我的朋友黃先生希望我公開他所寫的信中有關他與”TG”及Dr. Nagayama互動那一部分

我的朋友黃先生希望我公開他所寫的信中有關他與”TG”及Dr.Nagayama互動那一部分

第一部分

建州運動於12/17/2013在臉書網頁及其他一、兩個網路平台張貼與發表「建州運動的一位朋友提醒Dr. Nagayama: 三個月期限已過，您尚未幫所謂的”TG”從美國政府那裡拿到『文件」』一文。

我的朋友發信給我，也發信給其他人士，希望我公開他所寫的信中有關他與”TG”及Dr. Nagayama互動那一部分，我的朋友的信這樣寫: 

Dear David:

請直接說那位建州朋友就是我黃育旗，我這個人對於社會公共事務喜歡講求透明，不喜歡掩掩遮遮，否則、就會像寫小說一樣，編故事，講故事，聽故事，我的部份都可以公開，這樣才能接受檢驗。

黃育旗 敬啟 2013-12-18

第二部分

我恭敬不如從命，所以現在把黃先生的信中有關的部分張貼出來:

//今(2013)年8月15日您我在洛杉磯一起和Nagayama老先生見面時，我跟他說：只要他能夠拿出【有所本】的依據，雖然我已漸漸隱退江湖，我一定會傾全力幫 “TGUSA” 在台灣大力推動，當時的 Nagayama先生承諾我會在三個月內提供或出示【有所本】的依據。//

//如今不但三個月已過去，而且Nagayama先生在今年10月間返台後，專程前往拜訪城老師，城老師也知道他今年八月15日和我在洛城見過面，並一起吃中飯，城老師問他有無和台灣小留學生家長協進會的黃育旗聯繫？他說：他忘記這個人是誰？對我來講，第一，他真的忘記曾經和我黃某人見過面，因為我並不算什麼重要人士，第二，他故意說謊，目的是萬一城老師想約他和我一起見面，甚至一起吃飯時，他不知道要如何面對他所承諾的【有所本】這件事。//

//當十月份Nagayama先生離台後，接著連平原先生又不斷找我，希望我幫他逐一聯繫一些台派大老，他希望我陪他一起拜訪那些我幫他列名的大老(連先生的那封信我有傳給您作參考)，我只嚐試性幫他打了第一通電話給某大老，那位大老反問我，育旗啊！我偶而都會看到你在質疑那些人的一些講法，怎麼啦！你現在相信了嗎？我無言以對。//

第三部分

建州派與所謂的”TG”之間，存在著一種競爭的關係，兩者之間當然不是敵我或零合關係，這兩個派系的領導層也必須將它們兩者的關係嚴格地控制在非敵我或非零合的關係，換言之，兩者之間若出現對對方的領導者或重要幹部的人身攻擊或人格謀殺的情事，那就必須加以處置，直到對方滿意為止(所以我們要提醒過去那些對建州運動的領導層進行中傷毀謗的那些人以及與那些人有同樣的毛病的人，不要再輕易嘗試)。

建州派與所謂的”TG”之間，若理性地就自己與對方的主張的優越性、必要性、急迫性、甚至是合法性、正當性、可行性互相論辯，這是可以的、正當的、也可能是必要的(其實談合法性、正當性、可行性，是很愚蠢的)，大家可以「老王賣瓜，自賣自誇」，但不可以使用下流或卑鄙的手段，來打擊、破壞或毀滅對方。

截至目前為止，可喜的是，雙方都在進行君子之爭，也就是雙方使用可被接受的方式在進行競爭，我們必須維持這種方式與關係。

第四部分

過去一段時間，比較值得注意的是蔡先生身邊的王先生在若干公開的場合(有時我在場的場合)總是說: 「某前美國政府官員跟Dr. Nagayama說，她preferred長山先生對台灣的主張，而不preferred周威霖對台灣的主張」，或者說: 「Dr. Nagayama跟某前美國政府官員説，他preferred台灣自治或建國，而不preferred台灣建州」(Dr. Nagayama並沒有公開澄清或解釋王先生的說法)。王先生以這種尚未被證實或無法證實、但很為文明的方式，來壓制建州運動，promote”TG”的政治主張，讓我們有苦難言，這種狀況還會持續下去，直到有一天，我們與該某前美國政府官員會晤並得到澄清時為止。

為了面對”TG”的王先生這種攻勢，我們在10/28/2013發表一篇文章，標題是: 「您到底要相信無法或未經證實的二手或三手傳言還是白紙黑字的公開陳述?」，底下是該文中的幾段:

//因為長山老先生在場(他坐在最前頭，被人遮住視線，所以我沒看到他老人家)，我也在場(我後到，坐在最後一排)，所以Mr. Nieco Tsai的「國務顧問王先生(我與他熟識，也常交換意見，雖然兩人的主張、哲學與策略均不同)又沒有忘記盡地主之誼，如同往昔，他總是先介紹我與長山老先生之間過去的一段機緣，指出我從1990年代(那時還沒有「何林蔡派」)以來在建構台灣前途解決的新理論體系的努力以及他們這個Group與建州派之間過去某些錯綜複雜的糾葛，他總是先捧我一下，然後話鋒一轉，立見刀鋒，他總是說: 當年身為小布希政府大官的萊斯與身為美國政府的官員的長山老先生有一段有關台灣到底是建州還是建國好以及萊斯最後表示「還是應該讓台灣獨立建國比較好」的對話。王先生那些無法被證實或尚未被證實的陳述意在打擊建州運動，讓前往聽講的台美人鄉親不要來支持「台灣加入美國」，我因為身為客人，不便在人家的場子展開論辯(否則就形同踢館)，只好啞巴吃黃連。還好，身為「台X政府」的負責人的蔡先生跟大家說，台灣前途的解決還是未知數，還存在各種可能性，算是替我解圍。//

//關於長山老先生以及他的一些說法(有的是被人轉述的)，我雖然表示尊敬與尊重，但由於事涉台灣的前途與大是大非，所以建州派只有本著「吾愛吾師，吾更愛真理」的原則與精神來對待。//

