中國狗咬美國人，不是新聞，美國人咬中國狗，才是新聞: 親中的美國東亞事務學者沈大偉竟然跳出來，豁出去，釋出「老共的統治已走到了盡頭」的訊息

中國狗咬美國人，不是新聞，美國人咬中國狗，才是新聞: 親中的美國東亞事務學者沈大偉竟然跳出來，豁出去，釋出「老共的統治已走到了盡頭」的訊息

第一部分

老共的外交學院國際關係研究所與國際安全研究中心於2015 年1 月發表了一份研究報告，題為「美國知華派評估報告」，該報告列出了美國知華派排名中位列前20名的學者，排名第一的是Johns Hopkins的藍普頓教授(David Lampton)，第二名就是我們今天這篇文章的主角---George Washington 大學的沈大偉教授(David Shambaugh)，他們都是中國事務專家中的「紅隊」成員，「紅隊」就是親中派、對中妥協派、對中調適派、鴿派、「不要把中國視為敵人，因為這樣就會把中國變成敵人，會變成自我實現的預言派」或對中國姑息派[這些人可總稱為莫名其妙、天真爛漫、誤國誤民派]。

我們一向對「紅隊」的專家學者的言論或主張感到不舒適，因為他們在幫助中國這個「新邪惡帝國」坐大，不過，我們從不會因此而拒絕閱讀他們所發表的文章、報告或論述，也不會以人廢言，我們總是認為應該對他們也公平一些，我們可以這樣說，容或他們的approach、思想、觀念、態度、路線有些可調整的或進步的空間，但他們畢竟還不至於被說成是百分之百的pro-Communist、un-American，雖然他們之中有人過去曾「假和平與穩定之名」，試圖要搞什麼「中程協議」或「和平協議」，把台灣送上「慕尼黑刑台」，要讓台灣成為另一個蘇台德(Sudetenland)。

第二部分

最近太陽竟從西邊出來，讓我們與世人都跌破眼鏡，眼鏡店因而大發利市，「紅隊」的人馬竟然像吃了搖頭丸或威爾鋼一樣，他們竟然開始無所顧忌，不再「畏懼」老共，並開始對老共背後插刀，這種突如其來的「斯巴達逆襲」肯定會讓老共吃不消，一時之間無法回神，老共現在有可能亡黨亡國的烏雲罩頂，軍心渙散，陣腳大亂，當然老共也可能變本加厲，一不做，二不休，對中國人民的思想與言論進行更嚴密的箝制，對中國境內的敵對勢力進行更無情的鎮壓。

我們先來讀與沈大偉有關的一篇報導:

「沈大偉：中國存在國際定位危機」
[日期：2015-03-01]
來源：美國之音作者：斯洋,鬱崗參與網( http://canyu.org/n95568c11.aspx )
28.02.2015 08:44

華盛頓—

//中國領導人習近平上台後推出了“奮發有為”的外交新政。從鄧小平的“韜光養晦”到“奮發有為”，中國外交出現了重大的變化。不過，美國一名著名中國問題學者稱，在二戰後的國際秩序問題上，中國則希望對某些領域進行修改和調整，但是，中國目前對“自己究竟是誰，想要什麼”並不明確，存在相當程度的身份定位危機。

美國喬治•華盛頓大學政治學和國際關係學教授沈大偉（David Shambaugh）2月27日在美國智庫布魯金斯學會說，中國對自己在國際上的定位，對於自己想要什麼並不清楚。

他說：“我想說的是， 中國對自己在全球的定位，在國際事務中扮演何種角色的看法是自相矛盾，含混不清的， 存在相當嚴重的定位危機。”

沈大偉是在布魯金斯學會舉辦的有關中國外交政策演變的一場研討會上這麼說的。這位中國和亞洲事務專家說，中國國內關於中國應對扮演何種國際角色的爭論從2008年就開始，目前還在繼續。

他說，中國的國際定位危機反映在外交關係上，那就是中國的外交行為並沒有連貫性。一方面，人們看到中國領導人參加20國工業集團、聯合國等會議、在全球事務中進行調停斡旋，似乎扮演著“負責任的大國”角色，另一方面，人們又可以看到中國外交部發言人、中國網上民族主義者的好戰言論， 中國在領土問題與鄰國產生爭議，以及中國在偏遠大陸為了獲得資源而進行的“新殖民主義”等。

中國國家主席習近平上台後，特別是中共“十八大”之後，中國展開更加積極的外交，中國似乎拋棄了前領導人鄧小平“韜光養晦”的戰略。從“周邊外交”到“新亞洲安全觀”到“亞洲基礎設施投資銀行”， 外界認為，中國一步步在挑戰二戰後美國領導的國際政治、經濟和安全體系。

沈大偉說， 中國對現存的國際秩序當然有相當的不滿意，但這並不表示中國要推翻整體體系。他說：“現在中國雖然資源還不是那麼豐富，但是卻越來越發達，我們看到一個更具“修正主義”姿態的中國（ a more revisionist China）。中國對二戰後自由體系的不滿也越來越顯現。不過，這並不意味中中國想要推翻整個自由體系。我是說，他們對部分體系，經濟體係從整體上說還是很滿意的。至於安全體系，他們從來就沒有滿意過，他們的確在尋求對此做出修改，甚至將其推翻。對於人權和其他社會體系，中國的表現比較模糊，他們可能尋求將其剔除。其他全球治理問題，他們則傾向個案解決。”

