尼克森總統任內的口述歷史與雷根總統日記(上)
一
我們在前幾天藉卡特總統的「白宮日記」來了解卡特政府的對台政策，今天我們藉一本口述歷史及「雷根日記」來了解。
這部口述歷史是Nixon: An Oral History of His Presidency by Gerald S. & Deborah H. Strober (Harper Collins Publishers, 1994)，我們用的是Chapter 5: Foreign Affairs其中的幾節: The Two Chinas, President Nixon’s Historic Visit to the People’s Republic of China, The Meeting with Mao Tse-Tung & The Shanghai Communique (pp.129-137)。
我們從這一本口述歷史知道，至少有兩位人士反對尼克森打開中國之門與訪中。
H. R. Haldeman[Haldeman是尼克森總統的白宮幕僚長，1969-1973，因水門案被判刑]說: “There was opposition in the White House. Pat Buchanan, who at that time was a major speechwriter, thought it was a sellout of the Taiwanese. Some of the President’s backers in Congress, and in the country also, had that view. Nixon knew there would be flak, but that the ultimate results would override the opposition.” [Patrick J. Buchanan是美國政壇出名的保守派，他在尼克森擔任總統期間擔任尼的演說主要撰稿人，他反對尼與北京結盟，他後來曾三度參加共和黨總統初選，但沒有出線。]
William A. Rusher[Rusher是著名的右翼雜誌The National Review的副總兼社長，1957-1988]說: “This man [指尼克森] had been the principal friend of the Republic of China in the United States for twenty years, and then he turned around, with cool precision --- a politician without any principles at all. He proceeded to double-cross them --- one of the greatest historical double-crosses of all time. He would justify having done it on the grounds that he was president and was fighting the Cold War. I have since asked what in the world we got from this. I don’t see that he solved the problem of China at all. I suppose we got some listening posts in China against Russia. Now, I guess, we have listening posts in Russia against China.” [Rusher表達他對尼克森的不屑，他認為尼與北京結盟，並沒有為美國爭到什麼。]
比較重要的是關於上海公報的口述歷史，這一部分只有Marshall Green與Winston Lord[他隨尼克森訪中擔任記錄員，後來擔任重要智庫The Council on Foreign Relations的總裁，1985-1989年間擔任美國駐中國大使，1993-1997擔任美國國務院亞太事務助卿]表達了意見，Winston Lord說的不重要，Marshall Green說的比較值得我們提:
Marshall Green說: “The Shanghai Communique could have been a disaster. It ------ left the implication that we stood behind all of our treaties in East Asia, but it excluded reference to our treaty obligations to Taiwan. Kissinger was very mad at me for finding the mistake in the communiqué, because I put him in an embarrassing position vis-à-vis the president: he had bound Nixon to a document which was wide open to criticism from the right wing. There was a stormy session when the president found out about it. Kissinger wrote about the incident in his book, The White House Years. The president is storming up and down in his underwear, swearing he will get even with the State Department. My guess is that the president was storming up and down because he was mad at Kissinger for this serious oversight. I hope that the history will be written correctly.”