//----我們最後必須說: 當年在小布希政府中擔負重任的Condi Rice(1)到底有沒有問過長山老先生「是台灣建州還是建國好」、(2)到底有沒有對長山老先生說過「建國比建州好」，這是無法或尚未被證實的事。//

//所以，我們最後必須請教大家: 您到底是要相信「台X政府」那些無法或未經證實的二手或三手傳言，還是Condi Rice白紙黑字的公開陳述? //
第五部分

今天本文不擬再張貼「您到底要相信無法或未經證實的二手或三手傳言還是白紙黑字的公開陳述?」那篇文章中有關「與Dr. Nagayama有過對話」(是否真有過那段對話，尚未被證實)的那位前美國政府官員在她在美國國家安全會議以及國務院任職時的談話與作為(她在任時的談話與作為與她後來在回憶錄中所寫的，事實上都指明，她根本就沒有同意或贊成Dr. Nagayama對台灣前途的主張)。我建議鄉親們回頭去閱讀該文，從頭到尾再讀一遍。

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

建州運動的一位朋友提醒Dr. Nagayama: 三個月期限已過，您尚未幫所謂的”TG”從美國政府那裡拿到「文件」

建州運動的一位朋友提醒Dr. Nagayama: 三個月期限已過，您尚未幫所謂的”TG”從美國政府那裡拿到「文件」

第一部分

台美人蔡先生原是「TCG政治金光黨」首腦林XX的副手，2013年4月，他們兩人之間發生了極為嚴重的權力鬥爭，因而分裂，蔡先生乃自組「政府」(即所謂的”TG”)，離開了他原來所屬的”TCG”。

“TCG”的領導層為了對台灣人與台美人進行詐騙，所以編織了許許多多的神話與謊言，其中最大的一連串謊言都指向: (1)「他們與美國政府進行政府與政府間的接觸」，(2)「他們的政府被美國政府承認與接受」。

這些謊言把許許多多不明究理的台灣人與台美人耍得團團轉，其中還包括牧師、醫師以及知識份子，甚至還曾包括兩位台灣的前總統，他們欺騙的功力真是驚人，這就難怪行大路、走正道的建州派與獨派的發展會受阻。

所謂的”TCG”現在當然還在繼續搞詐騙，而所謂的TG”呢?

所謂的TG”自從成立後，自任為「主席」的蔡先生就不斷在他們舉辦的活動中，告訴去參加他們的活動的台美人或台灣人鄉親，說他們「準備向美國政府要『東西』，他相信不久就可以從美國政府那裡拿到『東西』」，只要他們拿到那個『東西』，台灣人與台美人就沒話說了。

什麼是蔡先生口中的「東西」? 說白些，就是「文件」，也就是美國政府給他們一份「文件」，該項「文件 或信函可以證明: (1)他們與美國政府「進行政府與政府間的接觸」，或(2)他們的政府「被美國政府承認與接受」。

蔡先生為了讓台美人相信他與林姓政治神棍不同，為了讓人相信他有辦法從美國政府那裡拿到「文件」，所以他設法讓「TCG的真正開山祖」Dr. Nagayama現身，並成為他的護法，蔡先生認為，只要Dr. Nagayama現身，他就取得了正統，而他所要的「文件」也指日可待，台灣人與台美人都會追隨他，而華府也會把「中華民國」趕走，並讓他組織「台灣自治政府」。

第二部分

「台灣建州運動」在2013年7月建立臉書網頁這個文宣平台，之後就一直說: (1)美國斷無可能承認與接受蔡先生自組的、沒有精經過選舉產生的、沒有民意基礎的政府，(2)美國政府斷無可能給所謂的”TG”一份「文件 ，來證明或顯示美國政府與所謂的”TG”「以政府對政府的方式」往來或互動，或者證明或顯示美國政府「承認與接受」蔡先生自組的「政府」，(3)Dr. Nagayama能力很強，也曾在美國政府做事，但他所從事的政治工作並沒有得到美國政府的授權，美國政府也不會贊同他個人對所謂的”TCG”或”TG”的設計。

也就是說，雖然我個人十分尊敬Dr. Nagayama，但我認為，他想為蔡先生拿到一份「文件」的任務不會成功，他過去無法為”TCG”完成這個任務，現在也無法為”TG”完成這個任務。

在最近，也就是在12/6/2013，我們張貼了「吾愛吾師，吾更愛真理: 理解與尊重Dr. Nagayama，但建州派現在就已背負了至少一部分台灣人民的夢想與期待，必須堅持走自己的路」一文，我們還是說:

//我們研判，Dr. Nagayama無法幫”TG”拿到他們想要的「文件」(證明美國政府「承認」”TG”，或證明”TG”與美國政府進行「政府對政府的接觸」的「文件」)，這當然不是Dr. Nagayama沒有能力或沒有人際網絡，而是外部的國際環境不許可，外部的國際環境對他的主張產生難以跨越的制約。//

第三部分

12/17/2013，我一位朋友給我來信，他說:

//--------今(2013)年X月XX日，您我在洛杉磯一起和Nagayama老先生見面時，我跟他說：只要他能夠拿出【有所本】的依據，--------------我一定會傾全力幫 “TGUSA” 在台灣大力推動，當時的 Nagayama先生承諾我會在三個月內提供或出示【有所本】的依據。//

//如今，不但三個月已過去，而且Nagayama先生在今年XX月間返台後，專程前往拜訪XXX，XXX也知道他今年X月XX日和我在洛城見過面，並一起吃中飯，XXX問他有無和台灣XXXXXXXX會的XXX聯繫？他說：他忘記這個人是誰？對我來講，第一，他真的忘記曾經和我X某人見過面，因為我並不算什麼重要人士，第二，他故意說謊，目的是萬一XXX想約他和我一起見面，甚至一起吃飯時，他不知道要如何面對他所承諾的【有所本】這件事。//