他說，1970年代以來，鑑於資源缺乏， 中國選擇了務實的姿態加入了美國領導的國際體系。

具體到在美中關係上，沈大偉說，“ 韜光養晦”還是中國對美國的一個有效運作方式。他說，中國現在所做的是希望“凍結”美國。

他說：“在我看來，中國在美中關係上採用的策略是戰術性的。他們只是'敷衍'或是'凍結'美國。 他們在全球或是亞太區域建立關係的同時，他們的最佳希望，不是'反對'美國，而是'凍結'美國。”

他強調，美國不應該被中國所謂的“新型大國關係”所欺騙。美國現在要做的就是尋求可以合作的領域，同時管理好兩國的“戰略競爭”關係。他還說，在全球治理方面， 中國還不是美國的好夥伴。

布魯金斯學會的這場研討會匯聚了來自美國和日本的中國問題專家。專家們還提到，如何對待日漸崛起的中國考驗著美日同盟。 // [報導結束]

真是意外，「紅隊」的大將竟然說「在我看來，中國在美中關係上採用的策略是戰術性的，他們只是『敷衍』或是『凍結』美國」、「美國不應該被中國所謂的『新型大國關係』所欺騙」。這樣看來，紅隊與藍隊對中國的觀點、判斷與策略的差距正在縮小。

第三部分

建州運動在前幾天發表了一篇文章，我們現在把其中幾個部分重貼出來:

「鄧小平中共帝國」垮台，後繼的中國也很可能還是台灣、東亞、美國與西方的威脅，只要病態的「大中國主義」餘毒不除
(2/13/2015發表)  

一

屬於美國保守派陣營的主流媒體、文宣重鎮「華爾街日報」[----------]的網路版以及美國保守派陣營所經營的重要智庫「美國企業研究所」(AEI)的網站分別在1/29/2015與1/30/2015刊登了知日派的專家Michael Auslin所撰寫的一篇文章，此文一出，立即引起美國、台灣、日本、中國、東亞各國政界、智庫界、學術界的高度重視，台灣建州派當然也非常重視，我們在美國立即和一些相關的人士交換意見，絕大多數被我們徵詢的人士都同意作者在該文中所指的「經常跑中國的」、「看起應該是一些被歸類為『紅隊』的」美國的中國專家的普遍看法。

中共政權會不會緊張呢?應該會。老共那些領導們自己心裡會有數，您只要看「移民海外、把錢搬到海外」已成為中國人的全民運動，就可略知一二。

Michael 到底說了什麼?他說: 中共政權(也就是鄧小平中共帝國)氣數已盡，它的滅亡時日已進入倒數的階段，美國政府應該開始為這件大事做準備。

Michael 是研究日本與美日關係的專家，他談中國問題，顯然是撈過界，但問題是那些透露訊息的人是常跑北京、親中(或親中共)的「紅隊」，他們為了不得罪老共，為了維護既得利益，所以不敢、不願也不會發表這種文章，他們選擇讓保守派(「藍隊」)的人來寫，而且要求他們的發言被匿名發表，以免觸怒中共那些頭子。

「中共政權(也就是鄧小平中共帝國)氣數已盡」這種說法倘若是出自美國保守派(「藍隊」)的專家學者的口中，大家比較不會重視或比較不會相信，但若是出自美國的親中派(「紅隊」) 的專家學者的口中，大家就比較會重視或比較會相信，因為中共帝國垮台應該有損那些「紅隊」專家學者的既得利益，他們似乎沒有理由樂見這種事情發生。

二

我們現在先請台灣與台美鄉親們閱讀Michael發表的文章，不習慣閱讀英文的鄉親們就跳過這一節，直接閱讀第三節的漢文報導:

“The Twilight of China's Communist Party”
By MICHAEL AUSLIN
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
http://www.aei.org/publica …/twilight-chinas-communist-party/
1/29/2015

---President Xi Jinping may be gathering unprecedented power in China—but perhaps it is more the flaring of a candle before it gutters.

“I can't give you a date when it will fall, but China's Communist Party has entered its endgame.” So says one of America's most experienced China watchers to a small table of foreign diplomats at a private dinner in Washington, DC The pessimism from someone with deep connections to the Chinese government is notable. Washington should start paying attention if it wishes to avoid being surprised by political earthquakes in the world's second-largest economy.

The China scholar at my table is no conservative. Nor are the handful of other experts. Each has decades of experience, extensive ties to Chinese officials and is a regular visitor to the mainland. No one contradicts the scholar's statement. Instead there is general agreement .

“I've never seen Chinese so fearful, at least not since Tiananmen,” another expert adds, referring to the 1989 massacre of pro-democracy student demonstrators in the heart of Beijing. When prodded for specifics, he mentions increased surveillance, the fear of being investigated and increased arrests.

Just as there is no dissent from these views, there is unanimity on the cause of the new atmosphere of fear: President Xi Jinping .

In just two years, Mr. Xi has become the most powerful Chinese leader since at least Deng Xiaoping, and perhaps even since Mao Zedong. Some longtime experts talk about the possibility of something approaching one-man rule in Beijing, anathema since the excesses leading up to Mao's death in 1976. Others argue that collective leadership is alive and well, but the party is indeed tightening its grip on Chinese society.

The clearest manifestation of Mr. Xi's power is the unprecedented crackdown on corruption. The sensational corruption and murder scandal of former Politburo star Bo Xilai in 2012-13 was just the starting point in a campaign that has also snared Zhou Yongkang, the former head of the powerful security committee and an inner member of the Standing Committee. Now the former chief of staff to ex-President Hu Jintao is also being investigated. State media report that 180,000 party officials have been “disciplined.”

