一
福山是美國很有影響力的思想家之一，他在1989年發表;The End of History? (歷史的終結)一篇論文，引起或受到美國與全世界思想界、學術界、智庫界、外交界與學界的高度興趣與關注，並被熱烈討論，有關這個議題的精彩與重要的論著及評論不少，台灣建州運動當然都密切注意並加以研究。
福山近年來(包括今年的六月初)對那些評論與論著，都沒有忘記要加以回應，也沒有忘記要對他在25年前投出的那篇重量級論文加以回顧，但我們今天並不擬談論這些。
我們今天要向台灣與台美鄉親介紹的是福山於6/26/2014在倫敦The Financial Times發表的一篇重要的文章，標題是”ISIS Risks Distracting US from More Menacing Foes”(「『伊拉克與敘利亞伊斯蘭國』的問題給美國帶來從較具威脅性的敵人身上分心的風險」)。
二
我們先請鄉親們在或前往「建州運動臉書網頁」(https://www.facebook.com/pages/Formosa-Statehood-Movement-台灣建州運動/1374416149448954)，閱讀下面幾篇文章:
(1)「我們仍然活在危險的年代: 歐亞陸塊兩個邪惡帝國張牙舞爪，忙著恢復或建立它們的勢力範圍」(3/7/2014張貼);
(2)「自由世界在東西兩個戰場面對中俄兩個邪惡帝國 ，我們現在活在比以前更危險的年代」(3/15/2014張貼); 與
(3)「美國決策者究竟要把主力擺在東線(東亞)，還是西線(歐洲)?」 (3/27/2014) 張貼。
在這三篇文章以及稍早一篇文章中，我們說了下面幾段:
//建州運動說: 「就對付中國的威脅與擴張的Air-Sea Battle而言，陸軍的確可以被裁減」[建州派在美國的盟友多半不會同意我們這句話，因為他們也要保護美國在歐洲與中東的盟邦與安全夥伴(如以色列)]。不過，如果中國與俄羅斯這兩個邪惡帝國同時在歐陸與東亞發動戰爭，那回到第二次世界大戰前的規模的美國陸軍顯然將會難以應付。倘若這種狀況發生，美國武裝部隊與日軍、澳軍必須在東亞打一場決定性的戰爭，而歐陸戰場則必須先交給以英德法三國的武裝部隊為主力的歐美聯軍，待亞洲戰場取得決定性的勝利並將維持秩序的任務交給日澳聯軍後，再將整補後的美軍主力投入歐洲戰場。//
//西方國家若有人以為他們可以動員或說服老共在克里米亞事件上反對普廷，那他們就太不了解老共了 ，老共與普廷是一對活寶，他們會有樣學樣，普廷在喬治亞與烏克蘭達陣，會鼓勵老共在中國的周邊地區繼續進行軍事冒險，以便建立自己的帝國與勢力範圍。//
//由於歐亞陸塊的俄羅斯聯邦與中華人民共和國的邪惡政權與威權統治者還有他們統治的人民多數都懷抱著帝國夢或者病態的民族主義，所以現在美國又面臨了類似1950年代的狀況，它必須同時處理東西兩個戰場的問題，這是一項十分艱鉅的歷史使命與任務。比較令人憂慮的是，現在美國的領導層似乎缺乏當年的領導層領導世界的雄心壯志，而美國的財經力量也尚未完全從2008年的金融風暴及經濟蕭條中恢復過來，許多美國民眾也尚未從孤立主義中甦醒過來。//
//中國在台海、東海與南海的囂張行徑，俄羅斯在喬治亞與烏克蘭的流氓行徑，讓中國與俄國周邊的國家與人民認識到這個世界已在狼煙四起，這些國家及其人民都惴惴不安，都在向華府求救，所以現在即便向世界各國誓言 “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”的甘迺迪當政，恐怕也是一個頭兩個大。//
//世人現在必須有正確的認知: (1)中國與俄羅斯都具有深厚的威權統治的文化與傳統，也都具有源遠流長的帝國夢、領土擴張的野心及建立勢力範圍的歷史。(2)先拉攏中國、與中國締結戰略聯盟、打倒俄羅斯邪惡帝國的戰略不可行，也不能複製，若華府試圖複製尼克森的「中國牌」，那美國肯定會丟掉東亞與西太平洋，中國肯定會利用這個戰略機遇期，將美國勢力逐出亞太。//
//我們現在只有希望與期待: 在西線從事強化對俄國進一步的擴張進行反制與嚇阻的力量之同時，華府「重返東亞」的大戰略及「海空一體作戰」的軍事建設、佈署及準備不變，否則必然會鼓舞中國利用機會進行擴張。//三
福山在美國的思想界與戰略界中原屬於新保守派，不過在美國民意開始厭倦與反對伊拉克戰爭之後，他離開了新保守派的陣營。
