妄圖兵不血刃、迫使台灣人與蔡英文接受「一中原則」或「一中架構」的老共食髓知味，現在似已不以迫使蔡英文接受所謂的「九二共識」為滿足，據說還準備加碼，我們台灣人因此也必須加碼，才能為自己解套或繞過老共撒下的天羅地網

妄圖兵不血刃、迫使台灣人與蔡英文接受「一中原則」或「一中架構」的老共食髓知味，現在似已不以迫使蔡英文接受所謂的「九二共識」為滿足，據說還準備加碼，我們台灣人因此也必須加碼，才能為自己解套或繞過老共撒下的天羅地網

由於「台灣建州運動」最近又要開始再寫幾篇與所謂的「九二共識」有關的文章，所以我們今天先把我們在2012年初發表的一篇文章一字不改地重貼出來，請鄉親們閱讀。

我們要特別提醒鄉親們，即便是支持馬英九的前AIT台北辦事處主任包道格也不敢硬ㄠ，只敢說「九二共識」是一種「虛構」("a fiction")。雖然包道格很坦白地指出: 「九二共識是解決歧見的有效方法；大家都知道九二共識是虛擬的，是一個被雙方接受的虛擬說法，目的是給雙方作為進行事務性協商的基礎」，但是「反中國併吞台灣，反老K出賣台灣」的台灣住民與黨派都不能接受那種「虛構」，因為你不管怎麼表，都要在「一中」的框框裡面表，台灣人一旦掉進中國人「一中」的甕裡，那建州派與獨派都得吹熄燈號，而老共也就可以等著在「一中甕」中捉「台灣鱉」了。[老K那些敗類與一些「在台中國人」則不同，他們及他們的家人多半已有美國或其他國家的護照或居留權，所以他們等著看台灣的弱勢住民『被統』，也等著老共給他們更多的封賞。]

我們最近就會從這個基礎出發，陸續撰寫與發表幾篇與所謂的「九二共識」相關的文章，因為這是中國共產黨與中國國民黨這對邪惡的混球拿來困擾我們台灣人與做為「總統候選人」的蔡英文的重大議題。老共食髓知味，現在已不以迫使蔡英文接受所謂的「九二共識」為滿足，還準備加碼，我們台灣人因此也必須加碼，才能解套或繞過它。

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

附錄

「台灣人必須設法掙脫白宮誤判的所謂『九二共識』」
(1/31/2012發表) 

第一部分: 2012年大選不是所謂「九二共識」的公投，「九二共識」只是大選中的一項重大議題

在2012年台灣總統大選中，馬英九勝選，蔡英文敗選，勝選與敗選的因素當然很多。

在這次大選中，無可諱言地，馬英九所重申與強調的所謂「九二共識」是一項被拿來檢驗、辯論與攻防的重要議題，但在「多議題的總統大選」以及「許多選民並非因政見而投票」的現象與事實也可以很安全地否定藍營與藍媒所宣稱的「此次大選是對『九二共識』進行公投」以及「馬英九這次勝選是因為台灣選民肯定與接受『九二共識』」的膚淺說法。

話雖如此，我們也不能無視於「九二共識」這項議題所產生的負作用以及對一些選民的投票行為可能產生的負面影響，因為(1)美國政府(指總統與白宮國安顧問)對「九二共識」有不同的看法，它的看法與台灣人不同，因而選擇在幕後或暗中使出一些小動作，以支持馬英九或者做球給馬英九，讓馬團隊在媒體炒作，給台灣選民一個「美國政府支持馬」的印象或認知，(2)北京不斷釋出「若蔡英文不接受『九二共識』，台海就沒有和平與穩定，它就要收回對台灣的所謂『讓利』」的訊息，讓馬得以不斷打「安定牌」與「恐懼牌」，來爭取西進中國的台商及中間選民的選票，也迫使白宮對蔡英文施壓，在蔡英文不吃「九二共識」這個毒餌之後，就開始透過一些小手段，打擊蔡英文，並給馬一些利多，為他輔選。

如何面對與處理「九二共識」，必是今後仍要參加大選的民進黨的課題，若不接受，可能2016年的大選又面臨同樣的困境或問題(除非多數選民的態度或看法改變)，甚至情勢會更嚴峻，若要接受，則形同民進黨棄守「台灣人的立場」並接受「台灣被中國法理併吞」，民進黨接受「九二共識」，也等於宣告，除了台灣被中國併吞之外，別無其他前途選項，民進黨也就變成「中國民進黨」，如此，台灣的綠營可能會崩潰，民進黨可能會解體，另一個堅守台灣人主體的政黨可能取而代之，或者「台灣建州運動」可能乘勢崛起，總之，「九二共識」是讓要參加2016年大選的民進黨進退兩難、目前仍然無解的大問題。