While Mr. Xi clearly is attempting to restore the party's credibility with cynical and disenchanted Chinese, he is also sending messages about his strength and the reach of the Party throughout Chinese society. Faced with an economic slowdown that may impact the living standards of the middle class, Mr. Xi is short-circuiting any potential large-scale unrest. More worrisome, he may be gathering unprecedented power—but perhaps it is more the flaring of a candle before it gutters.

If the party really is in its endgame, then neither Mr. Xi's dramatic anti-corruption campaign nor his reform program will mean much, at least in the long run. Cynicism in China is at an all-time high. The elite hold foreign passports for their families, and wealth is being transferred offshore through real estate holdings and other means. A maturing Chinese economy means an economic slowdown in any case, but a more sustained downturn would exacerbate the tensions that remain just under the surface. Nor can one discount the possibility that the knives will come out for Mr. Xi, leading to internecine war within the party.

It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine a post-Communist China. The country's democratic and liberal voices have been suppressed for decades, and the extent of public sympathy for their cause is ultimately unknowable. A period of increasing unrest and internal disruption would undoubtedly follow any loss of power by the Communist Party.

If all this is accurate, then what should the West do? “Get outside the Fourth Ring Road,” the first specialist says, referring to the center of government power in Beijing. Western diplomats, scholars and NGOs are too isolated from the Chinese people . Greater engagement with China's various voices, from farmers to educators to liberal activists, is the only responsible approach for the long run.

Also build links to marginalized Chinese. “When was the last time you heard Washington criticize Beijing's human-rights record or labor relations?” the same scholar asks. It's time to show that the West has a moral stake in China's development. Decades of official interaction have done little if anything to change the behavior of China's leaders.

The West must alter its approach to China. Hopes for a mature cooperative relationship have foundered on economic and security disagreements. Beijing's support for aggressive actors like North Korea and Iran, and its repression of its own people, leave no mystery about the nature of the regime.

The endgame in China may not come for years. But being on the right side of history, no matter how messy it turns out, is the wise play.

(Mr. Auslin is a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC and a columnist for WSJ.com. )

三

--------我今天要藉這篇文章說:

第一，蘇聯共產帝國崩解之後，對外擴張的野心不死的與仍然企圖建立勢力範圍的「新俄羅斯帝國」又繼起，我深信，在「鄧小平中共帝國」崩潰後，繼之而起的中國人政權有極大的可能仍會對東亞與世界構成威脅，這對美國、日本、台灣與西方世界仍然是嚴重的挑戰。

第二，根據我對中國人的了解，中國人病態的、擴張性的民族主義很強，就算或即便中國會民主化或被和平演變，中國人有極大的可能仍然會持「大中國主義」 ，仍然會是帝國主義者，包括那些在美國深造與工作的中國菁英與海外的中國民運領導人，當您跟他們談「後中共帝國」的中國對外關係與國際政治時，他們多半仍信持「大中國主義」，他們仍然想併吞台灣、宰制東亞，他們仍然不願見到美國的勢力存在於亞太，當您與他們談「民主」時，他們多半並不懂民主的真義，他們對西方意義的民主並沒有什麼概念[與十八世紀領導美國獨立革命的那些先賢不同，那些中國菁英多半沒有真正受到John Locke、Jean Jacques Rousseau等先哲的啟蒙]，也沒有多大的興趣，所以我認為，即便他們未來有機會執政，他們的政權也會與美國、台灣、日本及東南亞國家產生嚴重的衝突，他們也不可能為中國建立西方意義的民主政治，但若美國人與西方人認為他們是民主派而且有意為中國建立民主政治，那就可能減弱美國與其他西方國家的朝野對「一個不受中國統治的台灣」的支持力道，這時台灣就會陷入更大的危險，若再加上台灣住民認為中國已民主化或正在走向民主化，這時就更危險，因為台灣的確有不少人認為，若中國「自由、民主、均富」，就可以搞所謂的「統一」或可以準備進行所謂的「統一談判」。

第三，「鄧小平中共帝國」是否會崩潰或者何時會崩潰，「台灣建州運動」沒有參與討論的興趣，我們也沒有進行預測的興趣，我們只相信: (1)我們台灣人必須站穩腳步，且要善盡保衛台灣的部分責任，(2)最大多數的台灣住民必須儘速建立「不管未來中國內部發生什麼變化，我們都要排除『台灣未來要與中國進行某種形式的政治聯合』的選項」的最大共識，這才是我們最好的未來[我們與卜睿哲不同，卜認為台灣人應該讓中國人認為中國與台灣的所謂『統一』的門並沒有被關死，中國帝國主義者才不會走極端，台灣才較安全]，(3)「美國保衛台灣的意願與實力」是確保台灣安全的最大關鍵，所以台灣人必須鞏固美台關係，(4)建州派必須成為台灣最親美的力量，而且必須發揮影響力，增強與鞏固美國朝野對台灣的道義、法律與政治責任。

第四，我們台灣人與台美人絕不可因為中共政權有可能垮台就鬆懈下來，相反地，我們的神經要繃得更緊，更要有憂患意識，因為中共也有可能在垮台之前攻台，也就是說，台灣可能先於中共滅亡。
第五，建州派始終認為，我們做為謀國之人，最正確的態度應該是: 要為台灣與台灣人民做最壞的打算，然後做最好的準備，否則就是不負責或天真。

第四部分

在Michael Auslin的文章出現後，另一個保守派刊物---The National Interest---接著發表了一篇文章，標題是“Doomsday: Preparing for China's Collapse”，我們把它放在本文之後，做為附錄一，請鄉親們參考。