//當十月份Nagayama先生離台後，接著XXX先生又不斷找我，希望我幫他逐一聯繫一些台派大老，他希望我陪他一起拜訪那些我幫他列名的大老(X先生的那封信我有傳給您作參考)，我只嚐試性幫他打了第一通電話給某大老，那位大老反問我，XX啊！我偶而都會看到你在質疑那些人的一些講法，怎麼啦！你現在相信了嗎？我無言以對。//

第四部分

蔡先生與Dr. Nagayama從事政治是用「把牛車放在牛的前面 」的方式在經營，他們有他們獨特的哲學與理念，他們也有他們採取這種經營及操作方式的理由，不過建州派並不分享這種哲學。

我的朋友的來信已指出，Dr. Nagayama給他自己定的三個月期限早就過了，到現在，我的朋友想要看到的「東西」或「文件」還不知道在哪裡，以至於我的朋友想為"TG”效命，卻「無所本」。

讓我告訴台灣與台美鄉親們，即便您再等半年、一年、五年、十年、二十年、五十年、一百年、五百年、一千年---------，那個「文件」您也都看不到，那只是天邊的彩虹與空中的樓閣。

我百思不解的是: 我尊敬的Dr. Nagayama為什麼要做出神仙也無法兌現的承諾?我更不能理解的是: Dr. Nagayama為什麼要做出很快就會被證明是無法兌現的承諾?

鄉親們，我們還是一起來推動「台灣加入美國，建立台灣領地的方案」，一起來追逐「美國夢」吧! 我們怎麼可以只讓馬英九家族、連戰家人、孫中山後人、蔣介石後人---------拿美國身份?!他們那一小撮人沒有比我們大多數的台灣鄉親高貴，我們也沒有比他們卑賤，不是嗎?

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (四)

                     台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (四)

倘若美國國會通過台灣政策法案(Taiwan Policy Act of 2013)而且總統簽署，成為法律，美國總統就必須向國會提出一項報告，報告要包括作戰計畫的檢討。

請讀:

SEC. 205. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF TAIWAN RELA
TIONS ACT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on implementation of United States security policy under the Taiwan Relations Act....

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) A review of the operational planning, policy reviews, and other preparations of the United States since 2000 to implement section 2(b)(6) and sub sections (a), (b), and (c) of section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act, including the extent to which the United States retains the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan. Such review shall take into account whether Taiwan’s air and air defense forces retain the ability to effectively defend Taiwan against China’s ballistic missile and air threats, and the extent to which the absence of credible Taiwanese air defense forces may complicate the ability of the United States to resist any resort to force that jeopardizes the security of Taiwan.

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (三)

                            台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (三)

(七~九略)

十

自由時報是綠營台灣人閱讀的主要平面媒體，所以建州派可以說，比較眼尖與敏感的綠營人士可能會讀到自由時報2/13/012「美學者著作中國曾提議撤飛彈換美終止對台軍售」這一篇報導中的一小段文字: 「美方還在2002年檢討了本身軟弱又無重點的台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04)，重新調整，並增加一些新元素」。

建州派讀到這一段，我們不禁要對寫這篇報導的記者給予讚美，看起來，他是很用心的。

關於美國聯參會的「台灣地區作戰計畫」，建州派應該對台灣與台美鄉親們做一些報告。

最早談到「台灣地區作戰計畫」的可能是建州派在「台灣建州運動」發起人周威霖於1998年所出版的「與美國有約」一書，其中的一章的其中一節就隱約地談到美軍的「台海緊急應變方案」。

有關「台灣地區作戰計畫」，美國軍事情報官出身的WilliamArkin(在美國軍方的消息上，他與The Washington Times的Bill Gertz一樣，是消息靈通人士，他們經常會透露很權威的訊息。


為了讓鄉親們更加了解，我們借用我們在數年前所蒐集的一篇報導:

"Inside U.S. War Plans"
By William M. Arkin
(The Washington Post, November 4, 2005)

William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security
washingtonpost.com

"Do Pentagon war planners game-play war against Venezuela? Of course they do," says WS, commenting on my blog saying that the Pentagon was newly eyeing Venezuela as a military threat and initiating war planning, "they probably game-play war against the Swiss!"

"I'd guess that there are hundreds of contingency plans in existence," Dave comments, "perhaps … even including some developed to respond to changes in our current allies' positions."

WS and Dave credit the Pentagon with far more prescience and capability then it actually possesses. Though there is an awful lot of contingency planning going on in this military-first, post 9/11 world, there aren't plans for every country or even for every potentially hostile country.

On the other hand, under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the military has made radical changes in both its methods of war planning and the plans themselves, a move that ultimately eases the ability of the government to take military action. Since the act of preparing a war plan for a country like Venezuela has such profound political consequences, it is a system that requires much greater transparency. Here is my small contribution:

According to Pentagon documents, my research and a lot of educated guesswork, the United States military currently has some 70 overall plans. These plans themselves take many forms, some being full-fledged war plans, others short fused "strategic concepts" for plans.

Of the 70 operations plans, only 48 are actual plans contemplating combat with other countries. That is because 10 plans deal with the air defense of the United States, homeland defense and other domestic defense tasks while 11 are generic "functional" plans (FUNCPLANs) dealing with humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics, peacekeeping, and other military operations in "permissive" environments.

Of the 48, five are what are called "complete" OPLANs, or operations plans. OPLANs are prepared for specific threats (that is, specific countries) of "compelling national interest" where prospective large scale operations demand detailed planning, actual target lists, and the logistics and choreography worked out for a conflict.

Of the five current OPLANs (and that is all that there are), one is the United States nuclear war plan (OPLAN 8044, and sometimes known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan or SIOP). Two are contingencies in Asia, one regarding defense of South Korea against a North Korea invasion (OPLAN 5027) and the other presumably a different Korean peninsula scenario (OPLAN 5077). Two war plans exist for the Middle East: one for Iraq (OPLAN 1003) that has already been implemented and another for an unknown contingency, possibly Iran. A sixth OPLAN (OPLAN 2002) exists, but it deals purely with homeland defense.