現在讓我們話說從頭，但我們今天的論述聚焦在美國，或者就說是白宮(國家安全顧問)的操作。

第二部分: 小布希執政的末期，對所謂「九二共識」有了正面的回應，動機明確，但沒有詳加交待

維護台海和平與穩定，讓美國可以把軍力與精力放在其他地區，讓美國可以避免與一個擁有核武的大國進行直接的武力衝突，是美國的既定政策，即便美國政府深知中國懷有將美國趕出台海、東亞及西太平洋的不軌企圖，美國也不會輕率或輕易地與中國開戰，任何人若認為或期待美國會輕易地主動與中國開戰，那一定是瘋了。美國可以也一直在準備(而且很清楚地讓老共知道，若台灣沒有挑釁，而中國攻擊台灣，美國一定會出兵救援台灣)以軍事保護台灣，但也不許台灣方面挑釁中國，美國且更進一步鼓勵台灣與中國對話與和解，共同負起維護台海的和平與穩定的責任。

但問題是，台灣與中國進行和解，台灣都要付出重大的代價，亦即台灣方面必須接受「一中原則」或「一中架構」，換言之，台灣的主體性或autonomy被剝奪了，台灣人除了被「終極併吞」之外，別無其他選擇，這樣的「和平」是Pax Sinica，是「投降式的和平」。

但小布希政權卻有不同的approach。

在3/22/2008，小布希總統就對甫當選的、聲言要以「九二共識」做為基礎、與中國尋求和解的馬英九，發出一份祝賀當選的聲明，該項聲明表示: "It falls to Taiwan and Beijing to build the essential foundation for peace and stability by pursuing dialogue through all available means and refraining from unilateral steps that would alter the cross-Strait situation. I believe the election provides a fresh opportunity for both sides to reach out and engage one another in peacefully resolving their differences."

這份聲明當然是由國安顧問Stephen J. Hadley所主導的，中間有可能經過向國務卿Condi Rice徵詢的程序。

這項聲明是一個伏筆，我們可以想像，在爾後的幾天，可能經過馬英九的國安事務顧問蘇起、馬的駐美代表袁健生等人與白宮國安顧問的互動與操作，馬團隊與北京的聯繫與互動，以及白宮人馬與中國胡錦濤人馬的緊密互動與安排(這些是各方幕僚的前置作業)下，小布希主動以熱線電話(這當然不是即興的演出或隨性的動作)，就諸多議題(台海議題只是其中一項議題)進行電話會談與溝通，這些前置作業與安排應該都有留下文件與記錄。

建州派先請台灣與台美鄉親們讀白宮發言人3/26/2008的一項聲明或陳述:

"President Bush called President Hu Jintao of China today. ----- On Taiwan, the President said that this weekend 's election provides a fresh opportunity for both sides to reach out and engage one another in peacefully resolving their differences."

在同一天，也就是在小布希與胡某通完電話後，小布希的國安顧問就在當天下午，在白宮舉行一項新聞簡報會，他做完簡報後，就與媒體記者互動，底下是互動的部分記錄:

Hadley: We can--- I think a couple things that struck me about the conversation --- and I would refer you to the readout the Chinese authorities did in Beijing of the conversation --- couple things are of interest. He said that it is China's consistent stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of the 1992 consensus, which sees both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definitions.

The interesting thing is whether this is an indication or a signal of a willingness to open dialogue on a basis that in previous years had been accepted by both parties. That was very --- pretty interesting.--------

So again------ There were some interesting elements of the statements and I think we'll have to see over time whether they come to fruition in respect to both the Taiwan and ---

Hadley: Well. there are a couple things. One, the Taiwanese election presents an opportunity to encourage China to reach out to Taiwan and to try and resolve differences, and the President did not want to let that go by. And that election, of course, was just this last weekend.

Secondly, ---- The Secretary of State has made some comments. ---- Particularly the President was going to be talking to President Hu Jintao about Taiwan, ------- There's an opportunity here and China needs to seize it.

我們從Hadley的新聞簡報會中讀到什麼?

(1)這一切看起來是白宮主動作為，白宮主動的作為當然就是國安顧問Hadley的作為，而這之前，應該是馬英九與胡錦濤的人馬在推著Hadley或在Hadley的團隊身旁鼓譟。

(2)"-----it is China's consistent stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of the 1992 consensus, which sees both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definitions."這一段確認了馬與胡都承認「只有一個中國」，既然如此，「反中國併吞」的陣營(台灣人、台美人、綠營、蔡英文、建州派、民進黨與獨派)都沒有理由接受「九二共識」。

(3)美國鼓勵胡某，而且說「『九二共識』很有趣」。怪啦，台灣人認為是洪水猛獸的東西，Hadley卻認為「很有趣」。

有關「九二共識」，我們對白宮所掌握的資訊就是這些，這些資訊在白宮的網站上，都可公開閱讀與取得，沒有什麼神秘可言，雖然如此，建州派可以合理地相信，關於這件事，一定還有許多至今不為外界所知的作業細節及決策內容。

英文「台北時報」3/28/2008一篇報導，提及白宮在對「九二共識」搞些動作，同時報導了來自民進黨的初步反應，這個反應是負面的，但它可以正確反映台灣綠營、獨派與建州派的評估。

"The DPP legislative caucus said yesterday that accepting the so-called "1992 consensus" would be the beginning of the end for Taiwan's democracy.