由新保守派的專家學者與刊物所發表的這類文章，可能比較不會被各界重視，因為大部分人可能會認為這是唱衰老共與中國，不過「老共會倒」或「老共氣數已盡」的說法若是出自親共派或親中派，那情況就會大大不同。

Michael告訴世人，他寫文章是有所本的，那是來自一名「與中共政權有很深的聯繫」的人，是「美國最有經驗的中國觀察家之一」，而且「不是保守派」 ，他雖然沒有把那名專家學者的名字告訴我們，不過，我們已可猜出他是誰。

幾天後，沈大偉就跳出來了，他在世界最知名的資本主義與保守派堡壘「華爾街日報」的「週六/週日評論版」[WSJ極重要的版面]的首頁與第二頁發表了一篇極為重要的文章，由於它太重要，所以我們必須把它放在本文的主體中，且必須為不習慣閱讀英文的鄉親們做重點翻譯或意譯。

“The Coming Chinese Crackup”
By DAVID SHAMBAUGH
The Wall Street Journal
March 7, 2015

---The endgame of communist rule in China has begun, and Xi Jinping's rut​​hless measures are only bringing the country closer to a breaking point

On Thursday, the National People's Congress convened in Beijing in what has become a familiar annual ritual. Some 3,000 “elected” delegates from all over the country—ranging from colorfully clad ethnic minorities to urbane billionaires—will meet for a week to discuss the state of the nation and to engage in the pretense of political participation.

Some see this impressive gathering as a sign of the strength of the Chinese political system—but it masks serious weaknesses. Chinese politics has always had a theatrical veneer, with staged events like the congress intended to project the power and stability of the Chinese Communist Party , or CCP. Officials and citizens alike know that they are supposed to conform to these rituals, participating cheerfully and parroting back official slogans. This behavior is known in Chinese as biaotai, “declaring where one stands,” but it is little more than an act of symbolic compliance.

Despite appearances, China's political system is badly broken, and nobody knows it better than the Communist Party itself. China's strongman leader,Xi Jinping , is hoping that a crackdown on dissent and corruption will shore up the party's rule. He is determined to avoid becoming the Mikhail Gorbachev of China, presiding over the party's collapse. But instead of being the antithesis of Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Xi may well wind up having the same effect. His despotism is severely stressing China's system and society—and bringing it closer to a breaking point. [雖然表面上看起來很不錯，很光鮮亮麗，但中國的政治系統卻非常殘破，關於這一點，老共比任何人都更清楚。 ]

Predicting the demise of authoritarian regimes is a risky business. Few Western experts forecast the collapse of the Soviet Union before it occurred in 1991; the CIA missed it entirely. The downfall of Eastern Europe's communist states two years earlier was similarly scorned as the wishful thinking of anticommunists—until it happened. The post-Soviet “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan from 2003 to 2005, as well as the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, all burst forth unanticipated. [預測威權政權會覆亡是一件帶有風險的事，極少的西方專家能在1991年之前預測蘇聯崩潰，美國的中情局在這方面可說是完全失準。東歐共產國家在早兩年敗亡，但它們會敗亡的預測也只是被人視為反共人士的一廂情願的想法，喬治亞、烏克蘭等國的顏色革命以及阿拉伯之春都是在沒有被預期的情況之下爆發。 ]

China-watchers have been on high alert for telltale signs of regime decay and decline ever since the regime's near-death experience in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Since then, several seasoned Sinologists have risked their professional reputations by asserting that the collapse of CCP rule was inevitable. Others were more cautious—myself included. But times change in China, and so must our analyses. [在天安門屠殺事件後，若干中國事務專家學者冒著失去他們的專業名聲的風險，聲稱老共統治的崩潰是無可避免的，不過，其他人就比較審慎，包括我沈大偉在內，不過，現在中國的情況已經改變，因此，我們的分析也必須改變。 ]

The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe, and it has progressed further than many think. We don't know what the pathway from now until the end will look like, of course. It will probably be highly unstable and unsettled . But until the system begins to unravel in some obvious way, those inside of it will play along—thus contributing to the facade of stability. [我沈大偉相信，老共統治的終結現在已經開始，而且它朝向覆亡的方向發展的速度可能超乎許多人的想像，當然，我們並不知道從現在到終結的路徑是什麼模樣，它可能會是高度的不穩定以及不確定。 ]

Communist rule in China is unlikely to end quietly. A single event is unlikely to trigger a peaceful implosion of the regime. Its demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent. I wouldn't rule out the possibility that Mr. Xi will be deposed in a power struggle or coup d'état. With his aggressive anticorruption campaign—a focus of this week's National People's Congress—he is overplaying a weak hand and deeply aggravating key party, state, military and commercial constituencies. [老共的統治不太可能會無聲無息地結束，一個單一事件也不太可能會引發中共政權從內部和平爆裂，它的滅亡有可能是時間拖得很長的、混亂的以及暴亂的，我不會排除習近平將會在一場權力鬥爭中或政變中被罷黜的可能性。 ]

The Chinese have a proverb, waiying, neiruan—hard on the outside, soft on the inside. Mr. Xi is a genuinely tough ruler. He exudes conviction and personal confidence. But this hard personality belies a party and political system that is extremely fragile on the inside.
Consider five telling indications of the regime's vulnerability and the party's systemic weaknesses.

First, China's economic elites have one foot out the door, and they are ready to flee en masse if the system really begins to crumble. In 2014, Shanghai's Hurun Research Institute, which studies China's wealthy, found that 64% of the “high net worth individuals” whom it polled—393 millionaires and billionaires—were either emigrating or planning to do so. Rich Chinese are sending their children to study abroad in record n​​umbers (in itself, an indictment of the quality of the Chinese higher-education system) .