Thirty-nine of the remaining 43 plans are what are called CONPLANs, "Operations Plans in Concept Form Only." These are operations plans in an abbreviated format prepared for less compelling contingencies, plausible but not likely in the near term. CONPLANs can be prepared for smaller scale operations as well as for what are called non-specific threats.

In addition to OPLANs and CONPLANs, there are four "strategic concepts" that have been more recently prepared. Though every OPLAN and CONPLAN includes the commander's statement of his strategic concept, stand alone strategic concepts are a post 9/11 invention allowing regional commanders to develop plan concepts, enemy estimates, alternative courses of action, and target lists prior to the completion of a CONPLAN or OPLAN.

By regional command, the OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Strategic Concepts plans are broken down as follows:

Central Command (Middle East): 2 OPLANs, 7 CONPLANs, 2 strategic concepts
European Command: 10 CONPLANs
Pacific Command: 2 OPLANs, 12 CONPLANs, 2 strategic concepts
Southern Command (Latin America): 7 CONPLANs
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), in addition to preparing the central nuclear war plan (OPLAN 8044), also has responsibility for three global CONPLANs, one for nuclear and conventional "global strike" (CONPLAN 8022), which is the implementation of the Bush administration's policy of preemption, one for ballistic missile defense (CONPLAN 8055), and one of unknown nomenclature (CONPLAN 80??) presumably for "information operations," or cyber warfare, STRATCOM's newly assigned global mission.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is also responsible for two weapons of mass destruction plans, one (CONPLAN 0400) dealing with offensive counter-proliferation and the other (CONPLAN 0300) for special operations support in the event of a WMD incident. A third JCS CONPLAN is for unknown purposes. Finally, it is presumed that the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has a newly produced CONPLAN to fight the global war on terrorism.

For some contingencies, such as North Korea, there are multiple OPLANs and CONPLANs: CONPLAN 5026, 5027, 5029, and 5030 are all known to deal with different Korean peninsula scenarios. There are also specific OPLANs and CONPLANs for Iraq.

You must be thinking if you've kept up with the arithmetic that with some 30 plans left, clearly there is room for Venezuela. Not so quick. Each of the commands has war plans for the "defense" of key allies: CONPLAN 4305 exists for the defense of Israel; CONPLAN 5055 seems to deal with the defense of Japan. Add up U.S. treaty commitments and deployments, and the number now shrinks to about 20.

Then there are the one or two generic CONPLANs each command has to guide unassigned small scale contingencies. European command, in addition, has a new set of "non-specific" CONPLANs dealing with potential regional action in the Transcaucasus, the Baltics, West Africa, Equatorial Africa and Southern Africa. Pacific Command has regional plans for South Asia, the Southeast Asia mainland, and Southeast Asian islands. Central Command has a regional plan for the Horn of Africa; Southern Command has one for the Caribbean.

So there are no more than ten plans that deal with specific "threats" and that has to accommodate one or more plans for Iran and China, possible contingency plans if thing go sour with Russia, additional contingencies dealing with Syria and Cuba, and yes, even Venezuela.

So on the one hand there are generic contingencies for virtually every corner of the planet, as well as war plans supporting transnational global combat -- preemption, cyber warfare, the war on terrorism -- that cross command boundaries and can apply to more than one country.

On the other, there are only a limited number of staff officers and a limited amount of resources. A decision to undertake serious planning for a new contingency -- such as a Venezuela -- is a big one. It is particularly burdensome on the intelligence community, which has to produce "threat" estimates and enemy order of battle and target lists.

As planning software improves and the military moves to integrated network operations, the ease with which a plan can be quickly prepared will also increase. Already the Pentagon has shaved the time it takes in the old process to build a plan from 12-22 months to 4-6 months. With Rumsfeld's new "adaptive planning" initiative -- the draft Adaptive Planning Roadmap was approved on March 11 -- a whole new process of quick reaction plans is in the works.

Today, as far as I can surmise, there isn't a contingency plan for Venezuela. But there can be one real soon.


第四部分

關於美國聯參會的「台海作戰計劃」，我們就說到這裡，這個作戰計劃是否有最新的版本、其內容又是如何，當然是最高機密，包括建州派在內的非有關各方人士都不會知道，若您身邊有人告訴您，說他知道，那五角大廈就應該關門了。


台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (二)---(二下)

                     台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (二)----(二下)

第三部分

五

底下建州派將引用現實派的國際政治與國際關係學界巨擘Walt及再度引用另一位現實派的學界巨擘Mearsheimer的論著，這兩位學者在對以色列的立場上，與新保守派不同，建州派對他們在以色列的立場衝突一事上無法保持中立，因為周威霖個人在這個問題上與新保守派較接近。

Mearsheimer教授這篇演講與文章十分精彩，本應全文貼出，但如此一來，篇幅將會過長，所以只能張貼我們認為相關的部分。

"The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia" 
By John J. Mearsheimer
http://sydney.edu.au/news/84.html?newsstoryid=5351

5 August 2010
(Transcript of the fourth annual Michael Hintze Lecture in International Security
Delivered by Professor John Mearsheimer, 4 August 2010)


The United States has been the most powerful state on the planet for many decades, and has deployed robust military forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the early years of World War II. America's presence in your neighborhood has had significant consequences for Australia and for the wider region. This is how the Australian government sees it, at least according to the 2009 Defence White Paper: "Australia has been a very secure country for many decades, in large measure because the wider Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace and stability underwritten by US strategic primacy." The United States, in other words, has acted as a pacifier in this part of the world.

However, according to the very next sentence in the White Paper, "That order is being transformed as economic changes start to bring about changes in the distribution of strategic power." The argument here, of course, is that the rise of China is having a significant effect on the global balance of power. In particular, the power gap between China and the United States is shrinking and in all likelihood "US strategic primacy" in this region will be no more. This is not to say that the United States will disappear; in fact, its presence here is likely to grow in response to China's rise. But the United States will no longer be the preponderant power in your neighborhood, as it has been since 1945.

