一
台灣建州運動已隔了一段時間，沒有向台灣與台美鄉親報告從柯林頓政府起就開始在逐步進行的「重返亞洲」戰略。
有人說「重返亞洲」的戰略是從小步希的時代開始，有人說是從歐巴馬的時代開始，但也有人說美國從來就沒有離開亞洲，何來「重返亞洲」，這些說法都有部分的道理。
「重返亞洲」或「向亞洲再平衡」一說是由歐巴馬政府正式提出，戰略與作戰準則也是在歐巴馬主政時期逐步發展，而且是從國家安全戰略向下發展到戰區的臨戰、接戰與作戰準則層次，這整套的strategy與doctrine雖然尚未發展完備與成熟，但基本上，它的架構已建立起來，包括美國與盟國軍事同盟的強化以及同安全夥伴的軍事交流與合作的加強。
我們說「重返亞洲」是從柯林頓的時代開始，有兩個原因: (一)「重返亞洲」是為了要面對與處理不接受自由國際秩序的中國要成為亞洲區域霸權、要把美國勢力趕出美國而起，北京在天安門屠殺事件及蘇聯崩解後，就開始逐步展現它要與美國爭霸的野心，所以在1990年代，在美國就出現一波很強勁的「中國威脅論」，美中兩國在1990年代就出現過一些衝突，台海第三次危機就是其中的一例。(二) 柯林頓政府開始在關島等地，進行一系列強化面向中國的軍事前進部署與建設，小布希時代低調地繼續進行這些部署與建設。
「重返亞洲」在軍事方面的意義是，要建立「印太戰區」，即含蓋西太平洋、南太平洋、東海、南海、印度洋、波斯灣的戰區，這個大戰區中段的建設由於印度的Narendra Modi執政，而得到很大的突破，美、印、日、澳四國在印度洋與南海的結盟也有很正面的發展，這是歐巴馬執政團隊一項了不起的成就。
二
現任的印度總理Modi出身極為寒微卑賤，他在印度這種講究出身與門第的社會竟然能在政治上冒出頭，而且成為政府首腦，這真是一項異數，老實說，我到今天都還覺得不可思議。由於諸多原因，Modi於2014年5月在印度大選獲勝之後，我對他主政後的美印關係的發展與前景並不看好，就是在2014年7月，我讀到夏威夷太平洋大學的政治學教授Patrick Bratton在CSIS的「太平洋論壇」所發表的”Cautious optimism? What to expect from Modi’s India”一文後，我對Patrick的看法也多少持保留的態度。
不過，這幾個月下來，到今天，我們看到事態的發展與Patrick所說的很接近，今天，我們已看到美印日三國的結盟，至少我們可以稱之為準同盟，我們也看到北京為此而感到有如芒刺在背。
台灣建州運動樂見美印日三國同盟或準同盟的出現，美印日三國同盟或準同盟是美國「重返亞洲」戰略極為重要而且不可或缺的一環。
我們今天先把Patrick Bratton的大作張貼出來，做為附件，請習慣閱讀英文的鄉親們參考，不習慣閱讀英文的鄉親們則僅需閱讀我們擇要做出的漢文摘譯或摘要。
過幾天，我再來寫本文的二之二，把美印日三國同盟或準同盟一事說得更詳細些。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
附件
“Cautious optimism? What to expect from Modi’s India”
By Patrick Bratton
Pacific Forum CSIS
July 3, 2014
By Patrick Bratton
Pacific Forum CSIS
July 3, 2014
India’s May 2014 election received far less attention from the US media than it deserved. The landslide victory of Narendra Modi and the BJP is significant for both India and the Indo-Pacific region. Notwithstanding important achievements – like the Indo-US nuclear deal – the previous Congress-led coalition government of Manmohan Singh, seemed to the electorate like a decade of missed opportunities and drift. Internationally, many of India’s friends and partners often found it too cautious. In contrast, Modi will have an increased focus on Asia, leveraging Indian diplomacy to increase Asian investment in India.
