日本必須整軍經武，但也必須服從美國的大戰略(三)

                        日本必須整軍經武，但也必須服從美國的大戰略(三)

四

建州派樂見親美、反中、友台的日本右翼執政，我們樂見日本修憲，我們樂見日本擴軍，我們樂見美日安保條約的適用範圍擴大，不但要對付會危及日本安全的「周邊事態」，也要含蓋世界其他地區，換言之，我們希望日本憲法與美日安保條約能提供日本武裝部隊在世界各地與美軍進行協同作戰的法源與架構 。

但是，建州派也希望日本右派能夠在言行上加以節制，不要辜負美國對建立美日韓三邊軍事合作的期待，不要破壞或弱化美國重返東亞、抑制中國在東亞的侵略與擴張的大戰略與聯盟。

日本右派若不能在言行上加以節制，就給中國見縫插針與挑撥離間的機會，最壞的是，若美國認為再度崛起的日本終將又會威脅美國 ，那就會存在美國會考慮在日本與中國之間採取中立的可能性，若如此，以美日同盟做為東線作戰武力的基石的設計就會出現裂縫，也就是說，日本右派若不能在言行上加以節制，就可能給中華邪惡帝國帶來戰略機遇期，徒讓親痛仇快。

我們現在來讀一篇報導，希望日本右派引以為戒，也希望華府持續對日本右派及日本右派政權的言行加以節制，建州派認為，包括日本在內的所有美國盟國及安全夥伴都要服從美國的大戰略，以便在這場新的兩線戰爭中贏得最終的勝利。


「閻學通：安倍參拜，中國外交的戰略機遇 」
環球時報[中共的喉舌「人民日報」的海外版]
1/2/2014

日本首相安倍晉三於12月26日參拜靖國神社，實現了他夢寐以求的擔任首相當年就參拜靖國神社的政治夙願。安倍這一做法必然惡化中日關系，影響中國經濟建設的國際環境。然而，管子曰：“國修而鄰國無道，霸王之資也。”安倍為日本軍國主義戰犯翻案的無道行為，也是中國外交戰略的一個資產。

安倍參拜靖國神社的行為不僅引發了中國和韓國的強烈抗議，也引來俄羅斯、歐盟及聯合國的批評，連對日本領導人參拜靖國神社從不公開表態的美國，這次也破例以駐日使館名義發表聲明，表示“失望”。英國、菲律賓、印尼等國的媒體對安倍的行為進行了嚴厲批判。英國《每日快訊》稱安倍的行為是“新的挑舋”。國際社會對安倍參拜的譴責，顯然是中國爭取國際社會孤立安倍政權的機遇。

安倍頑固到底的做法，是我們放棄顧全中日關系大局這個包袱的機遇。安倍明知參拜靖國神社會惡化與中、韓的關系，會引起國際社會以至美國的不滿，但他仍決定參拜，這說明他認為參拜比不參拜更有利於實現他的政治目標，即爭取國內對修改和平憲法的支持，重獲戰爭權，使日本成為所謂的“正常國家”。安倍在明知傷害日本國際利益的情況下參拜靖國神社，這意味著他在執政期內很可能都會採取與國際社會對抗的政策，不給中日關系改善留任何機會。這將使我們可以無顧慮地在歷史分歧、領土爭端、海洋權益這三個長期困擾中日關系的問題上，做足我們該做的事，為今后中日戰略關系的長期穩定發展奠定可靠的全新基礎。

顧及中日關系的戰略大局以及日本人民的情感，中國長期以來在靖國神社問題上僅對日本政府採取規勸的政策，而難下決心糾正日本社會上的錯誤歷史觀。安倍上台以來，日本國內的右傾勢力急劇膨脹，正從支流向主導思潮發展。日本時事社2013年年初公布的民調顯示，有56.7%的受訪者支持安倍參拜靖國神社。由於日本政府從不主動批判日本軍國主義的二戰罪行，而是採取輕描淡寫甚至掩蓋事實的做法，因此使許多未親身經歷二戰的日本人不了解日本在二戰中的犯罪行為。在日本的中青年中，流行的觀點是二戰為帝國主義間的戰爭，戰爭雙方沒有正義與不正義之分。更有甚者認為日本的二戰罪行是戰勝國強加給日本的。如果不改變日本社會中的這種思想認識基礎，靖國神社問題對中日關系的負面影響無法消除，對地區安全的威脅也無法消除。

安倍參拜靖國神社恰好使我國不必再有投鼠忌器的顧慮，可在全球范圍內開展一項日本二戰罪行的教育工程。我國可以借鑒以色列對全世界進行德國納粹迫害猶太人的教育經驗，如建立小展覽館，圖片展會、媒體報道、廣告宣傳、個人演講、學術研討、散發簡介、出版著作等多種方式。通過在世界各地及各種國際場合開展低成本的歷史教育工作，使全世界的人不忘記日本軍國主義的殘酷行為。這項工程的重點是在國外或國際場合進行，因此可倡議全體華人在世界各地共同參與。為增強這一工程的效力，有必要區分安倍政府與日本民眾，配合這一工程的策略應是，鼓勵中日兩國企業加強經濟合作和人民之間的廣泛往來。

在全球范圍開展日本二戰罪行教育工程具有多重戰略作用。一是使國際社會時刻警惕日本軍國主義復活的危險，增強對日本右傾勢力的國際壓力，防范安倍政府對東亞地區構成的安全威脅。二是使日本民眾在國外經常受到日本二戰罪行的教育，意識到安倍政府給日本帶來的政治恥辱，弱化安倍右傾政策的國內社會基礎。三是增強人們對日美同盟助長日本右傾勢力的警惕，使美國“重返亞太”戰略以日美同盟為基石的政策失去正義性。四是依據日本政府對二戰歷史的認識態度調整確定該工程的力度大小，為與安倍之后的日本政府改善關系創造條件。再有，防止日本對二戰罪行記憶的淡化，把日本認識二戰罪行作為發展中日關系的政治基礎。另外，通過該工程展現我們承擔國際安全責任，維護國際正義和維護地區和平的形象。

安倍參拜靖國神社這個機遇，不僅在於使我國對日政策獲得道義制高點，使日本處於道德窪地，還使我們與日本之外國家發展戰略合作多了一個抓手。利用好安倍參拜靖國神社這個沖突，我們可以促成與俄羅斯在維護二戰戰勝國國際地位方面的合作﹔通過與韓國共同搞日本二戰罪行工程，拓展與韓國在東亞地區的安全合作﹔從防止日本破壞二戰后國際秩序出發，強化美國對建立中美新型大國關系重要性的認識﹔使東盟認清日本為了修改憲法不可避免地故意與中韓對抗，也必然會阻撓東亞的區域性合作，從而與東盟共同探討應對日本阻礙地區經濟合作的戰略。

外交戰略從韜光養晦向奮發有為的轉變，其實是從回避沖突向利用沖突的轉變，是從等待機遇向創造機遇的轉變，是從適應環境變化向塑造良好環境的轉變。利用安倍參拜靖國神社這個戰略機遇，建設起一個使世界人民永不忘記日本二戰罪行的教育體系，從而為中日關系的良性發展奠定一個永久性的政治基礎。▲(作者是清華大學當代國際關系研究院院長)


五

安倍於12/26/2014參拜靖國神社 ，同日美國主流媒體就加以報導，同時發表社論，予以評論。 ---Read More--- 

(1)“Risky Nationalism in Japan”
By The Editorial Board
New York Times
December 26, 2013 

On Thursday, one year after coming to power, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni, the controversial Shinto shrine that honors Japan’s war dead, including war criminals from World War II. China and South Korea swiftly criticized the move, as did the United States. Mr. Abe’s visit will worsen Japan’s already tense relations with China and South Korea, which see the shrine as a symbol of imperial Japan’s wars of aggression and colonialism. THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY SAID AMERICA WAS “DISAPPOINTED THAT JAPAN’S LEADERSHIP HAS TAKEN AN ACTION THAT WILL EXACERBATE TENSIONS WITH JAPAN’S NEIGHBORS.” 