Just this week, the Journal reported, federal agents searched several Southern California locations that US authorities allege are linked to “multimillion-dollar birth-tourism businesses that enabled thousands of Chinese women to travel here and return home with infants born as US citizens.” Wealthy Chinese are also buying property abroad at record levels and prices, and they are parking their financial assets overseas, often in well-shielded tax havens and shell companies.

Meanwhile, Beijing is trying to extradite back to China a large number of alleged financial fugitives living abroad. When a country's elites—many of them party members—flee in such large numbers, it is a telling sign of lack of confidence in the regime and the country's future.

Second, since taking office in 2012, Mr. Xi has greatly intensified the political repression that has blanketed China since 2009. The targets include the press, social media, film, arts and literature, religious groups, the Internet, intellectuals, Tibetans and Uighurs , dissidents, lawyers, NGOs, university students and textbooks. The Central Committee sent a draconian order known as Document No. 9 down through the party hierarchy in 2013, ordering all units to ferret out any seeming endorsement of the West's “universal values​​”— including constitutional democracy, civil society, a free press and neoliberal economics.

A more secure and confident government would not institute such a severe crackdown. It is a symptom of the party leadership's deep anxiety and insecurity. [習某上台後對思想與言論的箝制變本加厲，沈大偉認為這些並非習某大權在握、能掌控全局的展現，而是他這個政權深層的不安與沒有安全感的徵狀。 ]

Third, even many regime loyalists are just going through the motions. It is hard to miss the theater of false pretense that has permeated the Chinese body politic for the past few years. Last summer, I was one of a handful of foreigners (and the only American) who attended a conference about the “China Dream,” Mr. Xi's signature concept, at a party-affiliated think tank in Beijing. We sat through two days of mind-numbing, nonstop presentations by two dozen party scholars—but their faces were frozen, their body language was wooden, and their boredom was palpable. They feigned compliance with the party and their leader's latest mantra. But it was evident that the propaganda had lost its power, and the emperor had no clothes.

In December, I was back in Beijing for a conference at the Central Party School, the party's highest institution of doctrinal instruction, and once again, the country's top officials and foreign policy experts recited their stock slogans verbatim. During lunch one day, I went to the campus bookstore—always an important stop so that I can update myself on what China's leading cadres are being taught. Tomes on the store's shelves ranged from Lenin's “Selected Works” to Condoleezza Rice's memoirs, and a table at the entrance was piled high with copies of a pamphlet by Mr. Xi on his campaign to promote the “mass line”—that is, the party's connection to the masses. “How is this selling?” I asked the clerk. “Oh, it's not,” she replied. “We give it away.” The size of the stack suggested it was hardly a hot item.

Fourth, the corruption that riddles the party-state and the military also pervades Chinese society as a whole. Mr. Xi's anticorruption campaign is more sustained and severe than any previous one, but no campaign can eliminate the problem. It is stubbornly rooted in the single-party system, patron-client networks, an economy utterly lacking in transparency, a state-controlled media and the absence of the rule of law.

Moreover, Mr. Xi's campaign is turning out to be at least as much a selective purge as an antigraft campaign. Many of its targets to date have been political clients and allies of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin . Now 88, Mr. Jiang is still the godfather figure of Chinese politics. Going after Mr. Jiang's patronage network while he is still alive is highly risky for Mr. Xi, particularly since Mr. Xi doesn't seem to have brought along his own coterie of loyal clients to promote into positions of power. Another problem: Mr. Xi, a child of China's first-generation revolutionary elites, is one of the party's “princelings,” and his political ties largely extend to other princelings. This silver-spoon generation is widely reviled in Chinese society at large.

Finally, China's economy—for all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut—is stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit. In November 2013, Mr. Xi presided over the party's Third Plenum, which unveiled a huge package of proposed economic reforms, but so far, they are sputtering on the launchpad. Yes, consumer spending has been rising, red tape has been reduced, and some fiscal reforms have been introduced, but overall, Mr. Xi's ambitious goals have been stillborn. The reform package challenges powerful, deeply entrenched interest groups—such as state-owned enterprises and local party cadres—and they are plainly blocking its implementation.

These five increasingly evident cracks in the regime's control can be fixed only through political reform. Until and unless China relaxes its draconian political controls, it will never become an innovative society and a “knowledge economy”—a main goal of the Third Plenum reforms. The political system has become the primary impediment to China's needed social and economic reforms. If Mr. Xi and party leaders don't relax their grip, they may be summoning precisely the fate they hope to avoid.

In the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the upper reaches of China's leadership have been obsessed with the fall of its fellow communist giant. Hundreds of Chinese postmortem analyses have dissected the causes of the Soviet disintegration.

Mr. Xi's real “China Dream” has been to avoid the Soviet nightmare. Just a few months into his tenure, he gave a telling internal speech ruing the Soviet Union's demise and bemoaning Mr. Gorbachev's betrayals, arguing that Moscow had lacked a “real man” to stand up to its reformist last leader. Mr. Xi's wave of repression today is meant to be the opposite of Mr. Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. Instead of opening up, Mr. Xi is doubling down on controls over dissenters, the economy and even rivals within the party.

But reaction and repression aren't Mr. Xi's only option. His predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao , drew very different lessons from the Soviet collapse. From 2000 to 2008, they instituted policies intended to open up the system with carefully limited political reforms .

