According to Dr. Henry Kissinger: 「上海公報」中的”all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait”以及尼克森穿內衣褲，暴跳如雷的故事(下)
二
讀完了上面兩篇文章的片段之後，就可溫故而知新，我們今天使用季辛吉寫的「白宮歲月」 (Henry Kissinger: White House Years, Little, Brown & Co. 出版社出版, 1979) 一書中相關的章節時，大家就能很快地進入狀況。
我之所以要用「白宮歲月」 這本書[老季在這本書其中幾章，對他的秘密訪中、與老共就「上海公報」進行祕密談判與草擬的過程，描述得十分詳盡，所以很值得參考]，是因為當年的美國國務院亞太事務助卿葛林(Marshall Green)提到它。葛林說: “Kissinger wrote about the incident in his book, The White House Years.” 我因而說，「我們未來會談老季在”The White House Years” 這本回憶錄中相關的記載。」
我們都知道，「上海公報」中有這麼一段文字:
“The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT maintain there is but one China and that TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA. ------------“ [用大寫字母打出來的字是我刻意打出來的，是為了強調與提醒，以下若出現同樣的情形，用意都相同，不再另行說明]
關於這一段，我們今天要提出兩點說明，不過，我們是引用老季「白宮歲月」中的記載與解說 。
首先我們來談”part”這個字。老季說: “In the process, we secured Chiao’s agreement to stating that we acknowledged Taiwan as a ‘PART’ rather than a ‘PROVINCE’ of China, thus ELIMINATING A SUGGESTION OF SUBORDINATION. “ (美方在談判的過程中，取得中方的談判對手喬冠華的同意，讓美方使用「美國認知台灣是中國的一部分」，而非「美國認知台灣是中國的一省」的陳述，這樣就可去除「台灣臣屬於中國」的暗示或意涵。)
再來，我們現在要用比較大的篇幅，來說明”ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT”這一組字的處理、變化與由來，但我們用老季自己的話來解說 ，我們從他的描述看到當時的美國國務院官員[主要是國務卿羅吉斯以及亞太事務助卿葛林]如何在尚未被發佈的「上海公報」的文字上與老季及老尼力爭，以及老尼那很傷形象的立即反應。
“On the plane to Hangchow the State Department experts were given the communiqué[關於「上海公報」的祕密談判與內容，由於老尼不信國務院的人馬，所以國務院的人馬一直都被”Tricky Dick” [老尼的綽號]與老季蒙在鼓裡，直到這個時候， 國務院的人馬才被告知。國務院的人馬雖然在大方向與原則上無能為力，但他們可以在專業或技術上，就文字提出異議與看法，以便進行最後的調整，不管尼克森再怎麼`不高興，國務院的人馬的確盡了力] ，in the preparation of which they had had no part. Predictably, they found it wanting. [國務院的人馬一看到這個文件的最後草案版本，就馬上發現它有嚴重的缺失] It is the price that must be paid for excluding the professionals from a negotiation. [老季自承，這是他與老尼把國務院的職業外交家排除在美中談判的過程中所必須付出的代價] Unfamiliar with the obstacles overcome, those not participating can indulge in setting up utopian goals (which they would have urged be abandoned during the first day of the negotiation had they conducted it) and can contrast them with the document before them. Or they can nitpick at the result on stylistic grounds, pointing out telling nuances, brilliantly conceived, which the world was denied by their absence. I had recommended that Assistant Secretary Green join our negotiating team. Nixon had vetoed this for fear of leaks and because he preferred to have his inevitable confrontation over drafting with Rogers all at once rather than day by day. As over Rogers’ absence from the meeting with Mao, I should have insisted; we now paid the price.” [老季說，他曾推薦葛林助卿參加美中的秘密談判，但老尼擔心國務院會洩露消息，所以加以否決，老尼也知道，國務院會有意見，但他寧願與國務卿一次解決這項不可避免的衝突，也不希望日復一日地就此事論爭。]
“No sooner had we arrived in Hangchow than Secretary Rogers --- -- informed the President that the communiqué was unsatisfactorily. [尼克森一行人一抵達杭州，國務卿Rogers馬上就向老尼表示，國務院對 「上海公報」的最後草案不滿意] He submitted a list of amendments, prepared by his staff, as numerous as they were trivial. For example, HIS EXPERTS OBJECTED TO THE PHRASE THAT ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT maintained that there was but one China. IT SEEMED TO THEM TOO INCLUSIVE; THERE MIGHT BE SOME CHINESE WHO DISAGREED. THEY PROPOSED THAT WE REPLACE ‘ALL CHINESE’ WITH ‘THE CHINESE’ --- A DISTINCTION BEYOND THE GRASP OF MY UNTRAINED MIND. [國務卿的專家與人馬提出大約十五項修改的建議，他們反對老季使用「台灣海峽兩岸的中國人」這種詞，並建議以「台灣海峽兩岸所有的中國人」這個詞來代替，因為「台灣海峽兩岸的中國人」這種詞含蓋太廣，理由是會有一些「中國人」不同意「世界上只有一個中國」這種說法]Another recommendation was to drop the word ‘position’ in the phrase ‘does not challenge that position.’ There were about fifteen changes of the same order of magnitude, including the reasonable proposal that the English text put the American statement of position first while the Chinese text would reverse the procedure. This is conventional diplomatic practice.)“