The question is why Mr. Abe decided to visit Yasukuni now. It had been seven years since a Japanese prime minister visited the shrine, a recognition at the highest levels that the site is symbolically repugnant to China and South Korea and that such a visit is detrimental to relations with them. Japan’s relations with those two nations are worse now than during the mid-2000s. Both Chinese and South Korean leaders have refused to meet with Mr. Abe since he became prime minister in 2012 (his first stint as prime minister was 2006-7), in part because of issues over territory in the East China Sea and Korean comfort women, who were forced into sexual slavery by Japanese soldiers during World War II. 

Paradoxically, it is Chinese and South Korean pressure on these fronts that has allowed Mr. Abe to think a visit to Yasukuni is a good idea. China’s belligerent moves in the past year over Japanese-administered islets has convinced the Japanese public that there is a Chinese military threat. This issue has given Mr. Abe cover to ignore all the signals from China and to pursue his goal of transforming the Japanese military from one that is strictly for territorial defense to one that can go to war anywhere. The visit to Yasukuni is part of that agenda. 

South Korea’s continuing and sharp criticism of Japan’s grudging stance on the comfort women issue and the refusal by President Park Geun-hye to meet Mr. Abe to discuss the issue have sown distrust of South Korea among Japanese citizens, nearly half of whom, polls say, also see South Korea as a military threat. Such views among voters have effectively given Mr. Abe license to act without regard to the reactions in Beijing and Seoul. 

The three major national newspapers — Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi — have been editorializing against a prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni, especially in the year since Mr. Abe took office. And more important for Mr. Abe and his nationalist supporters, Emperor Akihito has refused to visit Yasukuni, as did Emperor Hirohito before him. 

Mr. Abe’s ultimate goal is to rewrite Japan’s pacifist Constitution, written by Americans during the postwar occupation, which restricts the right to go to war. Here, too, Emperor Akihito disapproves, though he has no political power under the Constitution. A few days before Mr. Abe visited Yasukuni, the emperor, in comments marking his 80th birthday, expressed his “deep appreciation” toward those who wrote the post-1945 constitution in order to preserve the “precious values of peace and democracy.” 

So, if history is the problem, Chinese and South Korean leaders will find allies in Tokyo, and they should meet Mr. Abe to confront, to negotiate and to resolve these issues. Their refusal to meet will only give Mr. Abe license to do what he wants. Japan’s military adventures are only possible with American support; THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MR. ABE’S AGENDA IS NOT IN THE REGION’S INTEREST. SURELY WHAT IS NEEDED IN ASIA IS TRUST AMONG STATES, AND HIS ACTIONS UNDERMINE THAT TRUST. 


(2)“Shinzo Abe’s Yasukuni Offense”
Japan’s whitewashing of history is a strategic liability.
Wall Street Journal
12/26/2014

---------South Korea’s culture minister said that Seoul “cannot withhold regret and anger over the visit,” while the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo says it is “disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors.”

Mr. Abe’s visit (the first by a sitting Prime Minister since 2006) IS A GIFT TO CHINESE LEADERS WHO LIKE TO USE THE SUPPOSED SPECTER OF JAPANESE MILITARY RESURGENCE AS AN EXCUSE TO EXPAND THEIR OWN POWER. INTERNATIONALLY, BEIJING IS AGGRESSIVELY THREATENING JAPANESE CONTROL OF TERRITORY IN THE EAST CHINA SEA WHILE PROTESTING JAPANESE PLANS TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING BY A TINY AMOUNT COMPARED WITH CHINA’s OWN EXPENDITURES. AT HOME, BEIJING STOKES ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONALISM TO BUTTRESS THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS ONE-PARTY STATE-----------.

South Korea ------------ BUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH DIPLOMATIC DIFFICULTY ARE ENORMOUS WHEN CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS MAKES REGIONAL COOPERATION IMPERATIVE, ESPECIALLY AMONG WEALTHY U.S. ALLIES WITH THE MOST POTENTIAL TO DETER CHINESE HEGEMONY.

THIS IS CRUCIAL CONTEXT TO THE YASUKUNI STORY. IT IS TROUBLING ENOUGH THAT SOME SENIOR JAPANESE OFFICIAL PERSIST ---DUE TO PERSONAL BELIEF, POLITICAL PANDERING OR BOTH --- IN WHITEWASHING THE TRUTH ABOUT --------- SEX SLAVERY -----------. BUT JAPAN’S OFFENSES AGAINST TRUTH BECOME STRATEGIC LIABILITIES WHEN THEY HURT THE ABILITY OF LIKE-MINDED STATES TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL, LIBERAL REGIONAL ORDER.

Mr. Abe, who is generally clear-eyed about the dangers of an authoritarian China, may bear in mind when Tokyo inevitably considers its next proposal for a new, secular war memorial untainted by the darker details of Yasukuni. 
(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

日本必須整軍經武，但也必須服從美國的大戰略(二)

                        日本必須整軍經武，但也必須服從美國的大戰略(二)

二

美國與西方國家雖然仍試圖要繼續與俄羅斯進行外交解決 ，但我們看不出克里姆林宮會改變做法，從既定的立場撤退，此乃因為恢復前蘇聯與帝俄時代的帝國版圖與勢力範圍乃是普廷的夢想與政策，這種夢想被許多俄羅斯人懷抱與分享，他的政策至少在現階段也具有相當的民意基礎。

換言之，美國已身不由己，被迫再度面臨東西兩線的兩面作戰態勢(處於外線作戰的位置)。

建州運動的估算是，這種態勢將會持續一段時間，但我們無法知道這會持續多久。

美國與美國在東西兩線的盟友與安全夥伴(包括台灣、台灣建州運動)必須設法先解決一個戰場的壓力，然後集中全力來面對及解決另一個戰場。

在3/15/2014，建州派在「自由世界在東西兩個戰場面對中俄兩個邪惡帝國 ，我們現在活在比以前更危險的年代」一文中說:

//但無論如何，美國必須設法儘速解除這種兩面作戰的態勢。

世人現在必須有正確的認知: (1)中國與俄羅斯都具有深厚的威權統治的文化與傳統，也都具有源遠流長的帝國夢、領土擴張的野心及建立勢力範圍的歷史。(2)先拉攏中國、與中國締結戰略聯盟、打倒俄羅斯邪惡帝國的戰略不可行，也不能複製，若華府試圖複製尼克森的「中國牌」，那美國肯定會丟掉東亞與西太平洋，中國肯定會利用這個戰略機遇期，將美國勢力逐出亞太。//

經過分析，我們認為，美國應該設法調整它的中國政策，運用目前已出現的若干條件或若干優勢，加速創造其他若干條件或優勢，將中國和平演變，推翻中共政權，扶植親美國與西方的政權，建立民主體制，剷除欲挑戰及取代美國的世界領導權的中華邪惡帝國，若能完成這個任務，美國與它的盟國就能先解除它們在東線作戰的壓力，這猶如第一次世界大戰時，德意志帝國扶植列寧，建立共黨政權，並從東戰場撤退，德軍因而解除了東線作戰的壓力一樣 。

也就是說，應該在東線採取政治攻勢，進行積極的政治作戰。

三

3/15/2014，建州派在「自由世界在東西兩個戰場面對中俄兩個邪惡帝國 ，我們現在活在比以前更危險的年代」一文中，為美國及自由世界提出一些謀略:

//為今之計，美國必須採取下列做法[但不限於這些做法]:

(2)說服日本不再發表或從事會導致阻礙或破壞美國、日本與南韓三邊軍事合作的言論或行動。

(3)鼓勵日本與澳洲建軍，強化美日同盟、美澳同盟及美日澳三邊軍事合作。

(4)協助整合中國境外的民主力量，鼓勵他們採「菲律賓或烏克蘭模式」，以「人民的力量」推翻中共政權，將中國和平演變並讓它成為「民主與文明國際社會」的responsible stakeholder，之後協助並責成他們將中國病態的民族主義及帝國夢背後的文化、歷史、經濟與社會基礎予以鏟除。