"From 'accepting the 1992 consensus to signing a peace agreement to eventual unification,' these would be the three steps that ruin Taiwan's democracy," DPP legislative caucus whip Yeh Yi-ching(葉宜津) said.

英文「台北時報」於3/29/2008發表一篇以"Hypnotism and the '1992 Consensus'" 為題的社論。

該篇社論說: // If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, White House security advisers will eventually come to believe it. So it is with the stillborn myth of the "1992 consensus" between Taiwan and China, which now has the distinction of trickling Stephen Hadley, national security adviser to US President George W. Bush, into thinking that it ever existed.// 這段話若從建州派所獲得的訊息來看，似乎是太小看了Hadley。

社論指出，李登輝否認有所謂「九二共識」的存在，因此，它接著說: //These days, it seems, fiction has a role to play in cross-strait affairs if it fits the template of peaceful deference to Chinese sensibilities.//請鄉親們特別注意fiction(虛構)這個很關鍵的字，這個字引起建州派特別的關注，因此，往後的兩三年，我們一直都在利用機會，包括閱讀美國國安事務界人士所發表的報告與論著，希望從中找到答案或蜘絲馬跡，但我們一直沒有能找到答案。

比較接近的答案可能要上溯到2006年2月，根據英文「台北時報」2/28/2006的報導(標題是"AIT Pans '1992 Consensus'"，這項報導係引自「中央社」來自華盛頓的消息)，AIT的理事主席薄瑞光就所謂「九二共識」的問題，有一段談話: // "[There was] some language [in the faxes] that overlapped and some language that differed," Then Taiwan and China agreed to conduct dialogue based on their statements written in those faxes. "that's what happened. Nothing more or nothing less." [Raymond] Burghardt said, adding that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) called this the '1992 Consensus,' which was to some extent "confusing and misleading. To me, I'm not sure why you could call that a consensus." //
請鄉親們注意，在薄瑞光發言以前，據信沒有任何其他的美國官員針對「『九二共識』是否存在」的問題表達過立場，而薄的發言看起來是傾向於否定該項「共識」的存在。

在2008年底，建州派有一個機會與一位美國國安事務界的人士會晤，建州派亟欲從該人士的口中得知「小布希政府支持北京與馬政權以『九二共識』做為基礎，進行台海兩岸接觸、諮商與會談的背後理由」，我們得到的解釋是: (1)小布希政府認為這是一種「讓台海可以穩定與和平的策略，與台灣問題的終局解決無關」，(2)小布希政府認為「『九二共識』這種『沒有共識的共識』與『上海公報』的"agree to disagree"策略有異曲同工之妙， 可被用來在原則性的問題各說各話，但又可在一些技術性的問題或工作達成協議，這不失為一種妥協性的智慧」。

建州派必須交待的是，當我們提及白宮的國安顧問與美國總統是否能證實或是否相信有所謂「九二共識」的存在時，我們並沒有得到回應或答案。

建州派沒有將這項會晤所得的訊息公開，原因是:

(1)這些訊息並沒有其他訊息可以參照、佐證或支撐，所以我們無法確信或盡信。(2)我們被要求在一段期間內不予公開，我們也給予不公開的承諾，因此我們必須信守該項承諾。(3)我們認為公開這些談話，對整個綠營及台灣人不利，我們也對華府這項approach與policy的智慧有保留，我們認為華府沒有正確掌握馬英九與國民黨的賣台本質，也沒有正確掌握「北京對台統戰、欲藉台灣的民主來埋葬台灣，最終把美國的勢力趕出台灣的圖謀」，我們認為馬英九集團只是在說美國人說的語言，其實是在幹危害美國在台灣、東亞與西太平洋的利益的勾當，總之，建州派認為，美國並沒有作出「這項策略會導致台灣門戶洞開、最終被北京和平併吞」的正確評估與判斷。(4)我們認為，綠營與建州派若接受華府的approach，台灣「反中國併吞」的陣營將會瓦解 (建州派對「九二共識」的認知與判斷，導致建州派拒絕在這個議題上附和華府，並在2012年的大選，堅決支持不承認「九二共識」存在、也不接受「九二共識」的蔡英文，我們甚至在蔡初選的階段，就公開支持她)。

美國國務院於8/28/2011，在一則背景資料中，就「九二共識」是否存在的問題，以迴避的方式，加以處理，也就是說，美國政府在「九二共識」這項議題上，並不願公開表示立場。它說: // Question relating to establishing the basis for dialogue between PRC and Taiwan is a matter to the parties to solve. U.S. takes no position of the substance of such a question. Our abiding interest, which has been consistent across many administrations, is that any resolution be peaceful. We believe dialogue is the best way to achieve this. // 雖然有這項聲明，但事後卻證明，歐巴馬行政團隊在檯面下的小動作不斷，這些動作對蔡英文的競選產生很大的影響與困擾，令人遺憾。