談到這裡 ，我必須說，老季這裡的說法基本上與他當年的助理John Holdridge的回憶錄所記載的差不多，但有一點出入。Holdridge說的是，國務院的人之所以反對，是因為他們認為，並非「台灣海峽兩岸所有的人」都認為他們自己是中國人，所以，若使用”THE CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT”，並不妥當。
再來，我要指出，Holdridge說的是，老季的草案使用的是”THE PEOPLE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT”這種說法，這顯然又有出入。這種情形之所以發生，可能的原因是: 他們兩人之中有一個人記憶發生問題[當年John Holdridge去當翻譯，Winston Lord去當記錄]，另一個可能的原因出在我，因為我現在手頭上沒有Holdridge 那本回憶錄，我因此也有可能發生記憶的問題。關於這件事，我以後會再進行查證，若我的記述出現錯誤，我會立即更正。
三
接下來，我們來讀老尼第一時間的反應。---Read More--- 老季說:
“Nixon was beside himself. He recognized his political dilemma. He was already edgy about the reaction of his conservative supporters to the trip; he dreaded a right-wing assault on the communiqué. And he could see that leaks that the State Department was unhappy about American concessions might well be the trigger. He also knew that reopening the communiqué after the Chinese had been told he agreed to it might well sour his trip --- especially since the importance of the proposed changes was next to impossible to explain. HE WAS SO EXERCISED THAT HE STARTED STORMING ABOUT THE BEAUTIFUL GUEST HOUSE IN HANGCHOW IN HIS UNDERWEAR. HE WOULD ‘DO SOMETHING’ ABOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY --- A THREAT HE HAD MADE AT REGULAR INTERVALS SINCE MY FIRST INTERVIEW WITH HIM THOSE MANY YEARS AGO AT THE PIERRE HOTEL, AND NEVER SPECIFIED OR IMPLEMENTED. ONE MINUTE HE INSISTED THAT HE WOULD STICK TO HIS WORD, THE NEXT THAT HE COULD NOT GO HOME WITH A DIVIDED DELEGATION. [老尼瘋掉了，他陷入了困境 他一時不知所措。一方面，他已與老共就「上海公報」的內容達成協議，現在若再要求文字的調整，美方甚難啟齒，另一方面，他若不調整，那後果嚴重，一來他的訪中代表團將為此而分裂，二來他回到美國後，原來支持他的保守派不會給他好日子過，說不定連任會造成問題，無論如何，他對]此事十分光火，盛怒之下，[穿著內衣褲，在號杭州賓館跑上跑下，發誓要找國務院算帳。不過，如同以往，他雖口不擇言，胡亂開罵，但事後總是不了了 之。]
最後，老季當然得硬著頭皮，去跟老共商量，老共那一頭為了顧全大局，為了更長遠的利益，當然也只有同意調整一途，以免節外生枝。
四
關於國務卿Rogers被排除在美中談判以及沒有隨同尼季兩人一起去會見老毛的事，老季事後說:
“Nixon had told me five days before [指2/21/1972尼克森抵達北京那一天的前五天]that he wanted [Secretary of State William] Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green TO BE OCCUPIED ELSEWHERE SO HE COULD DISCUSS SENSITIVE MATTERS WITH MAO AND CHOU. Nor was Rogers invited to the meeting by the Chinese, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF COMMENTS THAT STATE [DEPARTMENT] HAD MADE ABOUT TAIWAN’S ‘UNSETTLED’ JURIDICAL STATUS DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR. Yet I could have insisted that Rogers come, and had I done so neither Nixon nor the Chinese would have refused; it is one of the prerogatives, indeed obligations, of the security adviser to appeal Presidential decisions he considers unwise, I did not. The neglect was technically unassailable but fundamentally unworthy. The Secretary of State should not have been excluded from this historic encounter.” [做為總統的國家安全顧問，他原有責任與特權在總統做出不當的決定時，向總統進言，他當年若跟總統建議，應邀請國務卿一起去會見老毛，相信尼克森與中方都不會拒絕，但他卻沒這麼做，此事雖然在技術上無可厚非，但在基本上卻是不值得，在他們會晤老毛時，國務卿確實不應該被排除在外。這是一生擅於弄權的老季的懺悔嗎?