(5)考慮對與中共政權有密切關係的及貪腐的企業集團以及在美國運作的文宣傳媒加以適當的處理(例如，不得在美國從事購併、掛牌上市及遊說活動)。

(6)考慮對居住於美國且與中共政權有密切關係的個人(包括已入籍者)加以適當的處理(如加強監控)。

(7)協助「反中國併吞台灣的勢力」在台灣執政。

(8)將台灣視為美國的「準領地」，並宣示「將以保衛美國的領土同樣的等級，來保衛台灣 」(即宣示「保衛台灣如同保衛美國領土，台灣若遭受武裝攻擊，將被視同對美國領土的攻擊」)，以對中國及台灣內部的「親中賣台勢力」進行有效的嚇阻。

(9)增強對「東土耳其斯坦復國運動」及「大圖博復國運動」的協助。//

這些謀略是為了解除美國與民主國家、自由世界在東線作戰的壓力，我們今天要就其中一項謀略進行初步的探討，我們今後會再繼續探討也會陸續探討其他各項謀略。

(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

日本必須整軍經武，但也必須服從美國的大戰略(一)

                         日本必須整軍經武，但也必須服從美國的大戰略(一)

----在安全與軍事的領域與事務中，日本必須把自己定位為美國的Junior Partner，必須玉成與呵護美國亟欲建立的美日韓三邊軍事合作機制，以較好地共同面對中國在東亞的挑戰與擴張。

一

昨天(3/16/2013)，俄羅斯的普廷政權無視國際社會普遍的反對，一手導演了「克里米亞從烏克蘭分離並加入俄羅斯聯邦的自決與公投」，在公投結果出爐後，白宮在第一時間，就發表歐巴馬與普廷的通話紀錄以及一項聲明 ，表明美國政府不承認該項公投的結果。

“Statement by the Press Secretary on Ukraine”
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
March 16, 2014

The United States has steadfastly supported the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine since it declared its independence in 1991, and WE REJECT THE “REFERENDUM” that took place today in the Crimean region of Ukraine. This referendum is contrary to Ukraine’s constitution, and THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE RESULT OF A POLL administered under threats of violence and intimidation from a Russian military intervention that violates international law.

No decisions should be made about the future of Ukraine without the Ukrainian government. Moreover, this vote was not necessary. The Ukrainian government has made clear its willingness to discuss increased autonomy for Crimea, and the presidential elections planned for May 25 provide a legitimate opportunity for all Ukrainians to make their voices heard on the future of their country.

In addition, Ukraine, the United States, the EU, the OSCE, the UN, and others have called for Russia to allow international monitors into the Crimean peninsula to ensure that the rights of ethnic Russians in Ukraine are being upheld. Russia has spurned those calls as well as outreach from the Ukrainian government and instead has escalated its military intervention into Crimea and initiated threatening military exercises on Ukraine’s eastern border.

Russia’s actions are dangerous and destabilizing. The UN Security Council recognized this in a vote yesterday that only Russia opposed. As the United States and our allies have made clear, military intervention and violation of international law will bring increasing costs for Russia – not only due to measures imposed by the United States and our allies but also as a direct result of Russia’s own destabilizing actions.

In this century, we are long past the days when the international community will stand quietly by while one country forcibly seizes the territory of another. We call on all members of the international community to continue to condemn such actions, to take concrete steps to impose costs, and to stand together in support of the Ukrainian people and Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.


“Readout of the President’s Call with President Putin”
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
March 16, 2014

President Obama spoke this afternoon with President Putin of Russia. President Obama emphasized that the Crimean “referendum,” which violates the Ukrainian constitution and occurred under duress of Russian military intervention, WOULD NEVER BE RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED STATES and the international community. He emphasized that Russia’s actions were in violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and that, in coordination with our European partners, we are prepared to impose additional costs on Russia for its actions. President Obama underscored that there remains a clear path for resolving this crisis diplomatically, in a way that addresses the interests of both Russia and the people of Ukraine. He noted that the Ukrainian government continues to take concrete steps that would allow for the de-escalation of the crisis, particularly as it prepares for elections this Spring and undertakes constitutional reform, and he asked that Russia support the immediate deployment of international monitors to help prevent acts of violence by any groups. President Obama reiterated that a diplomatic resolution cannot be achieved while Russian military forces continue their incursions into Ukrainian territory and that the large-scale Russian military exercises on Ukraine’s borders only exacerbate the tension. President Obama said that Secretary Kerry continues to be prepared to work together with Foreign Minister Lavrov and the Ukrainian government to find a diplomatic resolution to the crisis.

在3/10/2014，建州運動發表「3/16/2014將舉辦的『克里米亞加入俄羅斯聯邦的複決』與建州派主張的未來 『台灣加入美國公投』之不同」一文 ，我們說:

//3/16/2014將舉辦的「克里米亞加入俄羅斯聯邦的複決」與建州派主張的未來 「台灣加入美國的公投」兩者之間有很大的不同。

在終戰後，原來「被永久割讓」給日本的台灣成為「國際法律地位未定，而其歸屬尚未確立的主權至今仍在美國的政治監護之中的自治政治實體」，所以在「台灣關係法」保護下的台灣人民有百分之百的權利就台灣的前途進行自決與公投，台灣人民要透過自決與公投讓台灣加入美國或獨立建國，都不存在分裂什麼國家或會侵害任何國家的領土與主權的完整的問題，但克里米亞的主權屬於烏克蘭，所以「克里米亞人民的人民自決的權利」[這勉強可被類比為魁北克欲脫離加拿大的「民主自決」，這也與世人所理解的、傳統的殖民地人民的「民族自決」有些不同]就會與烏克蘭「維護領土與主權的完整的權利」產生衝突。//

我們之所以必須一再強調這個論點，並在以後適當的時機，向美國各界人士及國際社會廣為宣傳，並爭取支持，乃是因為國際社會及美國的媒體界都犯了嚴重的錯誤，他們普遍都報導北京的觀點，說什麼北京在克里米亞公投一事，不敢或不願正面與公開支持莫斯科的立場與做法，乃是因為北京有所顧忌，它擔心克里米亞「脫離烏克蘭，加入俄羅斯聯邦」的公投會創造先例，因而鼓舞台灣、東土耳其斯坦與圖博人民進行自決，「危害中國領土與主權的完整」，這真是莫名其妙，大錯特錯。

台灣是台灣，中國是中國，台灣的主權不屬於中華民國，也不屬於中華人民共和國，台灣與中國完全無關，這種狀況不會因為有人主張「台灣是中國的固有領土」或「台灣是中華民國」，不會因為台灣目前事實上仍然在「中華民國體制」的治理下，也不會因為中國制訂了什麼「反分裂國家法」，台灣就屬於中國。

(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

老共海軍跑到印尼海域兩個海峽去演練、探底與挑釁(下)

                             老共海軍跑到印尼海域兩個海峽去演練、探底與挑釁(下)

四

「自由時報」可能沒有報導老共海軍這項挑釁行動，帶但它報導了澳大利亞國防事務與戰略的專家Prof. Paul Dibb對此事件的評論:

「澳洲學者︰中國海軍是紙老虎 」
自由時報
2014-03-10
〔編譯詹立群╱綜合報導〕澳洲國立大學戰略學榮譽教授狄布（Dibb），七日在「澳洲人報」發表文章，以「[海上操練揚波]中國海軍只是紙老虎」為題，說中國海軍沒打過現代海空戰，缺乏遠程境外操兵能力、打不了持久戰，若槓上美國海軍肯定吃敗仗。

文章稱，近來三艘中國軍艦行經印尼爪哇島與聖誕島間，而新造中國航母派駐南海都引發預期中的過度反應；事實上，這些都不是大事，也絕非預告中國海軍在西太平洋上的主導優勢。