The most important question that flows from this discussion is whether China can rise peacefully. It is clear from the Defence White Paper—which is tasked with assessing Australia's strategic situation out to the year 2030—that policymakers here are worried about the changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. Consider these comments from that document: "As other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change. When this happens there will be the possibility of miscalculation. There is a small but still concerning possibility of growing confrontation between some of these powers." At another point in the White Paper, we read that, "Risks resulting from escalating strategic competition could emerge quite unpredictably, and is a factor to be considered in our defence planning." In short, the Australian government seems to sense that the shifting balance of power between China and the United States may not be good for peace in the neighborhood.

I would like to argue tonight that Australians should be worried about China's rise, because it is likely to lead to an intense security competition between China and the United States, with considerable potential for war. Moreover, most of China's neighbors, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, Vietnam, and yes Australia, will join with the United States to contain China's power. To put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully.

It is important to emphasize, however, that I am not arguing that Chinese behavior alone will drive the security competition that lies ahead. The United States is also likely to behave in aggressive ways, thus further increasing the prospects for trouble here in the Asia-Pacific region.

Naturally, not everyone will agree with my assessment of the situation. Many believe that China can rise peacefully, that it is not inevitable that the United States and a powerful China will have confrontational relations. Of course, they assume that China will have peaceful intentions and that welcome fact of life can help facilitate stability in this region, even though the underlying balance of power is expected to change dramatically.

The Case for China's Peaceful Rise

I would like to examine three key arguments that are often employed to support this optimistic prognosis. First, some claim that China can allay any fears about its rise by making it clear to its neighbors and the United States that it has peaceful intentions, that it will not use force to change the balance of power. This perspective can be found in the Defence White Paper, which states: "The pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans." In essence, the belief here is that Beijing has the ability to signal its present and future intentions to Australia and other countries in compelling ways.

Unfortunately, states can never be certain about each other's intentions. They cannot know with a high degree of certainty whether they are dealing with a revisionist state or a status quo power. For example, there is still no consensus among experts as to whether the Soviet Union was bent on dominating Eurasia during the Cold War. Nor is there a consensus on whether Imperial Germany was a highly aggressive state that was principally responsible for causing World War I. The root of the problem is that unlike military capabilities, which we can see and count, intentions cannot be empirically verified. Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern. You might say that Chinese leaders can use words to explain their intentions. But talk is cheap and leaders have been known to lie to foreign audiences. Thus, it is hard to know the intentions of China's present leaders, which is not to say that they are necessarily revisionist.

But even if one could determine China's intentions today, there is no way to know what they will be in the future. After all, it is impossible to identify who will be running the foreign policy of any country five or ten years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. It cannot be emphasized enough that we face radical uncertainty when it comes to determining the future intentions of any country, China included.

A second line of argument is that a benign China can avoid confrontation by building defensive rather than offensive military forces. In other words, Beijing can signal that it is a status quo power by denying itself the capability to use force to alter the balance of power. After all, a country that has hardly any offensive capability cannot be a revisionist state, because it does not have the means to act aggressively. Not surprisingly, Chinese leaders often claim that their military is designed solely for defensive purposes. For example, the New York Times recently reported in an important article on the Chinese navy that its leaders maintain that it is "purely a self-defense force."

One problem with this approach is that it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive military capabilities. Negotiators at the 1932 Disarmament Conference tried to make these distinctions and found themselves tied in knots trying to determine whether particular weapons like tanks and aircraft carriers are offensive or defensive in nature. The basic problem is that the capabilities that states develop simply to defend themselves often have significant offensive potential.

Consider what China is doing today. It is building military forces that have significant power projection capability, and as the Defence White Paper tells us, China's "military modernization will be increasingly characterized by the development of power projection capabilities." For example, the Chinese are building naval forces that can project power out to the so-called "Second Island Chain" in the Western Pacific. And they also say that they are planning to build a "blue water navy" that can operate in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. For understandable reasons, they want to be able to protect their sea-lanes and not have to depend on the American navy to handle that mission. Although they do not have that capability yet, as Robert Kaplan points out in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, "China's naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century US naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued for sea control and the decisive battle."

Of course, most Chinese leaders think that their navy is defensively oriented, even though it has considerable offensive capability and will have much more in the future. Indeed, they refer to their naval strategy as "Far Sea Defense." As Kaplan's comments indicate, it seems almost certain that as the Chinese navy grows in size and capability, none of China's neighbors, including Australia, will consider it to be defensively oriented. They will instead view it as a formidable offensive force. Thus, anyone looking to determine China's future intentions by observing its military is likely to conclude that Beijing is bent on aggression.

Finally, some maintain that China's recent behavior toward its neighbors, which has not been aggressive in any meaningful way, is a reliable indicator of how China will act in the decades ahead. The central problem with this argument is that past behavior is usually not a reliable indicator of future behavior, because leaders come and go and some are more hawkish than others. Plus circumstances at home and abroad can change in ways that make the use of military force more or less attractive.

The Chinese case is illustrative in this regard. Beijing does not possess a formidable military today and it is certainly in no position to pick a fight with the United States. This is not to say that China is a paper tiger, but it does not have the capability to cause much trouble in this region. However, that situation is expected to change markedly over time, in which case China will have significant offensive capability. Then, we will see how committed it is to the status quo. But right now we cannot tell much about China's future behavior, because it has such limited capability to act aggressively.

What all of this tells us is that there is no good way to divine what China's intentions will be down the road or to predict its future behavior based on its recent foreign policies. It does seem clear, however, that China will eventually have a military with significant offensive potential.


Imitating Uncle Sam

What does America's past behavior tell us about the rise of China? In particular, how should we expect China to conduct itself as it grows more powerful? And how should we expect the United States and China's neighbors to react to a strong China?

I expect China to act the way the United States has acted over its long history. Specifically, I believe that China will try to dominate the Asia-Pacific region much as the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. For good strategic reasons, China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and potentially dangerous neighbors like India, Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on the warpath and conquer other countries in the region, although that is always a possibility. Instead, it is more likely that Beijing will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the way the United States makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back.