Internal Focus
Modi’s priorities are internal and focus on returning to high growth. In recent years, the economy has grown just 5-6 percent annually instead of the 8-9 percent of a decade ago. The view in Delhi is that India needs 7-8 percent growth rates. Voters were concerned about issues like high commodity prices, job creation, corruption, and inadequate infrastructure. To achieve this growth, Modi seeks to develop infrastructure, build transit corridors, and increase the effectiveness of the Indian bureaucracy.
Internal security will be a priority for the government, as seen by the selection of veteran counter-terrorism intelligence chief, Ajit Doval, as National Security Advisor. In its election manifesto, the BJP stressed that it will have a “zero tolerance” policy toward terrorism, indicating that in the event of another terrorist attack, this government will take action unlike the passive response of Singh’s government to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Beyond responding to the domestic call for a more hawkish stance, this emphasis on domestic security is necessary for growth. It will prove difficult to attract needed investment if foreign investors feel India is unstable. In the 2000s, India was one of the countries most often struck by terrorist attacks, just after Iraq and Afghanistan.
Southern Asia
During his inauguration ceremony, Modi took the unprecedented step of inviting the heads of government from South Asia, including controversial guests like Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, Mahindra Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, and Tibetan Prime Minister-in-exile Lobsand Sangary. [Modi邀請流亡的圖博總理Lobsang Sangay參加他的就職典禮，大家可想而知，老共肯定冒火。 ---Read More--- ]His first foreign visit was to Bhutan. Modi wants to be seen as the “leader of South Asia” to increase his status and expand regional economic ties. This will prove difficult: South Asia is one of the world’s least economically integrated regions and the regional organization, SAARC, one of the most ineffective. In addition, China has invested heavily in both infrastructure development and military assistance to several of these states (in particular Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) so Modi will be playing catch up to balance Chinese influence in the region.
China
The most delicate relationship that the new government will have to manage is with China. Although bilateral trade has grown 30 percent annually in recent years, the trade imbalance (favoring China) is a source of irritation. China is India’s largest trading partner, but India is only China’s 10th largest. Modi’s government would like to increase India’s access to the Chinese market for its IT and pharmaceutical industries, and increase Chinese capital and capital goods investment in Indian infrastructure. The recent visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi focused on economic issues, in particular getting increased Chinese investment in India’s industrial parks and railways. Beyond economics, there have been murmurs of India becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which is unlikely).
Potential spoilers remain, however, such as the border dispute (last April there was another confrontation), Chinese support for Pakistan, and other issues. Modi’s government has indicated to China that while improved economic ties are important, India will remain firm against Chinese assertiveness. Among these signals are: inclusion in the government of several figures known for their harder stance on China (VK Singh, Kiran Rejiju, etc.), Modi’s invitation of the Tibetan prime minister-in-exile to his inauguration, and plans to develop infrastructure in border areas in Arunachal Pradesh (parts of which are claimed by China as “South Tibet”). When campaigning in Arunachal Pradesh, Modi criticized China’s “expansionist mindset.” [當Modi在Arunachal Pradesh地區從事競選活動時，他批判中國的擴張心態。]
ASEAN
Modi will also look to resuscitate India’s “Look East Policy” (LEP) of economic and security engagement with Southeast Asia. The Singh government delayed initiatives for increased trade because of domestic politics. Since one of Modi’s priorities is to develop Arunachal Pradesh and other northeastern states, the LEP seeks to bring trade and investment to one of India’s least developed areas. For decades, Delhi has lost great sums of money and suffered many casualties in attempting to prop up these states in the face of violent insurgencies, minimal infrastructure, and poor economies. Promoting economic ties between Northeast and Southeast Asia is part of a long-term strategy for developing (and bringing peace) to this region of India.
