral moves by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. This message was directed to both sides.
The President and the senior leadership of this administration consistently make clear to Chinese leaders that the United States will fulfill its obligations to help Taiwan defend itself, as mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act. At the same time we have very real concerns that our efforts at deterring Chinese coercion might fail if Beijing ever becomes convinced Taiwan is embarked on a course toward independence and permanent separation from China,
and concludes that Taiwan must be stopped in these efforts.
We applaud the success of democracy in Taiwan and the dedication of Taiwan's people to the rule of law. This position is consistent with the deeply held values of the American people. Taiwan is a most complex and, in some ways, inconsistent polity. Its economic participation in the mainland Chinese economy is at an unprecedented level, yet it is now undeniable that Taiwan identity has emerged as a political and social issue on the island that figures in election campaigns. However, reliable polling also consistently demonstrates that a clear majority of Taiwan residents prefer the continuation of the status quo to either independence or reunification. The U.S. strongly supports Taiwan's democracy, including the right of its people to elect their leaders and make the full range of decisions about their security, economy, foreign relations, and other issues. But we do not support Taiwan independence. A unilateral move toward independence will avail Taiwan of nothing it does not already enjoy in terms of democratic freedom, autonomy, prosperity, and security. Realistically, such moves carry the potential for a response from the P.R.C. a dangerous, objectionable, and foolish response -- that could destroy much of what Taiwan has built and crush its hopes for the future. It would damage China, too. We,
in the United States, see these risks clearly and trust they are well
understood by President Chen Shui-bian and others in Taiwan.
While strongly opposing the use of force by the P.R.C., we must also acknowledge with a sober mind what the P.R.C. leaders have repeatedly conveyed about China's capabilities and intentions. The P.R.C. refuses to renounce the use of force regarding Taiwan despite our consistent representations stating they should do so. P.R.C. leaders state in explicit terms that China considers
Taiwan's future a vital national interest and that the P.R.C. would take military action in the event Taiwan declares independence. While we strongly disagree with the P.R.C.'s approach, and see military coercion as counter-productive to China's stated intent to seek a peaceful outcome, it would be irresponsible of us and of Taiwan's leaders to treat these statements as empty threats.
What is more, P.R.C. military modernization and the increasing threat to Taiwan indicate to us that Beijing is preparing itself to react in just such a possibility. We encourage the people of Taiwan to regard this threat equally seriously. We look to President Chen to exercise the kind of responsible, democratic, and restrained leadership that will be necessary to ensure a
peaceful and prosperous future for Taiwan.
There are uncomfortable realities, yet they are facts with which we must grapple. As Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly and bluntly if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely impact U.S. security interests or have the potential to undermine Taiwan's own security. There are limitations with respect to what the United
States will support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its constitution. We are uncertain about the means being discussed for changing the constitution. We do no one any favors if we are unclear in our expectations or obfuscate where those limitations are. The President's policy regarding our opposition to
unilateral changes to the status quo will be reinforced in this dialogue with Taiwan about its political evolution.
Taiwan is a success story for democracy in Asia and around the world. We feel strongly that others can benefit from knowing more about Taiwan's achievements. We will explore with our friends in Taiwan how they may be able to promote their story to a global audience, and how we can help to make Taiwan's
instructive example available to all countries that are attempting to institute democratic reforms. We can only do this, Taiwan can only do this if it avoids unilateral steps that risk destroying all that it has accomplished.
The United States and Cross-Strait Differences
Our position continues to be embodied in the so-called "six assurances" offered to Taiwan by President Reagan. We will neither seek to mediate between the P.R.C. and Taiwan, nor will we exert pressure on Taiwan to come to the bargaining table. Of course, the United States is also committed to make available defensive arms and defensive services to Taiwan in order to help Taiwan meet its self-defense needs. We believe a secure and self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political interaction and dialogue with the P.R.C., and we expect Taiwan will not interpret our support as a blank check to resist such dialogue.
In the final analysis, the Taiwan issue is for people on both sides of the Strait to resolve. This is the only way a peaceful and durable solution can be found and it is a vital element in guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia. Taiwan faces many challenges in the years ahead, and recurring
crises with Beijing can only interfere with the central tasks of promoting democracy, ensuring economic growth, advancing the popular welfare, and enabling Taiwan's security. Beijing likewise faces daunting challenges in overcoming poverty and backwardness, establishing the rule of law, and beginning a process of political reform and opening up. China would gain
nothing from a conflict. It would undermine a historic transformation through which China has become a respected member of the international community. War in the Strait would be a disaster for both sides and set them back decades, and
undermine everything they and others in the region have worked so hard to achieve. We continue to urge Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue as soon as possible through any available channels, without preconditions.
第四部分
現在我來提醒鄉親們, Kelly助卿非常坦誠地說: "Because the possibility for the United States to become involved in a cross-Strait conflict is very real, the President knows that American lives are potentially at risk." 換句話說, 美國知道如果台灣的獨派追求台灣獨立建國就會導致台海衝突的可能性(請獨派的朋友注意, 這不是建州派說的, 這是小布希政府說的), 而且美國因此被捲入一場衝突的可能性會變得十分的真實, 美國總統因而了解美國子弟的生命可能會冒著風險.
Kelly助卿又說: "There are uncomfortable realities, yet they are facts with which we must grapple. As Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly and bluntly if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely impact U.S. security interests or have the potential to undermine
Taiwan's own security." 這段話是在告訴我們台灣人以及台灣本土政權, 在我們進行民主深化時, 我們不免要朝台灣獨立建國或者台灣法理獨立的方向前進, 這時就會帶著絕對影響美國的安全利益或者對台灣的自身的安全會有潛在的危害的可能性, 換句話說, 在台灣本土政權執政時, 美國政府會[嚴加看管], 這就是在本文所指的那位老先生即使能夠[上達天聽], 他也無法對小布希政府在台海政策上產生任何影響力的原因.
(待續)
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
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