A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out of the Pacific-Asia region, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Imperial Japan did in the 1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. Consider that in March, Chinese officials told two high-ranking American policymakers that the United States was no longer allowed to interfere in the South China Sea, which China views as a "core interest" like Taiwan and Tibet. And it seems that China feels the same way about the Yellow Sea. Last week the US and South Korean navies conducted joint naval exercises in response to North Korea's alleged sinking of a South Korean naval vessel. Those naval maneuvers were originally planned to take place in the Yellow Sea, which is adjacent to the Chinese coastline, but vigorous protests from China forced the Obama administration to move them further east into the Sea of Japan.

These ambitious goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbors, just as the United States prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. No state in its right mind should want other powerful states located in its region? All Chinese surely remember what happened in the last century when Japan was powerful and China was weak. Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept US military forces operating in its backyard? American policymakers, after all, express outrage whenever distant great powers send military forces into the Western Hemisphere. Those foreign forces are invariably seen as a potential threat to American security. The same logic should apply to China. Why would China feel safe with US forces deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, would not China's security be better served by pushing the American military out of the Asia-Pacific region?

Why should we expect China to act any differently than the United States has over the course of its history? Are they more principled than Americans are? More ethical? Are they less nationalistic than Americans? Less concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is likely to imitate the United States and attempt to become a regional hegemon.

And what is the likely American response if China attempts to dominate Asia? It is crystal clear from the historical record that the United States does not tolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated over the course of the twentieth century, it is determined to remain the world's only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat to rule the roost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

China's neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. India and Japan, for example, signed a "Joint Security Declaration" in October 2008, in good part because they are worried about China's growing power. India and the United States, which had testy relations at best during the Cold War, have become good friends over the past decade, in large part because they both fear China. Just last month, the Obama administration, which is filled with people who preach to the world about the importance of human rights, announced that it was resuming relations with Indonesia's elite special forces, despite their rich history of human rights abuses. The reason for this shift was that Washington wants Indonesia on its side as China grows more powerful, and as the New York Times reported, Indonesian officials "dropped hints that the group might explore building ties with the Chinese military if the ban remained."

Singapore, which sits astride the critically important Straits of Malacca and worries about China's growing power, badly wants to upgrade its already close ties with the United States. Toward that end, it built the Changi Naval Base in the late 1990s so that the US Navy could operate an aircraft carrier out of Singapore if the need arose. And the recent decision by Japan to allow the US Marines to remain on Okinawa was driven in part by Tokyo's concerns about China's growing assertiveness in the region and the related need to keep the American security umbrella firmly in place over Japan. Most of China's neighbors will eventually join an American-led balancing coalition designed to check China's rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the United States to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.


Contrasts with the Cold War

(美中爭霸戰與美俄冷戰之比較)

There will be important differences, however, between the superpower competition
during the Cold War and a future rivalry between China and the
United States. For starters, the Soviet Union was physically located in both
Asia and Europe, and it threatened to dominate both of those regions.
Therefore, the United States was compelled to put together balancing
coalitions in Asia as well as Europe. China, on the other hand, is strictly
an Asian power and is not likely to threaten Europe in any meaningful way.
As a result, the major European states are unlikely to play an active role in
containing China, but will probably be content to remain on the sidelines.
The United States and the Soviet Union also competed with each other in
the oil-rich Middle East. Both superpowers had allies in the region that
sometimes fought wars with each other, and the United States was seriously
worried about a Soviet invasion of Iran following the ouster of the Shah in
1979. Given China’s dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf, it is likely to
compete with the United States for influence in that strategically important
region, much as the Soviets did. But a Chinese invasion of the Middle East is
not likely, in part because it is too far away, but also because the United
States would surely try to thwart the attack. China is more likely to station
troops in the region if a close ally there asked for help. For example,
one could imagine China and Iran establishing close ties, and Tehran
then asking Beijing to station Chinese troops on its territory. In short,
while the Americans and the Soviets competed actively in Europe, Asia,
and the Middle East, China and the United States are likely to compete in
only the latter two regions.

Although the Soviet–American rivalry spanned most of the globe, the
main battleground was in the center of Europe, where there was the
danger of a large-scale conventional war for control of the European continent.
That scenario was especially important to both sides not only because
there was considerable potential for nuclear escalation in the event of a war,
but also because a decisive Soviet victory would have fundamentally altered
the global balance of power. It is hard to imagine similar circumstances
involving China and the United States, mainly because Asia’s geography
is so different from Europe’s. Korea is probably the only place where those
two countries could get dragged into a conventional land war; in fact, that is
precisely what happened between 1950 and 1953, and it could happen again
if conflict broke out between North and South Korea. But the stakes and the
magnitude of that conflict would be nowhere near as great as a war between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact for control of Europe would have been.

In addition to Korea, one can imagine China and the United States fighting
over Taiwan, over disputed islands or islets off China’s coast, or over
control of the sea lanes between China and the Middle East. As with Korea,
the outcome of all of these scenarios would be nowhere near as consequential
as a superpower war in the heart of Europe during the Cold War.
Because the stakes are smaller and a number of the possible conflict scenarios
involve fighting at sea—where the risks of escalation are more easily
contained—it is somewhat easier to imagine war breaking out between the
China and the United States than between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is
also worth noting that there was no territorial dispute between the superpowers—
Berlin included—that was as laden with intense nationalistic feelings
as Taiwan is for China. Thus, it is not hard to imagine a war breaking
out over Taiwan, which is not to say that the odds of such a war are high.
Another important difference between the Cold War and a future Sino–
American rivalry concerns ideology. The superpower competition was especially
intense because it was driven by sharp ideological differences between
the two sides as well as by geopolitical considerations. Communism and
liberal capitalism were potent ideological foes not only because they offered
fundamentally different views about how society should be ordered, but also
because both American and Soviet leaders thought that communism was an
exportable political model that would eventually take root all over the globe.
This notion helped fuel the infamous ‘domino theory’, which helped convince
US leaders that they had to fight communism everywhere on the
planet. Soviet leaders had real concerns, as the spread of liberal capitalism
posed a serious threat to the legitimacy of Marxist rule. The incompatibility
of these rival ideological visions thus reinforced the zero-sum nature of the
rivalry, and encouraged leaders on both sides to wage it with unusual
intensity.