第三部分: 歐巴馬總統國安顧問Thomas E. Donilon的放話與操縱

2011年9月中旬，蔡英文以民進黨總統候選人的身份訪問美國，在她一離開華盛頓時，美國國家安全顧問Thomas Donilon的人馬就利用很有公信力的倫敦「金融時報」放聲，並從此展開一系列對蔡英文不利的小動作，雖然國務院的發言人與東亞事務助卿先後公開表達在台灣大選中維持中立的立場，但所有的政治觀察家都知道，華府藉著一些小動作，要對外傳達它對信持「九二共識」的馬英九的信任、偏愛與支持，並表達對不接受「九二共識」的蔡英文的懷疑與不支持。

有關於Donilon在幕後與暗地的操作，引起建州派的高度關切，我們從2011年9月中旬起，撰寫與發表了數篇文章，因為我們知道，這件事會被馬團隊充分運用及炒作，對台灣人與蔡英文會產生很不利的影響，由於我們過去已就Donilon的不當作為有了充份的報導與評述，所以我們今天不再重覆。

第四部分: 包道格(Douglas H. Paal)的解讀與操弄

關於華府對所謂「九二共識」的認知與approach，至今的確可說仍是個謎，因為沒有適格的權威人士或高層官員在官式場合提供答案或給予解讀。

比較接近的case是，AIT的前台北辦事處處長包道格的發言與解讀，但建州派還是認為，或許他的發言很權威，很貼近真相，但畢竟也僅能做為參考。

包道格在這方面的發言，要從他在9/7/2011發表的文章開始，雖然那時蔡英文尚未抵達華府。

"Taiwan: The DPP and Its Dilemmas"
Douglas H. Paal
Asia Pacic Brief
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
9/7/2011

Taiwan’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) confronts a dilemma as it approaches January’s combined legislative and presidential elections. On the one hand, it rests on a firm support base of about forty percent of Taiwan’s voters. These voters usually support independence for Taiwan from mainland China—or at least are opposed to reunification. They are often identified as “ethnic Taiwanese” or Minnan dialect speakers, not recently descended from mainland-origin migrants who usually speak the Mandarin dialect.

On the other hand, the DPP will normally need support from “centrist voters” to get a majority in two-candidate elections. Many voters in Taiwan’s “middle” do not support reunification with China, but also want to avoid hostility and friction with the mainland and want to promote economic progress ahead of independence.

The dilemma for the DPP is how to win “centrist voters” (zhongjian xuanmin) while not alienating the party’s anti-mainland base.--------

So the DPP needs to find a way to appease the party’s so-called “deep green and light green” base, while drawing in new “centrist” or “light blue” voters to achieve a majority. To that end, the DPP announced on August 23 the National Security Chapter of its Ten Year Policy Outlook, setting forth the principles and policies to guide Taiwan’s international relations and dealings with mainland China.

The language of the report clearly attempts to side step inflammatory rhetoric that might turn off centrist voters. It calls for Taiwan to “construct a framework for peaceful and stable interaction between Taiwan and China.” This contrasts with the belligerent tone struck through most of the years of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency.

One key point in the report is its implicit rejection of the so-called “1992 consensus” employed by incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou to create ambiguity on the critical issue of how to handle China’s insistence on the principle of “one China.” So long as both sides of the Taiwan Strait advocate “one China,” under the “92 consensus” each side can take its own perspective on what it means (yizhong, gezi biaoshu). This is the critical compromise that enabled practical improvements in cross-strait economic and other relations over the past three years.

The new DPP chapter is silent on “one China,” but calls for a new Taiwan “democratic consensus” to be established as a basis for dealing with the mainland and other foreign relationships. By not addressing how the DPP intends to finesse the “one China” principle, the DPP document quietly threatens the reduction in tensions the Ma government has achieved.

Chinese officials meeting with Americans this year signaled a willingness to be flexible toward any new efforts by the DPP to find its own way to address “one China,” and did not demand adherence to the “92 consensus.” But they were insistent that the “one China principle” needs to be addressed in some fashion to sustain the current trade, tourism, and other arrangements.

Now that the DPP has failed to meet China’s test for seriousness of intentions, Beijing faces its own dilemma. If it chooses to speak up forcefully and threateningly against the DPP in the run-up to the election, experience indicates (and Chinese leaders know) it will provoke a negative reaction among Taiwan’s voters and could drive them to support the DPP. If it speaks too softly in opposition to the DPP position, centrist voters may conclude there is no real cost to replacing the Ma government with one led by the DPP’s Ts’ai Ing-wen.

Officials from the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office so far are straddling these two sides of the dilemma and it appears to be awkward for them. It undoubtedly is even more uncomfortable for them because of the climate of nationalism pervading China’s new media.