美國精良海軍領先群雄，中國還差得遠，中國還需要很長時間，才能擁有境外遠程用兵的能力、進行海上持久戰。

狄布說，現在中國高度依賴海上貿易，未來將更可能興致勃勃地要保衛每一條海上貿易路線；但沒有一個國家能做得到，最好是與「朋友」分攤責任。

中國的問題是，沒什麼值得一提的「朋友」，除非有人認為北韓或巴基斯坦靠得住；但它在東海威脅日本、在南海恫嚇菲、越與馬來西亞，讓事情更糟。

狄布說，未來中國恐因日益壯大的海軍軍力而欺壓東南[亞]國家，希望看到此區域有人挺身—像是澳洲—抵抗中國霸權；由於美國海軍比中國強，澳洲應該鼓勵美國海軍多多造訪此海域，若華盛頓方面出現對於西澳[洲]海軍[設施]的任何要求，澳洲應該給予正面回應。


五


Prof. Dibb是澳洲重量級的戰略專家與學者(曾擔任澳大利亞國防部副部長)，他所發表的著述深受建州派與自由世界各國戰略研究界的重視與喜愛。 ---Read More---

我們現在就請台灣與台美鄉親們直接來讀他在澳洲一個主流媒體發表的一篇文章，不透過任何人的翻譯或任何媒體記者的編譯:

“Manoeuvres Make Waves, But in Truth
China's Navy Is a Paper Tiger”
By Paul Dibb
The Australian
3/6/2014

The recent transit of three Chinese warships between Java and Christmas Island, as well as the new Chinese aircraft carrier being deployed in the South China Sea, are causing predictable overreaction.

The fact is that neither of these are momentous events and they certainly do not herald the coming of Chinese naval superiority in the Western Pacific.

China is still way behind advanced navies, such as those of the US. It will be a long time before it has a true distant power projection capability able to wage sustained naval warfare. It has no history of carrying out modern warfare at sea or in the air and if it confronts the US on the high seas it will certainly lose.

None of this is to deny that China is making some quite impressive progress in its naval modernisation. That is only natural for an emerging power that until recently has not had a navy worth talking about. China is now highly dependent on seaborne trade and will be increasingly interested in securing its trade routes where possible. The fact is, however, that no nation is capable of defending all its trade routes. The best one can do is to co-operate with like-minded friends and share the burden of maritime security.

The big strategic problem for China is that it has very few friends in our region worth talking about - unless you think North Korea and Pakistan are reliable security partners. It is a strategic loner.

China is only making matters worse for itself by threatening Japan in the East China Sea and The Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea.

A prominent Chinese academic has recently declared with regard to China's territorial rights in the South China Sea that it "is entitled to use all means at its disposal to settle disputes to its satisfaction" and this includes "employing its full capacities to assert sovereignty". Such provocative statements would not be made without official endorsement in a tightly regimented society such as China's.

So, we have to be concerned that China is starting to throw its weight about and that it will increasingly have the military capabilities to bully smaller powers, especially in Southeast Asia.

That is of concern to Australia because we want to see a Southeast Asia that resists Chinese hegemony.

Japan is in a much stronger position because it still has a highly competent navy and air force and is taking steps to be able to handle Chinese military provocations, short of all-out war.

This is where the US comes in because it has an infinitely more powerful navy in the Pacific than China. We should encourage Washington to reinforce its presence in our region. In the upcoming visit by Barack Obama in April to Japan, South Korea, The Philippines and Malaysia, it will be important for the US President to demonstrate tangibly the so-called pivot to Asia.

Australia can usefully assist here, not only by facilitating the presence of US marines in Darwin but also by responding positively to any US requests for greater use of our naval facilities in Western Australia and the future use of Cocos Islands.

It is important, however, that we keep the expansion of China's naval capabilities in perspective.

While prudent steps must be taken to demonstrate to Beijing the superiority of US naval capabilities, there are serious questions about whether China will be the dominant naval power that some are drumming up.

China is a land power with enormous domestic challenges ahead that will constrain its strategic ambitions.

Robert Ross of Harvard University has pointed out that China's maritime power will be limited by the constraints experienced by all land powers: extensive challenges to territorial security (China shares borders with 14 countries) and a corresponding commitment to a large ground force capability.

China spends as much on internal security as on defence.

Historically, land powers such as Russia, Germany and France have repeatedly failed to secure maritime power. The optimal maritime strategy for a continental power such as China is what is called access-denial capability to its maritime approaches, which is precisely what China is undertaking. This was also the Soviet Union's maritime strategy for nearly three decades.

And like the former Soviet Union, China has limited geographical access to open seas, which can easily be constrained by superior Western detection and tracking capabilities.

Chinese nationalism is driving grandiose and costly expectations for a large blue-water navy, which is a traditional symbol of great power status. But now is not the time for exaggerated assessments of Chinese naval power or breathless proclamations that Australia's strategic environment has radically changed.

We have heard all that before when prime minister Malcolm Fraser proclaimed that the arrival of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean in the 1970s heralded a serious threat to the West's oil supplies. And where is Russia's navy now?

(Paul Dibb is professor emeritus of strategic studies at the Australian National University. He is a former deputy secretary for Defence, director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation and head of the National Assessments Staff.)



台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

News | The University of Sydney

sydney.edu.au

It is a pleasure and an honor to be here at the University of Sydney to give the annual Michael Hintze Lecture in International Security. I would like to thank Alan Dupont for...

老共海軍跑到印尼海域兩個海峽去演練、探底與挑釁(中)

                              老共海軍跑到印尼海域兩個海峽去演練、探底與挑釁(中)

三


若不是中國海軍早已注意到Prof. Mearsheimer所說的問題，就是在Prof. Mearsheimer說了之後才開始注意到Prof. Mearsheimer所說的問題，然後開始研究與測繪這些海峽與水域的水文與海圖，總之，老共一隻海軍艦隊在1/20/2014離開海南島三亞港，巡航西沙群島 ，1/26/2014在靠近馬來西亞沙勞越的James Shaol舉行宣誓典禮，1/29/2014艦隊通過巽他海峽，並藉海上救難及反海盜之名進行演習，艦隊約在1/31/2014進入倫巴海峽，之後往北走，通過印尼的婆羅洲與西里伯斯(蘇拉威西)兩島之間的Makassar 海峽，再往西北走，於2/3/2014進入菲律賓岷答那峨島東方的太平洋水域，並舉行實彈軍事演習，之後，繞行菲律賓群島東方，通過台灣與呂宋之間的巴士海峽，往西航行，於2/11/2014抵達廣東湛江港，這整個航程與行動對美國、台灣、菲律賓與東南亞諸國都極具挑釁性。
我們現在來讀華爾街日報的一則報導(只貼一部分):


“Beijing’s Power Play Exposes Anxieties”
By Trefor Moss & Rob Taylor
Wall Street Journal
2/20/2014

A three-week patrol by a Chinese naval flotilla in Southeast Asian waters has drawn conflicting responses from regional governments, exposing confusion over how to react to China’s rising maritime power.

Two Chinese destroyers and one amphibious landing craft, which may have traveled with a submarine escort, according to security analysts, left southern China on Jan. 20, Chinese state media provided detailed coverage of the patrol, -------

------The Chinese vessels first conducted a patrol of the Paracel Islands, a South China Sea group contested by China and Vietnam, before proceeding to James Shoal, a reef some 50 miles off the coast of Malaysia in South China Sea areas claimed by both China and Malaysia.

The flotilla then proceed beyod waters claimed by Beijingto the Indian Ocean, where it conducted 

The U.S. has refrained from commenting specifically on the Chinese patrol. On Feb. 5, Daniel Russell, the assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, expressed concern during congressional testimony about a “pattern of behavior in the South China Sea” whereby China was seeking to assert control over disputed areas in ways that were “noninconsistent with international law.”


我們再請鄉親們讀一篇評論:

“China makes statement as it sends naval ships off Australia's maritime approaches”
By Rory Medcalf
7 February 2014 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.com/

Australia's strategic environment changed a week ago, even if much of our media did not notice. Last weekend, a Chinese taskforce of three warships steamed south through the Sunda Strait to conduct combat simulations and other exercises in the Indian Ocean, somewhere between Indonesia and Christmas Island.