Marshall這段話十分重要，所以我必須特別加以解釋[在親日與親台的美國的保守派眼中，William Rogers之後的美國國務院已變成親共或親中的大本營，在尼克森與季辛吉掌控了美國的外交政策的方向與制訂之後，William Rogers國務卿的國務院已變成可有可無，而且逐漸被紅色勢力入侵，尼季兩人對當時的國務卿完全不看在眼裡，當國務院官員對上海公報的內容初稿加以挑裼時，據說尼克森十光火，認為國務院跟他搗蛋]，他說: 尼克森氣急敗壞，穿著內衣內褲，奔上跑下，暴跳如雷，發誓要向國務院討公道。這段描述十分傳神。
隨尼季訪中的Marshall Green在一行391人中排名第8，他當時的官階與職務是國務院的亞太事務助卿，層級不低。是他發現了「上海公報」原稿中對台灣的利益有重大損害、且會被美國政壇親台的右翼勢力拿來攻擊尼克森政府的把柄的條款與文字 ，並立即向國務卿報告，國務卿立即向尼克森反映，尼克森十分光火，但還是做了些彌補與修正。倘若沒有這些彌補與修正，Marshall說，那就會對台灣與尼克森政府帶來災難[ “The Shanghai Communique could have been a disaster.” ]，因為Marshall發現了重大錯誤，但也將季辛吉置於在尼克森面前陷入尷尬的處境，所以老季對Marshall十分生氣。
Marshall最後說: “My guess is that the president was storming up and down because he was mad at Kissinger for this serious oversight. I hope that the history will be written correctly.”他認為尼克森的光火不是針對國務院或他，而是對老季的疏忽光火，他希望這段歷史未來能夠被正確地寫出來。
我們未來會談老季在”The White House Years” 這本回憶錄中相關的記載。
二
既然提到「尼(克森)周(恩來)上海公報」，我們現在就把已經解密、存放於The National Security Archives的 「尼周會談記錄」等文件張貼出來。
Nixon's Trip to China
Records now Completely Declassified,
Including Kissinger Intelligence Briefing and Assurances on Taiwan
by William Burr
Posted - December 11, 2003
In their accounts of the historic February 1972 trip to China, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger focus on the February 21 meeting with Mao Zedong as well as the talks with Zhou Enlai on the Vietnam War, Taiwan, and the Shanghai Communique. Both kept secret one of the trip's more remarkable episodes -- Kissinger's top secret intelligence briefing to the Chinese on Soviet military forces arrayed against China. They also kept secret some of their talks with Zhou; Kissinger later claimed that Zhou "spent very little of our time on" Taiwan, but actually Nixon and Kissinger went to some length to mollify his concerns about the possibility of Taiwanese independence and prospective Japanese influence over Taiwan. After years of declassification requests and appeals, the National Security Archive publishes here for the first time the intelligence briefing to the Chinese and the complete texts of Nixon's conversations with Zhou, including the assurances on Taiwan.
Richard Nixon's trip to China in February 1972 was a critically important moment in the early history of the Sino-American rapprochement. Keeping Secretary of State William Rogers out of the talks, Nixon and Kissinger met privately with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai where they confirmed understandings on sensitive issues such as Taiwan and the normalization of diplomatic relations. Nearly ten years ago, the National Security Archive filed a mandatory review request with the National Archive's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff for declassification review of the memoranda of conversations (memcons) for the Nixon-Mao-Zhou Enlai meetings. While the Nixon-Mao memcon had been declassified separately among State Department records at the National Archives, the memcons of the Nixon-Zhou talks were finally released in the spring of 1999. Three of them, however, were released with a significant number of excisions. The National Security Archive promptly filed an appeal with the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, which rejected it two years later on the grounds that declassification would harm U.S. foreign relations and national security. The next step, taken in June 2001, was an appeal to the Interagency Security Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the "court of last resort" for the mandatory review process. ISCAP enhanced its already remarkable reputation by approving complete release of the memcons in the fall of 2002. Possibly because of understaffing, the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff delayed releasing the documents until 14 November 2003.---Read More---
While the newly released information in the Nixon-Zhou talks is interesting, none of it was so sensitive that it could not have been released years ago. Some of the excisions had to do with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and the 1971 South Asia War but most relate to two preoccupations of the Chinese leadership: 1) fear of renewed Japanese expansion, and 2) opposition to Taiwanese independence. The late 1960s and early 1970s was a period when Japan's export successes were catching attention throughout the industrialized world, not least in the United States where some industries were feeling the brunt of Japanese competition. As orthodox Marxists, the Chinese leadership easily assumed that economic expansion would develop into political and military expansion, a revival of the Japanese imperialism that had caused so much devastation in China only a few decades earlier. In keeping with this, Zhou expressed concern about the possibility of Japanese expansion into South Korea and Taiwan, with Nixon and Kissinger assuring him that as long as the United States had a security treaty with Japan, Washington would be in a position to check any Japanese tendencies toward militarism and political expansionism. With the U.S. committed to pulling its forces out of Taiwan, Zhou expressed anxiety not only about the revival of Japanese influence in its former colony, but also about the prospects for an independent Taiwan. The forces pushing for independence were small, but Zhou was nonetheless concerned and wanted assurances that Washington would not support any movement that was inconsistent with the concept of "one China."