Ironically, this leads the Chinese privately to express hope for intervention by the Obama administration to tilt the political playing field in favor of the Ma Ying-jeou’s government and against Ts’ai’s DPP. Back in the days of Chen Shui-bian, China counted on the Bush administration to rein him in. But after Ma was elected, Beijing increasingly indicated it wanted the United States to back off. Once again the tide has turned and Beijing is looking to Washington for help to manage what it ordinarily insists are its internal affairs with Taiwan. (這一段指出，北京私下要求歐巴馬行政團隊介入台灣大選，支持馬，反對蔡，華府果然基於與北京有平行利益，因而配合演出，真令蔡英文團隊與台灣人為之氣結。)

This in turn will create a dilemma for Washington: how to appear impartial in Taiwan’s domestic elections and yet convey its preference for a continuation of Ma Ying-jeou’s management of cross-strait relations. Look for Obama administration officials to state that they are impartial about the voting and will welcome whatever is the result of the democratic elections in Taiwan. But they are likely also to state that the United States hopes for a continuation of the reduction in tensions and would not welcome provocations from either side of the strait. (最後這一段的最後一句話，已隱約點出了華府對馬的偏愛及對蔡的質疑。)

建州派現在插進在淡江大學任教的陳一新教授的一篇文章，這篇文章引起建州派的極大關注，因為它傳達的信息有一部分與建州派所得的信息類似或相同，現在請大家讀一讀:

「九二共識，會將台灣帶向統一？」
(陳一新，中國時報，1/9/2012)

//蔡英文最近痛批馬英九總統與財團、中國一起壓迫人民接受「九二共識」，並說那些有錢人都是受到中國壓力才這樣做，並說九二共識只會將台灣帶向統一。問題是，美國、日本、新加坡、紐西蘭、馬來西亞、印度都關心兩岸關係，也都肯定九二共識是兩岸關係正向發展的基礎，莫非也是受中國壓力？難道這些國家都要把台灣推向統一？//
　
//蔡英文與民進黨的支持者辯稱，九二共識只會將台灣帶向統一，強調與其和中國談九二共識，不如與台灣人民談「台灣共識」。//
　
//眾人皆知，統一是中共的長期目標，也是北京的陽謀。卡特政府時期的國家安全顧問布里辛斯基最近在《外交政策》撰文指出，中國近年快速崛起與美國相對衰退之後，台灣將愈來愈難擋得住中國大陸的壓力，特別是經濟吸引力，因此統一的時程可能會縮短，而且是在對中國有利的條件下達成，屆時美中兩國可能不免衝突。//
　
//美國知道自己的最大弱點在經濟，雖然經濟規模仍是世界第一，但若不能在數年內振衰起敝，其盟國與夥伴恐將紛紛求去，最可能的一項發展就是「脫美入中」。因此，歐巴馬去年十一月在亞太經合會經濟領袖高峰會議上登高一呼，表示美國將帶領亞太國家成立範圍更大的「泛太平洋夥伴關係」（ＴＰＰ）。在美國的此一構想初步獲得日本、加拿大、墨西哥回應後，我國也表示願意盡量克服經濟結構上的困難，共襄盛舉。顯然，美國主導的ＴＰＰ不啻為亞太國家在中國主導的東協之外，提供另一選項。//
　
//由於軍事是美國強項，因此盟國與夥伴聞風景從。美國敦促日本南下、澳大利亞北上，印度東進，並強化本區盟國與夥伴的軍事合作關係，自己更派軍長駐澳大利亞北部。但是歐巴馬去年亞洲行期間就宣稱，儘管美國大事刪減國防預算，但在亞洲卻不會刪減一分錢。在日前參加國防部戰略檢討報告發表的記者會上，他指出：「國防優先目標的排序必須更有智慧…，美國將增加在亞太地區的軍力」。在美國挾更強軍事實力回到亞洲之際，中國自顧之不暇，又怎有能力與精力動統一台灣的腦筋？//
　
//更何況，美國國務卿希拉蕊二○一一年十一月十日在夏威夷東西中心演說時，指出亞太地區將是美國今後外交戰略的重心，二十一世紀將是美國的太平洋世紀，美國採行「一個中國大陸」政策，致力維持台灣海峽的和平及穩定。她並強調，「台灣是美國重要的安全及經濟夥伴，美國與台灣有堅實的關係」，不啻是一九七九年以來美國對我國提供最強而有力的戰略再保證。//
　
//從以上分析來看，想用「九二共識會將台灣帶向統一」來嚇唬台灣人民，無疑是徒勞無功的。倒是不承認九二共識，必定會導致兩岸關係倒退。正如企業鉅子張榮發指出，蔡英文提出台灣共識，實則就是主張台獨。蔡英文一旦掌權，不僅兩岸緊張情勢升高，甚至會將台灣帶向戰爭。//

(國家政策研究基金會，
網址: http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/10215)

建州派無法知道陳一新文章的論點是否來自華府或受到美方的影響，但有一點我們可以確知的是，他的一些論述，建州派聽起來很熟悉，特別是他指出 「九二共識並不必然會將台灣帶向統一」這種說法，與我們在前面所陳述的「小布希政府認為，這是一種讓台海可以穩定與和平的策略，與台灣問題的終局解決無關」那種說法相近。

接下來，建州派要請鄉親們仔細讀底下這篇文章，這篇在包道格啟程前來台灣的同日發表的文章，已經點出了他在抵達台灣後將為馬輔選的談話重點，它被發表的當天，就立刻引起建州派的關注，我們感到這是不祥之兆。