The vessels, two destroyers and an advanced 20,000-ton amphibious ship capable of carrying some hundreds of marines (pictured), then skirted the southern edge of Java before heading north through the Lombok and Makassar Straits and into the Pacific.

This is the first substantial Chinese military exercise in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean and in Australia's maritime approaches. It seems also to be the first time a Chinese taskforce has transited the Sunda and Lombok straits as alternatives to the Malacca Strait.

With this decidedly Indo-Pacific foray, China is sending many signals, deliberately or not. One is about its ability and ambition to project force through and beyond the South China Sea. Another is its wish to be seen to be interested in protecting its commercial sea lanes into the Indian Ocean. A third is that the People's Liberation Army-Navy will go where it wants when it wants, without necessarily consulting or forewarning local powers.

A fourth is that the islands of East Asia are not a meaningful 'chain' to constrain China's military reach. In that sense, this exercise should be seen alongside a larger activity in the western Pacific last October. 

To be clear, there was nothing illegal or fundamentally hostile about what the Chinese navy has just demonstrated. A greater Chinese security role in the Indian Ocean is inevitable and at one level a corollary of China's economic interests.

Even so, this recent episode is bound to raise questions in national security establishments across the region, including in India and Indonesia as well as in Australia. I will have more to say about that next week in a joint opinion article with prominent Indian strategist Raja Mohan (a Lowy Institute nonresident fellow and incidentally my co-chair in a major Australia-India dialogue that kept us busy this week).

Although the Chinese navy may have surprised us all with the precise timing and nature of its Indo-Pacific venture, nobody can accuse Beijing of a lack of transparency in its public reporting during the event.

Indeed, the coverage of the exercise in the Chinese media and on social media is a textbook case for intelligence analysts and policymakers in how so-called 'open sources' can provide early warning of change in the strategic environment – earlier, I suspect, than much of the secret stuff.

I first learned of the exercise six days ago, with help from a friend who makes a habit of monitoring Chinese-language press, the magic of Google translate, as well as a tweet from American China expert Taylor Fravel. Within another day or two, Chinese state television was proudly reporting, in English and in some technical detail, about the Indian Ocean drill. These and other Chinese reports were more than enough to piece together a clear sense of the route and activities of the three ships, as well as the historic nature of their voyage.

Yet days passed before much of this made it into the international English-language media, and I am yet to see serious news coverage in Australia (the Hindu's excellent China correspondent was a little quicker off the mark).

The precise strategic implications of the Chinese navy's newly-demonstrated ability to operate in Australia's northern approaches are open to debate. Neither China nor Australia wants a confrontational relationship. The idea that China might pose a direct military threat to Australia remains far from mainstream in our strategic debate. Australia has rightly sought to engage China as a security partner in recent years, for instance in disaster-relief exercises.

Even so, it is a safe bet that the voyage of the three Chinese warships Changbaishan, Wuhan and Haikou will prove far more consequential to Australia's strategic future than any number of those certain other vessels in the waters off Indonesia that have so dominated our media and political attention of late.


倫敦的「金融時報」在2/13/2014也有一篇報導，標題是: “Quest for Blue Water Makes Waves”，這則報導就提到The Lowy Institute的亞洲安全事務專家Rory Medcalf所寫的文章，也就是上面那一篇。

(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

News | The University of Sydney

sydney.edu.au

It is a pleasure and an honor to be here at the University of Sydney to give the annual Michael Hintze Lecture in International Security. I would like to thank Alan Dupont for...

老共海軍跑到印尼海域兩個海峽去演練、探底與挑釁(上)

                  老共海軍跑到印尼海域兩個海峽去演練、探底與挑釁(上)

一

最近在台灣爆紅的現實派國際關係學界泰斗美國芝加哥大學教授 John J. Mearsheimer 在三、四年前應邀到澳大利亞做了一場十分重要的演講，講題是: 「山雨欲來: 中國對美國在亞洲的勢力的挑戰」。

就如同他在2013年12月在台北的一場演講對台灣人帶來震撼一樣，在澳大利亞的那場演講也給澳洲人帶來衝擊。現在的澳洲人跟1930與1940年代的澳洲人一樣 ，有了來自北方的威脅，以前是日本的威脅，這次是來自中國的威脅。

這場演講十分重要，所以建州運動要把演講全文轉貼 。

不過，我們要請鄉親們特別注意Prof. Mearsheimer演講的最後一段內容，因為那一段談的是Rising China and Australia (澳洲與竄起中的中國)，這一段有幾個重點，也就是我們今天本文的主題。

(1)Chinese strategists are going to pay serious attention to Australia in the years ahead, mainly because of oil. China's dependence on imported oil, --------[ 中國的戰略家將會在今後幾年開始對澳大利亞加以注意，主因是石油，中國對進口石油的依賴------這是說，由於中國依賴進口的石油，所以會關注石油的運輸線的安全。]

(2)China, however, faces a major geographical problem in securing those sea-lanes, which has significant implications for Australia. Specifically, there are three major water passages that connect the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. [中國面臨維護海上運輸線安全的重大地緣問題 ，這個重大問題對澳大利亞有重大的意義，挑明地說，連結南中國海與印度洋之間有三個主要的水道。]

(3)Chinese ships can go through the Straits of Malacca, which are surrounded by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, or they can go further south and traverse either the Lombok Strait or the Sunda Strait, both of which cut through Indonesia, and both of which bring you out into the open waters of the Indian Ocean just to the northwest of Australia. China, however, is not likely to be able to get through the Straits of Malacca in a conflict with the United States, because Singapore, which is closely allied with Washington, sits astride that passageway. This is what Chinese strategists call "the Malacca dilemma." Therefore, China has a powerful incentive to make sure its ships can move through the two main openings that run through Indonesia. [中國船艦可以通過麻六甲海峽或者較偏南的巽他海峽或倫巴海峽，後兩海峽通過印尼，從南中國海通過這兩海峽，可以進入印度洋，這時的航線就會靠近澳大利亞的西北部，在美中發生衝突時，中國的船艦不太可能會通過麻六甲海峽。]

(4)This situation almost certainly means that China will maintain a significant military presence in the waters off the northern coast of Australia and maybe even on Indonesian territory. China will for sure be deeply concerned about Australia's power projection capabilities, and will work to make sure that they cannot be used to shut down either the Lombok or Sunda Straits or threaten China shipping in the Indian Ocean. The steps that China takes to neutralize the threat that Australia poses to its sea-lanes—and remember, we are talking about a much more powerful China than exists today—will surely push Canberra to work closely with Washington to contain China. In short, there are serious limits to how much geography can shield Australia from an expansive China. [因此，中國將會在澳大利亞的北海岸附近的水域甚至是印尼的領土維持可觀的軍事存在，所以中國將會十分關切澳大利亞的軍事投射能力，且將會設法確保這兩個海峽不會被關閉。]

二

底下是Prof. Mearsheimer的演說全文， ---Read More--- 不習慣閱讀英文的鄉親都可以把英文跳過去:

"The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia"
By John J. Mearsheimer
http://sydney.edu.au/news/84.html?newsstoryid=5351

5 August 2010
(Transcript of the fourth annual Michael Hintze Lecture in International Security
Delivered by Professor John Mearsheimer
4 August 2010)

The United States has been the most powerful state on the planet for many decades, and has deployed robust military forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the early years of World War II. America's presence in your neighborhood has had significant consequences for Australia and for the wider region. This is how the Australian government sees it, at least according to the 2009 Defence White Paper: "Australia has been a very secure country for many decades, in large measure because the wider Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace and stability underwritten by US strategic primacy." The United States, in other words, has acted as a pacifier in this part of the world.

However, according to the very next sentence in the White Paper, "That order is being transformed as economic changes start to bring about changes in the distribution of strategic power." The argument here, of course, is that the rise of China is having a significant effect on the global balance of power. In particular, the power gap between China and the United States is shrinking and in all likelihood "US strategic primacy" in this region will be no more. This is not to say that the United States will disappear; in fact, its presence here is likely to grow in response to China's rise. But the United States will no longer be the preponderant power in your neighborhood, as it has been since 1945.