Why security reviewers working with the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff sought to block complete declassification of these memcons is puzzling. Granting that some of the discussion remained sensitive during the 1970s, by the time that the Nixon project made the initial denials in 1999 and 2001, so much information had been declassified relating to the touchier portions of these documents that there could be no legitimate reasons to maintain their classification. Indeed, details on Beijing's concerns about Japanese expansion, possible Japanese influence in Taiwan and South Korea, and the Taiwanese independence movement had already been declassified in the Nixon National Security Files and State Department records at the National Archives. Concerns about harm to U.S. foreign policy were greatly exaggerated; its earlier decisions on the withholdings are a telling example of the overclassification problem in the U.S. government secrecy system.
The release of the Kissinger intelligence briefing to the Chinese on 23 February 1972 shows much better judgment. After it initially denied the Archive's mandatory review request in the spring of 2002, the Nixon Project released, in response to an appeal, the memcon of the intelligence briefing. Kissinger's intelligence briefings to the Chinese have long been a subject of discussion, but this is the first one to be declassified. Perhaps the ISCAP decision on the Nixon-Zhou talks made the Nixon Project and the National Archives less hesitant to declassify once sensitive documents, such as this one, that had long been overtaken by events. In light of their pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union at the same time, Nixon and Kissinger had understandable reasons for assigning a high classification to secret briefings on Soviet military forces arrayed against China. Now that so much information has been released on triangular diplomacy, however, this document was ripe for declassification, which the Nixon Project recognized, after some hesitation.
Documents
Document 1: Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10 p.m. - 6:10 p.m.
Location of original: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, box 87, Memoranda for the President Beginning February 20, 1972
Newly Released Material: Pages 5 and 10-12 [New information appears in brackets]
The Nixon Project made several withholdings from this memcon, during which Nixon and Zhou reviewed the Taiwan issue, the U.S. military posture, Sino-American relations during the 1940s, and the Vietnam War negotiations. Key statements in the conversation (see page 5) were those in which Nixon provided the basis for what has been U.S. policy on Taiwan ever since. While Nixon said that the United States would not support "any" Taiwanese independence movement and asserted that Taiwan was "part of China,"[請注意，尼克森聲稱「台灣是中國的一部分」還好 「上海公報」不是這麼說。]
我們在前幾天藉卡特總統的「白宮日記」來了解卡特政府的對台政策，今天我們藉一本口述歷史及「雷根日記」來了解。
這部口述歷史是Nixon: An Oral History of His Presidency by Gerald S. & Deborah H. Strober (Harper Collins Publishers, 1994)，我們用的是Chapter 5: Foreign Affairs其中的幾節: The Two Chinas, President Nixon’s Historic Visit to the People’s Republic of China, The Meeting with Mao Tse-Tung & The Shanghai Communique (pp.129-137)。
我們從這一本口述歷史知道，至少有兩位人士反對尼克森打開中國之門與訪中。
H. R. Haldeman[Haldeman是尼克森總統的白宮幕僚長，1969-1973，因水門案被判刑]說: “There was opposition in the White House. Pat Buchanan, who at that time was a major speechwriter, thought it was a sellout of the Taiwanese. Some of the President’s backers in Congress, and in the country also, had that view. Nixon knew there would be flak, but that the ultimate results would override the opposition.” [Patrick J. Buchanan是美國政壇出名的保守派，他在尼克森擔任總統期間擔任尼的演說主要撰稿人，他反對尼與北京結盟，他後來曾三度參加共和黨總統初選，但沒有出線。]
William A. Rusher[Rusher是著名的右翼雜誌The National Review的副總兼社長，1957-1988]說: “This man [指尼克森] had been the principal friend of the Republic of China in the United States for twenty years, and then he turned around, with cool precision --- a politician without any principles at all. He proceeded to double-cross them --- one of the greatest historical double-crosses of all time. He would justify having done it on the grounds that he was president and was fighting the Cold War. I have since asked what in the world we got from this. I don’t see that he solved the problem of China at all. I suppose we got some listening posts in China against Russia. Now, I guess, we have listening posts in Russia against China.” [Rusher表達他對尼克森的不屑，他認為尼與北京結盟，並沒有為美國爭到什麼。]
比較重要的是關於上海公報的口述歷史，這一部分只有Marshall Green與Winston Lord[他隨尼克森訪中擔任記錄員，後來擔任重要智庫The Council on Foreign Relations的總裁，1985-1989年間擔任美國駐中國大使，1993-1997擔任美國國務院亞太事務助卿]表達了意見，Winston Lord說的不重要，Marshall Green說的比較值得我們提:
Marshall Green說: “The Shanghai Communique could have been a disaster. It ------ left the implication that we stood behind all of our treaties in East Asia, but it excluded reference to our treaty obligations to Taiwan. Kissinger was very mad at me for finding the mistake in the communiqué, because I put him in an embarrassing position vis-à-vis the president: he had bound Nixon to a document which was wide open to criticism from the right wing. There was a stormy session when the president found out about it. Kissinger wrote about the incident in his book, The White House Years. The president is storming up and down in his underwear, swearing he will get even with the State Department. My guess is that the president was storming up and down because he was mad at Kissinger for this serious oversight. I hope that the history will be written correctly.”