他現在與新保守派有一點很大的不同: 新保守派力主美國同時要關注與維護美國在中東、東亞與歐洲的利益。對於中東地區的關切，主要是關切以色列的生存以及伊斯蘭極端份子與恐怖主義給美國帶來的安全與利益的威脅。對東亞的關切，主要是關注中國對東亞地區的安全與和平的威脅、中國意圖在東亞進行領土擴張與建立勢力範圍、中國企圖將美國勢力逐出東亞及中國企圖與美國在世界爭霸的問題。對歐洲的關切，則主要聚焦在俄羅斯領土擴張、俄羅斯企圖在歐洲建立勢力範圍以及反猶的歐洲極右翼勢力興起的問題。但福山則認為，中東伊斯蘭恐怖主義的威脅比起中國與俄羅斯對美國帶來的威脅相比，根本是小巫見大巫，美國無需再跟以前一樣犯小題大作以及用牛刀殺雞的大錯，也就是說，美國無需再把對付伊斯蘭恐怖主義的威脅放在戰略優先以及資源配置優先的位置，美國真正的威脅是俄羅斯與中國，但俄羅斯由於經濟發展模式有缺陷，最終會導致自身力量的衰微，因此俄羅斯不足為懼，美國真正要嚴肅面對與對付的敵人是中國。
福山這種看法、判斷與戰略設想深得建州派的心，所以我們今天優先把福山最新發表的重要文章介紹出來，
請習慣閱讀英文論著的鄉親們及建州派兄姊們仔細閱讀。
“Isis risks distracting US from more menacing foes”
By Francis Fukuyama
June 25, 2014 3:47 pm
The Financial Times
Allies America is sworn to defend are threatened elsewhere, writes Francis Fukuyama
For some, it will always be 1939. We are forever telling ourselves how, in the 1930s, the US and Britain underestimated the threat from Germany and Japan, how Winston Churchill alone among western leaders saw the danger and summoned his country to a defence of democracy against the Nazis. The 70 years of American leadership following the second world war were a catalogue of Churchillian moments, from the Berlin airlift to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
There is much truth to this: the US and its allies performed admirably in creating a peaceful and liberal international postwar order in Europe and Asia. But this narrative is highly selective. There were many moments when western leaders believed they were Churchill: the UK’s Anthony Eden in the 1956 Suez crisis, US Presidents Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam and George W Bush in Iraq. They overestimated the threat they faced and made things worse, provoking unnecessary and counterproductive wars, while undermining political support for an internationalist foreign policy.
The focus of today’s debate ought to be: how should we prioritise the threats facing us and how bad are the most serious? This year we have seen a fast-moving sequence of events, from Russia’s annexation of Crimea to China’s assertion of sovereignty over the South and East China seas to the collapse of the Iraqi government’s power. Authoritarian forces are on the move.