The most important question that flows from this discussion is whether China can rise peacefully. It is clear from the Defence White Paper—which is tasked with assessing Australia's strategic situation out to the year 2030—that policymakers here are worried about the changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. Consider these comments from that document: "As other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change. When this happens there will be the possibility of miscalculation. There is a small but still concerning possibility of growing confrontation between some of these powers." At another point in the White Paper, we read that, "Risks resulting from escalating strategic competition could emerge quite unpredictably, and is a factor to be considered in our defence planning." In short, the Australian government seems to sense that the shifting balance of power between China and the United States may not be good for peace in the neighborhood.

I would like to argue tonight that Australians should be worried about China's rise, because it is likely to lead to an intense security competition between China and the United States, with considerable potential for war. Moreover, most of China's neighbors, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, Vietnam, and yes Australia, will join with the United States to contain China's power. To put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully.

It is important to emphasize, however, that I am not arguing that Chinese behavior alone will drive the security competition that lies ahead. The United States is also likely to behave in aggressive ways, thus further increasing the prospects for trouble here in the Asia-Pacific region.

Naturally, not everyone will agree with my assessment of the situation. Many believe that China can rise peacefully, that it is not inevitable that the United States and a powerful China will have confrontational relations. Of course, they assume that China will have peaceful intentions and that welcome fact of life can help facilitate stability in this region, even though the underlying balance of power is expected to change dramatically.

The Case for China's Peaceful Rise

I would like to examine three key arguments that are often employed to support this optimistic prognosis. First, some claim that China can allay any fears about its rise by making it clear to its neighbors and the United States that it has peaceful intentions, that it will not use force to change the balance of power. This perspective can be found in the Defence White Paper, which states: "The pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans." In essence, the belief here is that Beijing has the ability to signal its present and future intentions to Australia and other countries in compelling ways.

Unfortunately, states can never be certain about each other's intentions. They cannot know with a high degree of certainty whether they are dealing with a revisionist state or a status quo power. For example, there is still no consensus among experts as to whether the Soviet Union was bent on dominating Eurasia during the Cold War. Nor is there a consensus on whether Imperial Germany was a highly aggressive state that was principally responsible for causing World War I. The root of the problem is that unlike military capabilities, which we can see and count, intentions cannot be empirically verified. Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern. You might say that Chinese leaders can use words to explain their intentions. But talk is cheap and leaders have been known to lie to foreign audiences. Thus, it is hard to know the intentions of China's present leaders, which is not to say that they are necessarily revisionist.

But even if one could determine China's intentions today, there is no way to know what they will be in the future. After all, it is impossible to identify who will be running the foreign policy of any country five or ten years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. It cannot be emphasized enough that we face radical uncertainty when it comes to determining the future intentions of any country, China included.

A second line of argument is that a benign China can avoid confrontation by building defensive rather than offensive military forces. In other words, Beijing can signal that it is a status quo power by denying itself the capability to use force to alter the balance of power. After all, a country that has hardly any offensive capability cannot be a revisionist state, because it does not have the means to act aggressively. Not surprisingly, Chinese leaders often claim that their military is designed solely for defensive purposes. For example, the New York Times recently reported in an important article on the Chinese navy that its leaders maintain that it is "purely a self-defense force."

One problem with this approach is that it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive military capabilities. Negotiators at the 1932 Disarmament Conference tried to make these distinctions and found themselves tied in knots trying to determine whether particular weapons like tanks and aircraft carriers are offensive or defensive in nature. The basic problem is that the capabilities that states develop simply to defend themselves often have significant offensive potential.

Consider what China is doing today. It is building military forces that have significant power projection capability, and as the Defence White Paper tells us, China's "military modernization will be increasingly characterized by the development of power projection capabilities." For example, the Chinese are building naval forces that can project power out to the so-called "Second Island Chain" in the Western Pacific. And they also say that they are planning to build a "blue water navy" that can operate in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. For understandable reasons, they want to be able to protect their sea-lanes and not have to depend on the American navy to handle that mission. Although they do not have that capability yet, as Robert Kaplan points out in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, "China's naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century US naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued for sea control and the decisive battle."

Of course, most Chinese leaders think that their navy is defensively oriented, even though it has considerable offensive capability and will have much more in the future. Indeed, they refer to their naval strategy as "Far Sea Defense." As Kaplan's comments indicate, it seems almost certain that as the Chinese navy grows in size and capability, none of China's neighbors, including Australia, will consider it to be defensively oriented. They will instead view it as a formidable offensive force. Thus, anyone looking to determine China's future intentions by observing its military is likely to conclude that Beijing is bent on aggression.

Finally, some maintain that China's recent behavior toward its neighbors, which has not been aggressive in any meaningful way, is a reliable indicator of how China will act in the decades ahead. The central problem with this argument is that past behavior is usually not a reliable indicator of future behavior, because leaders come and go and some are more hawkish than others. Plus circumstances at home and abroad can change in ways that make the use of military force more or less attractive.

The Chinese case is illustrative in this regard. Beijing does not possess a formidable military today and it is certainly in no position to pick a fight with the United States. This is not to say that China is a paper tiger, but it does not have the capability to cause much trouble in this region. However, that situation is expected to change markedly over time, in which case China will have significant offensive capability. Then, we will see how committed it is to the status quo. But right now we cannot tell much about China's future behavior, because it has such limited capability to act aggressively.

What all of this tells us is that there is no good way to divine what China's intentions will be down the road or to predict its future behavior based on its recent foreign policies. It does seem clear, however, that China will eventually have a military with significant offensive potential.

The Not-So-Benign United States

Up to now, I have been concerned with how an American or an Australian might assess China's future behavior. But to fully understand how China's rise will affect stability in the Asia-Pacific region, we must also consider what Chinese leaders can divine about future American behavior, by looking at its intentions, capabilities, and present behavior.

There is obviously no way China's leaders can know who will be in charge of American foreign policy in the years ahead, much less what their intentions toward China will be. But they do know that all of America's post-Cold War presidents, including Barack Obama, have stated that they are committed to maintaining American primacy. And that means Washington is likely to go to considerable lengths to prevent China from becoming too powerful.

Regarding capabilities, the United States spends more money on defense than all the other countries in the world combined. Moreover, because the American military is designed to fight all around the globe, it has abundant power projection assets. Much of that capability is either located in the Asia-Pacific region or can be moved there quickly should the need arise. China cannot help but see that the United States has formidable military forces in its neighborhood that are designed in good part for offensive purposes. Surely, when Washington moves aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straits—as it did in 1996—or when it redeploys submarines to the Western Pacific, China sees these naval assets as offensive, not defensive in nature.

This is not to deny that most Americans, like most Chinese, think that their military is a defensive instrument; but that is not the way it looks when you are at the other end of the rifle barrel. Thus, anyone in China seeking to gauge American intentions by assessing its military capabilities is likely to think it is a revisionist state, not a status quo power.

Lastly, there is the matter of America's recent behavior and what that might tell us about future US actions. As I said earlier, past actions are usually not a reliable indicator of future behavior, because circumstances change and new leaders sometimes think differently about foreign policy than their predecessors. But if Chinese leaders try to gauge how the United States is likely to act down the road by looking at its recent foreign policy, they will almost certainly conclude that it is a war-like and dangerous country. After all, America has been at war for 14 of the 21 years since the Cold War ended. That is 2 out of every 3 years. And remember that the Obama administration is apparently contemplating a new war against Iran.

One might argue that this is all true, but the United States has not threatened to attack China. The problem with this argument is that American leaders from both the Democratic and Republican parties have made it clear that they believe the United States, to quote Madeleine Albright, is the "indispensable nation" and therefore it has both the right and the responsibility to police the entire globe. Furthermore, most Chinese are well aware of how the United States took advantage of a weak China by pushing forward the infamous "Open Door" policy in the early 20th century. Chinese officials also know that the United States and China fought a bloody war in Korea between 1950 and 1953. It is not surprising that the Economist recently reported that, "A retired Chinese admiral likened the American navy to a man with a criminal record 'wandering just outside the gate of a family home'." It seems that this is a case where we should be thankful that countries usually don't pay much attention to a potential rival's past behavior when trying to determine its future intentions.