Marshall這段話十分重要，所以我必須特別加以解釋[在親日與親台的美國的保守派眼中，William Rogers之後的美國國務院已變成親共或親中的大本營，在尼克森與季辛吉掌控了美國的外交政策的方向與制訂之後，William Rogers國務卿的國務院已變成可有可無，而且逐漸被紅色勢力入侵，尼季兩人對當時的國務卿完全不看在眼裡，當國務院官員對上海公報的內容初稿加以挑裼時，據說尼克森十光火，認為國務院跟他搗蛋]，他說: 尼克森氣急敗壞，穿著內衣內褲，奔上跑下，暴跳如雷，發誓要向國務院討公道。這段描述十分傳神。
隨尼季訪中的Marshall Green在一行391人中排名第8，他當時的官階與職務是國務院的亞太事務助卿，層級不低。是他發現了「上海公報」原稿中對台灣的利益有重大損害、且會被美國政壇親台的右翼勢力拿來攻擊尼克森政府的把柄的條款與文字 ，並立即向國務卿報告，國務卿立即向尼克森反映，尼克森十分光火，但還是做了些彌補與修正。倘若沒有這些彌補與修正，Marshall說，那就會對台灣與尼克森政府帶來災難[ “The Shanghai Communique could have been a disaster.” ]，因為Marshall發現了重大錯誤，但也將季辛吉置於在尼克森面前陷入尷尬的處境，所以老季對Marshall十分生氣。
Marshall最後說: “My guess is that the president was storming up and down because he was mad at Kissinger for this serious oversight. I hope that the history will be written correctly.”他認為尼克森的光火不是針對國務院或他，而是對老季的疏忽光火，他希望這段歷史未來能夠被正確地寫出來。
我們未來會談老季在”The White House Years” 這本回憶錄中相關的記載。
二
既然提到「尼(克森)周(恩來)上海公報」，我們現在就把已經解密、存放於The National Security Archives的 「尼周會談記錄」等文件張貼出來。
Nixon's Trip to China
Records now Completely Declassified,
Including Kissinger Intelligence Briefing and Assurances on Taiwan
by William Burr
Posted - December 11, 2003
In their accounts of the historic February 1972 trip to China, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger focus on the February 21 meeting with Mao Zedong as well as the talks with Zhou Enlai on the Vietnam War, Taiwan, and the Shanghai Communique. Both kept secret one of the trip's more remarkable episodes -- Kissinger's top secret intelligence briefing to the Chinese on Soviet military forces arrayed against China. They also kept secret some of their talks with Zhou; Kissinger later claimed that Zhou "spent very little of our time on" Taiwan, but actually Nixon and Kissinger went to some length to mollify his concerns about the possibility of Taiwanese independence and prospective Japanese influence over Taiwan. After years of declassification requests and appeals, the National Security Archive publishes here for the first time the intelligence briefing to the Chinese and the complete texts of Nixon's conversations with Zhou, including the assurances on Taiwan.