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
讀完了上面兩篇文章的片段之後，就可溫故而知新，我們今天使用季辛吉寫的「白宮歲月」 (Henry Kissinger: White House Years, Little, Brown & Co. 出版社出版, 1979) 一書中相關的章節時，大家就能很快地進入狀況。
我之所以要用「白宮歲月」 這本書[老季在這本書其中幾章，對他的秘密訪中、與老共就「上海公報」進行祕密談判與草擬的過程，描述得十分詳盡，所以很值得參考]，是因為當年的美國國務院亞太事務助卿葛林(Marshall Green)提到它。葛林說: “Kissinger wrote about the incident in his book, The White House Years.” 我因而說，「我們未來會談老季在”The White House Years” 這本回憶錄中相關的記載。」
我們都知道，「上海公報」中有這麼一段文字:
“The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT maintain there is but one China and that TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA. ------------“ [用大寫字母打出來的字是我刻意打出來的，是為了強調與提醒，以下若出現同樣的情形，用意都相同，不再另行說明]
關於這一段，我們今天要提出兩點說明，不過，我們是引用老季「白宮歲月」中的記載與解說 。
首先我們來談”part”這個字。老季說: “In the process, we secured Chiao’s agreement to stating that we acknowledged Taiwan as a ‘PART’ rather than a ‘PROVINCE’ of China, thus ELIMINATING A SUGGESTION OF SUBORDINATION. “ (美方在談判的過程中，取得中方的談判對手喬冠華的同意，讓美方使用「美國認知台灣是中國的一部分」，而非「美國認知台灣是中國的一省」的陳述，這樣就可去除「台灣臣屬於中國」的暗示或意涵。)
再來，我們現在要用比較大的篇幅，來說明”ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT”這一組字的處理、變化與由來，但我們用老季自己的話來解說 ，我們從他的描述看到當時的美國國務院官員[主要是國務卿羅吉斯以及亞太事務助卿葛林]如何在尚未被發佈的「上海公報」的文字上與老季及老尼力爭，以及老尼那很傷形象的立即反應。
“On the plane to Hangchow the State Department experts were given the communiqué[關於「上海公報」的祕密談判與內容，由於老尼不信國務院的人馬，所以國務院的人馬一直都被”Tricky Dick” [老尼的綽號]與老季蒙在鼓裡，直到這個時候， 國務院的人馬才被告知。國務院的人馬雖然在大方向與原則上無能為力，但他們可以在專業或技術上，就文字提出異議與看法，以便進行最後的調整，不管尼克森再怎麼`不高興，國務院的人馬的確盡了力] ，in the preparation of which they had had no part. Predictably, they found it wanting. [國務院的人馬一看到這個文件的最後草案版本，就馬上發現它有嚴重的缺失] It is the price that must be paid for excluding the professionals from a negotiation. [老季自承，這是他與老尼把國務院的職業外交家排除在美中談判的過程中所必須付出的代價] Unfamiliar with the obstacles overcome, those not participating can indulge in setting up utopian goals (which they would have urged be abandoned during the first day of the negotiation had they conducted it) and can contrast them with the document before them. Or they can nitpick at the result on stylistic grounds, pointing out telling nuances, brilliantly conceived, which the world was denied by their absence. I had recommended that Assistant Secretary Green join our negotiating team. Nixon had vetoed this for fear of leaks and because he preferred to have his inevitable confrontation over drafting with Rogers all at once rather than day by day. As over Rogers’ absence from the meeting with Mao, I should have insisted; we now paid the price.” [老季說，他曾推薦葛林助卿參加美中的秘密談判，但老尼擔心國務院會洩露消息，所以加以否決，老尼也知道，國務院會有意見，但他寧願與國務卿一次解決這項不可避免的衝突，也不希望日復一日地就此事論爭。]
“No sooner had we arrived in Hangchow than Secretary Rogers --- -- informed the President that the communiqué was unsatisfactorily. [尼克森一行人一抵達杭州，國務卿Rogers馬上就向老尼表示，國務院對 「上海公報」的最後草案不滿意] He submitted a list of amendments, prepared by his staff, as numerous as they were trivial. For example, HIS EXPERTS OBJECTED TO THE PHRASE THAT ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT maintained that there was but one China. IT SEEMED TO THEM TOO INCLUSIVE; THERE MIGHT BE SOME CHINESE WHO DISAGREED. THEY PROPOSED THAT WE REPLACE ‘ALL CHINESE’ WITH ‘THE CHINESE’ --- A DISTINCTION BEYOND THE GRASP OF MY UNTRAINED MIND. [國務卿的專家與人馬提出大約十五項修改的建議，他們反對老季使用「台灣海峽兩岸的中國人」這種詞，並建議以「台灣海峽兩岸所有的中國人」這個詞來代替，因為「台灣海峽兩岸的中國人」這種詞含蓋太廣，理由是會有一些「中國人」不同意「世界上只有一個中國」這種說法]Another recommendation was to drop the word ‘position’ in the phrase ‘does not challenge that position.’ There were about fifteen changes of the same order of magnitude, including the reasonable proposal that the English text put the American statement of position first while the Chinese text would reverse the procedure. This is conventional diplomatic practice.)“