What all of this tells us is that the future security environment in the Asia-Pacific region will revolve around China and the United States, and each of those great powers will have a military with significant offensive capability and unknowable intentions.

There is one other factor that matters greatly for future Sino-American relations. There is no centralized authority that states can turn to for help if a dangerous aggressor threatens them. There is no night watchman in the international system, which means that states have to rely mainly on themselves to ensure their survival. Thus, the core question that any leader has to ask him or herself is this: what is the best way to maximize my country's security in a world where another state might have significant offensive military capability as well as offensive intentions, and where there is no higher body I can turn to for help if that other state threatens my country? This question—more than any other—will motivate American as well as Chinese leaders in the years ahead, as it has in the past.

The Pursuit of Regional Hegemony

I believe there is a straightforward answer to this question and that all great powers know it and act accordingly. The best way for any state to ensure its survival is to be much more powerful than all the other states in the system, because the weaker states are unlikely to attack it for fear they will be soundly defeated. No country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare strike the United States because it is so powerful relative to all its neighbors.

To be more specific, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the hegemon in the system, because then its survival would almost be guaranteed. A hegemon is a country that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states. In other words, no other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it. In essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system.

When people talk about hegemony these days, they are usually referring to the United States, which they describe as a global hegemon. I do not like this terminology, however, because it is virtually impossible for any state—including the United States—to achieve global hegemony. The main obstacle to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power over huge distances, especially across enormous bodies of water like the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The best outcome that a great power can hope for is to achieve regional hegemony, and possibly control another region that is close by and easily accessible over land. The United States, which dominates the Western Hemisphere, is the only regional hegemon in modern history. Five other great powers have tried to dominate their region—Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union—but none succeeded.

The United States, it should be emphasized, did not become a hegemon in the Western Hemisphere by accident. When it gained its independence in 1783, it was a weak country comprised of 13 states running up and down the Atlantic seaboard. Over the course of the next 115 years, American policymakers worked unrelentingly in pursuit of regional hegemony. They expanded America's boundaries from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans as part of a policy commonly referred to as "Manifest Destiny." Indeed, the United States was an expansionist power of the first order. Henry Cabot Lodge put the point well when he noted that the United States had a "record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century." Or I might add the twentieth century.

But America's leaders in the nineteenth century were not just concerned with turning the United States into a powerful territorial state. They were also determined to push the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere, and make it clear to them that they were not welcome back. This policy, which is still in effect today, is known as the "Monroe Doctrine." By 1898, the last European empire in the Americas had collapsed and the United States had become a regional hegemon.

States that achieve regional hegemony have a further aim: they seek to prevent great powers in other geographical regions from duplicating their feat. A regional hegemon, in other words, does not want peer competitors. The United States, for example, played a key role in preventing Imperial Japan, Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy. Regional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons in other regions, because they fear that a rival great power that dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe that is essentially free to roam around the globe and cause trouble in their backyard. Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions, because their proximity will force them to concentrate their attention on each other rather than the distant hegemon. Furthermore, if a potential hegemon emerges among them, the other great powers in that region might be able to contain it by themselves, allowing the distant hegemon to remain safely on the sidelines.

The bottom line is that for sound strategic reasons the United States labored for more than a century to gain regional hegemony, and after achieving that goal, it has made sure that no other great power dominated either Asia or Europe the way it dominates the Western Hemisphere.

Imitating Uncle Sam

What does America's past behavior tell us about the rise of China? In particular, how should we expect China to conduct itself as it grows more powerful? And how should we expect the United States and China's neighbors to react to a strong China?

I expect China to act the way the United States has acted over its long history. Specifically, I believe that China will try to dominate the Asia-Pacific region much as the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. For good strategic reasons, China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and potentially dangerous neighbors like India, Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on the warpath and conquer other countries in the region, although that is always a possibility. Instead, it is more likely that Beijing will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the way the United States makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back.

A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out of the Pacific-Asia region, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Imperial Japan did in the 1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. Consider that in March, Chinese officials told two high-ranking American policymakers that the United States was no longer allowed to interfere in the South China Sea, which China views as a "core interest" like Taiwan and Tibet. And it seems that China feels the same way about the Yellow Sea. Last week the US and South Korean navies conducted joint naval exercises in response to North Korea's alleged sinking of a South Korean naval vessel. Those naval maneuvers were originally planned to take place in the Yellow Sea, which is adjacent to the Chinese coastline, but vigorous protests from China forced the Obama administration to move them further east into the Sea of Japan.

These ambitious goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbors, just as the United States prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. No state in its right mind should want other powerful states located in its region? All Chinese surely remember what happened in the last century when Japan was powerful and China was weak. Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept US military forces operating in its backyard? American policymakers, after all, express outrage whenever distant great powers send military forces into the Western Hemisphere. Those foreign forces are invariably seen as a potential threat to American security. The same logic should apply to China. Why would China feel safe with US forces deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, would not China's security be better served by pushing the American military out of the Asia-Pacific region?

Why should we expect China to act any differently than the United States has over the course of its history? Are they more principled than Americans are? More ethical? Are they less nationalistic than Americans? Less concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is likely to imitate the United States and attempt to become a regional hegemon.

And what is the likely American response if China attempts to dominate Asia? It is crystal clear from the historical record that the United States does not tolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated over the course of the twentieth century, it is determined to remain the world's only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat to rule the roost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

China's neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. India and Japan, for example, signed a "Joint Security Declaration" in October 2008, in good part because they are worried about China's growing power. India and the United States, which had testy relations at best during the Cold War, have become good friends over the past decade, in large part because they both fear China. Just last month, the Obama administration, which is filled with people who preach to the world about the importance of human rights, announced that it was resuming relations with Indonesia's elite special forces, despite their rich history of human rights abuses. The reason for this shift was that Washington wants Indonesia on its side as China grows more powerful, and as the New York Times reported, Indonesian officials "dropped hints that the group might explore building ties with the Chinese military if the ban remained."

Singapore, which sits astride the critically important Straits of Malacca and worries about China's growing power, badly wants to upgrade its already close ties with the United States. Toward that end, it built the Changi Naval Base in the late 1990s so that the US Navy could operate an aircraft carrier out of Singapore if the need arose. And the recent decision by Japan to allow the US Marines to remain on Okinawa was driven in part by Tokyo's concerns about China's growing assertiveness in the region and the related need to keep the American security umbrella firmly in place over Japan. Most of China's neighbors will eventually join an American-led balancing coalition designed to check China's rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the United States to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Contrasts with the Cold War
(美中爭霸戰與美俄冷戰之比較)

There will be important differences, however, between the superpower competition during the Cold War and a future rivalry between China and the United States. For starters, the Soviet Union was physically located in both Asia and Europe, and it threatened to dominate both of those regions.

Therefore, the United States was compelled to put together balancing coalitions in Asia as well as Europe. China, on the other hand, is strictly an Asian power and is not likely to threaten Europe in any meaningful way.

As a result, the major European states are unlikely to play an active role in containing China, but will probably be content to remain on the sidelines.

The United States and the Soviet Union also competed with each other in the oil-rich Middle East. Both superpowers had allies in the region that sometimes fought wars with each other, and the United States was seriously worried about a Soviet invasion of Iran following the ouster of the Shah in 1979. Given China’s dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf, it is likely to compete with the United States for influence in that strategically important
region, much as the Soviets did. But a Chinese invasion of the Middle East is not likely, in part because it is too far away, but also because the United States would surely try to thwart the attack. China is more likely to station troops in the region if a close ally there asked for help. For example, one could imagine China and Iran establishing close ties, and Tehran then asking Beijing to station Chinese troops on its territory. In short, while the Americans and the Soviets competed actively in Europe, Asia,
and the Middle East, China and the United States are likely to compete in only the latter two regions.