Richard Nixon's trip to China in February 1972 was a critically important moment in the early history of the Sino-American rapprochement. Keeping Secretary of State William Rogers out of the talks, Nixon and Kissinger met privately with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai where they confirmed understandings on sensitive issues such as Taiwan and the normalization of diplomatic relations. Nearly ten years ago, the National Security Archive filed a mandatory review request with the National Archive's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff for declassification review of the memoranda of conversations (memcons) for the Nixon-Mao-Zhou Enlai meetings. While the Nixon-Mao memcon had been declassified separately among State Department records at the National Archives, the memcons of the Nixon-Zhou talks were finally released in the spring of 1999. Three of them, however, were released with a significant number of excisions. The National Security Archive promptly filed an appeal with the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, which rejected it two years later on the grounds that declassification would harm U.S. foreign relations and national security. The next step, taken in June 2001, was an appeal to the Interagency Security Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the "court of last resort" for the mandatory review process. ISCAP enhanced its already remarkable reputation by approving complete release of the memcons in the fall of 2002. Possibly because of understaffing, the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff delayed releasing the documents until 14 November 2003.
While the newly released information in the Nixon-Zhou talks is interesting, none of it was so sensitive that it could not have been released years ago. Some of the excisions had to do with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and the 1971 South Asia War but most relate to two preoccupations of the Chinese leadership: 1) fear of renewed Japanese expansion, and 2) opposition to Taiwanese independence. The late 1960s and early 1970s was a period when Japan's export successes were catching attention throughout the industrialized world, not least in the United States where some industries were feeling the brunt of Japanese competition. As orthodox Marxists, the Chinese leadership easily assumed that economic expansion would develop into political and military expansion, a revival of the Japanese imperialism that had caused so much devastation in China only a few decades earlier. In keeping with this, Zhou expressed concern about the possibility of Japanese expansion into South Korea and Taiwan, with Nixon and Kissinger assuring him that as long as the United States had a security treaty with Japan, Washington would be in a position to check any Japanese tendencies toward militarism and political expansionism. With the U.S. committed to pulling its forces out of Taiwan, Zhou expressed anxiety not only about the revival of Japanese influence in its former colony, but also about the prospects for an independent Taiwan. The forces pushing for independence were small, but Zhou was nonetheless concerned and wanted assurances that Washington would not support any movement that was inconsistent with the concept of "one China."
Why security reviewers working with the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff sought to block complete declassification of these memcons is puzzling. Granting that some of the discussion remained sensitive during the 1970s, by the time that the Nixon project made the initial denials in 1999 and 2001, so much information had been declassified relating to the touchier portions of these documents that there could be no legitimate reasons to maintain their classification. Indeed, details on Beijing's concerns about Japanese expansion, possible Japanese influence in Taiwan and South Korea, and the Taiwanese independence movement had already been declassified in the Nixon National Security Files and State Department records at the National Archives. Concerns about harm to U.S. foreign policy were greatly exaggerated; its earlier decisions on the withholdings are a telling example of the overclassification problem in the U.S. government secrecy system.
The release of the Kissinger intelligence briefing to the Chinese on 23 February 1972 shows much better judgment. After it initially denied the Archive's mandatory review request in the spring of 2002, the Nixon Project released, in response to an appeal, the memcon of the intelligence briefing. Kissinger's intelligence briefings to the Chinese have long been a subject of discussion, but this is the first one to be declassified. Perhaps the ISCAP decision on the Nixon-Zhou talks made the Nixon Project and the National Archives less hesitant to declassify once sensitive documents, such as this one, that had long been overtaken by events. In light of their pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union at the same time, Nixon and Kissinger had understandable reasons for assigning a high classification to secret briefings on Soviet military forces arrayed against China. Now that so much information has been released on triangular diplomacy, however, this document was ripe for declassification, which the Nixon Project recognized, after some hesitation.
Documents
Document 1: Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10 p.m. - 6:10 p.m.
Location of original: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, box 87, Memoranda for the President Beginning February 20, 1972
Newly Released Material: Pages 5 and 10-12 [New information appears in brackets]
The Nixon Project made several withholdings from this memcon, during which Nixon and Zhou reviewed the Taiwan issue, the U.S. military posture, Sino-American relations during the 1940s, and the Vietnam War negotiations. Key statements in the conversation (see page 5) were those in which Nixon provided the basis for what has been U.S. policy on Taiwan ever since. While Nixon said that the United States would not support "any" Taiwanese independence movement and asserted that Taiwan was "part of China,"[請注意，尼克森聲稱「台灣是中國的一部分」還好 「上海公報」不是這麼說。]