"Taiwan Election has the United States and China on Edge"
Douglas H. Paal
Asia Pacic Brief
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1/11/2012

Senior officials in both Beijing and Washington regard the elections in Taiwan this coming Saturday, January 14 as possibly a first and early test of the stability of U.S.-China relations, as well as of cross-strait relations, in this politically sensitive year. Both are quietly hoping for the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou and the maintenance of the status quo, while the United States naturally is publicly proclaiming its neutrality in the three-way presidential election. China is calmly but firmly making it clear that Taiwan will pay a price if it elects opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen. (第一段就指出，華府與北京都暗中[豈只是暗中，這兩個政權還使了很多公開的動作，為馬輔選]希望馬能連任。)

After China’s relations with the United States and many of its neighbors drifted into troubled waters in 2010, a U.S. diplomatic initiative to reset the relationship was met with a warily positive Chinese response that has seen those waters calm considerably over the intervening fifteen months. In recent encounters, top officials on both sides have emphasized their desire to maintain stability, despite the inevitable political countercurrents of the American election season and China’s party and state leadership transition.

Recently, Chinese official statements have been calm and positive, but have not completely muffled the sound of grinding jaws over President Obama’s tour of the Pacific in which “containing China” was the media theme. This is now true, as well, of China’s initial reaction to the repeated references to China in the Obama administration’s newly proclaimed defense “strategy.” An awkward transition to a DPP-led government in Taiwan could greatly complicate maintaining bilateral stability, and preventing a downslide remains a priority.

The presidential election in Taiwan appears to be tight, judging from the closing polls last week, with Ma enjoying a small lead in most. Traditionally, his Kuomintang party has enjoyed a structural advantage and the DPP a structural disadvantage, the latter rarely breaching a roughly 40 percent ceiling in cross-island voting. The presence of a third candidate, James Soong Chu-yu of the People’s First Party, further complicates the picture, although poll analysts generally conclude he takes votes about equally from both of the leading candidates.

Washington’s lips have formally and consistently supported the democratic process in Taiwan, and will automatically voice a desire to work with whoever wins the election, and it has been clear through its actions in recent months that it supports candidates who will maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. To reinforce its policy preference, the Obama administration has successively approved a $5.852 billion arms sales package for Taiwan that managed not to trigger a harsh Chinese reaction, arranged visits by American officials of five agencies at increasingly high levels that had not been seen in Taiwan in more than a decade, and signaled its intention to admit Taiwan to the valued visa waiver program next year—all in advance of the election.

Although these actions may redound to the benefit of the Ma administration, it is not to say that similar gestures could not be made to a hypothetical Tsai administration, presuming it can manage cross-strait relations in a peaceful and stable condition. Again, the American preference is for a policy outcome that fosters and does not endanger growing American cooperation with China across a range of interests, such as the pressing ones of North Korea, the South China Sea, and Iran.

The nub of the cross-strait issue is that candidate and DPP chairwoman Tsai has repeatedly and forcefully decried the underlying formula that has enabled China and Taiwan to find compromise solutions to practical problems despite their contest over sovereignty: the so-called “1992 consensus,” a phrase that allows both sides to acknowledge “one China” but to retain their respective and different interpretations of its meaning. Beijing has been consistently adamant that she must find a way to acknowledge the “one-China” principle if she hopes to maintain the status quo as president of Taiwan. Last year, Chinese officials showed signs of flexibility in how she might do this, but with her campaign statements and the party’s “ten-year platform” enshrining its rejection, Beijing’s attitude has hardened.

Tsai has emphasized privately and publicly that she is a moderate and pragmatic person, and wants to retain the benefits of the relaxation of the past three years, while improving the terms on which Taiwan cooperates with the mainland. She obviously wants to reassure voters that the roller coaster turbulence of the days of former DPP president Chen Shui-bian is not in the offing if she is elected.

Beijing officials, for their part, have become increasingly vocal in saying that a Tsai victory will not perpetuate the status quo and that a price will be exacted. Absent a turnabout by Tsai on “one China,” if she is elected, Beijing can be expected to initially seek options that will demonstrate the need for her to adjust or close new opportunities for the island.

Presumably, Beijing will not want to alienate the constituencies it has been cultivating on the island, including farmers, educators, and professionals by hurting their newly developed economic and other interests. But it has a range of choices to express displeasure, running from ending the “diplomatic truce” under which China has deflected offers of diplomatic relations from Taiwan’s current partners, curtailing Taiwan’s “international space,” ceasing the flow of central, provincial, and local officials to Taiwan to write new deals, and suspending its acceptance of Taiwan officials in negotiating delegations to the mainland. There are probably other steps it can take as well.

China can announce these steps right after Tsai’s election, but would hesitate to implement them until May 20, when Taiwan’s inauguration ceremony occurs, so as not to punish Ma for the perceived sins of Tsai. It likely would use the unusually long four-month interregnum to pressure Tsai to adjust her pre-election stance. Beijing would undoubtedly press Washington to do the same.