They strengthened local party committees and experimented with voting for multicandidate party secretaries. They recruited more businesspeople and intellectuals into the party. They expanded party consultation with nonparty groups and made the Politburo's proceedings more transparent. They improved feedback mechanisms within the party, implemented more meritocratic criteria for evaluation and promotion, and created a system of mandatory midcareer training for all 45 million state and party cadres. They enforced retirement requirements and rotated officials and military officers between job assignments every couple of years.

In effect, for a while Mr. Jiang and Mr. Hu sought to manage change, not to resist it. But Mr. Xi wants none of this. Since 2009 (when even the heretofore open-minded Mr. Hu changed course and started to clamp down), an increasingly anxious regime has rolled back every single one of these political reforms (with the exception of the cadre-training system). These reforms were masterminded by Mr. Jiang's political acolyte and former vice president, Zeng Qinghong, who retired in 2008 and is now under suspicion in M​​r. Xi's anticorruption campaign—another symbol of Mr. Xi's hostility to the measures that might ease the ills of a crumbling system.

Some experts think that Mr. Xi's harsh tactics may actually presage a more open and reformist direction later in his term. I don't buy it. This leader and regime see politics in zero-sum terms: Relaxing control, in their view, is a sure step toward the demise of the system and their own downfall. They also take the conspiratorial view that the US is actively working to subvert Communist Party rule. None of this suggests that sweeping reforms are just around the corner.

We cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are witnessing its final phase. The CCP is the world's second-longest ruling regime (behind only North Korea), and no party can rule forever. [我們無法預測中共何時會垮台，但是若要我們不做「我們正在見證中共的統治已進入末期」的結論也很難。 ]

Looking ahead, China-watchers should keep their eyes on the regime's instruments of control and on those assigned to use those instruments. Large numbers of citizens and party members alike are already voting with their feet and leaving the country or displaying their insincerity by pretending to comply with party dictates. [大量的中國人與中共黨員都已經在用腳投票，都在離開他們的國家，或者藉假裝遵循黨的指示的方式，來展示他們的不真誠。 ]

We should watch for the day when the regime's propaganda agents and its internal security apparatus start becoming lax in enforcing the party's writ—or when they begin to identify with dissidents, like the East German Stasi agent in the film “The Lives of Others” who came to sympathize with the targets of his spying. When human empathy starts to win out over ossified authority, the endgame of Chinese communism will really have begun.

(Dr. Shambaugh is a professor ​​of international affairs and the director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His books include “China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation” and, most recently, “ China Goes Global: The Partial Power.”)

第五部分

老共的文痞與喉舌的反擊行動尚未展開，雖然已有一篇反擊的文章已經在美國媒體出現，我們稍後會加以介紹。

由於沈大偉提起習某可能會被政變與罷黜，所以中國流亡在美國的民運領袖魏京生就寫文章談政變，我們現在把該文轉貼在下面，做為附錄二。

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

附錄一

“Doomsday: Preparing for China's Collapse”

By Peter Mattis
The National Interest
March 2, 2015 
http://nationalinterest.org/…/doomsday-preparing-chinas-col…

A couple of weeks ago, AEI scholar Michael Auslin published a column for the Wall Street Journal about a quiet dinner in Washington where a senior China scholar declared the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had reached the final stage before collapse. The political collapse of the world's second-largest economy and a nuclear power is no small thing. What should Washington do? Go outside the Fourth Ring Road (a Chinese reference akin to saying go outside the Beltway), forge links to marginalized Chinese and speak out about Chinese human rights to show the Chinese people that the United States has “a moral stake in China's development.” Even if the CCP's collapse does not occur for years, these measures will help US policy makers be “on the right side of history.”

Such measures appear trivial in the face of a problem the size of China's potential political instability and the collapse of its governing structure. By Auslin's telling, this anonymous China scholar and those nodding in approval think that these first steps constitute a genuine signal to the Chinese people that Washington stands and will stand by them. Rhetorical support, however, will not grace the United States in the eyes of the Chinese people if their discontent demolishes the CCP. Actions, rather than words, in the heat of another crisis at least on the scale of nationwide protests in 1989 will be the measure of Washington's moral interest in China's future.

Being prepared for a political crisis with the potential to bring down the CCP requires a much more serious effort that involves both research and planning. Before that day of crisis comes, the mindset for dealing with China must include the ability to imagine a China without the CCP and how that outcome might develop. The tens of thousands of demonstrations serve as a reminder that, despite China's rise to international prominence, the country still has political fault lines capable of causing an earthquake. With this kind of warning, the moral failing would be to ignore the potential for regime-changing unrest or any other political crisis that might threaten the regime, and what Beijing might do to prevent that from happening.

The purpose of these tasks is to reduce the uncertainty faced by policy makers as a Chinese crisis emerges and cascades across the country, as well as to identify ways and decision points where Washington can influence the CCP's choices. If an effort is not made to reduce the uncertainty, then fear of the unknown is likely to drive US policy makers to a decision about whether to support the Chinese government out of ignorance, rather than informed calculation.

One of the first research-related steps is to identify the cohesive and centrifugal forces inside China. The CCP us​​ed its sixty-six years in power to dismember Chinese civil society and insert itself into any group with the potential to become a political force. Groups that could not be coopted, like Falungong, became pariah and hunted by the regime. Nascent civil-society and activist groups survive in the blind spots of China's underlapping bureaucratic maze. Chinese political culture beyond the party needs to be understood if Washington wants to claim a “moral stake.”