It is on this point that US President Barack Obama’s foreign policy speech at the West Point military academy in May was wrong-headed. It laid out various abstract criteria for the use of force (actions must be “proportional and effective and just”; where no direct threat to US interests exists, “the threshold for military action must be higher”). It is hard to disagree. But he went on to state that the only direct threat we face is terrorism. He said virtually nothing about long-term responses to the two other big challenges to world order: Russia and China. There was great fanfare surrounding the US “pivot” towards Asia – one of the most important initiatives of Mr Obama’s first term – but he did not mention the word once.
Despite the recent successes of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (known as Isis), I would argue that terrorism is actually the least consequential of these challenges in terms of core US interests. What we are witnessing in Iraq and Syria is the slow spread of a Sunni-Shia war, with local forces acting as proxies for Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is a humanitarian crisis in the making. However, we could barely contain sectarian hatreds when we occupied Iraq with 150,000 troops; it is hard to see how we can act decisively now.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, on the other hand, crossed a very important threshold. The entire post-cold war order in Europe rested on Russia’s acceptance that ethnic Russian minorities stranded in neighbouring states would remain in place. President Vladimir Putin has thrown all that into question, with effects that will be felt from Moldova to Kazakhstan to Estonia.
Russia’s power is based, however, on a flawed economic model that in time will weaken its power. Not so with China: it already has the world’s second-largest economy, and may overtake the US in the coming years. China has been claiming territory in small increments while flying under the cover of more dramatic events elsewhere. It wants to be the dominant power in east Asia and to push the US out of what it claims as its sphere of influence.
The extremism of Isis will in the end prove self-defeating. By contrast, allies the US is sworn to defend are now threatened by industrialised nations with sophisticated militaries.
Yet, for all the seriousness of the challenges from Russia and China, this is still far from the situation of 1939. What would be an appropriate US response? Our priorities should be political: the reinvigoration of Nato as a real military alliance rather than a democracy-promotion club; and establishment of a multilateral framework for dealing with China that gives its neighbours an alternative to facing Beijing alone. Mr Obama talks a multilateral game but invests little capital in making it real.
Strategy is about setting priorities, saying that some things are more important than others and explaining why this is so. The notion that there is no place unworthy of US attention is not a strategy. Mr Obama has set the wrong rhetorical priority, continuing the original mistake of overestimating the terrorist challenge made by his much-criticised predecessor. Even so, he has been strangely passive, letting places such as Libya and Egypt deteriorate through inattention. And he has not invested nearly enough time and effort shoring up existing institutions and establishing broader frameworks for dealing with long-term challenges elsewhere.
The poles established by the neoconservatives on the one hand and isolationists on the other present false choices. Real strategy always has to lie somewhere in between.
The writer is a fellow at Stanford University and author of ‘Political Order and Political Decay’
四
福山在文中說: //Our priorities should be political: the reinvigoration of Nato as a real military alliance rather than a democracy-promotion club; and establishment of a multilateral framework for dealing with China that gives its neighbours an alternative to facing Beijing alone. Mr Obama talks a multilateral game but invests little capital in making it real.// 福山提到要在東亞建立對付中國的多邊架構，不過，我們認為這不容易，現階段比較務實的做法是:
福山在文章的結尾那一段說: //The poles established by the neoconservatives on the one hand and isolationists on the other present false choices. Real strategy always has to lie somewhere in between.// 也就是說，他不贊成新保守派所建立的一個「極端」以及孤立主義者所標榜的另一個極端，他認為這兩極都代表「錯誤的選擇」，他說「真正的戰略總是必須在這兩個極端的中間地帶」。
不過，建州運動認為，美國的執政團隊與國會都不可能漠視以色列的生存與安全，也不可能無視於伊斯蘭恐怖主義給美國與世界帶來的威脅，所以我們認為，美國把許多資源配置在中東地區，也是合理的且是邏輯的必然(我們這樣說，是要表達我們對新保守派的世界戰略的尊重)，我們只能盼望，美國把東亞列為戰略優先，且真正執行「重返東亞」的政策與戰略，這不是建州運動自私的想法，我們的想法是出於維護、促進與確保美國、台灣人民以及東亞最大多數國家的最大與最長遠的利益。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
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