If Ma is re-elected, Washington can be expected to breathe a sigh of relief and issue hearty congratulations. The chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Ray Burghardt, will fly to Taipei to congratulate the participants. (若馬能連任，華府將會喘一口氣，並發佈窩心的祝賀，薄瑞光將會來台，對參選者表示祝賀。[這些事都已發生，薄瑞光現在就在台灣]。)

When Tsai was in the United States last September, she suggested vaguely that the four-month interregnum should give Americans some room to see that she will handle things smoothly. It was this vagueness, however, that prompted administration officials’ doubts and did not reassure them. Subsequently, officials let it be known widely, but anonymously, that on the basis of what she had to say, they lacked confidence in her ability to manage cross-strait relations effectively.

If Tsai Ing-wen wins, failing some intervening major development, the Obama administration can be expected to dispatch very quickly the AIT chairman to urge her at the very least to avoid saying things that will worsen the outlook, and to adjust her pre-election stance to a more promising one before she takes office. This was done in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian was elected, but importantly the AIT chairman was accompanied by a senior political figure, then chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Lee Hamilton. Officials today are aware that not sending a similarly high-level messenger of caution will lead Tsai, Taiwan, and China to believe the United States is not taking the matter seriously enough. Thus, a senior presidential-level envoy seems most likely, if the need arises.

包道格在一下飛機後不久，就接受與中國有些關聯的「中天電視台」的專訪，之後，他就帶著與他同行的美國觀察員去見馬英九，他們在總統府熱烈擁抱，狀極親密。包道格現在智庫The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace供職，擔任研究部副總裁，專責亞洲研究。馬英九在他勝選後，當然要大肆封賞，他對輔選有功的包道格任職的智庫可能會有很適當的回饋，這種回饋既屬合法，也是人情之常。

我們現在來讀包道格接受專訪的報導，這項文字報導出現在把「九二共識」奉為無上律令、幾乎每天都試圖要迫使或勸誘蔡英文接受「九二共識」的「聯合報」。

「包道格電視專訪：北京等不到蔡的新模式」
(聯合報，1/13/2012)

//美國在台協會台北辦事處前處長包道格昨天接受電視訪問表示，九二共識是中方支持，符合美國利益的解決歧見有效方法，北京曾替蔡開一扇門，說可能接受一個不同的模式，但等不到蔡的模式，才更強調九二共識。//

談九二共識：非常有創意的模式

以下是包道格接受中天電視記者史哲維專訪摘要：

//九二共識是解決歧見的有效方法；大家都知道九二共識是虛擬的，是一個被雙方接受的虛擬說法，目的是給雙方作為進行事務性協商的基礎，這完全是前所未有的。// (由於這項專訪還沒出現英文版本，所以建州派暫且用The China Post與The Taipei Times的報導的有關部分，做為替代: // On the topic of the "Taiwan Consensus," which Tsai has repeatedly stressed throughout the election run-up, while brushing the "1992 Consensus," Paal said it is "a fiction." -----// ， // Paal said he thinks highly of "the 1992 consensus," -----it has been an "effective means" for two sides that are at odds on ways to cooperate while holding on to their own principles. This is what the U.S. and China have done on several occasions, Paal said, citing as an example the way the two countries have found a way to cooperate even when they have big disagreements,------//)

//中方常常在談一個中國原則，這對他們內部的聽眾非常受用，但當與美方對話時，中方一再重申，九二共識可能是目前唯一的方式；根據胡錦濤與布希總統的熱線談話，以及新華社發出的通稿，都提到了九二共識，不能說中方沒有支持過九二共識。//

//九二共識是一個非常具有創意的模式，中間容許模糊存在，一中就被埋在其中的某個地方，各方對何謂一個中國，都可以有自己的主張；這樣的模糊在兩岸之間，能建立一個創意的方式，讓各自的主權能維持，但實務議題又能夠得到解決。//

//記者問九二共識是出賣台灣主權、對北京磕頭或被中共統一？包道格說，在他這個圈子的人包括官員，都不這樣解讀，這是國與國之間相互交往的過程中必須做出的妥協，它符合美國的利益。//

談台灣共識：需幾十年才能形成

//去年中方涉台部門曾經好幾次傳遞出訊息，說他們可能會接受一個不同的模式，因為他們很清楚蔡博士對九二共識的抨擊，所以他們（替蔡英文）打開了一扇門，像是未來一中，或陳水扁說說的、或其他模式，但他們並沒有等到這個模式。所以他們（中方）才開始更強調九二共識，而且九二共識必須要被尊重。//

//美國把台灣共識看成是不可能的事，因為台灣對於未來與中方的關係，內部有不同意見，所以美方懷疑，台灣共識代表（蔡英文）毫無意願與對岸達成共識，「我不認為台灣共識能成為增進兩岸實質進展的進一步基礎」。//