Although the Soviet–American rivalry spanned most of the globe, the main battleground was in the center of Europe, where there was the danger of a large-scale conventional war for control of the European continent. That scenario was especially important to both sides not only because there was considerable potential for nuclear escalation in the event of a war, but also because a decisive Soviet victory would have fundamentally altered
the global balance of power. It is hard to imagine similar circumstances involving China and the United States, mainly because Asia’s geography is so different from Europe’s. Korea is probably the only place where those two countries could get dragged into a conventional land war; in fact, that is
precisely what happened between 1950 and 1953, and it could happen again if conflict broke out between North and South Korea. But the stakes and the magnitude of that conflict would be nowhere near as great as a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact for control of Europe would have been.

In addition to Korea, one can imagine China and the United States fighting over Taiwan, over disputed islands or islets off China’s coast, or over control of the sea lanes between China and the Middle East. As with Korea, the outcome of all of these scenarios would be nowhere near as consequential as a superpower war in the heart of Europe during the Cold War. Because the stakes are smaller and a number of the possible conflict scenarios
involve fighting at sea—where the risks of escalation are more easily contained—it is somewhat easier to imagine war breaking out between the China and the United States than between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is also worth noting that there was no territorial dispute between the superpowers— Berlin included—that was as laden with intense nationalistic feelings as Taiwan is for China. Thus, it is not hard to imagine a war breaking out over Taiwan, which is not to say that the odds of such a war are high.

In addition to Korea, one can imagine China and the United States fighting over Taiwan, over disputed islands or islets off China’s coast, or over control of the sea lanes between China and the Middle East. As with Korea, the outcome of all of these scenarios would be nowhere near as consequential as a superpower war in the heart of Europe during the Cold War.

Another important difference between the Cold War and a future Sino– American rivalry concerns ideology. The superpower competition was especially intense because it was driven by sharp ideological differences between the two sides as well as by geopolitical considerations. Communism and liberal capitalism were potent ideological foes not only because they offered
fundamentally different views about how society should be ordered, but also because both American and Soviet leaders thought that communism was an exportable political model that would eventually take root all over the globe.

This notion helped fuel the infamous ‘domino theory’, which helped convince US leaders that they had to fight communism everywhere on the planet. Soviet leaders had real concerns, as the spread of liberal capitalism posed a serious threat to the legitimacy of Marxist rule. The incompatibility of these rival ideological visions thus reinforced the zero-sum nature of the rivalry, and encouraged leaders on both sides to wage it with unusual intensity.

There are certainly some ideological differences between China and the United States, but they do not affect the relationship between the two countries in profound ways, and there is no good reason to think that they will in the foreseeable future. In particular, China has embraced a market-based economy, and does not see its current version of state capitalism as an
exportable model for the rest of the world. If anything, it is the United States that shows a greater tendency to want to export its system to others, but that ambition is likely to be tempered by setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the impact of the 2008 recession. This situation should work to make a future rivalry between Beijing and Washington less intense than the ideological-laden competition between the superpowers.

Finally, the Soviet Union and its close allies had remarkably little economic intercourse with the West during the Cold War. Indeed, there was little direct contact between the elites, much less the broader publics, on the two sides. The opposite is the case with China, which is not only deeply integrated into the world economy, but is also actively engaged with Western elites of all kinds. For those who believe that economic interdependence produces peace, this is good news.29 However, it is bad news for those who think that these ties are often a major source of friction between great powers. My view is that economic interdependence does not have a significant effect on geopolitics one way or the other. After all, the major European powers were all highly interdependent and prospering in 1914 when First World War broke out.

Rising China and Australia (澳洲與竄起中的中國)

I would like to discuss in more detail how I think China's rise will affect Australia in particular. There is no question that geography works to Australia's advantage; it is located far away from China and there are large bodies of water separating the two countries. Australia, of course, faced a similar situation with regard to Imperial Japan, which helps explain why the Japanese military did not invade Australia when it went on a rampage across the Asian-Pacific region in December 1941.

One might be tempted to think that Australia's location means that it has little to fear from China and therefore it can stay on the sidelines as the balancing coalition to contain China comes together. Indeed, the 2009 White Paper raises the possibility that "an Australian government might take the view that armed neutrality was the best approach in terms of securing its territory and people." This is not going to happen, however, because China—should it continue its rapid rise—will eventually present a serious enough threat to Australia that it will have no choice but to join the American-led alliance to contain China. I would like to make three points to support this claim.

First, please remember that we are not talking about the threat posed by today's Chinese military, which does not have a lot of power projection capability and is not much of a danger to its neighbors. We are talking about how Australians will think about China after it has undergone two more decades of impressive economic growth and has used its abundant wealth to build a military that is filled with highly sophisticated weaponry. We are talking about a Chinese military that comes close to rivaling the US military in terms of the quality of its weaponry. That Chinese military, however, should have two important advantages over its American counterpart. It should be larger, maybe even much larger, since China's population will be at least three times bigger than the US population by the middle of this century. Furthermore, the United States will be at a significant disadvantage in its competition with China, because the American military will be projecting its power across 6,000 miles of ocean, while the Chinese military will be operating in its own backyard. In short, China is likely to have far more offensive military power in 2030 than it has in 2010.

Second, although Imperial Japan did not launch an amphibious assault against Australia in 1942, it seriously contemplated that option, and decided against it not only because of the difficulty of the operation, but also because Japan thought that it had an alternative strategy for dealing with Australia. Specifically, it felt that it could use its control of the Western Pacific to effectively blockade Australia and neutralize it. Although that strategy failed, we should not lose sight of the fact that Imperial Japan was a grave threat to Australia, which is why Australia enthusiastically fought alongside the United States in World War II.

Third, Chinese strategist are going to pay serious attention to Australia in the years ahead, mainly because of oil. China's dependence on imported oil, which is already substantial, is going to increase markedly over the next few decades. Much of that imported oil will come out of the Middle East and most of it will be transported to China by ship. For all the talk about moving oil by pipelines and railroads through Burma and Pakistan, the fact is that maritime transport is a much easier and cheaper option. The Chinese, of course, know this and it is one reason why they are planning to build a blue water navy. They want to be able to protect their sea-lanes that run to and from the Middle East.

China, however, faces a major geographical problem in securing those sea-lanes, which has significant implications for Australia. Specifically, there are three major water passages that connect the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Otherwise, various Southeast Asian countries separate those two large bodies of water. That means China must have access to at least one of those passages at all times if it hopes to be able to control its sea-lanes to and from the oil-rich Middle East.

Chinese ships can go through the Straits of Malacca, which are surrounded by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, or they can go further south and traverse either the Lombok Strait or the Sunda Strait, both of which cut through Indonesia, and both of which bring you out into the open waters of the Indian Ocean just to the northwest of Australia. China, however, is not likely to be able to get through the Straits of Malacca in a conflict with the United States, because Singapore, which is closely allied with Washington, sits astride that passageway. This is what Chinese strategists call "the Malacca dilemma." Therefore, China has a powerful incentive to make sure its ships can move through the two main openings that run through Indonesia.

This situation almost certainly means that China will maintain a significant military presence in the waters off the northern coast of Australia and maybe even on Indonesian territory. China will for sure be deeply concerned about Australia's power projection capabilities, and will work to make sure that they cannot be used to shut down either the Lombok or Sunda Straits or threaten China shipping in the Indian Ocean. The steps that China takes to neutralize the threat that Australia poses to its sea-lanes—and remember, we are talking about a much more powerful China than exists today—will surely push Canberra to work closely with Washington to contain China. In short, there are serious limits to how much geography can shield Australia from an expansive China.

The picture I have painted this evening of what is likely to happen if China continues its impressive economic growth is not a pretty one. Indeed, it is downright depressing. I wish that I could tell a more optimistic story about the prospects for peace in the Asia-Pacific region. But the fact is that international politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of good will can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. And there is little doubt that there is one on the horizon. 

(待續)

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖

David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

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