There are certainly some ideological differences between China and the
United States, but they do not affect the relationship between the two countries
in profound ways, and there is no good reason to think that they will in
the foreseeable future. In particular, China has embraced a market-based
economy, and does not see its current version of state capitalism as an
exportable model for the rest of the world. If anything, it is the United
States that shows a greater tendency to want to export its system to
others, but that ambition is likely to be tempered by setbacks in
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the impact of the 2008 recession. This
situation should work to make a future rivalry between Beijing and
Washington less intense than the ideological-laden competition between
the superpowers.


Finally, the Soviet Union and its close allies had remarkably little economic
intercourse with the West during the Cold War. Indeed, there was little direct contact between the elites, much less the broader publics, on the two sides. The opposite is the case with China, which is not only deeply integrated into the world economy, but is also actively engaged with Western elites of all kinds. For those who believe that economic interdependence produces peace, this is good news.29 However, it is bad news for those who think that these ties are often a major source of friction between great powers. My view is that economic interdependence does not have a significant effect on geopolitics one way or the other. After all, the major European powers were all highly interdependent and prospering in 1914 when First World War broke out.


六

再來，建州派要請鄉親們讀美國一名資深媒體人Robert Kaplan對Mearsheimer教授的觀點的介紹，他指出，

台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (二)---(二上)

台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (二)--(二上)

第三部分

從這一部分開始，我使用我在3/20/2012撰寫的那篇未完成的文章:

一

藍營的國防與戰略專家黃介正先生日前在一篇文章中指出: (台海)兩岸之間的主戰場在華府，不在台海，穩華府則台海可保，失華府則不戰而危。

這項認知是十分正確的，建州派過去都不斷發表類似的談話。

對於台灣的安全，日本前外交家岡田久彥說得最好: 台灣的安全有賴於美國保衛台灣的意願與實力。

倘若有一天 ，相對於中國，美國的綜合國力與軍力處於弱勢或/及美國沒有保衛台灣的意願或意志，台灣肯定要落入北京的魔掌或淪入「中華新邪惡帝國的勢力範圍。

到今天為止及可預見的將來，美國的軍力與軍事科技相對於中國，還可保持領先，我們唯一要擔心的是，美國國內那些親中派、對中姑息派、對中調適派、棄台派與賣台派對白宮及國務院那些決策者的壞影響，倘若那些Un-American的份子的影響力越來越大，台灣有一天就會滅亡，而台灣人就要走投無路。

2011年11月，美國國務卿柯林頓夫人說台灣是美國的「安全伙伴」。

同年6月，美國眾議院外交委員會主席Ileana Ros-Lehtinen(重量級的眾議員)在她所舉辦的聽證會中說:

"Some in Washington policy circles are suggesting that the
time has come to recognize the reality of a rising China and to cut
our ties to Taiwan. This would be a terrible mistake which would
have far-reaching ramifications on how the U.S. treats its democratic
allies, its friends."

"I have news for the naysayers on Taiwan policy as well: The
United States is a Pacific power and plans to remain so for this
century and beyond. The commitments made in the Taiwan Relations
Act have remained unchanged for over 30 years and still hold
true today. The pledges in the six assurances given by President
Ronald Reagan to Taiwan, including the one not to set a date for
termination of arm sales to Taiwan, remain as firm today as they
were back in 1982."


從這裡我們看到美國國會保衛台灣的承諾與意願，所以我們至少暫時還不用擔心。

但是，我們台灣人還是要密切注意情勢的演變與發展，當然，台灣與台美鄉親都知道，建州派一直都在為增強美國的保台意願與意志而努力。

二

今天(3/20/2012)，中國時報的資深記者郭崇倫在該報發表了一篇我們認為重要的文章，因為這篇文章涉及了建州派極為關注的兩個重大議題: 一是2012年的美國總統大選，另一是關涉台灣生死存亡的所謂「棄台論」。

建州派可能是台灣所有的黨派與政論家之中第一個把美國總統大選與台灣的安全兩個議題放在一起討論的，今天我們發現郭先生也這樣處理，所以格外引起我們的注意。

關於美國總統大選，建州派已談過兩次，都與台灣的安全問題掛鉤，我們今天是第三度談論。

建州派目前都是以共和黨爭出線的候選人Mitt Romney及Rick Santorum為核心來談，而且是側重他們的國安與外交展望與政策，因此免不了要提及他們的國安與外交事務的團隊，特別是他們的影子國安團隊。

截至目前為止，我們談過Eliot Cohen以及Robert Kagan，我們今天會再度提到Kagan，以後我們會談到其他人，如Aaron L. Friedberg，他們現在都已在扮演很重要的角色，倘若Romney當選總統，建州派預測他們都會出任要職。

Friedberg、Kagan他們都屬於新保守派，Friedberg曾在副總統Dick Cheney辦公室任職，Cheney人馬與國防部長Rumsfeld的人馬是小布希時代最挺台灣的兩支人馬，Kagan且曾在The Project for New American Century(PNAC)與The Heritage Foundation兩組人馬在1999年所發表的「保衛台灣的聲明」上簽字(PNAC的首要人物William Kristol當然也在該聲明上簽名，表示支持)。

我們現在來讀該項聲明:

STATEMENT ON THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN
August 20, 1999

The People's Republic of China continues to threaten military action against the democratically-elected government of Taiwan. It has therefore become essential that the United States make every effort to deter any form of Chinese intimidation of the Republic of China on Taiwan and declare unambiguously that it will come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan, including against the offshore islands of Matsu and Kinmen.

The United States should also make clear that while it is prepared to accept any resolution regarding Taiwan's future status to which both sides voluntarily agree, the future of Taiwan must reflect the will of the people of Taiwan as expressed through their duly elected government. If the people of Taiwan do not want to be united with the mainland until China becomes a democracy, the United States has a moral obligation and strategic imperative to honor that determination.