//我們這些夠了解台灣的人知道，台灣共識只是一個極微小的可能性，可能需要好幾十年，才能形成一個共識。//

談簽FTA：兩岸不平順無法想像

//整體來看，馬總統的連任會讓區域、北京和華府都大大鬆一口氣，「我假設對台灣也是」，因為這將代表一個相對繁榮且具有建設性的狀態可持續。//

如果蔡當選：美派高層要她維持現狀

//如果蔡英文當選，美國會立即與她接觸，派出一個高層代表，要她維持現狀，並協助她找到維持台海和平穩定的方式；美方會試著傳遞一個極為強力的訊息，那就是請她從當選的第二天起，不要做任何讓情勢更惡化的事，並嘗試找出方法說服中方。//

//蔡英文九月前往華盛頓訪問時，沒有完全讓美國官員相信，她是否有能力平順的處理兩岸關係；蔡英文對兩岸關係所提出的保證過於空泛，讓華盛頓無法安心。//

//如果蔡英文贏得勝利，選後初期焦慮感會提升，外界會想從她身上尋找她有能力處理兩岸關係的跡象；屆時，美方很重要的代表團會到這裡（台灣），來尋求（蔡英文的）保證，全台灣也會很期待聽到，她（蔡英文）會怎麼說。//

中天電視這項訪問最驚人的地方是包道格直指: //九二共識是解決歧見的有效方法；大家都知道九二共識是虛擬的，是一個被雙方接受的虛擬說法，目的是給雙方作為進行事務性協商的基礎，這完全是前所未有的。// 這項說詞證實蔡英文與民進黨、李登輝、黃昆輝一貫所指的「『九二共識』並不存在」的說法是正確的。

這項專訪還有一個驚人的地方: //記者問九二共識是出賣台灣主權、對北京磕頭或被中共統一？包道格說，在他這個圈子的人包括官員，都不這樣解讀，這是國與國之間相互交往的過程中必須做出的妥協，它符合美國的利益。// 包道格的說法與建州派在早先所聽到的解釋相同，也與陳一新文章中的陳述相近。

第五部分: 台灣人與建州派的對策

從上面的一些資訊看來，華府(指小布希政府及歐巴馬政府)對所謂「九二共識」的認知與解讀跟北京、台灣的綠營、台灣的獨派、台灣建州派不同，就好像它的「一個中國政策」的內涵與台北、北京的「一個中國原則」不同一樣。美國的「一個中國政策」在美國政府於2007年7月向聯合國遞出一項有關台灣地位的「九點聲明的非文件」後，已經可以確認它沒有「台灣是中華人民共和國的一部分」的內容。

最近半年來，特別是在蔡英文敗選之後，綠營及獨派的陣營普遍對華府的態度與立場產生不滿與反感，這種情緒似乎在蔓延。華府的確應受譴責，但若不滿的情緒升高為仇美的情緒，則台灣人與綠營反受其害，這就好比台灣人與綠營不管接受或拒絕「九二共識」都好像會受到傷害一樣，這真是進退兩難。

台灣人與台美人的領袖應該設法將這種不滿情緒加以疏導與化解。

台灣人與台美人的領袖以及台灣人中的國安事務人員、專家、學者以及美國事務專家，必須努力設法縮短或消除美台兩方對台海事務或議題的認知與判斷的落差，並導向對台灣人有利的方向發展。若做不到，對台灣人就是大災難。

要說服美方(指總統與白宮國安顧問這一個層級)接受台灣人與綠營的觀點與判斷，絕非易事，最好的辦法是，透過適當的管道，勸使美國採取平衡與損害控管之策，以求在台灣「反中國併吞陣營」與「國民黨賣台集團」之間求取平衡，美方可以考慮師法以前的政府的智慧，例如以「台灣關係法」平衡「美中三公報」，以雷根「對台六項保證」平衡「八一七公報」。

「台灣建州運動」因此要公開與私下向華府做出建議: 美國政府可以考慮發表一項聲明或對台灣人民採取一項措施，指出國共所虛構的「九二共識」沒有也不會改變「美國的一個中國政策」，也與台灣前途的終局解決無涉。

這種聲明有點類似雷根的六項保證，因此美國政府不妨就重申遵守雷根的對台六項保證，還來得乾脆與省事。

建州派必須進一步為台灣人強化與鞏固美國人民、政府與朝野中親台的力量，做為台灣人的靠山，並藉著這股力量，來平衡或抵銷親中或棄台的勢力。

台灣的藍營或親中被統勢力的執政或政策，最多只是讓國民黨的權貴及親國共的紅頂商人獲得政經利益，但台灣與絕大多數的台灣人民卻會成為犧牲品，它最終會讓台灣人民失去自由、民主、人權、法治，而綠營的執政或政策卻會導致狼狽為奸的北京與國民黨的掣肘與作亂，讓台海情勢緊張，讓台灣人民與企業界人士沒有安全感，所以台灣人民必須嘗試找到另一條路，它既能確保美國對台灣的軍事保護，有效排除中國威脅，有效管控台灣內部親中賣台勢力，讓台灣人民有安全感，又能確保或深化台灣的自由、民主、人權、法治、公民社會與文化、經濟的永續發展(包括與中國的經貿往來)，這一條路就是「台灣建州運動」所主張的「台美整合，台灣加入美國，台灣建州」。

「台灣建州運動」發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted to making Taiwan a state of the United States)