Ahead of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the National Intelligence Council produced an assessment of Iraq's political prospects after Saddam Hussein fell. The paper updated a periodically updated analysis begun in the early 1980s, and it accurately analyzed the sectarian rivalries and domestic cleavages that blew up under the post-Saddam US administration. It is not clear, however, whether such a paper could even be done on China today, let alone in any accurate manner. Such a paper cannot be about Uyghurs and Tibetans, but the 1.24 billion Han Chinese who inevitably will dominate China's autocratic or democratic future.

The second is to develop, maintain and update a database of leadership dossiers (as well as their families) that includes points of leverage, such as overseas assets that could be frozen, as well as electronic and telephonic contact information. The US government is certainly as capable as Bloomberg and theNew York Times of ferreting out this kind of information. If the CCP is imploding, the tense situation will ensure that many cadres start thinking in terms of their personal and family welfare, rather than the party. When survival is at stake, the CCP's institutional cohesion is likely to falter as each looks after his own and looks to ensure there is an escape hatch. In this kind of situation, the ability to influence Beijing's decisions will be highly personalized, and the ability to both contact and shape the incentives of individual decision makers in Zhongnanhai as well as provincial leaders and security officials could prove critical if Washington wants to shape outcomes.

Like corporate and nongovernmental organization databases, this project should be accompanied by records of meetings with US officials and other prominent Americans. This way, Washington has awareness of who might have an existing relationship and can be called upon to reach out to a Chinese official if the situation demands (and it might even help in routine negotiations to which Chinese interlocutors always seem to come better prepared with knowledge of their US counterparts). It also requires the White House to be honest, at least with the US bureaucracy, about its dealing with Beijing—something that has not always been the case in US-Chinese relations.

Third, determining the capability of China's internal security forces, including domestic intelligence and paramilitary capabilities, is vital to understanding whether unrest is approaching a critical mass. Most studies of China's future often assume the country's security services will function, without understanding their ability to protect the regime depends on a fluctuating dynamic that also involves citizen-activists and technology. If political change comes to China through mass public demonstrations, then it is because the assumptions held about a loyal and capable security apparatus did not hold.

Relatedly, any decision for military intervention will involve at the very least the PLA headquarters, if not the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the senior-most political-military policy-making body chaired by Xi Jinping. If the order from the center comes , the military leadership must make a decision whether to support the current government, take power for themselves or stand aside. Although most PLA officers are party members, the relationship between the two organizations has changed substantially since the days of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping when the Chinese leadership was dominated by dual political-military elites. The PLA may be developing a professional identity separate from its party identity. Exacerbated by the military's relative isolation from society on closed compounds and the absence of shared experiences, China's robust military modernization has required PLA officers to become better educated and more professional. If the PLA's professionalization gives strength to the idea that the PLA should be a national army, then US policy makers need to know—and they need to know who is harboring such sentiments.

Fourth, US policy makers and analysts need to map out the decisions Beijing will face as individual incidents of unrest begin to cascade into a larger crisis. First, Chinese leaders will have to make an assessment of whether the demonstrations can be stymied by buying off or capturing protest ringleaders. Or whether the unrest can be isolated and localized before it spreads across too many counties. The next big set of decisions faced in Beijing would involve whether to allow local and provincial authorities to resolve the crisis without involving the central leadership. Based on the complicated arrangements that make horizo​​ntal cooperation across jurisdictions almost impossible, widespread protests that cross provincial boundaries will require central intervention to coordinate action. Knowing how this works and who will decide at different levels could be crucial to influencing events. Parts of this process and the decision points can be imagined until new information can be acquired, but the important thing is to spell it out while never thinking that the answer is final. Concrete plans may be useless, to paraphrase President Dwight Eisenhower, but planning will be indispensable.

Fifth, the US government needs to find a way to maintain communication with the Chinese people, even if Beijing starts cutting international linkages. The Great Firewall may not be impervious and it will be difficult to shut down the Chinese internet, but China, as proved by its recent interference in virtual private networks (VP​​Ns), can make it extremely difficult to move communications and information via the Internet. Moving the American propaganda effort solely online without a failsafe would be foolhardy at best. If such a failsafe cannot be found with the capacity to elude censorship, then the next best thing would be retaining the capacity to broadcast radio into China in an emergency.

Finally, the kind of focused intelligence effort that this kind of contingency preparation will require may not be occurring. If the current US intelligence collection and analysis apparatus—including the US Foreign Service—is unsuited for these tasks, then some rethinking about how to build expertise, collect and process information and manage a political crisis inside China needs to occur. The question here is not necessarily the amount effort—as some claim US intelligence needs—but focus and ensuring the continuous effort to sustain the aforementioned measures. And it will require the direct involvement of policy makers, because of their role in collecting some of the crucial personal information as well as the truism that policy making determines the limits of intelligence.

If Washington is concerned that the CCP is approaching its twilight, then asserting a moral stake in China's development requires nothing less than a substantial effort to understand China's political landscape beyond day-to-day policy-making concerns and to influence Chinese leaders before they pull the trigger on their citizens again. Without advance preparation, US and other international leaders will find the prospects of an unstable China distressing, possibly with the view that it is “too big to fail.” They may even watch from the sidelines as in 1989 , not knowing the best course of action or how to influence the decisions of Chinese leaders. This may not be wrong, but such a momentous decision should not be left to ignorance, preexisting mental images or scattered information collected as a crisis breaks.

Peter Mattis is a Fellow with the Jamestown Foundation and a visiting scholar at National Cheng-chi University's Institute of International Relations in Taipei.