Efforts by the Clinton Administration to pressure Taipei to cede its sovereignty and to adopt Beijing's understanding of "One China" are dangerous and directly at odds with American strategic interests, past U.S. policy, and American democratic ideals. Failure to stand by Taiwan and live up to the spirit and letter of the Taiwan Relations Act in the present crisis can only exacerbate tensions and may well lead to serious miscalculation by Beijing.

The time for strategic and moral "ambiguity" with regard to Taiwan has passed. We urge the administration and leaders in Congress to make a clear statement of America's commitment to the people of Taiwan. Such a commitment is consonant with our nation's interests and ideals, and will help ensure peace in East Asia.
這篇聲明發表了九個月後，阿扁就執政了，可惜在阿扁執政才一年，就發生九一一恐怖攻擊，台灣人錯過了這個「台灣人與美國保守派同時執政的黃金組合」所能提供的最好機會。

三

建州派現在請鄉親們來讀郭先生的文章以及我們的附註及評論。

「郭崇倫專欄－美總統大選與棄台論」

台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (一)

                 台灣地區作戰計畫(代號OPLAN5077-04) (一)

第一部分

我在3/20/2012開始撰寫一篇文章，主要是要談美國聯參會所存在的「台灣地區作戰計畫」(代號OPLAN5077-04)，這篇文章若完成，篇幅不會很短，因為我從不冒充內行，從不加油添醋，從不說得天花亂墜，所以我都儘量借用一些權威的發言或論述。我也從不對外宣稱有五角大廈的內幕消息，從不裝神弄鬼，更不會以美國國防部的代表或發言人自居(在台灣就有這種小丑，他們真以「美國國防部的代表或發言人」自居) ，所以我寫文章，總是要引用一些可以交代來源的資訊。

我寫這類的長文，當然不是給一般基層的鄉親讀的。我若是要給一般基層的鄉親寫文章或發佈訊息，一定會是簡短易讀，而且儘量不夾雜英文。

由於我去年著手寫的那篇文章很長，我寫不到四分之一，就因故而中止，後來就再也沒繼續寫，不是我忘了這件事，而是有些資料比較敏感，我得等到有人公開提起後才來引用。這好比我們建州派在早年就知道有「519特遣部隊」存在，但我們不能公開，必須等到有媒體、智庫界、學界或官方公開之後，我們才會跟著提起，因為捍衛美國與台灣的安全利益是建州派的最高關切。

該篇文章談到建州派十分注意的美國國安與外交學界現實主義學派的泰斗John Mearsheimer。

最近Prof. Mearsheimer應「中華民國國際關係學會」之邀，在年會上以「在中國崛起陰影下的台灣」專題演講，這項演講 當然引起我的注意，該項演說的完整內容已經被公佈。



第二部分

我先張貼郭崇倫先生的報導，讓鄉親們做參考，然後再張貼英文演講內容，這樣大家比較容易懂，同時可以知道郭崇倫隱藏了什麼重要的訊息。


「現實主義權威米夏摩 對台悲觀預測 」
【郭崇倫（作者為聯合報副總編輯）】
12/9/2013聯合晚報

芝加哥大學政治系教授約翰．米夏摩（John Mearsheimer），不是一般的學者，他畢業於西點軍校，曾經在空軍服役五年，12年前出版的《大國政治的悲劇》，奠定了他國際政治新現實主義祭酒權威的地位。

在美國外交思潮中，台灣政學界對新保守主義最熟悉，小布希當政時，其勢力最大，認同台灣民主價值，要對抗並改變中國大陸，但是持續有影響的卻是現實主義，這以歐巴馬的第二任最為明顯，不出兵敘利亞、與伊朗和談，都是典型的現實主義思維。

中國在亞洲 逐步排除其他強權

米夏摩早在2003年就曾到過大陸講學，但一直沒有來過台灣，7日他應中華民國國際關係學會之邀，在年會上以「在中國崛起陰影下的台灣」專題演講，首次完整的闡述他對兩岸的看法。

他的現實主義理論有三個假設：國家是混亂狀態中唯一的行為者，沒有更高的權威；強權有軍事能力可以攻擊傷害其他國家；沒有國家能夠完全知道其他國家的意圖，所以國家要生存必需權力極大化，最終稱霸整個區域，排除其他國家的影響力。

美國是霸權，意思是在區域內，美國說了算，現在中國傾向在亞洲稱霸，就像美國在西半球稱霸一樣，逐步要把其他強權，包括印度、日本、俄羅斯，還有美國，都要排除出去，就像美國在19世紀，把歐洲勢力排除出拉丁美洲，宣示門羅主義一樣。事實上，中國與美國之前所做的並沒有不同，未來其他國家都會加入反中國的同盟，就像北約反蘇聯一樣。

中國戰略邏輯：把台灣中立化

而對台灣，中國大陸的戰略邏輯是：把台美安全關係切斷，把台灣「中立化」，未來統一，可以運用台灣「不沉航母」的地理位置，將軍力投射至西太平洋，更不用說，可以滿足民族主義，增加政權正當性。

但是美國不會容許這樣的事發生，過去一百年間，許多崛起的強權，想要挑戰美國大權，都失敗了，東海防空識別區與遼寧號遠航，象徵性的開啟中國對美國的挑戰，美國勢必不能容忍，而美台之間，雖然不像美日間有條約義務，但是美國基於戰略利益、維護信用，有強烈意願協防台灣。

可是米夏摩強調，他談的不是此刻，而是未來10年、20年會怎樣？他預估，只要解放軍軍力繼續增長，台灣地理鄰近，對大陸有利，而美國擔心引發核戰，不敢為台灣延伸核武威嚇，也不敢以攻打大陸本土替台灣解圍，這也難怪美國有些人開始討論「棄台論」，考慮要棄守對台安全承諾。

「中國軍力 2049年超過美軍」

米夏摩的時間估計也許太早，但是以目前速度，在歐巴馬卸任時，大陸經濟總體就會超過美國，而阿米塔吉公司也估計，2049年解放軍軍力將超過美軍，大家估計的時間也許不同，但是方向卻是一致的。

在這個前提之下，米夏摩明確的指出，台灣剩下三個選擇：