談到這裡 ，我必須說，老季這裡的說法基本上與他當年的助理John Holdridge的回憶錄所記載的差不多，但有一點出入。Holdridge說的是，國務院的人之所以反對，是因為他們認為，並非「台灣海峽兩岸所有的人」都認為他們自己是中國人，所以，若使用”THE CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT”，並不妥當。
再來，我要指出，Holdridge說的是，老季的草案使用的是”THE PEOPLE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT”這種說法，這顯然又有出入。這種情形之所以發生，可能的原因是: 他們兩人之中有一個人記憶發生問題[當年John Holdridge去當翻譯，Winston Lord去當記錄]，另一個可能的原因出在我，因為我現在手頭上沒有Holdridge 那本回憶錄，我因此也有可能發生記憶的問題。關於這件事，我以後會再進行查證，若我的記述出現錯誤，我會立即更正。
三
接下來，我們來讀老尼第一時間的反應。
“Nixon was beside himself. He recognized his political dilemma. He was already edgy about the reaction of his conservative supporters to the trip; he dreaded a right-wing assault on the communiqué. And he could see that leaks that the State Department was unhappy about American concessions might well be the trigger. He also knew that reopening the communiqué after the Chinese had been told he agreed to it might well sour his trip --- especially since the importance of the proposed changes was next to impossible to explain. HE WAS SO EXERCISED THAT HE STARTED STORMING ABOUT THE BEAUTIFUL GUEST HOUSE IN HANGCHOW IN HIS UNDERWEAR. HE WOULD ‘DO SOMETHING’ ABOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY --- A THREAT HE HAD MADE AT REGULAR INTERVALS SINCE MY FIRST INTERVIEW WITH HIM THOSE MANY YEARS AGO AT THE PIERRE HOTEL, AND NEVER SPECIFIED OR IMPLEMENTED. ONE MINUTE HE INSISTED THAT HE WOULD STICK TO HIS WORD, THE NEXT THAT HE COULD NOT GO HOME WITH A DIVIDED DELEGATION. [老尼瘋掉了，他陷入了困境 他一時不知所措。一方面，他已與老共就「上海公報」的內容達成協議，現在若再要求文字的調整，美方甚難啟齒，另一方面，他若不調整，那後果嚴重，一來他的訪中代表團將為此而分裂，二來他回到美國後，原來支持他的保守派不會給他好日子過，說不定連任會造成問題，無論如何，他對]此事十分光火，盛怒之下，[穿著內衣褲，在號杭州賓館跑上跑下，發誓要找國務院算帳。不過，如同以往，他雖口不擇言，胡亂開罵，但事後總是不了了 之。]
最後，老季當然得硬著頭皮，去跟老共商量，老共那一頭為了顧全大局，為了更長遠的利益，當然也只有同意調整一途，以免節外生枝。
四
關於國務卿Rogers被排除在美中談判以及沒有隨同尼季兩人一起去會見老毛的事，老季事後說:
“Nixon had told me five days before [指2/21/1972尼克森抵達北京那一天的前五天]that he wanted [Secretary of State William] Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green TO BE OCCUPIED ELSEWHERE SO HE COULD DISCUSS SENSITIVE MATTERS WITH MAO AND CHOU. Nor was Rogers invited to the meeting by the Chinese, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF COMMENTS THAT STATE [DEPARTMENT] HAD MADE ABOUT TAIWAN’S ‘UNSETTLED’ JURIDICAL STATUS DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR. Yet I could have insisted that Rogers come, and had I done so neither Nixon nor the Chinese would have refused; it is one of the prerogatives, indeed obligations, of the security adviser to appeal Presidential decisions he considers unwise, I did not. The neglect was technically unassailable but fundamentally unworthy. The Secretary of State should not have been excluded from this historic encounter.” [做為總統的國家安全顧問，他原有責任與特權在總統做出不當的決定時，向總統進言，他當年若跟總統建議，應邀請國務卿一起去會見老毛，相信尼克森與中方都不會拒絕，但他卻沒這麼做，此事雖然在技術上無可厚非，但在基本上卻是不值得，在他們會晤老毛時，國務卿確實不應該被排除在外。這是一生擅於弄權的老季的懺悔嗎?
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)
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