附錄二

魏京生特約評論: 談政變自由亞洲電台普通話
http://www.rfa.org/…/p…/weijingsheng/wjs-03052015101003.html

最近美國的主要報刊雜誌，時不時談論一下關於中國崩潰以後如何控制局面的問題。出餿主意的不少，基本上屬於不懂中國的謀劃。甚至像在烏克蘭做過的一樣，來控制中國的變化過程。確實異想天開。

不過其中的很多信息，倒是值得我們中國人注意。這就是經過仔細的收集和調查，再加以分析綜合等等。美國的一些著名的智庫至少得出了一個正確的結論，這就是中國的內部形勢已經超過了崩潰的臨界點。料理後事已經是當務之急，所以他們以他們一貫的商人性格，在考慮怎麼摘桃子了。

美國人在面臨變革之前首先考慮美國人的利益，這很正常。就像我們中國人首先考慮的也是我們自己的利益一樣。出發點當然不同，但是面對的現實卻是相同的。這就叫天下英雄所見略同，不過各為其主的謀劃可能就不同了。

美國人考慮的是如何控制變化過程，以便保護他們的利益。所以有智庫提出要和上層各派系拉關係。言外之意，就是不管你中國走向何方，就是上來一個希特勒也無所謂，只要保證我們美國的利益就行。

這個謀劃的前提就是；將來的中國會掌握在現在當權派裡的某些人手裡。不知道中國的當權派有多少人相信這種論調。從他們紛紛把老婆孩子和錢包放在西方國家，就可以知道他們不像美國的智庫那麼有信心。

我們中國人也該給共產黨料理料理後事了。對我們來說，什麼樣的變化是最好的呢？像陳勝吳廣那樣的民間起義，最後天下大亂，很多人覺得不好。像清末民初的軍閥混戰，中產小資們也會搖頭。和平演變，連傻子都知道共產黨絕對不幹，他們把阻止和平演變當作最重要的工作。

那麼會是什麼？最好的選擇就是政變了，假如還能選擇的話。既然反正是要變，那麼最少動蕩，損失最小的變革方式就是像蘇聯那樣政變。這個道理如此淺顯，所以大家都有點兒急不可耐了。就在前兩天還傳出一個消息，說是習近平和王岐山粉碎了一起政變，把中央警衛團的幹部都給抓起來了。

故事的藍本是華國鋒和汪東興抓捕四人幫。所以一聽就不像是真的，可是反映出大家都已經急不可耐的心情。在這種心情的驅使下，政變可能會以不同的形式發生。可能是華國鋒式的宮廷政變；也可能是四人幫政變成功，還可能是第三世界式的軍事政變，也可能是袁世凱式的逼宮，以及之後的軍閥割據。

但是萬變不離其宗，就是如何獲得民眾的支持。恰恰在這一點上，是中國古代政治文化的結晶，也是中國的當權者和美國的智庫所不懂的。現在的當權派和外國的智庫總在那兒說什麼；小資們怕變；群眾怕亂。但是變和亂一旦發生，人們就要考慮結果了。也就是往哪兒變，中國向何處去。

像習近平號稱的那樣；創造一黨專政的新模式。那肯定不是大多數人的夢想，連大多數共產黨員都不做此幻想。經過幾十年的比較和篩選，大多數中國人的夢想是民主自由的社會，是像美國和歐洲那樣的社會。這就是現在中國的民心不同於清朝末年；也不同於中東北非茉莉花革命的地方。

一個給人絕對美好願景的宗教式的目標，早已湮沒在實踐檢驗的汪洋大海之中了。中國的社會輿論更看重西方民主社會實際的好處，而不相信什麼主義的忽悠。所以政變者要想靠吸引人民的支持獲得成功，就必須打著民主人權的旗號。

而且他們也必須實行它，否則將敗於他們的競爭對手。如果他們設想他們的對手是傻瓜，他們自己就成了傻瓜。如果他們設想老百姓是文革時期那樣容易被忽悠，那他們就差不多傻到了家。

無論是宮廷政變還是軍事割據。屆時都面臨著各種不同對手的威脅，明面上的和潛在的威脅。像張勳的辮子軍那樣企圖復古的威脅，很容易對付。因為那肯定不得民心，比一百年前更不得民心。就連現在的毛派、左派，也是在爭取弱勢群體的權益。誰在乎什麼一黨專政。他們反對的就是當權派，是官商勾結的官僚資本主義。典型的打著紅旗反紅旗。

最可能的對手，就是打著民主旗號造反的對手。因為這樣會得到絕大多數人民的支持，造成當權者最大的威脅。中國的古典政治智慧早就總結出一個規律；得民心者得天下。所以未來中國的政治競爭，就在於爭奪民心；就在於誰能表現出真正走向民主，而不是拿民主的口號忽悠人。

西方那些傻傻的學者和政客們懷疑這點。他們說有能力的人都說他們喜歡一黨專政，沒有人說他們喜歡民主呀。前蘇聯和東歐的持不同政見領袖們也嘲笑這些西方人；說他們自己過著好日子，所以不懂專制環境下的人民是如何保護自己的，聽不出什麼是假話什麼是真話。

他們也不懂；在一個專制的環境下的逆淘汰過程中，誰是有能力的人。他們太習慣和中共的官員串通賺錢了，不知道也不想知道；中國有更多的正直而且有能力的人。

民主後的中國還擔心沒人能夠治理嗎？只能比逆淘汰的共產黨治理得更好。當然，中外資本家搞官商勾結的難度會大一些。他們賺的錢少一些，老百姓賺的就會多一些。他們不喜歡的可能就是這個。

（文章只代表特約評論員個人的立場和觀點）

文章來源：自由亞洲電台
http://www.ntdtv.com/xtr/b5/2015/03/06/a1182466.html…