India has also sought to engage Southeast Asia through military exercises (like the Milan exercises it hosts), [印度尋求透過聯合軍事演習，與東南亞國家接觸與往來。]and involvement in soft security issues like humanitarian assistance and disaster response. It has positioned itself as a benign regional power in contrast with China’s more assertive posture. As India becomes more interconnected with Southeast Asia, it risks upsetting Chinese sensibilities, however. In particular, India’s cooperation with longtime friend, Vietnam, both in terms of oil exploration in the South China Sea and defense cooperation could be a spoiler for Sino-Indian relations in the future. [印度也與越南在南海進行石油探勘的合作以及軍事合作，老共對印度的行動肯定極為不爽。]
Japan
Much has been made of similarities and close ties between Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo (Abe is supposedly one of only three people Modi follows on Twitter). Abe was the guest of honor in January’s Republic Day parade (a traditional method of signaling Indian priorities for the coming year) and Modi’s second international visit will be to Japan (it is speculated that the delayed Indo-Japan nuclear deal will be finalized during the visit). And while Japanese funds were used to finance Delhi’s metro system and the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, India needs Chinese as well as Japanese investment. [Modi與日本首相安倍關係甚為密切，Modi據說只與三人使用推特聯繫，而安倍是其中之一，安倍也將是印度2015年1月共和日的慶典的貴賓，他們兩人以英文聯繫。]
The burgeoning trilateral security cooperation between India, Japan, and the US will continue and likely strengthen under Modi. [這一段話最重要: 開始萌芽的印日美三邊安全合作將會持續，而且有可能在Modi主政下被增強。] India and Japan regularly have joint military exercises and high-level defense dialogues. It was announced that Japan will participate in the Indo-US Malabar exercises in the future. Moreover, an Indo-Japanese arms relationship seems to be developing with Japan’s new openness to arms sales and India’s new policy on 100 percent FDI in the arms industry. As the world’s largest arms buyer, India is an attractive market (the Japanese US-2 amphibious aircraft is high on India’s list).
US
Modi has been careful to send positive signals that he is ready to do business with the US. There were several reasons why the new government could have started with a cooler US relationship. First, Modi was chief minister of Gujarat during the 2002 sectarian riots and the US had refused to give him a tourist visa since 2005, making Modi the only person ever denied a visa under an obscure law denying visas to people linked to “severe violations of religious freedom.” Second, last winter, law enforcement officials in New York arrested an Indian diplomat on charges of visa fraud. What should have been a minor incident became a major diplomatic spat between the two nations. Yet, even before the election, Modi sent signals that relations between the countries could not be adversely affected by individuals and his government is ready to rebuild Indo-US relations. The visit by Assistant Secretary of State Nisha Biswal in June, plans for Modi’s state visit to the US in September, the upcoming Yudh Abyas exercises in India, and prospective arms sales (likely to include helicopters and artillery) indicate movement in a positive direction.
In sum, there is a case to be made for cautious optimism. Modi will be more decisive, and less risk averse than the previous government. Modi intends to leverage diplomacy to encourage investment from China and Japan, and deepen economic ties with the US. India will retain its traditional stance of “strategic autonomy,” however, and remain inward looking initially. While Modi won a clear mandate, he is under great pressure to deliver quickly on issues like economic growth, corruption, high commodity prices, and infrastructure. Modi’s government will give priority to economic growth and domestic politics to meet the electorate’s high expectations. There was a sense that the Singh government had invested too heavily in foreign affairs at the expense of domestic reforms. Modi’s government will seek to avoid a similar fate. So while India will actively seek economic ties, it will retain its traditional hesitation to get too enmeshed into Asian security dynamics. The difficult part will be courting all major players in the region for investment, and maintaining good relations if a crisis erupts and India is forced to pick a side.
(Patrick Bratton is the director of Diplomacy and Military Studies Program and associate professor of Political Science at Hawaii Pacific University)
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